A more human language: an exploration of Marx&#039;s theory of species being by Fox, J
1 
 
 
 
 
 
A MORE HUMAN LANGUAGE: 
AN EXPLORATION OF MARX’S THEORY  
OF SPECIES BEING 
 
 
 
 
John Fox 
(B.Juris, LLB, M.SocSci, MSW) 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy    
 
SCHOOL OF GLOBAL URBAN AND SOCIAL STUDIES 
RMIT UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
MELBOURNE 
MARCH 2013  
2 
 
CANDIDATE’S DECLARATION 
 
I certify that, except where due acknowledgement has been made, the work is that of the author 
alone; the work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, to qualify for any other 
academic award; the content of the thesis is the result of work which has been carried out since 
the official commencement date of the approved research program; any editorial work, paid or 
unpaid, carried out by a third party is acknowledged; and ethics procedures and guidelines have 
been followed. 
 
_____________________________ 
 
John Fox 
 
…../…03…/ 2013 
 
3 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This research reflects an extraordinary journey undertaken with the inspiration and 
support of many extraordinary people. From the very beginning, I have been blessed 
with the support of my parents, Terence Michael Fox and the late Margaret Mary Fox. 
They have taught me the meaning of selflessness and unconditional love. I have also 
been guided for so many years by a great many teachers. I am grateful for the vision 
and commitment of those at Benedict College, who saw more in this Western suburbs 
boy than I saw in myself. I am grateful, too, for those who introduced me to the riches of 
the critical tradition at the University of New South Wales as an undergraduate student 
and those at RMIT University who, in the course of my Masters studies, allowed me to 
discover and develop a sense of how I could contribute to that tradition.  
My debt extends to those who taught me about the centrality of our corporeality. These 
include my fellow students, who worked so hard to succeed, notwithstanding the 
difficulties they faced. They include those people who shared their experiences and 
insights whilst I worked in the community sector and then local government, especially 
their testimonies about poverty. They showed me how little their difficulties involved any 
lack of will or commitment, and how cruel dualist models of the human self could be, 
especially through the support they lend to arguments that mind can always conquer 
matter. I am conscious of the debt that follows from their trust. This thesis is a response 
to that debt. I also want to acknowledge the gift my dance teachers passed on to me. I 
began to dance for recreation but discovered so much more. I found a sense of joy and 
fulfilment in my body and in bodily interactions that multiply those pleasures. To dance 
is to experience one’s humanity as expanded rather than limited by the corporeal. This 
thesis a response to that discovery, and to those who have opened those possibilities 
for me, especially Melanie Dacres, Kate Hatfield, Rose Hawas, and Renay Taylor. Last, 
but not least, I want to acknowledge and celebrate the support and guidance of those 
who have worked with me in academic life, both as fellow academics and as students. If 
I am to speak of joy, then I must speak of that which comes from sharing this life of 
reflection and debate amongst them. 
4 
 
Of those fellow academics, I have been privileged to be guided in developing this thesis 
by my supervisors, Rob Watts, Kim Humphreys and, for the earlier stages, Bob Pease. I 
am grateful for their patience and generosity as I wrestled with the issues, and for their 
faith in the worth of this endeavour. I hope I can follow well in their footsteps in 
contributing to the critical tradition. Now, as this journey draws to its end, I must also 
thank Samantha Murray for her timely, clear-sighted copy-editing of my writing. In 
exploring Marx’s vision of a ‘more human language’ I have consistently struggled to 
present that language clearly and in a way that does justice to Marx and those who 
influenced him. In seeking to better convey the promise of their thought, I deeply 
appreciate the care lent to that endeavour by both Rob Watts and Samantha Murray. 
 
5 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction       8 
 
Chapter One – The flight from the corporeal  42 
 
Chapter Two – Early influences: Aristotle, Epicurus and 
Lucretius        73 
 
Chapter Three – Substance Transformed: Spinoza. Leibniz and 
the Romantic Movement     109 
 
Chapter Four – Hegel      164 
 
Chapter Five – Feuerbach     216 
 
Chapter Six – Towards a more human language: Marxian 
objective being       242 
 
Chapter Seven – Towards a more human language: Marxian 
species being       292 
 
Chapter Eight – Towards a more human language: Marxian 
species consciousness      348 
 
Chapter Nine – Conclusion: a more human language 383 
6 
 
 
Bibliography       424 
  
7 
 
In our sleep, pain that cannot forget falls drop by drop upon the 
heart and in our despair against our will comes wisdom through 
the awful grace of God.  
Aeschylus, Agamemnon 
 
We would not understand a human language and it would 
remain ineffectual. From the one side, such a language would 
be felt to be begging, imploring and hence humiliating. It could 
be used only with feelings of shame or debasement. From the 
other side, it would be received as an impertinence or insanity 
and so rejected. We are so estranged from our human essence 
that the direct language of man strikes us as an offence against 
the dignity of man, whereas the estranged language of objective 
values appears as the justified, self confident and self-
acknowledged dignity of man incarnate.  
Karl Marx, Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political 
Economy, 1975d, 276-7 (emphasis in original) 
 
You can’t cut a man in two and polish up his soul while you 
throw his body on the rubbish heap…If reason and revelation 
mean anything they mean that a man works out his salvation in 
the body by the use of material things … Unnecessary misery is 
an even greater defect because it is an impediment to salvation. 
When you don’t know where your next meal is coming from, 
how can you think or care about the state of your soul? 
Morris West, The Devil’s Advocate, 1959, 97 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I remember the sweat and the enthusiasm that my schoolmates exuded one summer 
afternoon. I remember their absence of restraint within the brick and chain-fenced 
boundaries. I was sixteen. The memory is still vivid: rolled up sleeves, shirt-tails loose, 
sweat pouring from their skin, and concentration and energy I found amazing in the 
heat—but then I was never a sportsman. I remember worrying (a little) for some of the 
boys, particularly when the lawless soccer of the school yard extended intercepts to 
pulling—and potentially tearing—the school uniforms that so many of them still wore.  
I remember worrying for those in school uniforms, as I knew they did without sports gear 
as their families could not afford both. I remember, too, being conscious of my different 
circumstances: of the private bedroom/study I enjoyed, and of the few household chores 
that were asked of me. Others had no private space, and less free time, to study at 
home, given family and work commitments. I could accept that some genetic lottery had 
given me some academic advantages, yet from times shared with those playing soccer 
in school uniform, I knew they had more ability than their academic performances 
displayed. I also knew, having seen their efforts and desire, and their hurt and 
humiliation, that their lower marks were not the product of a simple lack of will or effort.  
Years later, in the midst of a discussion with some refugees, I was witness again to hurt 
and humiliation, to the pain of will and efforts frustrated by limited resources. Several 
spoke of their experience of Australia’s income support provisions for the unemployed, 
and of the ‘activity tests’ they had to meet: 
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They are just keeping us busy in a circle, an empty circle. We go for assistance 
with Centrelink. Centrelink puts pressure [on us] to join the Job Network. The Job 
Network puts pressure on us to see employers. Employers send us letters of 
rejection and we keep repeating the circle year after year after year...The result, 
we know the end result anyway. We want to contribute, but there’s no way we’re 
allowed to contribute our expertise in this country because we’re going in a 
vicious circle. ...They [Centrelink] don’t admit that they cannot help us. They keep 
promising us there will be something at the end...We’re wasting our lives 
sending...job applications (Hume City Council 2004a, 46). 
One man, displaying great courtesy, explained to me how much money he received to 
support his family. He went on to show me the text book list from the school his children 
attended, and how he could only afford to buy the books for one child. He asked me 
how he should go about choosing between them. I had no answer for him then. It was a 
question—accompanied by some pain and shame—he should never have been 
burdened with. 
 
In this thesis, I respond to that man’s trust, and that of his fellow refugees, as well as 
others who have trusted me with their stories, including my former schoolmates. I seek 
to honour the debt that follows from that intimacy—if only to contest the legitimation of 
oppression that can follow from our silence. This thesis is a response to their lives’ 
testimony: that their disadvantage and suffering were not due to any lack of effort or 
commitment on their part. It is a demand for a better response, for policies and practices 
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that take into account something too often and too easily forgotten: the influence of the 
material or corporeal world. 
Drawing on these experiences, this thesis seeks a better understanding of the role of 
what are often treated as ‘external’ or ‘subordinate’ ‘influences’ upon a person’s 
capacity for agency. It is a response to deeply embedded attitudes and actions that 
reflect the persistent neglect of the influence of our bodies and the materiality of our 
world.  
It is also a response to a deepening appreciation of the role of the materiality of my own 
self, and the centrality of that materiality to human expression. I have felt the 
expansiveness of my self in my body—and its independence and resistance—and seen 
it in others too. As these very words suggest, with their distinction between my ‘self’ and 
my ‘body’, I have also encountered the lack of an adequate language to express those 
experiences.  
I am not the first to seek a more adequate language with which to consider the influence 
of the corporeal. The pre-Socratic philosophers made it a central theme of their works. 
They sought to determine what comprised the foundation of being and, in the face of the 
volatility of matter, considered the relationship between that foundation and change 
(that is, whether the foundation of being had to be un-changing). Since that time, many 
others have wrestled with these questions. Amongst the ancient Greeks, these included 
Epicurus, Lucretius, Democritus, and Aristotle. The works of later philosophers, such as 
Bacon and Hobbes, also evidence a keen interest in the influence of matter, reflecting 
the impact of Newtonian science on efforts to understand the world. Natural and 
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Romantic philosophers such as Goethe, Herder and Schelling equally sought to capture 
the depth and breadth of its influence. The material world was central to Marx’s thought 
and remains a core concern of those building on his initiatives. More recently, 
phenomenology has emphasised the centrality of the material world, with writers such 
as Merleau-Ponty (1945, 1948, 1968) highlighting the central role of our senses. The 
manipulation of our corporeality has also been a central concern of many postmodernist 
or poststructuralist writers, with Foucault (1990a), for example, concentrating on the 
invasive intimacies of ‘biopower’. Most recently, post-humanist or post-representative 
thought, such as that of Barad (2007), Bennett (2010), Hodder (2012), and Thrift (2008), 
has renewed interest in the volatility and influence of the material world. 
This recognition of the influence of the corporeal has, however, long been 
overshadowed by those who assert the corporeal to be of little or no significance. As 
long ago as Aristotle’s era, Western philosophy gravitated towards a view that the 
foundation of being had to be unchanging, and thereby dismissed the material world. 
Plato presented the long influential identification of the foundation of being with ‘forms’ 
or ‘ideas’, and classified the corporeal as a significant, but passing, burden upon that 
foundation. Gnostic and Stoic thought amplified this emphasis on the non-corporeal, 
and presented the corporeal as deficient, even evil, and demanding subordination. 
These tendencies were amplified by Christian thought, perhaps most famously 
represented by St Augustine, who treated the flesh as the source of enslavement and 
shame. Throughout this perspective, the foundation of human being has been located in 
the non-corporeal, be that called the soul or some aspect of consciousness, such as 
reason or will. More recently, Enlightenment philosophers, such as Kant, maintained 
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this emphasis. Indeed, efforts to then recognise the influence of the corporeal produced 
the Idealist philosophy of Fichte and Hegel, and an endeavour to reduce the corporeal 
to the terms of the non-corporeal. This preference for the non-corporeal has also lent its 
influence to postmodernist or poststructuralist thought, such as Judith Butler’s Gender 
Trouble, with the corporeal frequently treated as the passive text on which the non-
corporeal freely inscribes itself. 
This preference for the non-corporeal gives insufficient recognition to the ‘weight’ of the 
body, to borrow Bordo’s (2003) expression. It fails to account for the manner in which 
the corporeal both limits and enables all our actions in this world. Moreover, it is hardly 
representative of human experience. In privileging the dominated body and disciplined 
material world, this perspective reflects the typically white, masculine, ‘able-bodied’, 
bourgeois experience of the body as an instrument or tool, and the material world as a 
thing to be dominated and used. It does not reflect the lives of those who experience the 
corporeal as far more troubling. Feminist writers, such as Bordo (2003), Grosz (1994), 
Martin (2001) and Shildrick (1997), present womens’ experience of a much more 
resistant, ‘leaky’ body—one that often cannot serve as the simple instrument of one’s 
wishes. Those with different corporeal abilities and different states of health do not 
experience the ease of corporeal action that is assumed in this model. Further, it does 
not reflect the lives of those who labour directly with the material world, and bear the 
mark of its resistance in their bodies, as testified by writers such as Ehrenreich (2002), 
Shipler (2004), Shulman (2005), Toynbee (2003) and Wynhausen (2005). To privilege 
the experience of the domesticated body is, moreover, a myth of eternal youth—a myth 
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that is ultimately, inevitably betrayed by the inescapable and universal ageing of the 
body.   
The treatment of the body and material world as dominated, or requiring domination, 
retains its place of privilege today. In particular, as detailed below, it frames and limits 
the terms of social policy, and tends to render that policy an instrument of oppression 
instead of relief. With limited exceptions, particularly those within the Marxist, feminist 
and post-humanist traditions, we have not been provided with an adequate answer to 
the questions first confronted by the pre-Socratic philosophers. We have not developed 
an adequate way in which to treat the material world as an essential part of our human 
being without still, to some important degree, awarding greater value to the non-
corporeal. We have not fully confronted the uncertainties and anxieties and pains that 
follow from the unstable, volatile character of the material world, nor its influence on 
what we commonly treat as the non-corporeal. We have not abandoned the flight from 
our limitations, and their pain and promise.  
In this thesis, I set out to redress this long history of neglect, and the too frequent denial 
of the central and pervasive role of the material character of our being. The Western 
tradition has rarely embraced the corporeal as a central, essential, valuable part of our 
humanity. Rather, it has long been treated as having no influence on being (as absent) 
or as having inappropriate, even contaminating, influence (and so treated as wrongful 
and with hostility—as something to be subdued and excluded). These characterisations 
have persisted such that, in the ordinary course of our lives, we have taught ourselves 
to ignore our bodies. As Shildrick (1997, 168) has pointed out, we have become, too 
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often, deaf to its prompts: so much so that “the body is scarcely experienced...at all.” 
Kleinman, cited in Shildrick (1997, 168), described this “fidelity of our bodies [as] so 
basic that we never think of it – it is the certain ground of our daily experience.” 
However, when present: 
...the body is experienced as alien, as the not-self, the not-me. It is ‘fastened and 
glued’ to me, ‘nailed’ and ‘riveted’ to me, as Plato describes it in the Phaedo...the 
body is experienced as confinement and limitation: a ‘prison’, a ‘swamp’, a ‘cage’, 
a ‘fog’ – all images that occur in Plato, Descartes and Augustine – from which the 
soul, will, or mind struggles to escape... (Bordo 2003, 194).  
It is a view of the body expressed in some of the oldest and most celebrated works in 
the Western philosophical tradition, and remains a defining feature in our time: 
...we [don’t] need to delve particularly deeply, either historically, philosophically, 
or personally to recognize that our culture, our philosophic culture especially, has 
a profoundly somatophobic streak. The dualism of Western philosophical thinking 
is almost always hierarchical, valuing the mind (or soul) above the body, 
despising the body as something wholly other, as confining, as disruptive, as 
something we must struggle against and win control over. We are not our bodies, 
but we make use of these unreliable and intractable instruments, or flee their 
influence so that we can realize our true nature as intellectual or spiritual beings. 
As for us today, at the turn of the twenty-first century, although we recognize the 
traces of this attitude in history, we congratulate ourselves that we are no longer 
engaged in a flight from corporeality, we who are constantly surrounded by 
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images of and presentations for the flesh, we who are no longer repressed in 
sensual matters as were [our] benighted grandparents. And yet, what are these 
but directions for the use of the body: we are not our bodies, but we discipline, 
manipulate, and sell our bodies in order to get what ‘we’, not our bodies, want 
(Howe 2003, 97). 
One key axis on which this treatment has turned, enabling us to flee our bodies and to 
see this flight as a celebration—rather than a denial—of our very being, has been the 
tradition of considering particular beings and Being (in the sense of the totality) in terms 
of ‘substance’. The ‘substance’ of a being or thing was supposed to be that which 
provided its permanent, ongoing character, notwithstanding observable changes in its 
properties (Robinson 2004, 3). As one of the greatest philosophers of the seventeenth 
century, John Locke, put it, ‘substance’ is: 
The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being 
nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities, we find 
existing, which we imagine cannot subsist…without something to support them, 
we call that support substantia, which, according to the true import of the word, is 
in plain English, standing under or upholding (cited in Robinson 2004, 12). 
‘Substance’ assumes the existence of some quality that is separate to—and unaffected 
by—other, passing observable qualities. Spinoza (2002b, 217) defined it as: 
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that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that the conception of 
which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has to be 
formed. 
It is this separate quality that is relied upon to give a being continuity, and to render that 
which is changeable—including the corporeal—ephemeral, inessential and, if influential, 
pathological. Whilst there is no single, widely embraced definition of ‘substance’, the 
tradition of debate has emphasised the defining of a thing or being by reference to its 
continuing, and not  ‘accidental’ or temporary, properties. This emphasis is one of the 
key foundations on which the devaluation of the corporeal aspect of the human self 
rests.  
The corporeal, or matter, has, within this tradition of debate, been considered as unfit to 
fulfil the role of substance. Its apparent volatility and changeability has disqualified it 
from providing the permanent, ongoing, undergirding character desired of ‘substance’. 
Instead, by virtue of its pervasive presence, the volatility and mutability of the corporeal 
has more often seen it characterised as a threat to that desired continuity, and 
promoted its devaluation. In its stead, the non-corporeal, including qualities like reason 
or the will (to say nothing of an idea like the ‘soul’) has been treated as the human 
substance and, with the influence of the Enlightenment, as capable of subduing all that 
is ‘external’ to it, including the corporeal.  
This rejection of the corporeal has not gone unchallenged. Arguably one of the most 
striking challenges to the traditional debate about substance and defence of the 
corporeal was mounted by Karl Marx. In this thesis I argue that Marx’s contribution to 
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this debate, when illuminated with reference to his predecessors’ work, complements 
and extends the consideration of the body, and the broader material world, that has 
occupied much scholarly debate over the last thirty years. During those  years a range 
of contemporary theorists, including feminists such as Bordo (2003), Grosz (1994), 
Martin (2001), and Shildrick (1997), and post-humanist theorists such as Barad (2007), 
Bennett (2010), Hodder (2012), and Thrift (2008), have drawn attention to the volatility 
of the corporeal, and its resistance to regulation. They, and others, not least Foucault 
(1980, 1990a, 1990b, 1995) and those working within his legacy, have highlighted the 
intimate impact of this discipline, not only on the body and social relationships, but on 
the very identity or subjectivity of those affected. Most recently, drawing on the work of 
Deleuze, Haraway and Latour, post-humanist theorists have further explored the 
disciplines imposed by the material world itself, and the manner in which the tendency 
of things to ‘fall apart’ (Hodder 2012, L1699) draws us, in many unanticipated and 
sometimes unconscious ways, into mutual and increasingly complex ‘entanglements’ of 
reciprocity and dependence (Barad 2007, L19, Hodder 2012, L367). Most of these 
themes are clearly established in Marx’s theory of species being, and I suggest that his 
theory provides a promising framework to explore and integrate these contemporary 
debates. Marx’s theory focuses on the pervasive influence of the corporeal, the 
openness, vulnerability and interdependence that follows from that influence, as 
famously considered by him in terms of the ‘mode of production’, and the depth to which 
that combination of material and social relationships affects individuals caught up in that 
system. Moreover, Marx’s model suggests that the same volatility, openness and 
involvement holds emancipatory potential. In this thesis I argue that potential exceeds 
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the extreme circumstances Marx imagined and, drawing on contemporary literature 
about the body and the impact of bodily experience, suggest that the everyday 
experiences of pleasures and pain provide prompts towards a recognition of 
interdependence and the obligations we owe to each other. I suggest that this 
combination of old and new can progress the contemporary interest in resisting the 
discipline that extends so deep into our bodies and our sense of self and provide the 
terms from which to create a ‘more human language’. That is, a way of conceiving of 
our substance as human beings that differs to the traditional debate and better enables 
us to resist its cruel neglect of material and other needs, particularly as the key attribute 
of that approach to substance – especially ideas of independence and the privileging of 
the non-corporeal over the corporeal - are currently championed within liberal 
philosophy, politics and social policy. 
To that end I address a few central questions in this thesis. What was the idea of 
substance and how had that idea become central to a tradition of inquiry preoccupied 
with a conception of substance? What kinds of challenges had philosophers before 
Marx mounted against this account of substance? How did Marx appropriate this 
alternative tradition and develop his own account of corporeality? How does Marx’s 
account compare to contemporary reflections on substance? 
Similar questions have been asked by others before me. Marx’s works have inspired 
rich and varied scholarship, much of which has considered his views on materiality and, 
through his engagement with dialectics and emphasis on historical transitions, change. 
However, this work generally considered Marx through the lens of his late works, and 
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this led many—such as Althusser (1996) and Colletti (1973)—to regard Marx’s earlier 
works as immature and outdated. This devaluation of Marx’s earlier works led many to 
disregard the works of previous philosophers; even those expressly relied on by Marx in 
his earlier texts. This was, in no small measure, the product of Marx’s own express 
statements. In Concerning Feuerbach1, Marx insists that philosophy was inadequate for 
the task of human emancipation: this meant many viewed the works of Hegel and 
Feuerbach, for example, as merely preliminary “chapters in the book written by Karl 
Marx” (Hanfi 1972, 1). This characterisation of philosophy has, to a large extent, 
prevented them from fully appreciating Marx’s continued use of a range of philosophical 
terms throughout his works. Those asserting Hegel’s consistent influence on Marx, such 
as Arthur (2003, 2004a, 2004b), Levine (2012), Reuten (2000) and Smith (1999), 
illuminate some part of this inheritance, as do those who, for example, highlight the 
Spinozan character of much of Marx’s analysis, such as Althusser & Balibar (1997) and 
Negri (2004, 2011). However, I argue that Spinoza and Hegel, whilst of great 
significance, form part of a larger tradition, and that Marx’s works need to be understood 
in the context of that tradition. 
The long-standing (and ongoing) debate as to Hegel’s influence on Marx has played a 
significant role in this neglect. As part of the idealist endeavour to render all the world 
explicable in terms of the non-corporeal (and thereby found a comprehensive system of 
thought), many such as Althusser & Balibar (1997) have regarded Hegel’s works as 
entirely tainted and of no help in explaining Marx’s thought. Althusser & Balibar, and 
                                                          
1
 These are frequently referred to as Marx’s ‘Theses on Feuerbach’. Hereinafter, I will refer to them as Marx’s 
‘theses on Feuerbach’. 
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others following their lead, have treated Marx’s later works as presenting an entirely 
new conception of dialectics. Others, with regard to Marx’s critique of Hegel distorting 
experience to conform to his logic, have treated the dialectic as overshadowed by 
Marx’s historicism, if not replaced by it. The ambiguities as to what ends the dialectic 
operates, whether predictive or analytical, have contributed to this pattern, as pointed 
out by Ollman (1976, 2003). This, too, is part of Marx’s legacy. Not having written his 
planned book on method, we have been left with limited express discussion of his 
understanding of dialectics. This neglect of Hegel’s influence has recently been 
opposed by the revival of Marxist scholarship in relation to Hegel’s works on logic, 
particularly through Arthur (2003, 2004a, 2004b), Levine (2012), Reuten (2000) and 
Smith (1999). The implications of this exploration have not, however, been applied to 
the character of human being. 
Given the controversy over the character and status of the dialectic in Marx’s works, the 
significance of change has largely been considered through an historical lens. This 
emphasis, too, is suggested in Marx’s works (1998, 1973, 1976) where change is 
principally presented as the consequence of human initiative, particularly through 
distinctions such as ‘living’ and ‘dead’ capital, where animation is supplied solely 
through human labour. Change has tended to be considered on the large scale, in 
terms of transitions in modes of production, as driven by those modes’ internal 
dynamics. Discussions of the material world have, in large part, reflected the privileged 
view of matter as passive, and acting only as a weight or obstacle to be borne and 
shaped.  
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More recently, this tendency has been contradicted, and the older view of matter as 
active and volatile has been revitalised, primarily in response to environmental or 
‘green’ politics, through the efforts of writers such as Castree (2000), Foster and Burkett 
(2000) and Sheasby (2001; 2004a; 2004b). Their works, however, focus on whether 
Marx praised or criticised the industrial transformation and wastage of the non-human 
material world. They do not explore the consequences of environmental sustainability 
for Marx’s conception of human being. 
Scholars that do focus on Marx’s concept of human being (‘species being’) have also 
tended to neglect these issues. These writers, such as Archibald (1989), Arendt (1958), 
Geras (1983), Heller (1984), Markus (1978), McMurtry (1978), and Soper (1981), have 
tended to focus on those aspects of Marx’s texts that directly address issues such as 
needs, rather than the foundations of being itself. Those who have considered those 
foundations, such as Gould (1980) and Schmidt (1971), appear to have applied an 
Aristotelian model that locates being within individuals, and have not been consistent 
with Marx’s dialectical approach2. Moreover, most of those investigations were 
undertaken over twenty years ago and do not reflect the more recent engagements with 
the influence of Spinoza and Hegel, for example.  
A close reading of Marx’s works, however, reveals his continued use of a range of key 
terms developed as part of the long-standing endeavour to understand the influence of 
the material world and, given its volatility, to understand being in terms of change. Such 
a reading shows Marx to have directly or indirectly drawn on a range of philosophers 
                                                          
2
 Whereas Meikle (1985, 1991), who also applies an Aristotelian model, emphasizes the dialectic but fails to account 
for the influence of materialism in Marx’s thought. 
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whose influence is not well recognised in Marxist scholarship. Those philosophers 
provided key parts of the materials that Marx drew on in presenting a human being as a 
material being, with those corporeal and non-corporeal dimensions deeply entwined and 
equally deeply conflicted in a life-long dialectic—a tension that, in extremity, bore the 
promise of promoting a better understanding of our selves and our relationships with 
others.  
This thesis, then, situates Marx’s theory within a history of the debate about substance 
(and of its corollary, essence). It is a history of that tradition, in the sense that MacIntyre 
proposed in his Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988, 12), where he speaks of a 
tradition as an “argument extended through time’ based on some ‘fundamental 
agreements.” 
Marx’s theory of ‘species being’ forms part of the tradition focussed on the idea of 
substance—the idea that there is some underlying, grounding, defining aspect of all 
beings. As such, Marx’s works address the three ‘fundamental agreements’ that have 
founded that tradition: the first is the idea that a good human life is one free of anxiety 
and pain; the second is that uncertainty is to be avoided; and finally, the premise that 
this required some foundation for life that does not change. These convictions set loose 
a series of questions about which the history of the debate about substance turns. It is 
these questions which I address in the first part of my thesis. In what terms should 
substance be defined? Where is that substance located? In particular, can it be located 
in matter? How to explain change? In particular: how can apparently fundamental 
changes in the substance be explained (such as the transformation of an acorn into an 
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oak tree)? How can changes in the ‘external’ or inessential parts or aspects of a being 
be reconciled with the continuity or repetition of their association with that being’s 
substance? How might the experience of limitation and pain be reconciled with the 
security and immutability of substance? Can uncertainty, anxiety and pain ever work 
towards the human good? Addressing these questions first enables me to locate Marx’s 
work, and to show in what fashion he set out to resolve certain problems.  These 
questions constitute what might be called the ‘tradition questions’: these questions 
address two core categories, namely substance and essence. Marx’s use of ‘essence’ 
places him at the heart of a debate in which Aristotle, Epicurus, Descartes, Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Fichte and Hegel were key contributors. An appreciation of Marx’s theory of 
‘species being’ demands an engagement with their contributions. It also requires a 
consideration of others involved in key points of transition and translation of those 
concepts, such as Lucretius, Herder, Schelling and Feuerbach.  
Following this, I turn to another series of questions centring on Marx.  What critique did 
Marx make of the traditional debate about substance, and its application to humanity 
(whereby the non-corporeal was treated as the human essence)?  What alternative did 
Marx suggest (specifically, how did Marx seek to comprehend corporeality as central to 
the human essence)?  What explanations did Marx provide for the appeal of treating the 
non-corporeal as the human substance (and for the circumstances in which that appeal 
might be overcome and enable the adoption of a ‘more human language’)? 
Marx’s answers to those questions are founded within his characterisation of the 
‘human essence’ as the ‘ensemble of social relations’ in his theses on Feuerbach 
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(1975g, 570). Marx treated the essence of our humanity as located in the structures of 
our society, rather than in its individual members, with those structures serving to 
organise, like a musical ensemble, a series of interactions between elements that were 
interdependent. These interactions, moreover, gave this essence a dynamic, unstable 
character, which Marx described in the Grundrisse as the ‘absolute movement of 
becoming’, contrasting, again, with the stable, unchanging character traditionally 
ascribed to substance. For Marx (1973, 242-3, 488), it was this experience of interaction 
and change that, through the experience of working together, would bring “each 
[worker] [to confront]...the other as owner of the object of the other’s need, [and realise] 
that each of them reach beyond his own particular need etc, as a human being, 
and...relate to one another as human beings; [with]...their common species 
being...acknowledged by all.”  This experience would promote an awareness of 
interdependence, not only with those a worker directly encountered, but with that larger 
‘ensemble of social relations’ that comprised their very essence.  
In this thesis, I want to answer those questions centring on Marx through a close 
consideration of his key works, in particular his discussions in his doctoral thesis and 
notebooks, the 1844 Manuscripts, Concerning Feuerbach, The German Ideology, The 
Grundrisse and Capital.  
Why should we ask these questions and attend to these matters?  
There are several grounds for asking these questions. One rationale is theoretical. I will 
only indicate briefly here the theoretical rationale, which has to do with the way a 
relevant body of scholarship has set out to make sense of Marx’s work and has 
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struggled with the questions I address here. The foundations and terms of Marx’s theory 
of ‘species being’ require further examination.  
As noted above, whilst there is an extensive literature from the 1970s and 1980s 
concerning Marx’s theory of ‘species being’, there has been relatively limited relevant 
scholarship in recent years. When ‘species being’ is being addressed, that engagement 
generally considers three kinds of issues. One strand represents those who, like 
Castree (2000), Foster and Burkett (2000,) and Sheasby (2001; 2004a; 2004b), have an 
ecological interest, and emphasise the interdependent character of the human/nature 
relationship.  Another strand, exemplified by Foster, Clark and York (2008), and 
Toscano (2010), revisit Marx’s critique of religion as part of an endeavour to understand 
its increasingly prominent and resilient influence in recent times and global conflicts. 
Finally, there is also an emerging scholarship seeking to re-assert the influence of the 
corporeal, evidenced by works by Cerni (2007) and Fracchia (2005; 2008), which, in 
large part, respond to the manner in which so much postmodern thought tends to treat 
the corporeal as passive, if at all present. Overall, the critical observation of Fracchia 
(2005, 35), made after a review of the literature, continues to apply: “they have stalled 
[because]...they are not materialistic enough and have failed to grasp Marx’ [theory]...by 
its corporeal roots.” My thesis is founded on the belief that the literature still fails ‘to 
grasp Marx’ by his ‘roots’, as it has not adequately considered the influence of the 
tradition of debate about substance.  
A second rationale for addressing the questions central to my thesis has a more 
‘practical’ dimension. I believe that the neglect of the corporeal has a wide-ranging, 
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oppressive effect. Though this is far from being self-evident, the absence of the 
corporeal, for example, is central to the constitution of modern social policy.  
In contemporary social security policy, neglect of the corporeal grounds the promotion 
of the transition from ‘welfare to work’, the payment of inadequate benefits and denial of 
those benefits for several weeks on the ground that this denial will somehow crystallise 
the recipient’s motivation to secure work. A recipient of, for example, the Newstart 
unemployment benefit may be denied those benefits for up to eight weeks after failing to 
comply with the applicable ‘activity’ and other requirements (ACOSS 2005, 6).  
Contemporary social security policy locates the substance of our humanity—that which 
secures and ensures our humanity—in the will and, as substance, by definition 
continuous and independent of the corporeal, and unaffected by it. This approach 
legitimates a systemic cruelty. It supports and enables a long-standing emphasis on 
frugality, on ensuring that social security is ‘less eligible’ than waged work, and on hard 
physical labour within poorhouses as a test of will and of deservedness (Beder 2000, 
17-18). Here, corporeal discomfort and pain are treated as less important than the will, 
regardless of their actual impact. In social security policy, then, willpower is seen to be 
that power which, if engaged, can overcome all else, including less essential features of 
our humanity like our corporeal selves. This concept of substance has not only 
promoted a focus on the will and the neglect of the corporeal, but on the will as 
independent of all other influences and, in turn, has enabled a focus on independence 
and self-reliance as the essential character of our humanity.  
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The capacity to act independently, and to be self-reliant, has long been the objective of 
social security policy, and is reflected in demands that a beneficiary be ‘deserving’ of 
support. From the outset of Australia’s income support system, requirements reflecting 
the demands for self-sufficiency were central to the aged pension (Jones 1996, 18-21). 
In recent years, the focus on promoting self-reliance and discouraging dependence has 
become more explicit, and more oppressive. The review of Australia’s social security 
system (Cass 1986a, 1986b, 1986c) in 1989 recommended an increased emphasis on 
an ‘active’ system. The characterisation of the ‘problem’ in terms of ‘dependency’ was 
explicit in the government’s response: 
The Government has been progressively moving towards a more targeted, 
integrated system of income support and labour market assistance. The major 
focus has been on tackling the problem of long-term unemployment and welfare 
dependence through targeted packages of assistance aimed primarily at moving 
unemployed people back into work (Howe, 1989, 7, my emphasis). 
The Howard government (1996-2007) continued this emphasis. In 1999, it 
commissioned the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, which was chaired by Patrick 
McClure and was informally referred to as the ‘McClure Inquiry’. The perceived need to 
change the social security system from a ‘passive system’ promoting ‘dependency’ to 
one enforcing ‘self-reliance’ was one of the six principles governing that inquiry. The 
Inquiry was directed to propose means to create: 
28 
 
… greater opportunities for people to increase self-reliance and capacity-building, 
rather than merely providing a passive safety net (Commonwealth Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform  2000a, 63). 
The same emphasis anchored the mutual obligation regime: 
The primary purpose of this partnership is for the community to provide the 
support that individuals need to develop and realise their own capacity for self-
reliance (Commonwealth Reference Group on Welfare Reform, 2000a, 51, my 
emphasis). 
This emphasis was retained in the final report (2000b, 6, 9, 14). 
These practices were key features of the reforms effected through the Employment and 
Workplace Relations (Welfare to Work) Act 2005 which, as pointed out by the Australian 
Council of Social Services (2005, 12), affected some of the most disadvantaged welfare 
recipients—people with a disability, single parents, the long-term unemployed, and 
mature-aged unemployed.  
This understanding of our humanity is not restricted to social security policy. It is the 
common objective of most welfare and human services policy. The core policy 
framework of the current Australian government, for example, which aims to promote 
‘social inclusion’, reflects this same ideal. In early 2010, after extensive consultation and 
planning, the Rudd Labor government published a detailed statement of that strategy: A 
Stronger, Fairer Australia. The report documents a sympathetic and extensive approach 
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to human welfare, which was clearly and centrally expressed in its definition of social 
inclusion: 
Social inclusion means building a nation in which all Australians have the 
opportunity and support they need to participate fully in the nation’s economic 
and community life, develop their own potential and be treated with dignity and 
respect...An inclusive Australia is one where all Australians have the capabilities, 
opportunities, responsibilities and resources to learn, work, connect with others 
and have a say (Social Inclusion Unit, 2009, 2). 
However, the report (2009, 3 and 10) goes on to state that: 
This means focussing on the people facing the greatest disadvantage and 
helping them build the skills and capabilities that encourage self-reliance...[and] 
avoid long term dependency...[and] getting people to take responsibility for the 
choices that are within their control and providing support in ways that build and 
reinforce their capabilities, resilience and independence (my emphasis). 
Self-reliance has been largely uncontested as a goal—and as the key characteristic of 
the human substance—in Australian social welfare policy. Motivation—the state of a 
person’s will—has been the commonly presented arena within which the pathway to 
expressing or realising that substance is to be found. The human essence, and 
correspondingly, human dignity, has been equated with independence, with freedom 
from reliance upon others. Saunders, in upholding that equation, has frequently 
demonstrated the passion with which that belief is held, and the judgements implicit in it: 
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Self-reliance might be considered a good thing in and of itself. Liberals believe 
that rather than relying on handouts from others, self-reliance is virtuous and 
should therefore be encouraged wherever possible…Liberals believe it is 
immoral for the government to take money away from people who are 
maintaining themselves and their families through their own efforts and 
redistribute it to people who have no intention of even trying to achieve self-
reliance…The right to welfare is a demand that others do something for you, not 
a decision to do something for yourself and as such it is still based in weakness 
and dependency (cited in Watts 2003, 18, my emphasis). 
Dependence has become a synonym for debasement, for some profound degradation 
or corruption of the substance of one’s humanity. 
The difficulty with this approach is that it denies the recognition of the humanity of those 
who bear the ‘stain’ of the corporeal, and who cannot exhibit that self-reliance founded 
on willpower untrammelled by its influence—children, women, the aged, the ill, those 
with a disability, those experiencing poverty and others. It is an approach that 
oppresses them for revealing their—and our—humanity: 
There is something shocking about…a concentrated spectacle of sickness, 
decrepitude and mortality. We still live in a society that tends to hide illness and 
death, as if it were somehow symbolic of failure or defeat (Brown 2006, 43). 
The adoption of a concept of human being (and of human agency) in social policy 
based on the traditional debate about substance, gives that policy an oppressive 
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character. Instead of shaping it towards the fullest recognition and flourishing of those 
excluded from participation in the life of the community, it provides too little recognition 
of the influence of the corporeal to promote those people’s agency. Moreover, in 
treating the foundation of that agency as located in the non-corporeal, it positions its 
supposed beneficiaries as the cause of its failure. Whilst this criticism of social policy as 
‘blaming its victims’ is not a new ground of criticism3, the connection of this failure to the 
debate about substance is. It is hoped that this thesis will demonstrate the inadequacy 
of concepts such as independence and self-reliance as the objectives of social policy, 
and help promote polices that recognise both our interdependence and our corporeality, 
and the influence both have on any person’s capacity to act.  
While it may not seem to be the case, I must indicate something of the limited scope of 
my thesis: my argument engages with one aspect of the history of Western philosophy, 
with a view to understanding Marx’s theory. Accordingly, this thesis does not engage 
with some of the major contributions to the debate concerning substance, such as the 
work of Plato. To that end, the development of this thesis has been guided by 
Foucault’s genealogical approach to the history of ideas—that the engagement with 
potential influences on a particular body of thought be limited to those that are apparent 
on the ‘surface’ of the relevant works, rather than determined by the ‘second guessing’ 
of the researcher. In this thesis, I have concentrated on those works Marx expressly 
engaged with in his own texts, as well as those of his predecessors whose work was not 
explicitly acknowledged by Marx, but which influenced him. Where no such express 
reference is available, but Marx appeared to be using a term given a particular meaning 
                                                          
3
 See, for example, Beder (2000) 
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in the tradition of debate about substance, the investigation has focussed on known 
writers in Marx’s time, and as the primary shapers of those terms within the debate. 
My thesis is also limited in the sense that it is a history of the idea as it impacted on 
Marx’s theory, and not on the broader influence of the idea: it is not a social history of 
the debate about substance. Neither does this thesis fully consider the impact of the 
broader social context on the content of the ideas as expressed, such that it may be that 
their full meaning, as intended by their authors, or as appreciated by their intended 
audiences, is not captured. That, however, is not the objective of this thesis: rather, the 
objective is to comprehend those texts as Marx encountered them. 
In doing so, this thesis is not part of a history of philosophy per se – it does not attempt 
to capture the breadth of the entire system of the various contributors’ thought, or of 
Marx’s thought. Reference is made to other aspects of those contributors’ works and 
context, where relevant, but the risk of the full meaning failing to be captured remains. 
In this context, however, the character of the history of the debate about substance as a 
tradition in MacIntyre’s sense, justifies its consideration independently of such a 
comprehensive review. The debates concerning substance, having been clearly 
established well before Aristotle considered them, make it an exemplar of MacIntyre’s 
idea of a tradition—a long-standing, clearly understood debate defined within a set of 
‘fundamental agreements’ that cuts across a variety of systems of thought. Given the 
founding role of ontology in any system of thought, its consideration as a tradition 
suggests that it is one of the areas that can legitimately be considered in its own right. 
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To adequately engage with the influences on Marx’s views concerning substance and 
the corporeal is a substantial undertaking in its own right and is the focus of this thesis. 
Having explored the foundations of those views, this thesis only touches upon their 
detailed application to contemporary capitalist society so as to demonstrate their 
retention, notwithstanding arguments made to distinguish the late or ‘mature’ works 
from earlier ones. To consider in detail the application of Marx’s theory of ‘species 
being’ to capitalism, one would need to start with an exploration of the economic and 
other political literature of Marx’s time, including the works of Saint Simon, Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo, James Mill, Jean Baptiste Say, Jean Sismondi and others. To 
adequately do so is beyond the scope of this thesis. The character of Marx’s theory of 
‘species being’ can be well appreciated independently of its application to specific kinds 
of social formations, given that it forms part of the tradition of the debate about 
substance. Moreover, in many respects, the focus on the economic and other literature 
has limited the appreciation of the general theory and, in turn, limited the 
comprehension of that theory, as applied to capitalism.  
As I have indicated, any exploration of Marx’s critique of the traditional debate about  
substance, the development of his alternative model, and of the circumstances in which 
the movement might be made from one to the other, is part of a history of debate about 
substance.  
To indicate what this debate has been about, I start in Chapter One by examining the 
work of those, like Augustine and Descartes, who promoted an account of being (or 
substance) founded in its traditional terms of independence and separation, and who 
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‘made sense’ of being human in terms that devalued and dismissed the material and 
corporeal. In effect, the first chapter of this thesis outlines something of the contours of 
the mainstream philosophical approach to substance, by outlining Augustine and 
Descartes’ approach to substance as exemplars of a tradition central to Western 
philosophy which treats the corporeal either as a problem or as irrelevant. The contrast 
serves to ground Marx’s critique and illuminate the alternative he proposed. 
Chapter Two considers the works of Aristotle, Epicurus and Lucretius as key 
contributors to the early debates concerning substance and the place of the corporeal 
within it, as well as key influences on Marx. Aristotle looked favourably on the traditional 
emphasis on separation as a means of promoting certainty, yet, in developing his 
dualist hylomorphic alternative, and incorporating matter into it, highlighted matter’s 
volatility and influence. Such was matter’s instability that Aristotle, in seeking a secure 
location for the human substance, placed it in the species—rather than in individual 
beings—contrary to the approach preferred in the traditional debate. Epicurus and 
Lucretius, as some of the earliest materialist influences on Marx’s thought, also 
emphasised the activity and influence of matter, and the manner in which it involved the 
experience of limitation and of connection or interdependence, in contrast to the 
traditional concept. Epicurus and Lucretius also illuminated Marx’s critique of religious 
thought, with its images of lives without limitation—lives of godlike ease—undermining 
our capacity to live with limitation, tension and each other. They suggest, however, the 
transformative potential of this tension that Marx was to later locate in the extremities of 
alienation—and the manner in which this potential was frustrated through their 
insulation from the material world through their institutions of slavery. They suggested 
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that the experience of uncertainty, limitation and pain were not always antithetical to the 
good. 
Chapter Three addresses one of the great turning points in the debate. It considers 
Spinoza’s contribution through his inversion of the traditional approach to substance—
treating only nature as a whole as meeting its qualification of independence, rather than 
individual beings. In particular, this chapter considers the outcomes of this inversion, 
whereby individual beings or bodies within this inverted universe, having been denied 
the robust independence traditionally attributed to substance, become ‘essence’: fragile, 
uncertain aggregates that continue only so long as their dominant relation—or ‘mode’—
continues to persist. With Spinoza, the central place previously accorded to substance 
in discussing being comes to be occupied by the concept of essence and, with that 
change, the ‘fundamental agreements’ and shared understandings that framed the 
tradition of the idea of substance further challenged. Spinoza demands attention as 
crystallising and exploring a profound shift in that tradition. His works provide a fresh 
approach to the character of particular beings, their interdependence, and the 
incorporation of the mode of relation into the foundations of those beings: in turn, they 
illuminate Marx’s concepts of individual beings and the pivotal role of the mode of 
production in his works. This chapter also considers the influence of Leibniz, Herder, 
Fichte and Schelling, who, together with related theological and scientific debates, 
placed Spinoza’s thought in more organic, interdependent terms, and in the form in 
which it most directly influenced Marx’s thought. They made the concepts of being and 
of species in terms of an aggregate or ensemble commonplace, and gave them the 
character that Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx, following them, were to adopt. Their works, 
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however, provided a more radical development—even transformation—than the mere 
translation and expansion of Spinoza’s insights: they presented particular beings as 
active and brought out the movement between those incomplete, dependent particular 
beings and Spinoza’s transcendent, all-embracing substance. No longer was being 
characterised in the traditional terms of stability, separation and independence, and as 
only exceptionally, improperly, disturbed by change. Through the work of Idealist and 
Romantic philosophers, being became equated with change and thereby able to 
accommodate the instability of the corporeal that had long been excluded by the 
traditional debates about substance. 
This is the movement – the dynamic universe – that became the focus of Hegel’s works, 
which I consider in Chapter Four. Hegel’s Logic, as rejecting the traditional emphasis on 
independence and the source of the underlying concepts applied by Marx, is considered 
in detail in this chapter, particularly the early discussion of being and nothing, and the 
manner in which being could be understood as the aggregate of, and movement within, 
a variety of relations. Hegel’s exploration of particular beings’ drive towards a greater 
unity within those relations—of the dependence of any being on its objects and its 
conscious experience of this feeling of incompletion, of desire, as a constant, troubling 
drive towards change—was central to Marx’s own understanding of ‘species being’ and 
of the circumstances in which it might be fully realised. The tension, movement and 
transformative promise in this experience, as the focus of Hegel’s dialectics of the ‘Lord 
and Servant’ and the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ in the Philosophy of Spirit, is also 
explored in this chapter. This examination serves to highlight the influence of insecurity 
and uncertainty in Hegel’s work: goaded on by insatiable desire, Hegel’s humanity 
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searched for a more secure sense of self. For Hegel, contrary to the traditional debate 
about substance, insecurity, instability and anxiety were the norm. His is an image of an 
uncertain being only achieving some stability, some sense of freedom from the 
corporeal (from desire), through imposing the confrontation with desire on, and 
enslaving, others. Hegel not only represented the human substance as profoundly 
dependent on others, but as bound up with an oppressive flight from the corporeal, and 
foreshadowing the links between the constitution of our being and relations of 
oppression that Marx was to highlight. 
Marx subsequently criticised Hegel’s idealism as an instance of that flight from the 
corporeal. In ‘inverting’ Hegel’s thought, so as to give primacy to material experience, 
Marx reflected the criticisms made by Feuerbach before him. Chapter Five sketches 
Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel, and his emphasis on the importance of the corporeal 
encounter. In his call (quoted above) for a ‘more human language’, Marx drew on 
Feuerbach’s call for a philosophy that focussed on “the realm of embodied, living 
spirits...the realities of human misery...a human understanding, and human language” 
(cited in Wartofsky 1977, 196). In his exploration of ‘species being’, and of the character 
of being more broadly considered, there is a clear nexus between Feuerbach’s work, 
particularly his Thoughts on Death and Immortality, and that of Marx. Marx drew on 
Feuerbach’s insistence on the limited, anxious, material character of the human 
condition, and on our ‘religious’ denial of, and flight from, that experience (and the 
intolerant, oppressive relationships that promoted).  
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The next three chapters focus on Marx’s theory. Chapter Six outlines Marx’s rejection of 
the traditional debate about substance and the manner in which Marx adopted key 
concepts from Hegel’s Logic, so as to characterise being in terms of an ‘ensemble’ of 
relations, interdependence and becoming. It presents any being as ‘objective’—as 
deeply dependent upon what, in traditional approaches to substance, is treated as 
‘external’ and inessential, and emphasises the neediness, openness and instability of 
any such ‘objective being’. 
Chapter Seven builds on this presentation of being, in terms of an open, unstable, 
ensemble of relations. It explores the manner in which that character makes the human 
substance extrinsic, located in nature (humanity’s ‘inorganic body’) and thereby in the 
social (as the mode of production is the mode of life, the means by which the 
relationship between humanity’s organic and inorganic bodies are mediated). So 
precarious was individual being, in the face of nature’s resistance, that maintenance of 
the individual’s mode of unification, and hence, continuity was dependent on social co-
operation—so much so that the ‘human essence’ was located in the ‘ensemble of social 
relations’ Marx described as the ‘mode of production’. The character of our humanity 
was not that of the fixed, independent and separate, as favoured in the traditional 
debates about substance, but the openness, interdependence and volatility of essence. 
The connections between this unstable, interdependent being and the revolutionary 
transformation of society—the shift from the independent, non-corporeal self to ‘species 
being’—are explored in Chapter Eight. Drawing on writers from Epicurus to Feuerbach, 
this chapter also draws out the character of individual or particular beings as radically 
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insecure or anxious, and the manner in which Marx, drawing on these predecessors, 
comprehended religious thought both as providing the reassurance demanded by that 
anxiety, and working to exacerbate it. It draws out the links between the denial of our 
corporeal, interdependent character, anxiety and oppression. It suggests the manner in 
which that flight, however, is self-defeating and, yet, by virtue of that failure, capable of 
promoting a change in consciousness—the shift towards species consciousness. 
I have argued that we need an approach to considering being that treats the corporeal 
as a central component, and allows for its influence upon the non-corporeal—a way of 
thinking and talking about being that does not treat the two as separate and 
independent, and is not only sufficiently open to comprehending the influence of our 
bodies, but of the ‘external’ corporeal world. I argue that, to that end, Marx’s theory of 
‘species being’ is a better approach. His work was founded on a recognition of 
interdependence: that our lives are punctuated by, and organised around, moments of 
separation and of unity, and of anxiety, pain and pleasure. His theory embraces this 
breadth of experience, this mix of absence and presence, rather than favouring only one 
side. His theory is one that suggests a different ‘human language’ to that of the 
traditional debate about substance: one founded in relationships, rather than separation, 
thus embracing the corporeal as central to our sense of self. Moreover, Marx’s works 
(1975d, 276-7) were founded on an appreciation of the tenacity with which that 
language would be opposed: 
We would not understand a human language...From the one side, such a 
language would be felt to be begging, imploring and hence humiliating. It could 
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be used only with feelings of shame or debasement. From the other side, it would 
be received as an impertinence or insanity and so rejected. We are so estranged 
from our human essence that the direct language of man strikes us as an offence 
against the dignity of man, whereas the estranged language of objective values 
appears as the justified, self confident and self-acknowledged dignity of man 
incarnate (emphasis in original). 
Chapter Nine explores the unrealised potential of this language. Here, I suggest that the 
transformative potential of corporeal limitation and pain is not limited to the extremities 
which Marx thought necessary, but extends to much more everyday occurrences. With 
regard to the breadth and influence of the many ways in which we are called upon to 
discipline our bodies, and the extent to which related bodily anxieties have featured 
since the middle of the twentieth century, I argue that corporeal prompts towards a 
different sense of our selves are both immanent and promising. These arguments not 
only draw on the Marxist tradition, but on feminist insights, and the experience of those 
suffering serious, chronic illness, as well as the moments of joy and exhilaration we can 
experience in our bodies. I suggest that Marx’s notion of ‘species being’—as a collective 
mode of mediating between our organic and inorganic bodies—can equally apply to 
other experiences of the body, such as those shaped around gender. Whilst maintaining 
Marx’s emphasis on a dominant mode of production, I also draw on his recognition of 
the co-existence of other, less pervasive, modes to explore the potential application of 
Marx’s model to those whose life experiences are more immediately affected by other 
long-established, oppressive relations. Drawn together, these diverse experiences of 
the body testify to its centrality to our humanity, and to its potential realisations. To 
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consider other co-existing modes of being, as part of a larger ensemble or symphony 
dominated by a particular mode of production, is consistent with Marx’s views. To draw 
on that breadth of experience is also to soberly assess the influence of those varied 
corporeal experiences, and to recognise the efficacy with which relations of domination 
continue to dampen and distort the emancipatory prompts of the corporeal. It is to 
recognise that, absenting the extremity of pain Marx anticipated, more than those 
prompts will be required to support any real change in the foreseeable future. It is to that 
end this thesis is dedicated—the promotion of the terms with which those prompts might 
better be recognised and responded to. Through it, I seek to promote a ‘more human 
language’ that will allow us to encounter and interpret our corporeality afresh, and as 
the source of the best of our humanity. 
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CHAPTER ONE – The Flight from the Corporeal 
This thesis seeks to promote a better recognition of the centrality and promise of the 
corporeal. It seeks to contest the manner in which the material foundations of, and 
obstacles to, human agency are often ignored or underestimated in social theory and 
social policy by promoting what Marx, drawing on Feuerbach, called a ‘more human 
language’. I argue that Marx, in engaging in that endeavour, participated in that tradition 
of philosophical debate focussed on ‘substance’. As part of a tradition, Marx drew on 
and developed the arguments of those who preceded him. Chapters Two through to 
Five of this thesis explore the influences of those predecessors. However, to 
understand the contribution Marx and his predecessors made to that debate, it is 
necessary to have some sense of what they opposed. In this chapter, I provide a 
sample of those arguments that rejected the corporeal as essential and founded the 
human character—the human substance—in the non-corporeal. Perhaps ironically, 
considering this rejection extends to the passions, this sampling is also important to 
understand the extremity of conviction with which the corporeal has been rejected and 
devalued, and a dispassionate reason or will preferred. This passionate conviction 
suggests, in part, why Marx was to place so much faith in the transformative potential of 
extreme pain—that is, extreme alienation and immiseration. In Chapter Eight, I argue 
that, given the strength with which beliefs in the traditional debate about substance are 
held (particularly the idea that substance is something separate from all else, including 
the taint of the corporeal), Marx could only imagine their transformation through equally 
powerful experiences.  
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So strong is the conviction in the separate, untainted notion of a non-corporeal 
substance, that an assertion of the value and promise of the corporeal is often met with 
revulsion. For those who privilege the non-corporeal, the corporeal is something less 
than, despoiling the truly human. One of the greatest exemplars of that revulsion—and 
resulting disciplines—is St Augustine. Having located the human essence in the will, the 
volatility of the corporeal, and its capacity to contradict and even override the will, made 
it a threat demanding the most urgent and unrelenting discipline. 
More recently, growing from the confidence borne of empiricist science, the corporeal 
and material world has ceased to be regarded as a threat, so much so that the non-
corporeal has almost eclipsed the corporeal in everyday consciousness. In the light of 
science’s successes, the former’s unpredictabilities and insecurities regarding the 
natural world have lost much of their influence and prominence. So confident has 
contemporary Western society become, that the domination of the non-corporeal over 
the corporeal, if not already seen to be accomplished, is treated as a certain future 
achievement. The corporeal world has been reduced to humanity’s current or future 
representation of it. René Descartes is widely regarded as providing the first 
philosophical expression of this view, and I survey his consideration of substance as an 
exemplar of those who so devalue the corporeal, rendering it almost invisible. St 
Augustine and René Descartes are key exemplars of those who, in searching for some 
sense of the human character, treated the corporeal as inessential. However, this is by 
no means intended to suggest that they were the first philosophers to grapple with these 
questions. A preoccupation with ‘Being’ (ousia in Greek) or ‘Substance’ (substantia in 
Latin) has proved to be a recurring motif in Western philosophy. From the earliest traces 
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of metaphysics, philosophers have set out to say what reality is. For example, 
Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic writer claimed that there was a 
changeless Doxa ruled over by a deity: 
…who steers all things. For she rules over frightful childbirth and copulation of all 
things, sending the female to mingle with the male, and again contrariwise, the 
male to mingle with the female (Graham 2006, 208). 
If a preoccupation with Being provides one striking and persistent aspect of the 
architectonic of Western thought, another has been the tendency to treat the material 
world or the fact that we humans live in, and have, bodies, as a deeply unfortunate 
thing. That this disdain for the material and the corporeal has also had a lot to do with 
persistent religious beliefs and practices should come as no surprise.  
This concatenation is on full display in the work of one of the greatest Christian 
philosophers, St Augustine. Augustine’s vision of the true human existence was clear: 
The flesh will rise imperishable, the flesh will rise without blemish, without 
deformity, without mortality, without being a burden or a weight (Sermon 240.3 
cited in Miles 2005, 321). 
The flesh would no longer “confound” and “shame” us (Augustine 2012b, Book 13 
Chapter 13). As we secured the perfection of substance—the security, stability and 
certainty of our true being—it would fall or die. 
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Yet this prospect of death, regardless of the spiritual rewards it offered, provided little 
comfort to Augustine’s fellow Christians. He recognised that the ‘deepest human’ desire 
was to enjoy immortality: 
I know you want to keep on living. You do not want to die. And you want to pass 
from this life to another in such a way that you will not rise again as a dead 
person, but fully alive and transformed. This is what you desire. This is the 
deepest human feeling (Sermon 344.4 cited in Miles 2005, 321). 
The ‘deepest human’ desire was to continue living, but free of the burdens of a mortal, 
limited, material body. For Augustine, as a Christian, and so committed to the idea of 
bodily resurrection, this involved no simple abandonment of material existence, but its 
transformation from the body of the ‘flesh’, with its ‘corruptibility’, to that conforming to 
the substance or foundation of our humanity. It was to render our humanity an image or 
reflection of the divine—an image of the body conforming to the will, just as the world, 
as god’s artefact, perfectly conformed to his will (Dyson 2005; Holt 2008; Vessey 2012); 
a body free of “blemish...deformity...mortality...burden or weight”; a perfectly disciplined 
body, so much so as to be almost invisible, unnoticeable; a pure instrument.  
Augustine, writing in the fourth century, with his central, unsettled pre-occupation with 
the significance of the corporeal, marks one extremity of the Western engagement with 
the debate about the extent to which the corporeal forms part of the human substance. 
Descartes, writing in the seventeenth century, marks another important extremity in the 
Western tradition. In contrast to what, for Augustine, was the troublesome presence of 
the corporeal, Descartes treated its influence as diminishing to the point where it 
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disappeared. Both locate the foundation of all being, including the human substance, in 
the exercise of reason, and make the domination of the external world its task. For 
Augustine, this task is not easily met, whereas Descartes almost defines it out of 
relevance. 
Augustine’s vision (and his appreciation of the difficulties in realising it) makes him an 
exemplar in a theoretical tradition concerned with spelling out an account of being. His 
treatment of the relationship of the corporeal to the divine captures the manner in which, 
for so long, the corporeal has been treated as something foreign and corrupting of our 
substance and being. In this chapter, I want to represent a slice of the tradition which 
dealt with substance, and did so in ways that were dismissive of the corporeal. Rather 
than offering a comprehensive account, I have chosen to summarise this tradition by 
focussing on just two of its exemplary figures, St Augustine and René Descartes. Their 
work exemplifies this approach to Being or substance. Moreover, both philosophers are 
widely regarded as having made a lasting impression on Western thought. So 
significant was Augustine’s contribution that Dyson (2005, 3) prefaced his recent survey 
of Augustine’s works with the comment that, “it is hard to exaggerate Augustine’s 
influence on the development and character of European thought.” Further, Augustinian 
scholars point to him as the first person to legitimate the “first person standpoint” 
(Matthews 2005, 3; Taylor 1989). As such, despite the time between them, Augustine is 
seen as a, if not the, key predecessor to Descartes. Descartes’ influence, however, is 
not merely as a successor to Augustine. Woolhouse (1993, 1) points to how Descartes 
is “often named as [modern philosophy’s] father”, with his search for epistemic certainty 
influencing “the style, the shape, and the content of much subsequent philosophy.” As 
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Matthews (2005, 2) has pointed out, Descartes’ “proposal has so fully insinuated itself in 
modern ways of thinking that it cannot be ignored.” Together, Augustine and Descartes 
are two of the key contributors to that architectonic of Western thought that privileges 
the non-corporeal as the locus of being.  
In both men’s work, we see something of the characteristic disdain for the corporeal in 
which our bodies are treated as inappropriate, unseemly, shameful or contaminating, 
and requiring the most rigorous discipline. The kinds of views which they exemplified 
were hardly uncontested. Augustine himself wrote well after philosophers like Epicurus 
and Lucretius had rejected much of the debate about substance which Augustine and 
Descartes sought to defend. This very limited sampling of a major 
theological/philosophical tradition of thought about the nature and limits of the corporeal 
is the necessary starting point for my treatment of how and why it was that Marx 
contested this privileging of the rational, the ideational and the spiritual. 
Needless to say, my treatment follows where whole armies have marched before me. 
From the records of pre-Socratic philosophers, the earliest contributors to the Western 
philosophical tradition, one can trace the pre-occupation with being. The surviving 
fragments of the sixth century BCE works of Thales, Aniximanes, Exenophanes, 
Anaxagoras, and Empedocles suggest that the debate about the nature of primary 
matter was central, with water, air, earth and fire, individually or collectively, being held 
to fulfil the role (Curd 2011; Graham 2006; Macauley 2005; McKirahan 2010). Equally 
prominent were arguments about change. Anaximander and Aniximanes, for example, 
held that change characterised the world (Graham 2006). Perhaps most famously of all, 
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Heraclitus emphasised its universal character and the manner in which that universality 
enabled it to be considered a source of stability: “We step into and we do not step into 
the same rivers” (cited in McKirahan 2010, 118; see also Graham 2006). Others—with 
Parmenides, Zeno, Anaxagoras and Melissus prominent amongst them—denied any 
change, insisting that it was only a re-arrangement of existing materials or periodic 
shifts between different degrees of concentration of the same materials (Curd 2011; 
Graham 2006). This emphasis on change was to characterise the work of the atomists. 
Leucippus and Democritus, who reduced the variety of materials to the one uniform 
atom, represented change, through the atoms’ repeated collisions, as the constant 
feature of the universe (Graham 2006). 
Matter, however, was not the only candidate for the foundation of the universe. 
Anixmander suggested some uniform, unlimited starting point or foundation (arkle) 
(Graham 2006). Pythagoras presented the universe or kosmos as a harmonia, a ‘fitting 
together’ or connection, reflecting the universal logic of mathematics. He also 
introduced the notion of human beings as a combination of body and soul, with the latter 
treated as immortal. It was at this stage we find some of the earliest records of the 
distrust of the body, with Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Melissus characterising the 
senses as misleading and unreliable (McKirahan 2010).  
This distrust grew under the influence of Stoicism from the third century BCE. The 
Stoics developed the concept of the logos, as meaning both the order external to 
humanity in the world at large as well as an innate capacity in any human being to 
comprehend that order (Baltzly 2003; Nussbaum 1994 Tillich 1968). This participation in 
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the logos, and the potential to do so consciously, distinguished humanity from all other 
beings (Nussbaum 1994). However, it could only be realised with a rigorous ascetic 
discipline: one that distinguished oreixeis (healthy or necessary desires attendant on 
being a corporeal being) and pathe (‘unruly passions’ that prevented one securing unity 
with the logos) (McGinn 1991, 105; Nussbaum 1994). The ideal Stoic relationship to the 
body was one of ‘indifference’ (Fiala 2003, 154; Baltzly 2003; McGinn 1991). This 
discipline, however, and the wisdom it promised, was only expected to be achieved by a 
few. The Stoics had a pessimistic view for the bulk of humanity. They were not expected 
to free themselves of unwieldy passions and secure their position in the logos (Tillich 
1968; Tillich 2000). Whilst rejecting any original or innate evil, the Stoics still tended to 
regard the passage from an ordinary human life mired in passion to a life governed by 
wisdom as “an unbridgeable gap” (Tillich 1957, 112).  
However, it was Gnostic thought, including Manichaeism, in the second century CE 
(and later) that transformed this subordination of the corporeal into an unqualified 
rejection. Not only was the corporeal treated as unstable, unreliable and deceptive, 
Gnostic thought presented it as of a different, and evil, origin, as compared to the 
incorporeal (Atac 2006; Williams 1996). Gnostics treated the body as a prison within 
which the ‘spark’ of god’s spirit had been imprisoned.4 They regarded bodily desires as 
reinforcing and legitimising this imprisonment, and thus as something to be guarded 
against and disciplined. In particular, sexual activity was to be avoided, lest in the act of 
                                                          
4
 Whilst the diversity within those traditions commonly described as Gnostic makes it a contested 
category, and even suggest a more ‘ambivalent’ view as to the body, their characterisation of matter as 
evil appears to remain a widely accepted feature (Williams 1996, 117). 
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procreation another innocent soul or ‘spark’ be captured in a body (Ranke-Heinemann 
1990). 
This was the world in which Christianity sought, and eventually achieved, acceptance. 
That acceptance, however, was secured following a lengthy competition with both 
Stoicism and Gnosticism, and saw Christianity take on their hostility to the body. 
Contrary to Christianity’s Jewish origins, and Judaism’s more accepting attitude to the 
body, Christianity adopted the hostility that had been the standard of its competing 
belief systems. In particular, as Ranke-Heinemann points out (1990, 57) “virginity was 
[to become] the Christian virtue”. This assumption of pre-existing values was particularly 
clear for Ambrose, who was bishop of Milan in the fourth century CE (cited in Ranke-
Heinemann 1990, 57): 
This virtue is in fact our exclusive property...Though we share the same air with 
all others, and participate in all the aspects of an earthly body, though we are no 
different from others in our birth, yet we escape the miseries of nature, which is 
otherwise the same, only by virginity, while virginal chastity seems to be held in 
reverence by the pagans, but is nonetheless violated (even though it is placed 
under the protection of religion) and is persecuted by the wild tribes, and totally 
unknown to all other creatures. 
This process of accommodation—of the mutual adaptation of Christianity and the 
ancient world—was exemplified by the life of St Augustine. Encountering Christianity as 
an educated man, and sharing the dominant culture’s deep pessimism about 
corporeality, Augustine was only able to seriously consider that faith on being convinced 
51 
 
it shared that pessimism. So significant was this anxiety towards the corporeal, 
however, that it marked the balance of Augustine’s life and his works and, with them, 
the character and influence of the Christian church and Western philosophy.5 
  
AUGUSTINE’S PESSIMISM 
Augustine wrestled with the character of the corporeal throughout his works, as the 
Christian church had made a significant positive role for the body non-negotiable: 
Augustine himself, like Paul, emphasised that the belief in bodily resurrection was a 
fundamental Christian doctrine (Augustine 2012b, Chapter 22, Book 4). This same faith, 
however, in celebrating an omnipotent god, made the non-corporeal both superior to, 
and the ground of, corporeality. It made the corporeal irrelevant to the divine ground of 
all being—an absence—whilst placing it at the centre of their vision of fulfilled human 
                                                          
5
 Recent scholarship in relation to Augustine, such as Meilaender (2001), Vessey (2012) and Wetzel 
(2011), suggest that Augustine had a much less antagonistic attitude towards the corporeal. They posit a 
difference between his early works, such as the Confessions, and his later works, especially The city of 
god, as evidencing a distancing from the influence of Manichean thought in his early life. However, this 
view remains contested (see Van Ourt 2010 and Harrison, cited in Holt 2008). They present Augustine’s 
characterisation of the Fall as an act of disobedience that severed the unity of the will of Adam and Eve 
from that of god, resulting in the lack of unity between humanity and its various appetites (Dyson 2005, 
Holt 2008, Vessey 2012). Vessey (2012) also emphasises the context within which Augustine wrote, 
particularly the view held by other influential Christian thinkers in his time that sexuality was not a feature 
of the pre-lapsarian body. Sexuality, they held, was a product of sin. On this basis, Vessey argues that 
Augustine’s presentation of pre-lapsarian humanity as sexual and engaged in reproduction evidenced a 
much more inclusive approach to the body than has been recognised. Similarly, Wetzel (2011, 46) 
suggests that Augustine’s attitudes to materiality were much more ‘complex’ than ordinarily reflected in 
the literature. However, as detailed in this chapter, I find Augustine’s later works, including The city of 
god, to still express a loathing of the corporeal. Whilst Augustine does appear to be less concerned with 
the corrupting influence of the corporeal in his later works, and more with the divisions created by human 
disobedience, this concern itself evidences a lower valuation of the corporeal. Augustine’s treatment of 
the resurrected body, whilst incorporating sexuality, for example, is still an incomplete embrace for it is a 
body shorn of its defining characteristics. In any event, there remains a remarkable continuity in 
Augustine’s consideration of the corporeal. Contrary to Vessey’s (2012, 805) claim that the mature 
Augustine was “embarrassed about…the…barely veiled contempt” in his early works, I argue that same 
contempt remains present in his more mature writings, as demonstrated by the passages quoted later in 
this chapter. 
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being. Here, in Augustine’s attempt to reconcile his faith and experience, lies a central, 
and influential, exemplar of the problem of an approach to thinking about what the 
substance of human being is. With all beings dependent on the Christian god, and that 
god defined in terms of omnipotence, the corporeal was seen to have no influence on 
the universal substance. However, with this omnipotence seen to be expressed in both 
the act of creation and in the bodily resurrection of Jesus, the tensions of corporeal 
existence demanded some reconciliation. Humanity, as initially created and placed 
within the ‘garden of Eden’, was embodied and good. The return to perfection, as 
modelled for Christians in Jesus, involved the resurrection of the body. Yet it seems 
bodily existence troubled Christians from their earliest days. The Christian insistence on 
the one transcendent, creator god denied them the comforts drawn by many of their 
contemporaries from the dualist doctrines of Gnostic and Manichean thought.  
Augustine made a key resolution to resolving this tension. He did so by re-inventing the 
body, making it, both before the ‘Fall’ and after the ‘Resurrection’, present, but docile, 
domesticated and without influence. It made for an account of the body as 
experienced—as uncomfortable, demanding and resistant—in terms of deviancy. With 
Augustine, the body, when influential, when driving our being, became a form of 
perversion, a lesser humanity, a descent towards no-thingness, demanding discipline.  
Augustine’s domestication or sanitisaton of the body is illuminated by his vision both of 
god, and of humanity before the ‘Fall’ and after its salvation (that is, after the 
resurrection of the body). Together, despite his attempts to attribute some value to our 
corporeality, we find Augustine clearly preferring the non-corporeal as substance. His 
account of the Fall, moreover, clearly represents that corporeality as a punishment: that 
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our sensuousness and the vivid tensions of life are not sources of exhilaration or 
enlightenment, but penal servitude and corruption. For Augustine, to be corporeal was 
to suffer with only one worthwhile end: to discover our substance in the non-corporeal, 
and to discipline ourselves towards that end in the hope of resurrection, thereby 
securing release from the anxieties, instabilities, pains and delights of corporeal life. 
Augustine’s journey began with his reservations about Christianity. As a member of the 
educated elite, Augustine initially had trouble accepting the corporeal images of the 
Christian god (Griffin and Paulson 2002, 98). The popular belief in an anthropomorphic 
god (or gods) was widely held, and was well-grounded in both Jewish and Christian 
scripture, as well as Greek and Roman traditions (Griffin and Paulsen 2002, 97-103). 
This reluctance founded his initial—some, such as Van Ourt (2010), say life-long—
attraction to Manichaeism, with its emphasis on two fundamental substances and the 
location of the good in the non-corporeal. It reflected a “profound pessimism about 
reality”, which Tillich (1968, 106-7) argued, continued to characterise Augustine’s work, 
even after his conversion to Christianity. It produced a theology and philosophy in which 
“evil was displaced from God [and substance] to man” (Dollimore 1991, 145). 
So powerful were these reservations about the corporeal, and so widely ridiculed the 
Christian emphasis on resurrection, that Augustine only fully embraced the Christian 
tradition following his introduction to a conception of the Christian god in non-corporeal, 
‘spiritual’, terms (Griffin and Paulson 2002, 104). Augustine later confessed that: 
...although what was the nature of a spiritual substance I had not the faintest or 
dimmest suspicion – yet rejoicing, I blushed that for so many years I had barked, 
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not against the Catholic faith, but against the fables of carnal imaginations... 
(2012a, 6.3.4). 
Augustine’s works, and his frequent dealings with issues of corporeality and sexuality in 
particular, evidence the life-long effects of these reservations. His conversion to 
Christianity made questions of substance central to his thought and practice. Christian 
doctrine, with its insistence on one absolute, omnipotent god, and of creation ab initio 
(from nothing), ruled out the recognition of any claim to treat evil, or corporeality, as 
substance (as the ground of being). However, those doctrines also denied any easy 
subordination or devaluation of the corporeal, despite its insistent repetitive pains and 
appetites. In insisting on the centrality of the future resurrection of the dead, Christian 
doctrine required some validation of the corporeal. Augustine may have explicitly 
abandoned Manichaeism in his conversion to orthodox Christian beliefs, but this only 
aggravated the ongoing prominence of a dualism he was unable to resolve.  
The tale of Adam and Eve in the perfect Garden of Eden provided a basis for 
Augustine’s attempt to reconcile those tensions—just as it had his Christian 
predecessors, such as Gregory of Nyssa (Ranke-Heinnemann 1990, 52-4). Through it, 
he was able to insist that existence was, as created, founded in the one substance 
(god) and hence good, but made defective, deviant, or perverse by humanity’s 
disobedience (Dyson 2005; Holt 2008; Vessey 2012). The account in Genesis of the fall 
of humanity enabled Augustine to uphold one universal substance by locating the 
foundations of this disobedience—this deviation or perversion—in the ground of being 
itself. The Christian god, as omnipotent creator, experienced no limitation or obstacle to 
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his will. Substance then, in its purest form, was understood as will, as an expression of 
the capacity to choose. As that capacity, however, it also included the freedom to differ 
from god—to turn away—and that, for Augustine, was the essence of the Fall. 
Moreover, that same shared substance—the will—provided the potential for the future 
return (and eventual resurrection) of humanity. 
Augustine treated the choice made by the first humans in the Garden of Eden (to 
disobey the commandment to not eat the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge) as a choice 
made to turn away from unity with god’s substance—his will—and to privilege the 
interests of the human. To align one’s self with any finite thing was to align oneself with 
something less than god—as the creator ab initio, the creator from nothing, the 
Christian god was the source of all finite things. To turn one’s attention to those things 
was to turn away from the fullness of being towards nothingness (Dollimore 1991, 133, 
136). It was a turn towards death. Augustine described it as the “death of the soul” 
(Tillich 1968, 127). This death was a diminution of that which animated us, that which 
enlivened and ordered our bodies (our will). It was a turn to the always, ever, 
incomplete6 and, in Augustine’s eyes, enslaved us to insatiable, undisciplined desire: 
“the subjection of the spirit to the flesh in a sordid servitude” (2012c, Book 1, Chapter 9). 
This turn, as founded on the axis of will, could turn again. The same capacity that 
enabled humanity to found its existence in the finite could turn again towards the infinite. 
                                                          
6
 It is this division that recent scholarship (such as Dyson 2005, Holt 2008 and Vessey 2012) emphasises, 
rather than the turn to nothingness or a lesser good. Still presenting god as will, and human disobedience 
as the catalyst for the Fall, these writers present Augustine as concerned with the selfish division or 
separation it produced. This focus on the will—on the non-corporeal—only reinforces my reading of 
Augustine’s location of the human substance in the non-corporeal. The absence of the resisting body in 
the garden of Eden, moreover, parallels Augustine’s post-lapsarian treatment of that body as a 
punishment. For Augustine, the messy, volatile, troublesome body was not part of our essential humanity. 
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Here, Augustine’s Neo-Platonic heritage, and the conviction that our incorporeal 
character is more valuable, was reconciled with the Christian insistence on one 
substance and the resurrection of the corporeal body. If we focus our will on our 
participation in the divine substance—the incorporeal—we can, with the ‘grace’ (that is, 
support) of god, enjoy the greatest good. As Taylor (1989, 134) has put it, “By going 
inward, [we can be] drawn upward”. 
This involved no abandonment of the body, however. Augustine was clear that, as 
lesser beings, even when in union with the divine courtesy of constant contemplation, 
we cannot help but be embodied beings. These bodies, however, will not be ‘fallen’. 
They will experience no pain or desire, but return to their perfect pre-lapsarian condition 
(Dyson 2005; Holt 2008; Miles 2005, 319; Tillich 1968, 126; Vessey 2012). Prior to the 
Fall, Augustine pictured the body as completely subject to the will. The same perfect 
alignment—the same perfect discipline—would, in his view, characterise our 
resurrected bodies. However, Augustine recognised that this transformation would not 
be easy. In his eyes, humanity’s efforts to return to the good would always be fraught 
with risk. We would always be vulnerable to being overwhelmed, tempted, distracted 
and perverted by the corporeal. This was humanity’s punishment. Just as our forebears, 
Adam and Eve, disobeyed god, so, too, would our bodies disobey us. As Augustine 
(2012b, Book 13, Chapter 13) put it: 
They experienced a new motion of their flesh, which had become disobedient to 
them, in strict retribution of their own disobedience to God.  For the soul, revelling 
in its own liberty, and scorning to serve God, was itself deprived of the command 
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it had formerly maintained over the body.  And because it had wilfully deserted its 
superior Lord, it no longer held its own inferior servant; neither could it hold the 
flesh subject, as it would always have been able to do had it remained itself 
subject to God.  Then began the flesh to lust against the Spirit, in which strife we 
are born, deriving from the first transgression a seed of death, and bearing in our 
members, and in our vitiated nature, the contest or even victory of the flesh. 
Our punishment, as Tillich (1968, 126) described it, was ontological.  
The extremity of the body’s disobedience was overwhelmingly evidenced, for Augustine 
(2012b, Book 14, Chapter 16), in human sexuality: 
[Sexual] lust not only takes possession of the whole body and outward members, 
but also makes itself felt within...So possessing ... is this pleasure, that at the 
moment of time in which it is consummated, all mental activity is suspended. 
So dangerous was sex that it, even if only temporarily, completely severed our link with 
the divine, and with our true substance. It was for this reason that Augustine described 
sex as “a miniature shadow of death” (Brown 1988, 408, 417). In succumbing to lust, 
one succumbed to slavery—a sacrifice of one’s will and one’s substance. In embracing 
our corporeality, we became, for Augustine, inhuman. 
Moreover, this servitude was not hidden. It was readily apparent in the autonomy of a 
man’s penis. A man could have an erection against his will, and not have one when he 
truly desired it (Soble 2009, 108-9). 
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This extremity, and its ready observation, made plain man’s defect: that in his very self 
he experienced disobedience, a turning away from the will, and thereby from substance 
or being itself. It made this failure plain and founded the experience of shame. Hence, 
the pudency found in the shameful parts (pudenda): “It was after sin that our nature, 
having lost the power it had over the whole body, but not having lost all shame, 
perceived, noticed, blushed at, and covered it.” (2012b, Book 14, Chapter 21). 
For Augustine (2012c, Book 1, Chapter 9), this obvious, repetitive disobedience 
characterised the fallen, perverted body and founded the identification of discipline—the 
re-assertion of the will—as the pathway to resurrecting humanity’s substantial, anxiety-
free, existence: 
A man turns to good use the evil of concupiscence...when he bridles and 
restrains its rage...and never relaxes his hold upon it except when intent on 
offspring, and then controls and applies it to the carnal generation of 
children...not to the subjection of the spirit to the flesh in a sordid servitude. 
The demand for this discipline and restraint extended to women as the necessary 
partners in that act of generation. Moreover, for Augustine, women, as corporeal, sexual 
beings, were “identified as concupiscence, [as] the locus of temptation” (Power 1995, 
145). The feminine, for Augustine, was “a progression towards inferior things” (Power 
1995, 131), and embodied the risk of being “foully polluted by fornication” and 
“[plunging] into a foul whirlpool of carnal pleasure” (2010, 12-9-14). Augustine stressed 
that women (2010, 12-9-14) had to be veiled “because too great a progression towards 
inferior things is dangerous to that rational cognition” that comprises the substance: they 
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needed “to... be restrained”. He was “...convinced...that nothing turns the spirit of man 
away from the heights more than the caresses of woman” (Ranke-Heinnemann 1990, 
86). Augustine admonished husbands to “love the fact that...[their wives were] human, 
and hate the fact that [they are women]” (cited in Ranke-Heinnemann 1990, 96). 
This discipline of the corporeal, and its temptations, extended well beyond issues of 
sexuality. Augustine was at pains to point out that the Fall followed from the less 
tempting desire to eat (and was a greater fault for the greater potential ease of 
restraint).7 This basic corporeal demand represented in many ways a far more 
immanent, demanding threat: 
 There is another evil of the day… This much hast Thou taught me, that I should 
bring myself to take food as medicine. But during the time that I am passing from 
the uneasiness of want to the calmness of satiety, even in the very passage doth 
that snare of concupiscence lie in wait for me. ... And whereas health is the 
reason  of eating and drinking, there joineth itself as an handmaid a perilous 
delight… And oftentimes it is doubtful... … Placed, then, in the midst of these 
temptations, I strive daily against longing for food and drink. For it is not of such 
nature as that I am able to resolve to cut it off once for all, and not touch it 
afterwards, as I was able to do of concubinage (2012a, Book 10, Chapter 31.44 
and 47). 
 
                                                          
7
 “And as this commandment enjoining abstinence from one kind of food in the midst of great abundance 
of other kinds was so easy to keep,—so light a burden to the memory...the iniquity of violating it was all 
the greater in proportion to the ease with which it might have been kept.” (Augustine 2012b,Book 14, 
Chapter 12) 
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The body was not only difficult to discipline; it was even more difficult to discern when 
discipline was required. For Augustine: 
...vice [was] not so much the antithesis of virtue as its perversion, the more 
dangerous and potentially subversive for being in intimate relation with the good, 
rather than being an absolute difference or otherness (Dollimore 1991, 141). 
The difficulties posed by the corporeal and its desires, and the immanent, effervescent 
threat of corruption, made living a fully Christian life an anxious, unstable experience. 
Augustine’s effort at reconciling the demand for a monist model of substance that 
conformed to the Christian ideals of an omnipotent god, together with their belief in 
bodily resurrection, was a failure. His image of the resurrected human body was a 
fiction, made possible only by the denial of those things that make it a body. As a 
needless, painless, comprehensively disciplined entity, Augustine’s resurrected body 
was that of a god: a being in no way bound by the finite or by an existence as a body.  
The body’s value, then, was purely instrumental. It was, for Augustine, merely the 
means by which we discovered our inadequacy and our absolute dependence on god, 
and only when it approached absolute subordination. The value of the corporeal, and in 
particular, the senses, was their failure—their incapacity to give us reliable access to the 
world—and the way in which that failure forced us to rely on reason and appreciate its 
superiority. It was for this reason that Charles Taylor (1989, 132) has described 
Augustine as making the “proto-Cartesian move” of emphasising that one could not 
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doubt one’s own existence. It was the foundation for relying on reason, which, in turn, 
would lead us to discover its external source, god: 
God has not taken this punishment from us, in order that each of us might still 
remember to what places we have been called and by Whom; so that each one 
of us might seek out that embrace, in which no instability is found (Augustine’s 
Sermon 51.3.4, cited in Brown 1988, 426). 
For Augustine, the substance—the stable, certain foundation—of our humanity, was 
grounded in, and shared the character of the divine. It was not corporeal, but rather, 
partook of the character of the divine will. It was the exercise of this will that had turned 
humanity away from the divine, and had the potential to return to unity with it. It was 
only when, having faced the unreliability and insatiability of the corporeal, we turned 
within to reason that we would recover our substance. It was only through the 
contemplation of god, of discovering perfection in the incorporeal in contrast to the 
unreliable corporeal, and in turn being saved through the grace of god, that we would 
find the stability—the relief—we desired.  
 
THE CARTESIAN TURN 
Augustine’s pessimism about the corporeal and the ‘external’ world was not unique. 
Darrin McMahon (2006) has mapped how people were resigned to a life of suffering, or 
at least to one in which their quality of life was out of their control and subject to the 
unpredictable vagaries of fate. So deep was this sense of resignation, McMahon (2006, 
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19-20, 25) points out, that to seek some surety of happiness was, at least for fifth 
century BCE Heredotus, “an outrageous act of hubris”. For much of the history of the 
West, the human experience of the world was hostile—neither comprehensible nor 
predictable, the impact of both the social and natural worlds was widely regarded as a 
question of fate. So pervasive was this view, McMahon (2006, 10-11) argues that its 
influence is evidenced in the links between happiness and luck or fortune, retained in 
modern Indo-European languages: in English, we see it in the “root of ‘happiness’...[in] 
happ, meaning chance, fortune, what happens in the world, giving us such words as 
“happenstance”... and ‘perhaps’”. 
We can trace a similar sense of resignation, even as recently as the close of the 
seventeenth century: Hobbes then denied the capacity to enjoy lasting happiness or 
‘continual prospering’ in our mortal lives: 
For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we live here; 
because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without 
fear, no more than without sense (cited in McMahon 2006, 184-5). 
That perspective must have appeared particularly true for Europe in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, in the wake of the post-Reformation religious wars. Gillespie 
(2008, 130) points out that only “the Holocaust and the killing fields of Cambodia can 
begin to” approximate the devastation of those wars. Referring to conservative 
estimates, Gillespie indicated the impact in terms of the proportion of population lost. 
For England it was 10%, France 15%, Germany 30% and more than 50% for Bohemia 
(now part of Czech Republic).  
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Having faced generations of religiously-inspired conflict, the capacity of religion to 
provide comfort must have seemed much reduced in the seventeenth century. 
Moreover, that authority had long been challenged by the growing success and 
popularity of experimental science: science suggested a radical, promising capacity to 
escape the vicissitudes of fate and to secure some certainty in relation to the previously 
unknowable, unpredictable natural world. It suggested the capacity to comprehend and 
even avoid the pains and uncertainties of this life, particularly as they concerned the 
vagaries of our corporeal bodies.  
It was in this context that René Descartes continued, and deepened, the inward turn 
previously advocated by Augustine. He, too, saw the corporeal world as unreliable and 
could only find certainty in doubting it, and in reasoning that an opposing perfection 
existed. Descartes, however, broke with Augustine when he accepted that humanity 
could, of its own endeavour, secure that stability and enjoy the independence and 
character of substance. With the scientific achievements of Galileo and others before 
him, Descartes was able to approach the external world as having been rendered 
comprehensible and manageable in terms of mechanism. Nature, desire, and the 
experience of incompletion and dependence were no longer an inescapable part of the 
human experience. Nature, rather than god, had become discoverable through the 
inward turn to reason, and subject to the laws humanity could discern.  
For Descartes, nature, including humanity’s nature, was not necessarily unpredictable, 
uncertain or threatening. Like Augustine, Descartes had found much that was 
threatening in the world about him, although his experience had less to do with the 
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desperate passions of concupiscence, and more to do with his experience of the 
religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Thirty Years War 
shadowed Descartes’ life. It had begun when he was 22, and he was well aware of the 
atrocities undertaken in the name of religion (Gillespie 2009, 129; Phemister 2006, 17). 
Descartes’ response was not to bother with seeking security by submission to god, but 
to turn inwardly to seek there the source of authority.  Like Augustine, the vital, bloody, 
corporeal terms in which the religious conflicts played out in Descartes’ time proved, for 
him, its unreliability. However, working within the light cast by the scientific revolution 
wrought by Galileo and others, Descartes did not emulate Augustine. Rather, he 
reduced the corporeal to an inessential, mechanical, temporary influence. In Descartes’ 
works, we witness its near-complete eclipse by the illumination he expected to be 
derived from a methodical and disciplined application of reason. 
This makes Descartes another exemplar of the Western tradition of debate about 
substance. Like Augustine, Descartes treated the corporeal as something foreign to our 
true human character. However, Descartes’ near-invisible treatment of the corporeal 
approximates the contemporary confidence in our ability to manage, and enjoy, our 
bodies.8 Having displaced faith in god with faith in science, Descartes displaced the 
                                                          
8
 The interpretation of Descartes’ work in relation to substance remains contested (Afloroaei 
2010, Christofidou 2001, Rozemond 1995). In particular, the emphasis on the near invisibility of 
the corporeal has attracted a good deal of attention in recent scholarship. Writers such as 
Afloroaei (2010) and Christofidou (2001) are concerned with rehabilitating Descartes from what 
Christofidou (2001, 215) describes as his “role of anti-hero”. They argue that the treatment of 
Descartes as denying—even doubting—the existence of the corporeal or material world is 
incorrect. In their view, Descartes’ treatment of different substances as ‘separable’ was an 
epistemological and not an ontological distinction—such that his doubting the certainty with which he 
could reason about the corporeal did not mean he denied its existence (Afloroaei 2010, Ahlstrom 2010, 
Christofidou 2001, Rozemond 1995, and Wee and Pelczar 2008). Instead, Descartes is presented as 
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comfort previously gained from religious thought to experimental science and, above all, 
mathematics.  
Descartes defined ‘substance’ in traditional terms of completeness and independence—
it comprised “only those things whose existence is in no way reliant upon the 
existence...of anything else” (Phemister 2006, 68-9). He recognised, as had others 
before him, that only one being satisfied this definition—god (Christofidou 2001, 
Phemister 2006, 69) —and thereby continued to privilege the spiritual as the highest 
order of being and substance. However, Descartes treated ‘thought’ and ‘extension’ as 
substances, notwithstanding their dependence on god (Christofidou 2001; Phemister 
2006, 69). Nevertheless, Descartes treated the status of ‘extension’ as inferior: it did not 
resemble the divine—it lacked capacity for activity and did not provide the ground for 
Descartes’ much-desired certainty. 
Like Augustine, Descartes regarded the senses as deceptive and unable to provide a 
certain, reliable access to the world (Gillespie 2009, 191). He also regarded the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
asserting that experience was the sole source of knowledge of existence and not the logical process he 
presented in his Method (Afloroaei 2010). The tide, however, has not completely turned. Others, such as 
Broadie (2001, 295, 296), continue to see Descartes as having “identified the self…with the incorporeal”. 
Moreover, even those seeking to ‘rehabilitate’ Descartes admit that the relationship between the 
corporeal and incorporeal remains unclear and that no adequate explanation for their ‘union’ or interaction 
was provided by Descartes. Afloroaei (2010, 130) goes so far as to state that Descartes abandoned the 
attempt to do so and accepted the “paradox of two natures”. The current debates concerning Descartes’ 
dualism demonstrate, as Christofidou (2001, 237) put it, that “there is a lot of unfinished business”. Even 
so, I expect that the effort to rehabilitate Descartes will not completely succeed. The value Descartes 
placed upon the non-corporeal and his confidence in its continuity or immortality necessarily diminishes 
the value and significance of the corporeal. Even if Afloroaei (2010) and Christofidou (2001) are correct to 
claim that the reception of Descartes’ works has been distorted, to locate the source of that distortion 
exclusively outside those works would be misleading. The privileging of the non-corporeal in them is not, 
as Afloroaei (2010, 130) asserts, solely produced by the “search for ‘unquestionable proof’” by those 
reading them, but by the same search undertaken by Descartes himself.  
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imagination as problematic. He believed the religious wars had been prompted by the 
impassioned exaggerations of a fear of god and divine punishment. He sought to 
promote a humanity “governed by good sense, rather than the fear of god” (Gillespie 
2009, 206). For Descartes, the only certain basis of knowledge was doubt. The very act 
of doubting pointed, in Descartes’ view, to the certainty of our existence. As the only 
source of certainty, doubt, for Descartes (like Augustine) provided the foundation for 
understanding and acting in the world. It also prompted a turn towards the divine, as the 
very character of doubt implied its opposite—some fullness or perfection, assuming of 
course that god was not being deceptive (Ahlstrom 2010; Wee and Pelczar 2008).  
The question of god as deceitful was central to Descartes’ time and, despite his 
conclusion that a perfect god could not be deceitful, drove the ‘radical’ inward turn that 
characterises Descartes’ presentation of our humanity (Taylor 1989, 143). Consistent 
with Christian doctrine, Descartes grounded his thought in a perfect god. Consistent, 
too, with his experience of religious conflict, he imagined that god was both distant from, 
and not interested in, everyday practice, leaving its resolution, as Gillespie (2009, 204-
5) points out, to human hands. This impotent or irrelevant god did not affect nature, 
leaving humanity free to understand it. 
This world was one, in terms of extension or corporeality, and governed by fixed laws of 
mechanism and motion. It was a world in which the total quanta of motion between 
bodies was maintained by the omnipotent god, but in which no new motions arose—
only changes in direction. It was a world in which all extension was passive, having 
received its momentum from god, and from which all initiative or autonomous activity 
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was absent. All beings with some corporeal dimension – extension – were bound by 
these laws of mechanics, including living organisms (Phemister 2006, 119)9. Descartes 
(cited in Byers 2006, 730) invited his readers: 
… to consider ... all the functions ... such as the digestion of food, the beating of 
the heart and the arteries, the nourishment and growth of the limbs, respiration ... 
[and] to consider that these functions follow from the mere arrangements of the 
machine’s organs every bit as naturally as the movements of a clock or other 
automaton follow from the arrangements of its counterweights and wheels. In 
order to explain these functions, then, it is not necessary to conceive of this 
machine as having any vegetative or sensate soul or other principle of movement 
and life, apart from its blood and its spirits, which are agitated by the heat of the 
fire burning continuously in its heart – a fire which has the same nature as all the 
fires that occur in inanimate bodies. 
In contrast, thought, for Descartes, was the truly active and central principle. It was the 
basis upon which we, as humans, engaged with the world. Founded in god, and most 
resembling god, thought or reasoning was the ground from which Descartes secured a 
sense of certainty in the world. For Descartes, we did not have certain knowledge 
through the senses or perception, or when our imagination provided us with a mental 
image or interpretation of those perceptions. It was only when we had scrutinised—
                                                          
9
 The characterisation of Descartes’ physics as deterministic is not uncontested. Wee and Pelczar (2008) 
argue that some room for changes in direction caused by non-material influences remains as Descartes’ 
physics only addressed the process by which things were set in motion. With regard to Descartes’ works 
and the literature, Ahlstrom’s (2010) conclusion in this respect is more convincing. Ahlstrom argues that 
Descartes, whilst holding that subjective certainty or logic could not comprehend the character of the 
mind-body union, remained confident that it was not inconsistent with the mechanical laws of physics. 
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doubted—those impressions and reduced them to the clear logic of mathematics and 
geometry that ambiguity and uncertainty were removed. For Descartes, it was only 
when we construct our own representation of a thing that it becomes certain 
(Christofidou 2001; Gillespie 2009, 198, 200; Taylor 1989, 144-5): 
For Descartes, everything that we know is known only when it is perceived, 
transmitted to the brain, and represented upon the screen of the imagination by 
the will. The sensed object in this way is transformed into a mathematical line or 
form on a coordinate system, which Descartes refers to as extension. Thus the 
world only truly is when it is represented rather than sensed or imagined, that is, 
only when it is factual in a literal sense as something made or constructed 
(Gillespie 2009, 198). 
This is what Taylor (1989, 143) describes as Descartes’ ‘radical’ inward turn, which was 
undertaken to secure a basis for epistemological certainty10. The only certain foundation 
on which to build a stable, secure human life was to render the human substance its 
own creation. It was, as Gillespie (2009, 205) asserts, to make the human life godlike by 
assuming the very characteristics associated with the one true substance—omnipotent 
will. 
With this turn, Descartes rendered the “cosmos an artefact” (Gillespie 2009, 200) —
understood either as a product of, or at least responsive to, human will. In just the same 
way that a craftsman intimately understood his craft, so, too, could we use our 
                                                          
10
 This turn to oneself—to ‘subjective certainty’— is why Descartes’ work was so radical. This departure—
this radical subjectivity—remains unchallenged as a defining characteristic of Descartes’ work, even in 
the recent literature, such as Ahlstrom (2010), Christofidou (2001), and Wee and Pelczar (2008), that 
contests his treatment as doubting the existence of the material world. 
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knowledge of the universe to make ourselves “the masters and possessors of nature” 
(Smith 2004, 590). 
This primacy of the will remained in the midst of Descartes’ accounts of mind and body 
interaction. As two formally equal substances, thought and extension were capable of 
reciprocal influence (Phemister 2006, 149). The sensations experienced through 
extension were, in Descartes’ view, conveyed from body to soul through the pineal 
gland (Ahlstrom 2010; Phemister 2006; Wee and Pelczar 2008). This, however, was no 
direct transfer: rather the sensations were the ‘occasion’ on which the passions were 
activated (Phemister 2006, 155-6; Wee and Pelczar 2008). Far greater emphasis was 
given to the influence of thought over extension, with the human will, as a like 
substance to that of god, able to prompt god to alter the movement of the body 
(Phemister 2006, 157-8). The capacity of god, as the one true incorporeal substance, to 
directly affect extension when human thought lacked that capacity, only served to 
accentuate the identification of substance with the non-corporeal. Thought and 
extension may have been formally equally recognised as substance, but Descartes only 
ever accorded the former any meaningful weight or influence. 
Notwithstanding those texts in which Descartes described the corporeal—the human 
body—as a form of substance, and as interacting or “intermingling” with thought, this 
“unsatisfactory vacillation” (Phemister 2006, 124, 149) did not disrupt the privilege given 
to the non-corporeal. Faced with the brutal, painful traumas of religious conflict, 
Descartes turned from both the material and religious worlds and initiated the epistemic 
turn—the philosophical contemplation—that has shaped so much of modernity. In 
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searching for certainty and freedom from anxiety, Descartes’ body, like Augustine’s, 
was no body. It had in effect ceased to matter: 
We could also call it neutralising the cosmos, because the cosmos is no longer 
seen as the embodiment of meaningful order which can define the good for us. 
And this move is brought about by our coming to grasp the world as 
mechanism...  Gaining insight into the world as mechanism is inseparable from 
seeing it as a domain of potential instrumental control (Taylor 1989, 148-9). 
The corporeal, through the discoveries of science, was reduced to a ready calculation, a 
simple ordering: one that, with the right methodology, demanded so little of us as to 
deserve little recognition. The body was no longer the active, corrupting, seductive, 
threatening influence Augustine imagined, with its demands for a difficult, precarious 
discipline. At best, it formed part of an interaction or union that ended with death, whilst 
Descartes remained convinced that the non-corporeal, in some form, endured. The 
corporeal body was merely a co-incidence, a passing combination with the soul that had 
no direct impact upon it nor future with it (as, for Descartes, the soul continued 
independently of the body after death) (Phemister 2006, 39, 161-2): 
I knew I was substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and 
which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to 
exist. Accordingly this “I” – that is, the soul by which I am what I am – is entirely 
distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not 
fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist (cited in Smith 2004, 588). 
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The corporeal, in Descartes’ view, was not part of the human substance. Its presence, if 
registered, was negligible and temporary, and was so much in the shadow of thought as 
to be almost completely eclipsed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, Augustine and Descartes exemplify the religious character of a long 
standing tradition in Western thought: the flight from the trials and anxieties of painful 
existence by means of a fantasy of godlike domination. With Augustine, the corporeal 
remained present and threatening—a significant, if distressing and perverted, aspect of 
the human substance. There substance was equated with will, and access to that will, 
thereby enabling a blissful life—if only after death—in some incorporeal depth secreted 
within our bodies. In Descartes, that internal, incorporeal location of the human 
substance is located deeper still: so deeply internal to our humanity as to be substance 
in its most traditional sense—that which relies on nothing else. With Descartes, the 
Western search for the human substance—and for some stable foundation upon which 
to engage the trials of existence—led to the inversion that characterises modernity. It 
was but a small step from Descartes’ attribution of godlike powers to humanity and 
treatment of god as distant and disinterested, to treating humanity as god, and capable 
of godlike bliss.  
Together, Augustine and Descartes mark the poles of our struggle with our status as 
corporeal creatures. At one extreme, its pains, limitations and bliss are said to reveal 
the undoing of our godlike substance: the corporeal is prominent and central, but 
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demanding correction and discipline. At the other, the endeavour to reconcile its 
promise and pain is abandoned and, with it, the world external to the will. Contrary to 
Descartes’ vision of a stable, sensible community, the ‘inward turn’ was an act of self-
denial: an abandonment of the effort to live well in the world and the flight to a place of 
fantasy—a fantasy, however, that reflects the lives of few and encourages the pain and 
oppression of many. It is this fantasy which Marx, like Epicurus and Feuerbach before 
him, objected to. It is the very set of tensions—of pleasure and pain, of stability and 
anxiety—that Marx sought to reclaim as central, and as valuable, to our humanity.  
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CHAPTER TWO – Early Influences: Aristotle, Epicurus and Lucretius 
Augustine and Descartes are exemplars of the long-standing rejection of the corporeal 
as essential to the substance of our humanity. That rejection has, however, been 
paralleled by an equally long-standing insistence on matter, or on some material thing, 
as central to our substance. That contest is made plain by an examination of the pre-
Socratic philosophers, and is clearly evident in Aristotle’s own consideration of the 
issues.  
In this chapter, I begin the consideration of those various philosophers whose ideas, 
whether directly or indirectly, significantly influenced Marx’s conception of substance. 
Aristotle stands at a central point in this account. His works clearly engage in the 
traditional debate about substance—that of some  separate, underlying foundation. 
However, having done so in the face of opposing characterisations, and having 
examined the merits of the arguments for and against the inclusion of matter within 
substance, Aristotle’s thought witnesses the tensions that have remained at the heart of 
the tradition, which I called the ‘tradition questions’ in the introduction to this thesis. 
Those questions included the following: How might the experience of limitation and pain 
be reconciled with the security and immutability of substance? Could uncertainty, 
anxiety and pain ever work towards the human good? 
The tensions addressed by these questions are central to Aristotle’s works. He 
recognised, and wrestled with, the desire for certainty and security, as did Epicurus and 
Lucretius. Here, with some of the earliest recorded reflections on the nature of a true or 
74 
 
good human life, we find again the persistent religious beliefs and practices that have 
been central to the Western consideration of substance. In Aristotle and Epicurus, we 
find the longing for the certainty and tranquillity experienced by the gods, lives of 
uninterrupted contemplation or ataraxia. In the works of Aristotle, Epicurus and 
Lucretius, we find a recognition of the inescapable demands of the corporeal—the 
practical demands of life—together with a longing for the life of an immortal, a life free of 
the limitations and uncertainties our humanity constantly confronts. 
Marx confronted these same tensions. He confronted the pain and suffering of the 
emerging proletariat. He refused to accept prescriptions such as those of Malthus, who 
sought to naturalise the experience of poverty, and abandon the pains of the industrial 
poor and working class to extermination through starvation and disease. Marx rejected 
the normalisation of alienation promoted by classical political economy, particularly its 
strategies of abstraction that celebrated the formal freedom of the labourer and ignored 
the devastating impact of exhaustion and hunger in their lives. Marx sought to portray 
the extent to which corporeal pain was not restricted to one part of our being, but 
resonated throughout it, and to that end, engaged with Hegel’s dialectic. He sought a 
language with which to demonstrate the impact of the corporeal as it resonated 
throughout individuals, classes, and societies. He confronted and “inverted” (Marx 1976, 
103) Hegel’s idealism, so as to place the corporeal at the heart of that dialectic, and in 
doing so, drew on those who had previously participated in debates about substance 
and matter, such as Aristotle, Epicurus and Lucretius. Marx’s doctoral thesis, in relation 
to Democritus and Epicurus, is not merely of historical or biographical relevance. 
Rather, I argue that it marks his wrestling with this tension within Hegel’s works with the 
75 
 
aid of his predecessors in this tradition. Aristotle’s influence looms large here too. Hegel 
is said to have considered himself as “Aristotle redividus” (McCarthy 1992, 59; Depew 
1981, 134, 135, 137, 140). They were both dealing with the central issues concerning 
substance. Aristotle looked back to those who preceded him—the pre-Socratic 
philosophers—and confronted the tensions between certainty and change, particularly 
change as driven by the foundational elements of the world. Hegel, centuries later, 
sought to bridge a similar divide between certain and uncertain knowledge. Aristotle, 
like Hegel, discounted the influence of the corporeal, and sought to exorcise its 
unpredictability in order to secure a certain understanding of the world. However, unlike 
Hegel, Aristotle admitted that this goal could not be completely secured. He recognised 
the ongoing, significant influence of the corporeal. Epicurus and Lucretius gave this 
influence even greater scope: they challenged the association of certainty and reliability 
with the non-corporeal, instead placing it in the encounter with the material world. 
Aristotle, Epicurus and Lucretius, on the one hand, and Hegel and Marx (and 
Feuerbach), on the other, all wrestled with the same questions that I present as central 
to the tradition of debate about substance. An examination of the former’s works 
illuminates those of the latter. 
Aristotle, Epicurus and Lucretius all considered the definition and location of substance 
and its relationship to change. Aristotle addressed those questions by relying on the 
notion of potential awaiting actualisation. For Epicurus and Lucretius, it involved a 
validation of desire, coupled with a disciplining of its excesses. For each of them, it 
involved an understanding of being or substance as volatile, as somehow always, 
unavoidably, on the brink of change. It involved a grappling with the meaning of 
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substance and the extent to which it should be characterised in terms of openness and 
inter-dependence, rather than purity, isolation, independence and separation. As I will 
argue here, Aristotle struck a balance in favour of the latter, yet engaged with the 
volatility and challenges of the material world in ways that left that balance open to 
question. Epicurus also gravitated towards the latter, given his emphasis on ataraxia—
freedom from disturbance and anxiety—but Lucretius, drawing on key themes of 
Epicurus’ work, moved in the opposite direction, towards a more open conception of 
being. Each of these writers reflect on the instability of human existence and the 
accompanying anxiety that inspired, and continues to inspire, vigorous debate about the 
character of our humanity. 
The influence of Aristotle, Epicurus and Lucretius on Marx goes well beyond a distant 
illumination. Like so many others in nineteenth century Europe, Marx drew on the works 
of the Ancient Greeks in their search for a better understanding of our humanity, to the 
extent that many of the key terms used by Marx in his discussions of the character of 
humanity, such as ‘capacity’, draw directly on their thought. This is particularly so in 
relation to Marx’s materialism and his views on religion. It is quite easy to view the early 
debates on matter, such as those of the pre-Socratic philosophers sketched in the last 
chapter, through the lens of a Newtonian physics, with passive, inert matter predictably 
following the dictates of some external activation. The Western tradition has long 
located the source of activity or agency outside of matter: however, Aristotle, Epicurus 
and Lucretius did not have so simple a view. Their emphasis on the volatility of matter 
was to profoundly influence Marx and his response to the suffering and oppression he 
witnessed in early industrial Europe. A consideration of the works of Aristotle, Epicurus 
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and Lucretius highlights the centrality and difficulty of securing material needs, and 
suggests why labour, not as a mere footnote in the evolution of human industry, but as 
an ongoing ontological necessity, looms so large in Marx’s works. The works of 
Aristotle, Epicurus and Lucretius also cast Marx’s treatment of religion in a different 
light. Their works suggest that religion was part of the broader flight from the experience 
of uncertainty and instability, and reflects the powerful, pervasive influence of that 
experience. Considered together, Aristotle, Epicurus and Lucretius highlight the 
instability of matter, the difficulties it presents, and the solace provided locating the 
human substance elsewhere, whether in the immaterial or the immortal. Their works 
suggest why beliefs in the non-material essence of humanity continue to be so closely 
held and so vigorously defended. An examination of Epicurus and Lucretius’ thought is 
central to understanding Marx’s views as to how those beliefs might be overcome and 
replaced by a ‘more human language’. 
 
ARISTOTLE 
Aristotle was one of the earliest and most influential contributors to the traditional 
debate about substance. To be substance, in his eyes, required the primacy of 
independence and separation—that the entity be that which underlay all else: “Things 
are called substances in two ways, whatever is the ultimate subject which is no longer 
said of anything else; and whatever, being this so and so is also separable” (Aristotle 
cited in Pike 1999, 32; see also Politis 2004, 198; Shields 2007, 63). This went to his 
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doctrine of the categories, which is not epistemological, but ontological, in its 
presentation and function in his thought. 
This was not the substance Plato meant when he talked about the immaterial forms, nor 
was it what Democritus referred to in his discussion of atomistic materialism. Aristotle 
refused to dismiss the materiality of existence, and yet held that substance was more 
than matter alone. He refused to accept the Platonic dualism and its dismissal of the 
significance of the material, but still sought to recognise the regularities and repetitions 
that patterned the world: he sought a middle ground (Burns 2000, 3, 11; Shields 2007, 
285). That middle ground was to consider substance as a composite of those competing 
models—of matter (hyle) and form (morphe): hylomorphism.  
Aristotle’s work was centrally concerned with the tensions of existence, with the volatility 
and instability—and potential—of substance.  His consideration of the material and 
concrete brought the issue of change to the forefront. Instead of dismissing it as 
evidence of the inessential, Aristotle elevated matter to a necessary, productive role. In 
this way, he rejected the Platonic view of matter as the dross of a temporarily burdened 
existence. He made matter potent—a force that had to be reckoned with: however, as I 
argue here, he did so with such prominence as to limit the persuasiveness of his own 
solutions.  
In valuing the material and particular, Aristotle attributed potency to matter. Matter, 
whilst non-substantial in isolation, was not so much dead weight, as a volatile, change-
laden dimension of being, when combined with form. It became the locus of potential—
of realising substance—as well as its decay and decline: its limitation. Substance, then, 
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comprised an unhappy marriage: bound together, matter and form constituted one 
irreducible being, but one that was bound to decay and dissolve. Pike (1999, 117, 118-
119) described this decay (phthora) as the ultimate, inevitable successful resistance of 
matter to form, with the latter only effecting a temporary ‘dislocation’ of matter, and 
citing Williams’ suggestion that, in Aristotle’s eyes: 
matter is…a negative entity, like a negative charge or a negative number, which 
neutralizes and obliterates, saps and substracts from…form. 
By incorporating matter into substance, Aristotle gave the explanation of change equal 
weight to that of stability. He challenged the foundational and traditional idea that 
substance was free of change. Rather, in characterising life in terms of tension, 
resistance and limitation, change, for Aristotle, was no longer a flaw to be discounted or 
dismissed. However, it was this very characteristic—the volatility of matter—that led him 
to dismiss the atomistic materialists’ treatment of it as substance. In this regard, Shields 
(2007, 259-261) emphasises that, in Aristotle’s eyes, pursuing matter to its purest 
expression was to confront an amorphous, undefinable mass. It was to seek certainty in 
uncertainty, given that which was incapable of being known and incapable of definition. 
Aristotle’s preference for form over matter as the primary substance was founded on 
this demand for certainty. He answered the final tradition question—whether 
uncertainty, anxiety and pain could ever work towards the good—in the negative. He 
held that our capacity to reason depended upon the ability  to distinguish between 
entities, at least in some essential, unchanging respect: it demanded conformity with the 
principle of non-contradiction (that a thing could not be said to both have, and not have, 
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the same characteristic in the same respect at the same time) (Politis 2004, 124). In the 
absence of certainty, Aristotle (1984b, Book IV, 1006a 19-24) held that neither thought 
nor speech was possible.  
The starting point for all such arguments [about the principle of non-contradiction] 
is not the demand that our opponent shall say that something either is or is 
not…but that he shall say something which is significant both for himself and for 
another, for this is necessary, if he really is to say anything. For, if he means 
nothing, such a man will not be capable of reasoning, either with himself or with 
another. 
For Aristotle, the capacity to reason, and thereby know the world, was bound up with 
the existence of independent, identifiable substances: the two were mutually reinforcing 
demands and explanations (Politis 2004). For him, thought, speech and action turned 
on the firm, certain ground of some continuing, predictable substance. His metaphysics 
sought the knowledge of this being or substance in general, foundational terms. Each 
other exploration of a particular kind of being or substance was an application of that 
metaphysics—knowledge of the particular substance’s essential characteristics. This 
certainty then—this form—was the point towards which change was, in his view, 
directed: its ‘flourishing’ or full functionality in terms of those characteristics. Aristotle 
insisted that substance was this definition, understood as a known set of behaviours or 
functions, which he called ‘essence’, and which dictated the ‘form’ of the entity.  
This endeavour, as undertaken by human beings, was central to Aristotle’s work. The 
means by which a human being enjoyed eudaimonia or a ‘flourishing’, good life was the 
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overriding concern of a number of Aristotle’s works, not least of which were the 
Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. It is generally accepted that efforts to that 
end comprised contemplation (theoria), practical wisdom (phroneisis), including politics, 
and the development of character or the virtues (arete), although the precise hierarchy 
of their relationship remains controversial (Lawrence 2006, Shields 2007). 
Aristotle’s consideration of eudaimonia began with his claim that all things are done with 
an end in mind (1984c, 1094a 1-3). This, for human beings, turned on some exercise of 
rationality as the feature that distinguished humans from animals (1984c, 1098a 4). 
Ultimately, Aristotle held out contemplation (theoria) as the highest form of human 
flourishing.11 . Founded in our rationality, it was the one activity where human existence 
approached that of a god. For Aristotle, once you sought that which was unique to our 
humanity, and not shared with other beings, the highest human good was obvious: 
Now if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is 
left but contemplation? Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others 
in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that 
which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness (1984c, 1178b 
20-23). 
However, Aristotle recognised that the volatile character of human life meant that 
enjoying this uncompromised contemplation was rarely, and then only temporarily, 
                                                          
11
 This represents what Meyer (2011) described as the ‘intellectualist’ approach to Aristotle’s work. On 
this approach, practical wisdom serves to support contemplation. This interpretation is hotly contested. 
Others, such as Akrill and Meyer, propose an “inclusivist” approach, which gives contemplation and praxis 
a more equal influence on eudaimonia. Even on the latter interpretation, however, the argument that I 
make in this chapter would remain the same 
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enjoyed: “such a life would be too high for man” (1984c, 1177b 27). As human beings, 
we had to deal with the exigencies of life through the exercise of our practical wisdom. 
This made securing eudaimonia a question of character, of the acquisition and living out 
of the virtues (Ross 1995). The exercise of choice was central to acquiring and 
exercising those virtues. The option chosen was to be appropriate to the object, the 
domain and overall circumstances (Leighton 2011). Just how those ‘appropriate’ 
decisions were to be made was the subject of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. This 
doctrine—whilst still the subject of continuing debate, as evidenced by Lawrence 
(2006), Leighton (2006), Long (2011), Meyer (2011), Shields (2007) and others—
concerns, as Sir David Ross (1995, 202) describes it, the “avoidance of both excess 
and deficit”.  
To have character was to conform to the virtues: it was to successfully engage in an 
ongoing discipline. With regards to the corporeal, it involved the control of feelings or 
passions (pathe) “by the ‘right rule’ or ‘sense of duty’” (Ross 1995, 205; Meyer 2011) or 
in the ‘right way’ (Leighton 2011, 213). For Aristotle (1984c, II.3.1104b 5-10): 
…the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is 
temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent…For moral 
excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains…. 
To fail to discipline the corporeal—to be incontinent (akrasia) —was to be weak-willed. It 
was to live in non-conformity with our human substance. 
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This is not to say that this discipline was always successful. Rather (and this is the 
source of much of the controversy in current scholarship), Aristotle recognised that our 
human condition—in particular our material needs—presented a real distraction from 
contemplation, so much so that much of his work on ethics concerned how we struggled 
in practice to realise that desired state. Notwithstanding Aristotle’s emphasis on the 
ideal of contemplation, his works recognise the prominence of practice and the 
centrality of phronesis (practical wisdom). Once his Ethics are read together with his De 
Anima and Metaphysics, the pervasive influence of Aristotle’s notion of substance and, 
in particular, a consciousness of the underlying instability of human life, becomes clear. 
Aristotle, notwithstanding his insistence that the ideal existence was that of 
contemplation of wisdom already secured—of wisdom that, like substance, was 
complete, independent and separate—recognised that life, as experienced, was an 
insecure striving towards that end.  
Aristotle placed the experience of incompletion, instability and movement at the centre 
of being. He sought to straddle the ideal, desired life of certainty and stability with the 
immanence of movement and change that characterises this life. His concept of 
hylomorphism reconciled the immanence of change with the demand for certain 
knowledge through the concept of potential. The actualisation of the form of a particular 
entity then became the actualisation or expression of a pre-existing, but hidden, 
feature—a potential. Change (metabole) occurred in expression, rather than in 
substance. As Politis (2004, 58) and Waterlow (1982, 36-7, 107) both point out, 
substance, for Aristotle, ceased to comprise stability, but process, at least until the final 
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form was actualised: “something [was then] an acorn only as part of the process of the 
generation of a tree”. 
Delays in that actualisation, then, did not alter the substance of the entity. Substance, or 
being, for Aristotle, whilst reconfigured in terms of process, remained present as 
independent and self-sufficient. Whilst change might only occur in the presence of 
certain external entities, their presence only provided the conditions for the actualisation 
of the pre-existing potential. However, this division between the essential and 
inessential, between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’, tended to blur. In some cases, matter’s 
potential would be triggered—a change result—from the mere presence of the relevant 
condition. Whilst Aristotle reserved a role for some ‘internal’ trigger (such as the will in 
‘rational potentialities’), a significant influence remained for the ‘external’ to trigger the 
realisation of an ‘internal’ potential. Even those ‘rational potentialities’—those in which 
realisation of the potential required an act of will—depended upon the presence of the 
relevant object. Absent those objects, the potential remained inert—something less than 
being. For Aristotle, a person’s ‘internal’ capacity (or ability) did not precede, or exist 
independently of, the ‘external’ object, but only in its presence: a potential became 
actual in the presence of its necessary object. That potential was not merely exercised 
through the use of the object—leaving it available and otherwise ready for use—but 
arose because of the object. Despite his efforts to retain a sense of substance in terms 
of independence, Aristotle’s middle ground made that substance intimately open to the 
influence of that presented as ‘external’ and inessential. 
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 Aristotle’s treatment of these ‘external’ influences captured the defect that their 
absence entailed. Whilst not treated as forming part of the composite substance, the 
absence of those necessary conditions was considered an intimate deprivation—one 
Aristotle described in terms of ‘privation’ and ‘suffering’(pathos) (Waterlow 1982, 119-
120 and 168). Aristotle’s substance, whilst presented in terms of independence, was 
founded in a relationship of deep dependence: absent the requisite ‘external’ conditions, 
a being could not be its full self. It was only independent—substance in traditional 
terms—at the cost of its inadequate or incomplete enjoyment of its character. 
This suggestion of a deep inter-dependence is particularly strong when Aristotle turns to 
consider what comprises substance within the domain of biology. For a biological being, 
‘form’ referred to a creature’s species. Each particular being founded its character—its 
certainty—in its movement towards the exhibition of those behaviours or functions that 
were typical of a healthy or flourishing member of its species. The continuity of the 
substance—of the species form—then turned on its conveyance through the 
reproductive acts of its species’ members, with species-form-substance preserved 
through the cyclical, repeated imprint on unformed matter. The substance of a biological 
being was not located in separation and independence of its individual members, but in 
their species, as constituted and renewed constantly in those members—it depended 
on a process, a way of living and of making new life. Aristotle not only expanded 
substance to incorporate matter, and thereby the processes of change, but extended it 
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beyond the individual instances in which it was actualised to include the broader 
processes of reproduction.12  
Hylomorphism provided Aristotle’s middle ground—it incorporated both stability and 
change. It preserved a semblance of substance as independent and stable by its 
expansion, so as to incorporate change, and its source, matter, into its core: change 
became an internal, pre-ordained characteristic. Matter was then the potential that 
moved towards the actualisation of form.  
Form was, however, not simply the realisation of potential, but its imposition, and the 
exclusion of other potential expressions, other matter/form combinations. In Loux’s 
(2005, 121) view, Aristotle’s theory of biological reproduction involved a process of 
subordination—that “natures impose a top-down organisation on the things that have 
them”. Hand-in-hand with matter’s volatility, Aristotle presented its subordination, 
making the marriage of matter and form not only unhappy, but unequal. Substance and 
subordination became, in Aristotle’s hands, desirable: the stability of being came from 
form disciplining matter. This discipline is equally apparent in Aristotle’s discussion of 
the good human life. His characterisation of good character or virtue implied the 
discipline of the pains and pleasures of corporeality to an appropriate ‘mean’. Moreover, 
Aristotle’s ideal life of contemplation was one that was changeless—one in which, for 
                                                          
12
 Richards (2010) presents a detailed, well-supported argument in favour of interpreting Aristotle’s 
understanding of ‘species’ in processual or ‘development’ terms, rather than in conformity with the 
traditional understanding of substance. He demonstrates how one thousand years of intervening 
interpretations, and the limited availability of the full body of Aristotle’s works, promoted the latter 
outcome. A broader consideration of Aristotle’s thought, in particular that concerned with biology, reveals 
a “functional approach” that “focuses on the relation between the parts of an organism, an environment, 
and way of life” (2010, 27). Richards (2010, 30) acknowledges the ambiguity in Aristotle’s works, but, as I 
have argued, presents this as arising from “a fundamental tension in Aristotle’s epistemology – the 
tension between being as particular, and knowledge as universal”. 
87 
 
however brief a time, one did not need to wrestle with the practical exigencies of life. 
Whether that experience was, without qualification, superior to the dominant experience 
of life as pre-occupied with practical demands, or of equal status, remains the focus of 
much scholarly debate. That very debate, however, reflects the tensions that Aristotle 
addressed so directly in his work—the contest between what was to be valued in a 
human life, and the role of the material world in it. Unlike Plato and others who treated 
our corporeality as something inessential and contaminating, Aristotle strove to 
recognise its inescapable influence. Like his predecessors, however, he could not treat 
that corporeality as somehow bound up with what is best in us. He continued to 
privilege the non-corporeal as that which partook of the divine. Because of this, 
notwithstanding his pragmatism, there remains a kind of brutality in Aristotle’s work. His 
insistence on definition meant that relations of domination and subordination were the 
very threads by which there could be a fully human life. His insistence on certainty as a 
precondition to thought or action made oppression characteristic of those thoughts and 
actions. His vision of the happy or perfect human life as one of virtuous effort—the 
endeavour to secure one’s pleasures and pains within a modest ‘mean’—remained 
founded in a devaluation of the corporeal.  It was this dimension of Aristotle’s works that 
Hegel, and then Marx, revisited and re-worked. 
Aristotle’s composite category of hylomorphism remained a ‘sleight of hand’. He gave 
matter prominence and potency, yet sentenced it to a life-long discipline of form. He 
sketched a middle way, but one that relied upon a purported internalisation, definition 
and confinement of the tensions of being, rather than an acceptance of their essential 
character. Moreover, Aristotle’s approach to our corporeality involved far more than a 
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philosophical exercise. It was an attempted reconciliation with the demands of life that 
could only be upheld at the cost of an economy of the same, and through the imposition 
of a hierarchical teleology. Aristotle’s selection of form as substance closed off 
possibilities in order to ensure conformity to previously known traits: it limited substance 
to what was already known, and those features were restricted to those perceived to be 
unique to the substance. It limited what was recognisably good or virtuous in our 
humanity. It converted difference and diversity into deficiency and defect or, at least, 
infancy. Moreover, in seeking certainty, it assumed the original accuracy of that 
definition, of those lists of features, arriving (unsurprisingly) at the very place it began. In 
so doing, it had the potential to normalise that which was, in fact, defective. 
It was this flaw that Hegel was to later criticise. Hegel argued that Aristotle’s 
consideration of substance was limited and distorted by his acceptance of the practice 
of slavery in his time. Depew (1992, 68) and others have argued that Aristotle could not 
reconcile the tensions between matter and form because his society, and the way of life 
prized by him, was founded on the suppression of the corporeal. Matter, and its 
demands, was devalued and, in practice, ignored through its imposition on others—
slaves and women—together with a sustained denial of their claims on their 
beneficiaries (that is, those who enjoyed the benefits of their labours). Aristotle held that 
to be truly human and deserving of citizenship was to be free of necessity (1984a, III, 
1278a 8-11), thus free to enjoy a life of contemplation, and that this freedom was justly 
secured through the enslavement of others (1984a, I, 1253b 15-23). For Aristotle, a 
slave was “a living possession” (1984a, I, 1253b32) and “a part of the master, a living 
but separated part of his bodily frame” (1984a, I, 1255b 11-12), a mere living tool (an 
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organon) that did not warrant equal recognition or valuation, as a slave lacked the 
“deliberative faculty” (1984a, I, 1260a 13-14) that defined humanity. A slave was less 
human, making his subordination, like that of matter to form, a part of the natural order: 
there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects...for in all things which form a 
composite whole...a distinction between the ruling and the subject element 
comes to light...A living creature consists in the first place of soul and body, and 
of the two, the one is by nature the ruler and the other the subject...And therefore 
we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for 
in him we shall see the true relation of the two; although in bad or corrupted 
natures the body will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an 
evil and unnatural condition...the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not 
very different; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life (Aristotle 
1984a, I, 1254a 24 – 1254b 25). 
In Aristotle’s (1984a, I, 1253b 25) eyes, “no man [could] live...unless he is provided with 
necessities”. Equally, humans only realised their human potential to the extent they 
were freed from concern with those ‘necessities’ (hence his idea that theoria was a 
pursuit only for scholiae or gentlemen). To be human was to be both matter and form, 
but the substance of our humanity was located in the latter (the dominance of reason). 
To have truly embraced the inter-dependence of matter and form would have placed 
Aristotle on the path to challenging the institution of slavery—the very means by which 
he enjoyed freedom from necessity. 
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Aristotle sought a more direct engagement with the influence of change within our 
world. In refusing to adopt the eternal, fixed forms of Plato’s universals, Aristotle brought 
matter and, with it, change and inter-dependence to the very centre of substance. 
However, when confronted with a choice between the need for certainty and stability on 
the one hand, and on the other, the uncertainties and volatilities of life, he gravitated to 
the former. When considering the nature of a good human life, notwithstanding his 
recognition of the demands of life, it was the godlike stability and perfection of 
contemplation that he privileged. Aristotle presented substance as involving an intimate 
interdependence, but on unequal terms, with form dominating matter. Likewise, he 
recognised the fleeting enjoyment of contemplation—and its restriction to few people—
but maintained the godlike status of contemplation. These stances arguably accurately 
reflected Aristotle’s own dependence upon the institution of slavery for the way of life he 
preferred and celebrated—one free of the demands of ‘necessity’. Nevertheless, having 
brought matter, change and uncertainty to the centre of the debate, matter, true to the 
character he gave it, retained its potency and its resistance to the neat confines he 
sought to impose on it via form. Matter, in Aristotle’s hands, transformed the character 
of substance, shifting it from the firm, fixed substrata towards process, flux and inter-
dependence. Matter, as inadequate alone in his eyes, yet still essential to existence, 
became goal-orientated, moving, yearning, needing something alien yet intimate. As 
such, corporeality remained a compromise in our character: something, so long as we 
strove to live a human life, we also strove to restrict and resist, even if by imposition of 
its care and management on others. Aristotle, in seeking to defend a stable, well-
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defined, certain substance, left a legacy that Marx would avail himself of in developing 
his own vision of substance and of its ties to oppression. 
 
EPICURUS  
By contrast, Epicurus developed far less ambiguous answers to the question of 
substance. In his view, matter was substance, and social beliefs were the source of 
troubling, oppressive experience. His emphasis on matter as substance and his critique 
of religion as one of the sources of harmful social beliefs was central to Marx’s own 
doctoral research. The foundations of those emphases, however, have been less fully 
considered by those scholars who have considered Marx’s own consideration of 
religion, such as Foster, Clark and York (2008), McKinnon (2005) and Toscano 
(2010)13. In particular, Epicurus’ emphasis on the character of substance (and hence 
humanity) as material and mortal was part of a broader organising theme of limitation, 
while more fully developed by Lucretius, has not been actively explored. The social and 
religious beliefs that Epicurus and Lucretius criticised involved a flight from accepting 
limitation. That flight, moreover, depended upon that very experience—the direct, 
                                                          
13
 These writers have tended to focus on Marx’s immediate predecessors, such as the Young Hegelians 
and Feuerbach, and on Marx’s critique of Feuerbach, given the latter’s influential works on religious 
thought. As regards the latter, McKinnon (2005) and Toscano’s (2010) presentation of Marx’s adaptation 
of Feuerbach’s critique of religion echoes the well-established treatment of Marx abandoning Feuerbach’s 
works as essentialist and contemplative. I critique this limited engagement with Feuerbach in Chapter 
Five. Neither McKinnon nor Toscano explored the influence of earlier philosophers, including Epicurus 
and Lucretius, although Toscano (2010, 18) expressly acknowledges that his article did not deal with “the 
Marxian response to the idea of ineliminable anthropological basis to religious phenomenon”. McKinnon 
(2005) explored the various nineteenth century interpretations of ‘opium’ as a way into Marx’s views. He 
emphasised the status of opium as an almost ‘unquestioned good’ for medicinal purposes, and the 
manner in which Marx’s usage clearly connected it to the pain produced by capitalism. The consideration 
of pain, and religious responses to it, is only considered in that historical context, and with reference to 
philosophical works produced in that same period. Marx’s works have not been interpreted in their 
broader, longer term context, as drawing on Epicurus and Lucretius. 
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troubling experience of limitation, whereby the senses not only challenged pre-existing 
beliefs, but suggested better grounded alternatives. For Epicurus and Lucretius, the 
objections to the influence of uncertainty, anxiety and pain that are central to the 
traditional debate about substance were ill-founded: those experiences were, contrary 
to the traditional approach, essential to the promotion of a good life. The role of the 
corporeal encounter with pain, which promoted a different, more inter-dependent sense 
of substance, suggests an explanation for Marx’s confidence in the transformative 
potential of extreme alienation. It is also this very same potential—this troubling, 
challenging character of corporeal experience and desire—that suggests that anxiety 
and the temptation to flee the experience of limitation are, and will remain, a feature of 
the human condition. The impact of corporeal pain suggests not only why Marx saw the 
promise of transformation in alienation, but why that potential may be far broader and 
accessible than Marx himself appreciated.  
Epicurus argued that the failure to accept that all substance, including humanity, was 
comprised of aggregates of material atoms, was the foundation of much human 
suffering. He argued that the inability to accept our involvement in the natural world, 
and, with it, our mortal, limited character, was the cauldron within which desires were 
transformed into insatiable, self-defeating, anxious appetites and, with them, a life of 
ataraxia—freedom from disturbance and anxiety—transformed into a troubled, 
oppressive one.  
As natural beings, Epicurus saw humanity as desiring beings which, like animals, only 
sought objects that were ordinarily accessible to them. The Epicurean philosophy of 
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living within these natural limits was a key theme: living within these limitations was the 
key to an anxiety-free life (Asmis 2008, 144; De Lacy 1969, 106, 109). Needs, within 
these ‘natural’ limits, were restricted and readily satisfied. Epicurus, in his letter to 
Menoeceus (cited in Inwood and Gerson 1994, 29-31), emphasised that: 
…when we are not in pain, then we no longer need pleasure…simple flavours 
provide a pleasure equal to that of an extravagant lifestyle when all pain from 
want is removed…when we say that pleasure is the goal we do not mean the 
pleasures of the profligate or the pleasures of consumption…but rather lack of 
pain in the body and disturbance in the soul…. 
However, unlike animals, humans had come to value those pleasures that extended 
beyond those ‘natural’ limits. Nussbaum (2009, 149-154, 212, 261) characterises these 
as pleasures that are extended over time—particularly the extension of human life, 
which was expressed in the pursuit of an after-life—in passionate, erotic love, and in the 
acquisition of wealth, status and power. Epicurus criticised the ‘opinions of the many’ 
and their desire for immortality: 
…a correct knowledge of the fact that death is nothing to us makes the mortality 
of life a matter for contentment, not by adding a limitless time…but by removing 
the longing for immortality… (Letter to Menoeceus cited in Inwood and Gerson 
1994, 29). 
However, believing these larger pleasures to be within our grasp, human beings sought 
to secure impossible goals—they invested in desires that were incapable of fulfilment 
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(‘empty desires’). In Epicurus’ view, human society had become obsessed and distorted 
by these ‘empty’ desires, and preoccupied with their impossible satisfaction. In addition 
to irrational behaviour, on the list of harms attendant on these false beliefs, Nussbaum 
(2009, 103, 197) included subservience to religious leaders and the harms done to 
others in religion’s name. This understanding of religion—as founded in an inability to 
accept our material, mortal character, and as the foundation for anxiety and 
oppression—was to be a key influence on Marx’s thought, particularly through 
Feuerbach’s works. 
The appropriate strategy, in Epicurus’ eyes, was to understand ourselves as part of 
nature: that is, as mortal and limited. This, at its most basic, turned on an appreciation 
of atomistic physics. Epicurus believed the universal substance was constituted out of 
atoms: all beings were ultimately comprised of atoms. These atoms, in Epicurus’ view, 
were in constant motion and repeatedly collided with each other: 
…and the atoms move continuously for all time, some recoiling far apart from 
one another [following collision] and others, by contrast, maintaining a [constant] 
vibration when they are locked into a compound… (Epicurus’ letter to Herodotus, 
cited in Inwood and Gerson 1994, 7-8). 
Understanding life—and death—relied on understanding this physics. In this view, death 
was not an end or discontinuity, but simply a transformation. Understanding this 
physics, and thereby death, was Epicurus’ antidote to existential anxiety. This freedom 
from anxiety about finitude was also expected to free humanity of other ‘empty desires’, 
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including the lust for love, wealth, status and power, and the oppressions justified in 
their names.  
Nussbaum (2009, 115) presents Epicurean therapy as relying on rationality to dispel 
false beliefs and thereby to dissolve ‘empty desires’. A key element of this discipline 
involved the disproof of religious beliefs and other misconceptions so as to promote a 
sense of self—and substance—as immersed in and contained by the natural world. 
That same discipline involved a removal from the social world as the source of false 
beliefs and of suffering—the social, in Epicurus’ view, was not part of our substance. 
The cure from distorting social beliefs, then, involved a move towards social self-
sufficiency through the total immersion in Epicurean philosophy: it relied on making 
Epicureanism a way of life and the exclusion of different ways or philosophies of life. In 
short, it involved a form of social separation. For Epicurus: 
The most unalloyed source of protection from men, which is secured to some 
extent by a certain force of expulsion, is in fact the immunity which results from a 
quiet life and the retirement from the world (Principal Doctrine No 14, cited in 
Vitzthum 1995, 30). 
This cure did not rely on rationality or philosophical argument alone. Instead, 
anticipating the emphases of later materialists (including Feuerbach and Marx), 
Epicurus treated the senses as “heralds of the truth” (cited by Schaffer 2006, 43, 98). 
The senses were the reliable point of access to our natural state—our substance—once 
freed from distorting social influences: “Every sensation [was] its own verification” 
(Schafer 2006, 43). There was, as Nussbaum (2009, 110) has put it, “truth in the body”. 
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In particular, in extremity, sensation served to disrupt the circularity of rationalisation—
the sensuous could force us to make different sense of our experiences and overcome 
false, distorting, unsettling social beliefs. Nussbaum (2009, 199) describes these 
dramatic corporeal encounters as “moments of truth” with particular influence as the 
“force of [the] event” strips “bare” our life and penetrates our habits, leaving the 
“soul…raw and unprotected, simply perceiving itself”. 
The measure of this good for Epicurus—indeed the greater and enduring good—was 
the enjoyment of serenity or ataraxia, understood as freedom from disturbance and 
anxiety (Gillespie 2008, 140; Nussbaum 2009, 109). This was secured by the reduction 
of the scope of our desires to those readily and quickly satisfied: for Epicurus (Inwood 
and Gerson 1994, 29), “what is good is easy to get”. Nussbaum (2009, 213) explains 
the Epicurean view of natural pleasures as those which are immediately satisfied and 
not involving an extended period of effort and time. They were not “vulnerable to 
interruption” and to the “accidents of life”. This, however, was to seek to not only escape 
the ‘empty desires’ prompted by false social beliefs, but to escape desire in its totality. 
Epicurus’ insistence on living simply was to reduce desire and its pains to some tame, 
domesticated experience that knew none of desire’s demanding character.  
Whilst not quite removed from our experience, Epicurus’ tamed desires still spoke of a 
humanity enjoying a godlike existence. These ‘tamed desires’ evoked humanity in the 
terms of the traditional debate about substance: as independent and separate from the 
world, rather than immersed within it. Instead of a full embrace of humanity, a full 
immersion in nature, Epicurus preferred a society better characterised by self-
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sufficiency, than by interaction or interdependence. It was the world Epicurus strived to 
create in his famed garden—one with limited social interaction, and certainly one 
removed from diversity and contradiction. It was a world which, like Aristotle’s, 
sustained the practice of slavery, so as to free Epicurus’ community to enjoy labour’s 
fruits without its difficulties (Baronovitch 1992, 169). In the face of the contradictions 
within his thought—between a life modelled on nature and that modelled on a god, 
Epicurus’ reconciliation weighed towards the latter. Epicurus, in the face of the 
experience of pain and limitation by virtue of social relationships, still engaged in a flight 
much like that involved in religious thought. As Marx (2006b, 106, emphasis in original) 
was to later observe: 
Epicurus confesses finally that his method of explaining aims only at the ataraxy 
of self-consciousness, not of knowledge of nature in and for itself. 
Epicurus relied on his physics as a means by which humans might pry loose of the 
exaggerations of society. He promoted it as a means to return to a more natural, limited 
life. His physics, with its emphasis on participation in nature, was a means to promote a 
withdrawal from society and to secure that tranquillity of life commonly enjoyed by the 
gods. 
 
LUCRETIUS 
Lucretius, a Roman follower of Epicurus in the first century BCE, whilst adhering to 
Epicurus’ core directions, found less appeal in emulating the lives of the gods. He 
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pursued Epicurus’ core themes, but applied Epicurus’ naturalism much more 
thoroughly, emphasising our participation in, and vulnerability to, the natural world to a 
much greater extent. The volatility of the natural world of atoms was one that Lucretius 
presented as applying to our social world and, unlike Epicurus, as holding promise in 
addressing our anxieties. The social world was not simply the exaggeration or distortion 
of natural need. Rather, in just the same way that Epicurus held that we could learn to 
live well by reference to the physical structure of the world, Lucretius suggested that we 
could learn by paying attention to the most intimate of our social relationships. As Asmis 
(2008, 144, 149) has pointed out, Lucretius merged his physics and ethics so as to 
“transform Epicurean physics into an ethical system”. For Lucretius, participation and 
limitation not only characterised the physical, but the social worlds: a true human life 
was not one of withdrawal or self-sufficiency, but of intimate, often painful, involvement. 
So accurately and passionately did he portray the latter through his poetry, and so long 
has the West been troubled by the power of sexual desire, that it has only been 
relatively recently that his great work has not been dismissed as the drunken or 
poisoned excesses of an erotically distorted mind. Rather than focus on the distant and 
tranquil gods to gain insight into our fullest humanity, Lucretius focussed on the intimate 
dramas of sexual and emotional intimacy. He drew us closer to embracing the value 
and promise of our corporeality. 
Lucretius developed Epicurus’ response to pain and limitation in a novel direction. He 
embraced its difficulties, and its delights, and characterised our humanity in terms of 
social interdependence rather than self-sufficiency. Rather than treat desire as that 
which takes us outside our selves, as a force which, if not readily reckoned with, 
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becomes a threat, Lucretius presented desire as a source of unity and connection 
(Nussbaum 2009, 158-9). He gave it a much larger, more constructive, and enduring 
role in substance. Rather than treat limitation as mere restriction, Lucretius “transformed 
Epicurean physics” and made limitation “a unifying [and enabling] principle” (Asmis 
2008, 144). 
This is not to deny the vision of atomistic physics that Lucretius shared with Epicurus. 
For Lucretius, all being was comprised of atomistic matter, constantly engaged in 
collisions and movement (Greenblatt 2011; Vitzthum 1995). Moreover, there were no 
set forms or purposes driving those collisions and occasional resulting combinations of 
atoms. Life involved “ceaseless creation and destruction, governed entirely by chance” 
(Greenblatt 2011, L2960). The “swerve” —the movement from the straight line or direct 
fall—of atoms was the “most minimal” and “unexpected, unpredictable movement of 
matter” (Greenblatt 2011, L2973 and 179). It was the maverick element that denied any 
role for gods, for the sustained experience of ataraxia, or escape from limitation and 
pain.  
Lucretius’ characterisation of this instability as productive or enabling also reflected the 
concern he shared with Epicurus as to the manner in which social beliefs distorted 
human desires. As Greenblatt (2011, L3029) has pointed out, Lucretius shared 
Epicurus’ vision of all human beings as driven by a deep “craving for security”. Those 
anxieties fed the creation and maintenance of delusions of flight from mortality—of 
projections of “images of the power and beauty and perfect security that they would like 
to possess” (Greenblatt 2011, L3049-53). Like Epicurus, Lucretius did not see pain as 
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the principal obstacle to a good life, but delusion (Greenblatt 2011,L3089). It was the 
disastrous effects of fantasies of erotic love, however, that featured centrally in In 
Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things). Here, Nussbaum (2009, 173) has highlighted 
how Lucretius characterised erotic love as demanding unity—a fusion of the lover and 
the beloved: 
For e’en on the verge of consummation, with a vague unrest doth shift the lovers’ 
passion, as they doubt what first with hands or eyes they should enjoy. What 
they have grasped they tightly press, and e’en give pain unto its body, and 
ofttimes clash teeth on lips as mouth on mouth they crush, since tainted is their 
pleasure, and beneath lie secret stings, that goad them on to hurt the very thing, 
whate’er it be, whence spring these germs of madness (Lucretius 1946, 4. 1079-
89). 
Lucretius understood this excessive love as driven by the lovers’ pain and insecurity. 
The lover seeks to secure his position by what Nussbaum (2009, 173-4) sees as the 
complete possession or control of the other. This was a demand, however, that literally 
could not be met. Our corporeal condition placed boundaries on the depth of fusion and 
unity that can be achieved sexually.  
These same social beliefs, in promoting unrealistic expectations of one’s lovers, also 
imposed demands that could not be met, absent deceit and distance. They were 
demands for the presentation of an appearance in conformity with social standards of 
beauty and desire. Lucretius understood them to involve fantasies of perfection and the 
divine (Nussbaum 2009, 174-5). They were also demands that required time apart and, 
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if not satisfied, often extinguished desire. Nussbaum’s account of this loss of lust brings 
home another of the key continuities between the work of Epicurus and Lucretius: the 
emphasis on the senses as ‘heralds of the truth’ and that, in certain circumstances, the 
experience of pain was essential to the good. Lucretius wrote of lust lost on 
encountering the beloved’s experience of menstruation: 
But let her be as fine of face as she can be and let the power of Venus arise from 
all her limbs, still...she...reeks...of foul odours...the tearful lover...if he were..let in, 
and if just one whiff of that smell should meet him as he came in, he would think 
up a good excuse to go away...Nor are our Venuses in the dark about this. That’s 
why they are all the more at pains to conceal the backstage side of their lives 
from those whom they want to keep held fast in love. All for nothing, since you 
can still drag it all into the light of your mind, and look into the 
reasons...and...overlook all this in your turn, and yield to human life (Lucretius 
cited in Nussbaum 2009, 178). 
This was, in the most direct terms, an encounter with the corporeal. It was also, in 
Lucretius’ view, a prompt towards a different form of love—a different foundation for a 
relationship that valued the person over the fantasy. It was a sensual encounter, a 
difficult encounter that prompted a different view of ourselves and others: one that 
prompted us to ‘yield to human life’. Nussbaum (2009, 185) has presented this as a 
challenge “to attend to the everyday and make it an object of delight”. Not only did the 
encounter with the sensual challenge our ordinary beliefs, but it intimated the form of 
alternative beliefs. In the case of erotic love, it prompted a greater recognition of one’s 
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partner and the possibility of love founded in a greater mutuality, a greater reciprocity of 
pleasure, than erotic love’s calls for possession and incorporation. Here, in embryo, 
were ideas that, nearly two millennia later, Marx would seize on in his account of how 
human emancipation might take place. 
This ‘yielding to our humanity’, however, complicated life and the capacity to enjoy 
ataraxia. Nussbaum (2009, 187) has emphasised how: 
this new attachment to marriage and the family leads Lucretius to defend as 
valuable a way of life that does not seem to be the one best suited for individual 
ataraxia, since it includes many risks and possibilities for loss and grief...by 
describing a marital relationship that is, in effect, a form of philia, 
Lucretius...considerably widened the sphere of the good person’s need and 
interdependency. 
Lucretius promoted a deeper embrace of our mortality and sensuality than Epicurus. He 
suggested a more consistent recognition of the senses as ‘heralds of the truth’ arguing 
of a truth founded on a deeper integration into the natural world than Epicurus imagined. 
His was a vision of the truly human life as increasingly involved and inter-dependent—a 
life in which desire and anxiety were permanent, difficult features, but heralding the 
possibility of a richer human life by virtue of those difficulties, rather than their 
avoidance. 
It was a life that addressed the pressing fear of death and the attraction of religious 
thought; an approach that reconciled the tensions within Epicurean thought between a 
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life modelled on nature and one modelled on a god. Epicurean physics demonstrated 
that to be human was to not only be a part of nature, but to exceed it through gaining 
comprehensive knowledge of it. This knowledge did not change our material 
character—our sensation of experience—but did enable a change in the sense we 
made of that character. Nussbaum (2009, 216-7) has presented this knowledge of the 
whole as enabling one to reduce the impact those limitations on one’s actions.  
The experience and acceptance of limitation—and of uncertainty, anxiety and pain—
provided, as Asmis (2008, 144, 149) put it, “enabling conditions rather than constraints”. 
This expanded sense of inter-relation, however, was no secure achievement. Despite 
his confidence in the revelations ‘heralded’ by the senses, both Greenblatt (2011) and 
Nussbaum (2009, 264) see Lucretius as imagining our existence as remaining unstable. 
Epicurean physics presented that interdependence as a fragile unity, one that was not 
free of strife. Asmis (2008, 148) emphasises here that atoms collided until some pattern 
and stability emerged, and continued, within that unity, to tend towards some fresh 
conflict: 
… [the] fixing of boundaries brings a condition of stability. At the same time, each 
created thing continues to be engaged in strife with its neighbours. This 
competition is vital to the existence of each created thing; for it receives 
reinforcement from its neighbours, just as it gives up something of itself to them. 
This was not a rigid, confining unity, but a constitutive, enabling one. Within its 
confines—its limits—variation, spontaneity and freedom were experienced: De Lacy 
104 
 
(1969, 107-108) described this as “the domain of...swerve”. The swerve of the atom 
emphasised by Epicurus, and later noted as a key distinction from the atomism of 
Democritus, suggests a form of enabling through interdependence, rather than freedom 
from all limitation: according to De Lacy (1969, 108-9), “its consequences [do] not 
disrupt the fixed limits of natural processes but must only add variety within those 
limits”. This correlation of intimacy and tension, when translated to social relationships, 
founded Nussbaum’s final comments on Lucretius in The Therapy of Desire: 
It appears, then, that no development in the direction of a gentler and, in a sense, 
less bestial life – no advance towards more responsiveness to the claims of 
others, to more complex forms of interdependence – is without its cost. For each 
new softening brings new fears and dependencies; and each new complex 
device of protection generates attachments that lead the soul into increasing 
anxiety for itself and its own – and, from anxiety, all too often, into competitive 
and hostile raging (2009, 268). 
This is the rub of desire: the experience of being incomplete and needy and the demand 
that we learn to live with it—we learn that “a human life is necessarily vulnerable and 
incomplete” (Nussbaum 2009, 275) and not the stable, secure, self-sufficient entity that 
the traditional debate about substance imagined. “The atoms”, Lucretius insisted, “wage 
war that started when boundless time began” (cited in Vitzthum 1995, 39). Centuries 
later, Marx (2006b, 92), in his doctoral consideration of Lucretius’ work, recognised that, 
instead of immunity and continuity: 
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Decay itself is prefigured in the living, its shape should therefore be just as much 
grasped in its specific characteristic as the shape of life. 
Limitation and inter-dependence were, for both Lucretius and Marx, essential, and 
promising, characteristics of substance. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Epicurus and Lucretius, like Aristotle, sought a more direct engagement with the 
influence of change within our world. Grasping desire more acutely than Aristotle, 
Epicurus made its acceptance and its limitation the theme of his effort to secure an 
anxiety-free existence. However, like Aristotle, his confrontation with the openness and 
interdependence expressed by desire led to an incomplete recognition. Epicurus’ 
immersion in nature was a partial one, limiting the intimacy and compulsion of desire 
and asserting a freedom from adverse social influences. It failed to recognise that the 
very character of desire was a source of social unity and of mutual recognition. It is this 
emphasis that characterises Lucretius’ revision of his work. In an expanded application 
of Epicurus’ own commitment to recognising our intimate involvement in the natural 
world, Lucretius suggested its simultaneous parallels in the social world.  
Together, the work of Epicurus and Lucretius, like Aristotle’s, laid down lines of thought 
which would prove to be central to Marx’s own conception of the human substance, 
particularly his reliance on the potency and productivity of our corporeal experience. In 
their works lie suggestions of the sources and meaning of Marx’s later musings, with 
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their emphasis on the centrality of desire, of the material, and on our intimate 
participation in the natural and social worlds. In their critique of religious thought lie 
themes later developed by Feuerbach, that greatly influenced Marx, including their 
characterisation of that thought as the frustrated flight from limitation, and that a human 
life is one characterised by limitation, uncertainty and anxiety. Their valuation of the 
senses, too, as the ‘heralds of the truth’, is also illuminating, and suggests that 
confronting limitation was not merely the goad to a rational review of our sense of self, 
but to the very transformation of our rationality, with a transformative impact of 
comparable depth to Marx’s vision of alienation. Within their works, matter rose in 
prominence and influence, becoming a central feature of substance, if not defining it. 
The volatility and resistance of matter loomed larger too, and, with it, the pervasive 
influence of uncertainty and anxiety, and the repeated human efforts to evade it. They 
presented the human substance as more open, more involved and more vulnerable. 
Limitation and involvement, or inter-dependence, rather than the freedom and immunity 
suggested by the traditional debate about substance, came to characterise Epicurean 
thought, with Lucretius’ influence. Not only were we deeply immersed in nature, but in 
each other, in all the varied forms our societies conjured up. In Lucretius’ eyes, the 
substance of our being—the relationships and boundaries that constitute, define and 
enable us—strays well beyond the boundaries of any individual. Like Aristotle before 
them, where the incorporation of matter, and hence change, into substance prompted 
an expanded boundary of substance—one that extended to the species—Epicurean 
thought prompted a vision of substance as exceeding the individual again, and as 
deeply immersed in both the natural and social worlds. Substance could not be defined 
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in terms of independence and separation: it had somehow become trans-individual, 
both of and exceeding any particular being. 
The influence of these suggestions was not developed for centuries after Aristotle, 
Epicurus and Lucretius considered them. With the adoption of Christianity as the state 
religion of the Roman empire in the third century, the influence of Epicurean thought 
waned. The rise of the dominance of Christian thought throughout the West led to a 
near complete suppression of works that valued the corporeal. The religious trends 
evident in Aristotle and Epicurus’ thought, with their identification of the human 
substance with the non-corporeal divine, came to dominate Western Christianity, as 
exemplified by Augustine’s thought in the fourth and fifth centuries. It was not until the 
late eighteenth century that one could safely refer to Epicurus in public, and even then it 
could attract severe, and ongoing, censure. Greenblatt (2011) has traced the efforts 
through which the works of Epicurus and Lucretius once more entered broader debates, 
and highlighted the ferocity with which they were opposed. In 1549, the Catholic Church 
had considered placing Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura on the Index of Prohibited Books 
(Greenblatt 2011, L3586). Later that century, Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake for 
defending its claims. In 1632, the Society of Jesus condemned the doctrine of atoms 
(Greenblatt 2011, L4019). Later that century, the ordeals and trial of Galileo evidenced 
the continued extremity of the opposition and the consequences of challenging it. That 
opposition, and its savagery, continued through the seventeenth century, when 
Spinoza, whose work is considered in the next chapter, lived and worked. Whilst not 
attracting punishment by death in the eighteenth century, so deeply influential did 
Christian dogma remain, that the same attempts at censure shaped much of Marx’s 
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time and that of some of his immediate influences, preventing many of them securing 
academic positions. So deeply wrought are our anxieties about the instabilities and 
pains of life, that the threats to our sources of comfort and security have, and continue 
to, provoke some of the worst in us. 
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CHAPTER THREE – Substance Transformed:  
Spinoza, Leibniz and the Romantic Movement 
 
Hegel claimed that “one must first be a Spinozist” in order to engage in philosophy 
(cited in Beiser 1993, 4, Negri 1991, 140-1). Spinoza’s work is central to my argument, 
as it provides insights into the foundations of the totalising concept of substance that 
subsequently shaped Hegel and Marx’s thought. That influence, aside from some brief 
references, is not immediately obvious, although both Hegel and Marx were familiar 
with, and praised, Spinoza’s thought (Beiser 1993, 4; Casarino 2011, L2547, Levine 
2012; Vardoulakis 2011, L67).  
Spinoza led the modern challenge to the traditional debate about substance and, in 
particular, its characterisation of genuine being with independence. Jonathan Israel 
(2006, 46), for example, has emphasised that Spinoza’s: 
...one-substance doctrine...eliminates the traditional view that man consists of a 
separate substance, or combination of substances, thereby possessing a 
specially close and significant relation to God...[and removing] the ontological 
gulf between man and other creatures and products of nature. 
It is for this reason that Feuerbach (1986, 24) and Hegel credited him with beginning 
modern philosophy. Jonathan Israel (2009, 240) has characterised Spinoza as having 
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had an “unparalleled...role as a key progenitor of the Radical Enlightenment”, as his 
equation of god and nature was understood by many as an assertion of reason to the 
exclusion of religion and superstition.  
Radical as his views were, Spinoza still worked within the traditional debate about 
substance. He rigorously pursued its key feature—that only that which enjoyed self-
sufficiency could be substance—and consistently argued that only one entity, god or 
nature, met that demand. Working within the traditional arguments for substance, 
Spinoza inverted it: no longer was there a multiplicity of independent entities, but rather, 
there was one totality with a range of entities or beings that formed part of it, were 
dependent on it (and each other), and gave expression to it. Spinoza made 
interdependence the common feature of being, with each such being interrelated with 
other beings by virtue of their common participation in, and dependence on, the totality.  
Having inverted the traditional location of substance, Spinoza had also shifted the locus 
of being. That locus, for particular beings, was no longer internal but external—bound 
up with its relations with other beings and the particular configurations or modes of 
those relations from time to time. Beings were no longer closed entities but radically 
open, dependent upon and vulnerable to each other. No longer was being founded in 
independence and self-sufficiency, but need. In Spinoza, we find the vision of the totality 
that was to inform both Hegel and Marx’s works. We find the architecture Marx used to 
construct his vision of humanity, with its deep dependence on the mode of production. 
This is not to claim that Marx drew directly on Spinoza. Rather, I argue that Marx 
received these insights through a range of intermediaries, and ultimately, Hegel. My 
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argument is that Spinoza initiated the radical re-orientation of the debate, and provided 
the soil in which Hegel’s, and then Marx’s, ideas grew. This transmission is not readily 
apparent: in part, this is because of the style in which Spinoza presented his work, 
drawing on the forms of mathematical argument that appear far from the more organic 
language that was to characterise Marx’s work. This genealogy is also difficult to follow 
because Spinoza’s infamy made any public defence of his works dangerous. To baldly 
equate god and nature, as Spinoza did, was fraught with risk, as it challenged one of 
the common Christian (and Jewish) dogmas that there was a creator god who was 
independent of his creation. Given the close alignment of so much political authority 
with the Christian churches in seventeenth-century Europe, Spinoza’s challenge was 
not only religious but political.14 It attracted extraordinarily vehement censure and 
vilification (Israel 2006, 36; Negri 1991). According to Hampshire (2005, 33), Spinoza 
was known as “the destroyer of all established religion and morality”. As a 
consequence, he was excommunicated from his Jewish community in Amsterdam in 
1656, and expelled from that city in 1660 (Phemister 2006, 8). Having moved to The 
Hague, the publication of his Theological-Political Treatise, notwithstanding its 
anonymity and false imprint, rapidly attracted the local authorities’ intervention. The 
book was banned and Spinoza described as “a freak (monstrum)” (Klever 1996, 39-40). 
In that same year, the publication of similar views by Spinoza’s friend and mentor, 
                                                          
14
 Spinoza was more consistent than his fellow rationalists, Descartes and Leibniz, in treating religious 
passion as the cause of Europe’s then recent instability (Sharp 2011). He did not merely seek to dampen 
this god’s influence, but to remove it (and that of religion). For this reason Hampshire (2005, xxiv) 
described Spinoza as one of the “children of Epicurus”, as he, like Epicurus and Lucretius, located the 
attraction of false, but “comforting supernatural beliefs” in the fear of death, which had then been 
exacerbated by the contests between different religions. 
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Franciscus van den Enden, led to van den Enden being hanged in Paris (Klever 1996, 
46).  
The risks of offending religious orthodoxy meant that the more immediate means by 
which Spinoza’s ideas could be transmitted was through Leibniz’s promotion of a 
“science of forces and powers” (Hatfield 1979, 115). Having acknowledged the 
authorship of the Christian god, Leibniz was free to incorporate much of the scientific 
discoveries of his time. Drawing on studies in biology, chemistry and magnetism, and 
their characterisation of the natural world in terms of a pervasive interaction or flow of 
various ‘forces’,  Leibniz reconfigured substance by transforming matter from the stable 
blocks or units of atomic and mechanical thought, to the more dynamic relations of 
attraction and resistance suggested by the science of his time. 
Herder, one of the leading figures of the radical Enlightenment, and a pioneer of key 
themes in Romantic thought, drew on Leibniz’s ‘science of forces’ to enliven Spinoza’s 
substance. Herder made force, rather than matter, the ground of all things and thereby 
gave Spinoza’s open interactive expression of substance a more organic character. He 
transformed nature into a “system of forces” (Lamm 1996, 168), and considered the 
implications of that transformation for particular societies and their individual members. 
Drawing on Spinoza’s vision of an open, vulnerable interdependence, Herder 
considered the deep interaction between individual people, their societies and their 
environment. He drew out the importance of ‘belonging’ and the damage that followed 
from the loss of those constitutive connections. Having appreciated the openness and 
dynamism of being, Herder translated Spinoza’s vision of vulnerability from the plane of 
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Being to that of individual beings and societies. He drew out the senses of insecurity 
and anxiety that characterised such an existence, and explored their influence as goads 
to action, driving uneven and uncertain experiences of development and becoming. 
Having shifted the focus from the totality, Herder expanded Spinoza’s consideration of 
the notion of ‘expression’. All beings ‘expressed’ the totality, but their experience of that 
activity was an uneven one. It involved an uncertain struggle to re-cognise or re-cover 
the interconnections that comprised their being.  
This is the struggle that then featured in Idealist thought. Confronted with this vision of 
incompletely realised interconnection, and with the chasm drawn by Kant between 
noumena and phenomena, Fichte and Schelling bridged that gap by equating the 
totality with the absolute ego. They presented the movement of ‘expression’ as one of 
consciousness. For Fichte, individual consciousness, with its emphasis on separation, 
was constantly goaded by an intuition of a greater involvement, prompting constant 
revisions of that consciousness towards a recognition of the absolute ego. This 
endeavour, however, involved no easy transformation. Fichte and Schelling presented 
this process of development and becoming as an uncertain, agonistic, unending 
struggle. 
This analysis brings us to the point from which many have commenced Marx’s story. 
Hegel developed Fichte and Schelling thought to develop the dialectic that features in 
his works on logic and the struggle to realise absolute consciousness that is one of the 
most famous features of his Phenomenology of Spirit. I traverse the foreground 
constructed by Spinoza, Leibniz, Herder and others as I argue that Marx’s dialectic is 
114 
 
best understood by reading Hegel in light of his predecessors. It illuminates the terms 
Marx used to comprehend being, such as ‘expression’, ‘development’ and ‘becoming’. 
This exploration also reinforces the productive role of matter and of the experience of 
limitation and suffering. For Herder, Fichte and Schelling, that experience prompted the 
recognition of the interdependent character of being. Their recognition of its difficulty—
that reason alone could not effect that transformation—is also central to understanding 
Hegel’s Phenomenology and Marx’s anticipation of the productive impact of alienation 
and immiseration. 
 
SPINOZA 
There have been many different, conflicting interpretations of Spinoza’s works 
(Hampshire 2005, 6; Sharp 2011; Vardoulakis 2011, L105). As Stuart Hampshire (2005, 
6) has pointed out, “...there have been a Parmenidean Spinoza, a Cartesian Spinoza, a 
materialist-atheist-determinist Spinoza, [and] a mystical pantheist Spinoza”. Norris 
(2011) has recently detailed the reach of Spinoza’s influence and the variety of different 
responses to his work, many of which, like those of Spinoza’s contemporaries, were 
strikingly passionate. This includes contemporary writers, such as feminists Susan 
James and Moira Gatens, who refer to a “real fascination” and “magnetism” in Spinoza’s 
works, and “something awe-inspiring about Spinoza” (Colebrook 2000, Gatens 2000, 
James 2000, 42). Within the Marxist tradition, writers such as Antonio Negri, Etienne 
Balibar and Louis Althusser have also been inspired by Spinoza, with Althusser (1997, 
102) describing him as “Marx’s only direct ancestor, from a philosophical standpoint”. 
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Notwithstanding this variety, however, all interpretations have one thing in common: 
they all recognise Spinoza’s unbending commitment to a non-dualistic or monist notion 
of substance (Negri 2011; Norris 2011; Sharp 2011; Vardoulakis 2011). 
During Spinoza’s lifetime, the Cartesian and atheistic characterisations dominated, in 
large part because Spinoza could not safely contest those views. Come the eighteenth 
century, notwithstanding his continued controversial association with atheism, his 
reputation was somewhat rehabilitated, so much so that some enthusiastically 
embraced Spinoza as providing a more credible understanding of the Christian god. For 
Novalis, Spinoza was “a god-intoxicated man” (Garrett 1996, 1). Schleiermacher, one of 
the most prominent (and controversial) theologians in eighteenth-century Germany, 
founded his theology on Spinoza’s works, and described them as providing a “middle 
way” between atheism and an anthropomorphic understanding of god (Lamm 1996, 24, 
26).  
In the twentieth century, a fresh revival of interest in Spinoza followed Althusser 
expressly drawing on Spinoza’s work to promote a ‘structural’ Marxism. Here, Althusser 
drew on Spinoza to suggest a less determinist conception of the influence of the 
economic on other social structures, in contrast to the tighter causal relationship he 
claimed followed from interpretations of Marx through the prism of Hegel and Lukac’s 
works (Althusser and Balibar, 1997; Norris, 2011, L368; Vardoulakis 2011, L67). More 
recently, Deleuze and others have expanded on the more open character Spinoza gave 
to substance through his equation of god and nature. The equalising effect this equation 
had on being—doing away with a hierarchy of being—has founded a great interest 
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Spinoza’s vision of being as a “plane of immanence” (Deleuze 1988, 122), or an 
“ontological horizon of surfaces” (Negri 1991, 168). Writers, such as Susan James and 
Moira Gatens, have drawn on Spinoza as part of the long-standing feminist commitment 
to challenging the mind/body dualism. More recently, those seeking to promote a post-
humanist point of view—that is, one that does not consider human beings separately to 
other beings—such as Sharp (2011), have also drawn heavily on this ‘plane’ as a 
means to better consider the intimate interdependence of human and other, including 
inanimate, beings. There remains, in this century, a continuing creative engagement 
with Spinoza, including from those working within the Marxist tradition. Frederic 
Jameson has described the current form of capitalism as “the absent totality, Spinoza’s 
God or Nature” (cited in Casarino 2011, L2327). Casarino (2011, L2341, L2610-2612), 
again drawing on Spinoza’s ‘plane of immanence’, has described Marx and Spinoza as 
the early theorists of globalisation, by virtue of the characterisation of substance in 
those terms. 
Spinoza’s works have also been of lasting interest to artists and writers, perhaps more 
than any other philosopher (Uhlmann 2011; Bal and Vardoulakis 2011). Deleuze (1988, 
129) suggested the foundation for this interest, and for much of the widespread appeal 
of Spinoza’s vision, when he observed that “...writers, poets, musicians, 
filmmakers...painters too...may find that they are Spinozists” as “they think in terms of 
speeds and slownesses, of frozen catatonias and accelerated movements”. Similarly, in 
considering a Spinozist conception of agency, Sharp (2011, L2793) drew on musical 
metaphors, with her suggestion that agency resembled musical composition, with 
actions limited by available tones and the relationships between them. Once this appeal 
117 
 
is highlighted, it is not surprising that Spinoza was of great influence on the 
development of natural and Romantic philosophy in the eighteenth century, particularly 
in the works of Herder, Goethe and others. I argue that Spinoza’s works, whilst of direct 
influence on Hegel and Marx in relation to logic or dialectics, were at least equally 
influential (albeit indirectly) through their effect on those natural and Romantic 
philosophers.  
Spinoza did not challenge the focus of the traditional debate about substance—only the 
breadth of its application. Drawing on Aristotle’s definition of substance (Spinoza 2002b, 
217, Part 1, Definitions 3), which had, by virtue of Aristotle’s insistence on self-
sufficiency, previously supported the recognition of a range of substances or beings, 
Spinoza (2002a, 44 and 46; 2002b, 94) held that only one being could satisfy that 
definition—God or Nature (which he treated as identical). Spinoza’s inversion of the 
Aristotelian idea of substance turned on the location of the source of change. Aristotle 
set out to make that location internal to being—something separate to, and independent 
of, its surroundings. However, as Hampshire has pointed out, Spinoza, having sought 
the same degree of independence, could not locate it in the majority of beings. Spinoza 
insisted that a substance was that which “can be described as ‘cause of itself’ (causa 
sui)” (Hampshire 2005, 40) and of its modifications, not that which changes through is 
interaction with others. This, however, could only be the totality, which Spinoza called 
“God or nature” (Hampshire 2005, 40). 
Spinoza (2002a, 60; Hampshire 2005, 40, 43, 62, 67) argued that all other beings were 
merely limited or subordinate modes of that universal substance: 
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Particular things are nothing but affectations of the attributes of God, that is, 
modes wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and 
determinate way...The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of 
man; ie, substance does not constitute the form of man (Spinoza 2002b, 232 and 
249, Part I, Proposition 25, Corollary, and Part II, Proposition 10). 
All beings then reflected the universal substance (god or nature) and were comprised of 
its attributes, which Spinoza described in terms of thought and extension. The 
consideration of one attribute expressed—mirrored—all of substance as did other 
attributes, as they were all part of the one substance.  
All particular beings were founded in the one substance and each gave ‘expression’ to 
that substance. This ‘expression’, however, did not involve any sense of incompletion or 
creation. God, as substance, was perfect and completely realised in existence. For 
Spinoza, all things were dependent on god and reflected, just like a mirror held up 
before god, his pre-existing and unchanging perfection. ‘Expression’ referred to the 
pervasive immanent presence of this god. ‘God’, for Spinoza, was the: 
immanent and not a transient cause, since all that he produces is within himself, 
and not outside him, because there is nothing outside him (2002a, 50, 51). 
Moreover, “God is a cause through himself, and not by accident...The predisposing 
cause is [God’s] perfection itself” (2002a, 51). 
For Deleuze, this meant that “God’s nature is...in itself expressive”, and involves “a kind 
of [unavoidable, ever-present] unfolding”, such that the expression of god on the one 
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hand, and that of the world on the other, is identical and simultaneous (1990, 99 and 
175-6). 
Expression involved the revelation of, or the encounter with, that which already existed, 
that which was always immanent. Particular beings, as dependent on this substance, 
revealed part of that substance and discovered other parts in their encounters with other 
beings. There was no previous state in which those particular beings were not involved 
in, and dependent upon, the substance and on other beings. The connection to, and 
interdependence on other beings, and on the substance, was not something acquired or 
secured by those beings in a process of change. All were, from the moment of their 
inception, and would remain, ‘expressions’ of the substance. None existed 
independently of each other. ‘Expression’ did not suggest any coming to be, but the 
radical and pervasive depth of interconnection. All being was a reflection of god. All 
beings always were, and always would be, dependent on each other and that 
substance.15 
Within that substance, there was diversity—a range of attributes. However, no single 
attribute—neither matter/extension, nor form/thought—constituted a superior realisation 
of that substance. Extension and thought were both equal attributes of the one universal 
substance, and both equally gave expression to it. Being, for Spinoza, was not 
divided—it did not have a dualist character or hierarchy, whether by virtue of some 
absolute character or the latent or potential realisation of some characteristic. All of 
                                                          
15
 Negri (1991, 45-6) describes this as the ‘first foundation’ of Spinoza’s thought. Through it, “the 
ontological totality is the endpoint of the spontaneous expression of reality; reality is the product of the 
spontaneity of the infinite totality. To the spontaneity of existence corresponds the spontaneity of 
production.” 
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substance’s attributes ‘expressed’ that substance. Having inverted substance, Spinoza 
had also equalised its attributes. The Spinozan vision, to borrow from Deleuze’s (1988, 
122) description, was of a common “plane” of existence; one characterised by activity 
and instability; one in which change was “immanent” —a vision of intimate, dynamic, 
interdependence. Having equalised the attributes or expressions of the one universal 
substance, Spinoza had converted the character of particular beings. Being was now 
founded in matter and interdependence, rather than form and independence.16 
The character of these beings Spinoza (2002b/1675, Part 2, Axiom 5) described in 
terms of modes of extension or thought—we could only know “individual things…[as] 
bodies and modes of thinking”. An identifiable aggregate of the attribute of extension—a 
mode of extension—Spinoza called a “body” (2002b/1675, Part 2, Definition 1). The 
human mind, too, was also an aggregate, or mode of ideas or thought (Phemister 2006, 
168). Thought and extension, considered in relation to a particular being, paralleled or 
corresponded with, but did not cause, each other. Only in substance—god or nature—
did they exhibit identity. Outside that, they were parts of the larger ensemble of 
god/nature and dependent on it (Phemister 2006, 58, 166; Woolhouse 1993, 155, 172-
3). 
                                                          
16
 Here I differ to Negri’s (1991, 2004, 2011) view that Spinoza is mired in a Renaissance pantheistic view 
that maintains some ‘transcendent’ aspect. I argue that Spinoza’s recognition of one substance—the 
totality—goes hand-in-hand with a recognition of the equality of the attributes, and of their dynamism. The 
very basis on which Spinoza expands upon his all-inclusive definition of substance equates it with the 
sum of its attributes, and not as something over and above them. That interdependence necessarily 
makes for an open, unstable matrix of relationships, notwithstanding the continuity of the totality as a 
whole, for the reasons set out over the balance of this chapter. However, Negri’s point is well made to the 
extent that he points out that the Ethics does not give sufficient emphasis to the instability in substance 
itself that follows from the instability of its constituent bodies. In this sense, Spinoza does emphasise the 
“centripetal direction” of substance’s “emanations” over the “centrifugal reaction of the determinations” 
(1991, 54, 58). 
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All beings other than god (or nature) were not independent and separate, but intimately, 
already, involved with others: they were best defined against those others (2002b/1675, 
Part 1, Proposition 28). As Deleuze has pointed out, Spinoza laid “a common plane of 
immanence [and] ‘intersection’” (1988, 122). Any particular being was to be defined in 
terms of divergence or negation, or of ‘negation of negation’, as both Hegel and Marx 
were to later characterise it. One could only comprehend a particular being by reference 
to its relationships with others, rather than by reference to some underlying, unalterable 
character or substance, as it had been traditionally understood. 
Here, again, as with Lucretius, limitation is treated as both constituting and enabling, 
rather than antagonistic to the character of a particular being. For Spinoza, each and 
every being was constituted by virtue of its relations with others. This is the “relationship 
between liberation and limit” that Negri (1991, 177, 180) “insisted” was a feature of 
Spinoza’s work: “liberation as the continual conquest and construction of being”. No 
being existed in freedom from limitation (as it would then be substance). Rather, 
freedom was borne of necessity: 
That thing is said to be free which exists solely from the necessity of its own 
nature, and is determined to action by itself alone. A thing is said to be necessary 
or rather, constrained, if it is determined by another thing to exist and to act in a 
definite and determinate way (2002b/1675, Part 1, Definitions, 7). 
We live, then, not in some internal sanctuary, occasionally interrupted by some external, 
alien, influence. Rather, we live by virtue of our borders and boundaries: it is those 
encounters that frame and found and define us.  
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This is not to deny the particular, nor the individual, since it concerns only how they are 
understood. It is not to suggest that there is no distinction from the balance of 
existence—only that such distinction does not require separation. This was the point 
Spinoza (2002c, 849) made when referring to a worm living in a person’s blood: 
That worm would be living in the blood as we are living in our part of the 
universe, and it would regard each individual particle of blood as a whole, not as 
a part, and it could have no idea as to how all the parts are controlled by the 
overall nature of the blood. 
Rice (cited in Lamm 1996, 33) has emphasised that Spinoza’s point concerns how 
individuation occurs. For Spinoza, an individual could be distinguished as the focus of ‘a 
network’, but not in terms of absolute separation or independence. “Singularity”, to draw 
on Balibar (2008, 108), “is a trans-individual function. It is a function of communication”. 
This was to criticise the process by which a being was traditionally considered in 
isolation—as abstracted from those relations that determined, defined and constituted it. 
Particular beings or ‘individuals’ could not be understood outside of those relationships. 
All beings outside god or nature were interdependent: to consider them outside of their 
defining relations was to consider an incomplete, distorted picture. It was to consider an 
image that assumed independence and approximated that being’s life to that of a god. 
Spinoza’s inversion of substance —his treatment of the majority of beings as 
dependent—involved no such godlike security. Rather, his approach to substance 
revealed all beings as open to the influence of others. In place of the robust security and 
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continuity of substantive being—and the serenity of a god—Spinoza made being 
vulnerable and bound up with change. For Spinoza, all beings depended on one or 
more others and enjoyed a contingent, indefinite and vulnerable existence—separation 
and continuity were not taken for granted, but were instead seen as exceptional and of 
uncertain duration. Being was not only limited in the sense of being carved out of 
existence and constituted by its relations with others, but was limited in terms of 
duration by them. 
For Spinoza (2002b, 253), then, the continuity of a being—whether considered in the 
attribute of thought or extension—was determined by an ensemble of relationships: 
When a number of bodies of the same or different magnitude form close contact 
with one another through the pressure of other bodies upon them, or if they are 
moving at the same or different rates of speed so as to preserve an unvarying 
relation of movement among themselves, these bodies are said to be united with 
one another and all together form one body or individual thing, which is 
distinguished from other things through this union of bodies’. 
This ensemble—which was called the being’s “essence” (Deleuze 1990, 243, 249) —
provided for a very open concept of being, as that essence was only expressed or 
realised for so long as the relationships between those parts endured (Hampshire 2005, 
66). This ‘essence’ was to perform the role traditionally reserved for the concept of 
substance—it was to determine the definition and location of the character and 
continuity of a particular being, and to reconcile that continuity with the experience of 
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change and pain. In Spinoza’s works, and in the work of those who followed his 
initiative, this led to a radical reconfiguration of the responses to these issues. 
Being became seen as an uneasy tension between the internal and the external, as a 
result of this inversion of substance. In Spinoza’s terms, there was a tension between 
the preservation of the aggregate that comprised a particular being (its essence) and 
the ongoing threat that the other, external, relationships in which its aggregate parts 
participated might come to exert an irresistible attraction. The particular form those 
relationships took, as those various parts could form different relationships, was one 
‘mode’ of existence. The continuity of any particular being—its duration in the world—
was no longer located in some internal location, as it was with the traditional debates 
about substance, but in the continuity of that mode of relating that had constituted it. 
Having placed interdependence or relationships at the centre of the constitution of any 
particular being, Spinoza had also made fragility, precariousness and vulnerability a part 
of being. In his view, any being comprised that parallel or corresponding existence of 
particular modes of the attributes of thought and extension (respectively, mind and 
body). Each such mode was an ensemble or aggregate, held together by a dominant 
relation, but not in such a way that each participant in that relationship—each body or 
idea—could be isolated from external influences. Rather, each part of an ensemble 
could potentially be part of another ensemble of the same attribute (Hampshire 2005, 
66). The essence of any being, for Spinoza, was a process of interaction and exchange, 
rather than separation and independence enjoyed by ‘substance’, as traditionally 
understood. It comprised a dynamic process of aggregation and disaggregation, with 
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the efficacy and continuity of any being the product of a shifting balance between the 
‘internal’ (or distinguishing) aggregating relation and extrinsic, disaggregating, 
attractions—a tug of war, even in the case of so apparently well-bounded a being as the 
human body:  
The human body needs many other bodies for its preservation...But that which 
constitutes the form...of the human body consists in this, that its parts 
communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed 
proportion...Therefore, whatever is conducive to the preservation of the 
proportion of motion-and-rest, which the parts of the human body maintain 
toward one another, preserves the form of the human body, and, 
consequently...brings it about that the human body can be affected in many 
ways...whatever effects a change in the proportion of motion-and-rest of the parts 
of the human body...causes the human body to assume a different form; that 
is...it causes it to be destroyed... (Hampshire 2005, 66). 
In this way, the ‘interior’ of a body was not privileged over its ‘exterior’: rather, its very 
enmeshment in the world—its very constitution—also made it vulnerable to encounters 
with other, damaging, bodies. Negri (1991, 42, 222, 2004, 42) describes this as the 
“savage aspect” of Spinoza’s thought. The finite life of any body was due, as Deleuze 
(1988, 100) put it, not to some “internal” characteristic, but because the very character 
of any body meant that it was “necessarily [and continuously] open to the exterior”. 
The continuity of a being was understood to be the product of particular forms or 
processes of exchange. That the relations comprising the entity or body changed 
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however, did not mean that all those relations would change, or that they would do so at 
the same time, or in such degree as to prevent recognition of that being over time. This 
co-existence of change and continuity is the contradiction Heraclitus pointed to in saying 
that one cannot step in the same river twice. The changes in the river’s constitution are 
continuous but, at least for short periods of time, not sufficient as to make it 
unrecognisable. This same recognition was apparent in Spinoza’s works. According to 
Hampshire (2005, 65, 98-9), any body was best understood as a form of “configuration” 
and of varying levels of complexity, from combinations of “elementary particles” through 
to “configurations of configurations of configurations”. Changes could occur within any 
such configuration as to the “distribution” of activity but, so long as the total activity 
remains roughly constant over the entire configuration, it could be considered to 
maintain a continuous identity.  
As Spinoza (2002b, 254, Proposition 13, Lemma 4 - Proof, and Lemma 5) insisted: 
Bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance...That which constitutes the 
form of the individual thing consists in a union of bodies...But this union...is 
retained in spite of continuous change of component bodies...If the parts of an 
individual thing become greater or smaller, but so proportionately that they all 
preserve the same mutual relation of motion-and-rest as before, the individual 
thing will likewise retain its own nature as before without any change in its form. 
In the context of Western philosophy, Spinoza ended the traditional divorce between the 
character or substance of a being and change. Being no longer needed to be reconciled 
with the experience of change. Spinoza argued that if all beings were open and 
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interdependent, then any assumption of permanence underlying traditional approaches 
to substance ceased to be credible. 
Spinoza presented a particular being as an aggregate or ensemble, as enduring so long 
as its particular ‘relation of motion-and-rest’ continued. He called this the being’s 
‘essence’ or ‘conatus’, meaning simply its tendency or momentum to endure.17  In the 
twentieth century, and after Heidegger’s no less radical revision of Being, Deleuze 
(1988, 122, 123) demonstrated just how readily that endurance can be thought of in 
terms of a particular habit or way of life: 
…to be in the middle of Spinoza is to be on this modal plane - which implies a 
mode of living, a way of life…The important thing is to understand life, each living 
individuality, not as a form, or a development of a form, but as a complex relation 
between differential velocities…A composition of speeds and slownesses on a 
plane of immanence. In the same way, a musical form will depend on a complex 
relation between speeds and slownesses of sound particles. It is not just a matter 
of music but of how to live: it is by speed and slowness that one slips in among 
things, that one connects with something else. One never commences; one 
never has a tabula rasa; one slips in, enters in the middle; one takes up or lays 
down rhythms….  
                                                          
17
 This is the sense with which Spinoza wrote of ‘conatus’, rather than any inherent organising principle or 
purpose that existed independently of the relations within which a particular being was comprised. This is 
evident from Shirley’s translation of Spinoza’s works, where ‘power’ is used interchangeably with 
‘conatus’ (see Spinoza, 2002b, 254, 283, 293, 297, 306, 309, and 332). It is the interpretation given by 
Deleuze—for a definition of conatus, one is referred to that of ‘power’ (1988, 58 and 97) —and Hampshire 
(see 2005, 98). 
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The constitution of a being was profoundly dependent upon the way in which its 
constituent parts related to each other. That constellation of relations was not merely an 
expression of its life, but the basis on which that life or existence was constituted. For 
Spinoza, mode became central to being: that which defined its character and its 
continuity. In place of some underlying substance, Spinoza inserted the mode of 
relationship as the source of character, stability and duration. It was no longer sufficient 
to seek to comprehend a being in isolation, or by reference to some internal foundation 
or substance: the essence of any being was comprised of the mode by which its various 
parts related to each other. With Spinoza, the locus of being became ‘external’ and 
unstable. Marx was to construct his vision of our humanity from this very locus—a being 
driven by need and deeply dependent on the various ‘modes’ of production (and hence 
of life) by which those needs were met. 
The character or essence of being was, then, ‘becoming’. For Spinoza, being was 
immanent—always on the cusp of change, without the direction, form or outcome of that 
change predetermined. This “plane of immanence” (Deleuze 1988, 122) meant that the 
character of any being was never finalised as it was in a “constant interchange”. As 
Gatens (2000, 61) has noted, for Spinoza, “the body [was] a nexus of variable 
interconnections, a multiplicity”. 
Spinoza, through Hegel and Feuerbach, provided much of the materials from which 
Marx worked. Revisiting them provides the means to illuminate and explain much of 
Marx’s key works. Those connections are, in part, obscured by the formal, mathematical 
style of Spinoza’s works, and by the criticisms made of their apparently rigid character 
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by Hegel and others. Those criticisms, however, are themselves founded in the 
adoption and reworking of Spinoza’s key ideas by the Romantic movement, and the 
philosophers of nature. Their emphasis on a more organic, interactive world was 
explicitly developed in reliance upon Spinoza’s works—and that very reworking also 
served to obscure their influence. This reworking was also profoundly influenced by the 
revolutions occurring in scientific thought at this time.  
 
LEIBNIZ  
In so many ways, Leibniz was the key seventeenth-century rival and critic of Spinoza, 
by means of his engagement with that scientific revolution. He provided a key 
contribution to the transition of Spinoza’s thought from mechanistic, rationalist terms to 
those of natural philosophy, and thence to the terms that Hegel and Marx adopted. 
Leibniz made it possible to speak of all of nature in terms of a fluid interaction, by giving 
a central place to the emerging concept of ‘force’ (kraft) in explaining substance. Whilst 
Spinoza’s infamy and the limited publication of his works restricted their adoption in his 
lifetime, Leibniz’s accommodation within religious orthodoxy made it possible to revise 
the notion of substance without attracting religious or political censure. 
Leibniz, like Spinoza, rejected the lifeless, passive world of mechanistic thought. 
However, Leibniz preserved the traditional emphasis on the independence of substance 
through his assertion that the fundamental, indivisible components of all being were 
atom-like substances called ‘monads’. He considered that the entire potential of being 
resided within these monads, and that this potential included all its various relationships 
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with other monads, such that those relationships were ‘internally’ inscribed within each 
monad. As such, each monad ‘mirrored’ or ‘expressed’ the universe—all of its ‘external’ 
relationships were contained within it. Moreover, the consideration of any single 
monad—indeed, the consideration of any single attribute of any single monad—enabled 
the exploration of the totality because each monad, and each of its attributes (by virtue 
of these ‘internalised’ relationships) “mirrored” or “expressed” the world (Jolley 2005, 49, 
51-2). In this view, the world was ‘internal’ to—and immanent within—each being.  
Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition (Jolley 2005, 37, 45-7, 60-1), Leibniz located the 
source of change within these monads. Matter, composed of monads, was active and 
productive—it was no longer simply a negative or restrictive influence. Nevertheless, 
Leibniz’s use of the concept of ‘expression’ gave the realisation of the Aristotelian 
potential a radically different sense. ‘Expression’ by a monad referred to a profound 
interconnection. A being was only itself by virtue of a deep-seated, pre-existing, 
interconnection, as established by god: a ‘pre-existing harmony’. With Leibniz, as with 
Spinoza, the term ‘expression’ gave substance a radically different character to 
Aristotle’s potential—one founded in interdependence and on immanence; on the 
revelation or unfolding of that which already existed, rather than creation or emergence 
or realisation of some previously unexpressed potential.18 Leibniz, in emphasising this 
dynamic, expressive character, added to Spinoza’s challenge to traditional approaches 
to substance: whilst still internally located and apparently separate, substance, in 
                                                          
18
 Althusser and Balibar (1997), in ascribing a more traditional interpretation to ‘expression’, miss this 
change. Leibniz is not merely preserving the traditional ‘internal’ notion of substance, but is seeking to 
capture the essential interconnectedness of all being. Having neglected this change, Althusser and 
Balibar then fail to recognise Hegel’s contribution to this effort, and to Marx’s works. 
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Leibniz’s hands, was intimately involved in the world and bound to express that world—
to change. 
Leibniz, like Spinoza, sought to make matter active, and to do so within the theological 
strictures of their time (that is, within a context of still terrifying political fury about these 
matters). However expressed, the transcendence and omnipotence of the one all-
powerful god needed to frame their works, if they were to avoid controversy and 
potential expulsion from their communities. Spinoza’s approach involved the pantheistic 
equation of god and nature, and failed to avoid that fury. As noted above, he was 
‘excommunicated’ from his Jewish community in Amsterdam, his early publications 
were banned, and others were withheld from publication during his life for fear of the 
repercussions. Leibniz avoided the suspect taint of pantheism—and its suggestion that 
god was not transcendent—by presenting a more distant god; a god allowing a wider 
breadth to embrace the views of contemporary science as those views were only ever 
then a revelation of god’s pre-existing plan. It was on that basis that Leibniz was able to 
adopt the new concept of force or kraft that was coming to dominate the sciences of his 
day, and provide the means by which Herder and others could adopt and expand on 
Spinoza’s work without themselves attracting censure. Leibniz used this new concept to 
radically reconfigure the mechanistic science of atoms into a “science of forces and 
powers” (Hatfield 1979, 115). Force, for Leibniz, was an all-pervading influence, and the 
ground of the monads. Matter, when active—that is, in motion—was called “living force” 
(and matter without motion, “dead force”) (Meld Shell 1996, 22). The language of force 
suggested a greater sense of interconnection between monads and reduced the 
apparent impermeability of the boundaries suggested by their atom-like character.  
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This language of ‘force’, or kraft, had become one of the defining themes in eighteenth-
century science. It marked a shift in the conceptual grounding of all matter from the 
Newtonian emphasis on mechanistic notions of motion and impact between objects with 
firm boundaries, to the more fluid, porous interactions suggested by biology and 
chemistry. Mechanistic terminology failed to adequately capture the continuity of organic 
life: the manner in which so much of life did not appear to be the haphazard aggregation 
of component parts, but the unfolding of a pre-existing pattern, much in the sense 
suggested by Aristotle’s notion of potential. New developments in physics, geology, 
chemistry and biology pointed to a higher degree of interaction and interdependence 
between objects than previously appreciated.19 The discoveries in relation to 
magnetism, particularly the forces of attraction and repulsion, were widely influential and 
became key descriptive and explanatory terms. So influential was this new unitary 
theory that Neuser (cited in Petry, 1993, 383) has described it as possibly the one 
concept that captures the overall character of eighteenth-century science. 
Any object, or distinct part thereof, could be represented as the unity of opposing forces 
of attraction and repulsion, typically presented by analogy to the forces tied up in a 
magnet.  
The location of those forces was widely debated and, in many ways, paralleled the 
philosophical debates concerning ‘substance’. For some, the forces were independent 
of, and animated or vitalised, otherwise dead matter. In this view, force formed a 
                                                          
19
 Newton’s discoveries in physics, and Haller’s discoveries in biology had a profound impact (Beiser 
1987, 128, 147). Haller’s influence, for example, is clear from Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature and Herder’s 
Ideas For A Philosophy of History (Barnard 1969, 259, 282). Additional indications appear in Clark (1942, 
742, 745, and 748) and Kant’s Opus postumum (1993, 103, 104, 261, 271). 
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substitute for the interventions of the unknowable distant god in what remained closer to 
a mechanistic and mysterious view of the world. For others, however, forces were not 
foreign to, but were the very stuff of matter and of empirical science. 
This same debate extended to biology and the notion of an organism. Broadly speaking, 
the concept of an organism was that of a self-organising and self-preserving entity, 
reflecting the traditional approaches to substance. Here, too, the location of that 
organising principle—the character of an organism’s substance—was vigorously 
debated, particularly in relation to the continuity of a species. That debate turned on 
whether reproduction was dominated by an internal substance in the traditional sense 
(preformation) or was intimately affected by the ‘external’ environment (epigenesis). 
Those who advocated preformation, like Kant, thought reproduction was effected by 
means of previously formed, genetic-like material or factors, whilst proponents of 
epigenesis, such as Forster and Herder, drew on notions of force and argued that 
reproduction involved the interaction of various forces or kraft, including some 
generated within the external environment (Beiser 1987, 154, 155; Reill 2005, 188). The 
latter was described as “spontaneous generation” by some of its advocates, whereby 
forces present within matter spontaneously “adapt and react to [those in] their 
surroundings” (Beiser 1987, 155).  
These changes in scientific thought prompted and supported the transition from 
rationalist, mechanistic concepts, metaphors and models of substance to more organic 
ones. The notion of force, initially borrowed from the mechanical Newtonian sciences, 
had squarely fitted with the Rationalists’ vision of a world founded in reason, and could 
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be discovered and applied with the same confidence as mathematics. As such, the 
early considerations of force also reflected the Enlightenment confidence in the power 
and universality of reason. As apparently illustrated by the notion of force, reason could 
found not only the science of universal laws of physics, but of animate substances, 
including human beings. The endeavour to understand and regulate the world by means 
of reason was, however, challenged by the increasing recognition of the diversity of the 
world. As indicated above, the extension of the concept of force to animate beings, 
whilst effective at some level of generalisation, involved the recognition of a greater 
sense of diversity in the world. Johann Gottfried von Herder was instrumental in 
responding to that challenge. Drawing on contemporary scientific debates, he promoted 
a much more dynamic, organic model of being and substance. In particular, he made a 
critical contribution to the manner in which the terms ‘expression’, ‘development’ and 
‘becoming’ were understood by Marx and his contemporaries. These terms, moreover, 
were grounded in Herder’s application of the notion of force to a Spinozan concept of 
substance.  
 
HERDER 
Herder made Spinoza’s challenge to the traditional approaches to substance accessible 
and relevant to his generation. His influence was substantial and far-reaching. He 
formed part of a well-connected group, which included those with key interests in 
natural philosophy, including Goethe (Berlin 2000, 224; Pratt and Brook 1996, 352, 354-
6, 359; Richards 2002, 135, 340, 379, 485) and Schelling (Beiser 1987, 5; Richards 
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2002,120, 135, 225; Seigel 2005, 299, 382), and extended to others sharing an interest 
in Spinoza’s thought, such as Schleiermacher with his pantheist theology. Herder’s 
influence was such that Beiser characterised his “vitalistic pantheism [as] the inspiration 
for Schellings’ and Hegel’s Naturphilosophie” (Beiser 1987, 163; see also Pinkard, 
2000, 43, 59, 61; Seigel 2005, 299, 361). Jonathan Israel has gone further, describing 
Herder as one of “the two foremost figures of the German Radical Enlightenment” 
(Israel 2009, 70). Herder’s work comprised one of the original and ground-breaking 
endeavours in the movement towards Romantic thought. The key themes of his 
works—including his contribution to thought concerning substance—became key 
themes of that movement and helped undermine the confidence in universal reason 
promoted by the Rationalists and the Enlightenment.  
Herder’s preoccupation with particular beings and societies reflected the secular, 
subjective emphases of the eighteenth century. The driving issue was no longer the 
relationship between substance and the divine but, in the chaotic, uprooted world of that 
time, the manner in which particular beings and societies retained—or re-established—
a sense of belonging, of being ‘at home’ in, and an integral, secure, part of the world. By 
the eighteenth century, the experience of the French Revolution and the Terror, 
together with the Napoleonic wars and civil reforms, had reduced the authority of 
religious thought. Those events had, however, maintained much of the instability of the 
preceding century. The widespread impact of the emerging capitalist system had added 
to this experience, undermining long-established agrarian ways of life, and promoting a 
more mobile, urban society. The instability and excesses of religious wars had largely 
been replaced by those problems arising through the social and economic restructuring 
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of their society. Herder’s exploration of the concept of expression was a negotiation of 
the tension between the scientific (and other) views of a unified world, and the 
broadening experience of estrangement and alienation. It was a tension that became a 
key concern of Romantic thought. Goethe, for example, like Herder, held that 
“Everything that a man sets out to achieve…must spring from all his powers combined; 
all segregation is deplorable” (Berlin 2000, 228). Their task became reconciling the 
conflicting experiences of dissociation and of belonging. 
Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition (Beiser 1987, 128, 142, 349), Leibniz’s “dynamic, 
self-developing…entities” and Spinoza’s insistence on “rigorous interconnection” (Berlin 
2000, 239-40, see also 231-2; Beiser 1987, 15, 163; Seigel 2005, 332, 334, 336, 347, 
372), Herder represented kraft as providing the universal, connecting, dynamic (Barnard 
1969, 273-4). It comprised a range of forces that, through their varying interactions, 
grounded and drove all change (Berlin 2000, 201). 
Herder “translated Spinoza’s substance into substantial force” (Lamm 1996, 21). 
Instead of matter, he made kraft the ground of all things, and thereby made explicit its 
active or dynamic character that had previously only been hinted at. Aristotle had 
conceived of matter as dynamic, but in a destructive or negative way, with it working 
constantly to decay the form imposed upon it. Lucretius had insisted on the ‘swerve’ of 
the atom, as against Democritus’ atom’s passive fall. Spinoza’s ‘god or nature’ 
incorporated the creator’s dynamic within the universe. Leibniz’s monads worked 
through a system of forces (kraft) to realise the ‘pre-existing harmony’ stored up within 
them. Applying Leibniz’s system of powers and forces Herder gave the open, expansive 
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relations of Spinoza’s substance an organic character. In Seigel’s words (2005, 335), 
“Herder portrayed the whole of existence as ‘a colossal organism...’” 
Herder enlivened Spinoza’s vision of particular beings as aggregates through 
substituting the fluid language of force for the fixed rigidities of mechanistic thought, with 
its residual suggestions of substance-like fixed, foundational, unalterable atoms.  
Kraft, or force, was not directly observable, and so retained a deeply mystical character 
in Herder’s treatment. It possessed, as Sloan (1986, 410) argues “an almost pantheistic 
vitalism”. Berlin (2000, 201) said it owed “more to Neoplatonic and Renaissance 
mysticism and, perhaps, to Erigena’s natura naturans than to the science of his time”. 
This amalgam of mysticism and contemporary science, however, suggests the basis of 
some of its appeal. Beiser (1987, 163) notes how:  
This synthesis of Leibniz and Spinoza – a pantheistic vitalism or vitalistic 
pantheism...made Spinozism into an appealing doctrine for the post-Kantian 
generation. It thus seemed possible to combine one’s scientific naturalism and 
one’s moral and religious beliefs. 
It marked the change in views that was to begin the rehabilitation of Spinoza: no longer 
was he simply the ‘freak’ who threatened to undermine all religion and morality 
(although many still vehemently held this view and would continue to do so well into 
Marx’s time).  
This synthesis, however, was only a partial solution. It constituted a clear movement 
towards the interdependent organic totality that was to profoundly shape both Hegel and 
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Marx’s work. Insofar as kraft was given a mystical character, it reflected the epistemic 
problems emphasised by Kant, and the manner in which Kant’s solution had, as it were, 
reintroduced the problem of dualism ‘by the back door’. Herder’s work, whilst providing 
the foundation upon which the latter problem would be addressed, left the resolution of 
that problem to the work of Fichte and Schelling, which I will discuss in the next section. 
Herder’s innovative engagement with the concepts of force and organism did, however, 
enable him to effectively address some of the key tensions arising within the debate 
concerning substance.  Herder overcame the tensions between Spinoza’s dynamic 
presentation of individual beings and their dependence on the originating and 
underlying, immanent, absolute, perfect substance of god or nature. The latter’s 
influence, together with the manner in which Spinoza had limited his discussion of 
substance’s attributes to thought and extension, and the formal, mathematical model by 
which they were presented, had tended to obscure the open, dynamic character of 
Spinoza’s universe. Herder’s contribution was to emphasise this aspect. He made 
nature itself a “system of forces” (Lamm 1996, 168).  
Herder also explored the implications of Spinoza’s inversion of substance. Spinoza’s 
works had begun with, and been overshadowed by, an emphasis on the underlying 
totality and retained much of the rationalists’ language, with its emphasis on an atomic, 
largely disconnected, universe. Herder, and many of his contemporaries, effected the 
translation of Spinoza’s relatively abstract model into one that better reflected the 
sciences of their day, and the realms of individual and social experience.  
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Inspired by Spinoza’s reflections on particular being, and by contemporary science’s 
notions of force, Herder held that any being, including an individual human being, was 
an aggregate of forces: “Whenever and whoever I shall be, I shall be what I am now, a 
force in a system of forces” (Herder cited in Berlin 2000, 239). The essence of any 
being was an aggregate of forces, some genetic or internal, others external. Contrary to 
the traditional debate about substance, there was no single distinguishing feature or 
element that freed any being, including humanity, from interdependence. Herder 
pointedly objected: 
Philosophers have exalted human reason to a position of supremacy, 
independent of the senses and organs. But just as there is no such thing as an 
isolated faculty of reason, so there is no man who has become all he is entirely 
by his own efforts, as he is wont to imagine in the dream of his life...Upon 
returning, however, from the world of fantasy to the world of empirical reality he, 
and the philosopher, cannot but recognise that the whole chain of human 
development is characterised by man’s dependence on his fellows (Barnard 
1969, 311). 
Building on Montesqieu’s works and their emphasis on the variation of human societies 
with local geographies and climates (Berlin 2000, 171; Seigel 2005, 334), Herder 
adopted the notion of force to present this interdependence as intimately tied to the 
climate and culture of a place, and its history. Berlin (2000, 223), in this regard, 
emphasised how Herder came to regard our humanity as only fully realised in 
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“belonging” to a particular culture, with that culture intimately influenced by its 
environment (klime). 
So significant was the influence of klime, Herder (Barnard 1969, 295) warned that it 
should “not be thought that man can by the sheer power of his will and by the 
application of his skills arbitrarily turn any foreign region into a second Europe”. The 
influential of each particular environment was so fundamental, and so unique, that one 
could not consider human capacities independently of it. Whilst Europe’s climate may 
have supported a form of human development of one kind, it could not be assumed that 
someone from Europe could replicate the same conditions elsewhere. There they might 
well be very different people with very different capacities. 
This openness amplified the variety of forms in which particular beings and particular 
societies developed. This made for what Berlin (2000, 170) described as one of 
Herder’s “cardinal and influential” ideas, and major departures from traditional 
approaches to substance: plurality. It also provided the ground for Herder’s emphasis 
on belonging. The variety of forms of climate and society and particular beings made 
each being intimately attached to its usual context or environment. A plant taken from its 
usual environment would wilt. A human being removed from her community would also 
be diminished. So deep was the influence of the ‘external’ that it moulded the forms in 
which the ‘internal’ was expressed: it made the character of each particular being 
diverse, in stark contrast to the traditional assertion that each kind or species of being 
was unique and distinct. Moreover, for Herder, the plurality of humankind made 
belonging—the deep attachment to the ‘external’ in the form of one’s society and 
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environment—constitutive rather than contextual. The actualisation of any particular 
being required that being to ‘be at home’. Beiser (1987, 143-4), points out that, for 
Herder, there was no universal or “absolute” human essence, and that the one 
consistent feature of our humanity was our “plasticity” and openness to the influence of 
local culture, geography and climate. 
The continuity of any particular being was then dependent upon that of the climate and 
institutions that constituted its habitat. In just the same way that Spinoza’s beings 
continued so long as their particular constellation or mode of formative relations 
continued, so, too, did Herder’s individuals and societies only continue so long as their 
formative climate, culture and institutions continued. Bridging the gulf between particular 
beings and substance, constituting and stabilising particular beings and societies, stood 
those institutions and ways of life, those habits—the forms by which the particular and 
the absolute, the finite and the infinite, were mediated and maintained, and by which 
this mediation became of the essence of their being. 
However, those institutions, ways and habits were themselves only relations and only 
maintained so long as they were enacted: Herder’s belonging or unity was the product 
of, and preserved by, activity. This belonging, or unity of ‘internal’ and ‘external’, of 
character, climate and culture, was the product of, and preserved by, activity. Whereas 
Spinoza’s aggregate of bodies depended on the relatively limited bundle of relationships 
constituting that aggregate for its continuity, Herder located the essence of any person 
in a much wider range of relationships. Herder not only shifted the character of being 
from matter to activity by the notion of force or kraft, but expanded its boundaries by 
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emphasising the person’s deep dependence on, and openness to, their habitat (and 
habitus and history). Over the longer term, this activity not only preserved each 
individual being but her community. Contrary to traditional approaches to the individual 
being’s substance or character, change, rather than stability, had come to characterise 
being. 
Herder, drawing on Hamann, treated this activity linguistically, arguing that the rhythms 
and demands of a way of life was enacted by giving the formative and preservative 
influence to action words (verbs) rather than contemplative words (nouns) (Berlin 2000, 
193). The ‘incarnation’ of society, indeed, human beings’ fundamental, constitutive 
activity was, for Hamann and Herder, speech: it provided the foundations for 
consciousness and for social solidarity, and made “anthropology the key to 
understanding humans” (Berlin 2000, 189, 191, 194). This link between corporeal 
activity and language was particularly clear for Hamann: he saw the rhythms of Livonian 
poetry as clearly derived from their work (Berlin 2000, 224 n4). For Herder, poetry itself 
was activity: “words, rhythms, actions [were] aspects of a single experience” (Berlin 
2000, 195). Hegel, and Marx, would likewise emphasise activity as primary and 
constitutive, rather than secondary to, or a consequence of, some other ground or 
essence of being. 
Herder’s emphasis on the plasticity, openness and integration of being with what would 
ordinarily be regarded as the ‘external’ world also made the concept of a ‘species’ much 
more open. So varied were the different expressions of human plasticity, that the human 
species could only be considered in terms of an aggregate of individual beings. 
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Contrary to the traditional debate about ‘substance’, Herder saw the reproduction of the 
species as occurring at, and perpetuated by, particular communities, by means of their 
characteristic form of activity. The species was as much a product of environment and 
culture as it was genetics or some other underlying unique substance. 
Herder’s emphasis on interdependence meant that all of being, both human and the 
natural world, developed over time, but not in terms of a smooth progression to a pre-
defined end: 
… man is not an independent entity. All elements of nature are connected with 
him...And whilst he is...formed and changed with the help of the universe around 
him, he, in turn, whether he be awake or asleep, at rest or in motion, contributes 
towards its change...he continually interacts with the elements of his 
environment...Man constitutes a multitudinous harmony, a multiplicity and a unity, 
with his living self, acting and acted upon, by the harmony of the forces 
surrounding him (Herder in Barnard 1969, 282). 
All being was, then, historical, and Herder presented that history in terms of a deep, 
open-ended involvement through his use of the concepts of ‘expression’, ‘development’ 
and ‘becoming’.  
Berlin (2000) described the concept of expression as one of Herder’s key concepts. His 
approach was different to Spinoza’s. With both Spinoza and Leibniz, ‘expression’ was 
under the shadow of substance—that is, of the transcendent, omnipotent, god. For 
Spinoza, all things, being dependent on that one substance, reflected it. In Leibniz, one 
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finds a parallel interdependence, notwithstanding the independence of the monads, 
through the original, internal and unchangeable inscription of the universe of inter-
relationships in a harmony pre-established by god. Herder shared the emphasis on an 
immediate, but still varying, interconnection. However, he focussed on particular beings, 
on individuals and societies, on beings of lesser stature than substance or god, and on 
their experience and character as incomplete, inter-dependent beings. This focus gave 
‘expression’ a different character—it suggested the experience of some characteristic 
coming into being; of the individual, and his particular society, coming to a 
comprehension or consciousness or recognition of the breadth and depth of their 
interconnection. It also suggested, by virtue of its focus on a particular being or group of 
beings, that their realisation of that interconnection would always remain incomplete. No 
individual or group thereof could ever become the totality.   
In nature, substance was already, immanently, expressed. It involved no movement 
towards a more complete expression or existence. Like the monotheistic visions of god, 
it was already complete and perfect. However, its components—particular beings—
were changing, caught in a process or development towards the full recognition and 
enactment of their universal interconnection. For human beings, Herder saw this 
development as a movement of consciousness and of culture towards a recognition of 
interdependence—the establishment or realisation of what he called the humanitat, in 
which all sense of division and separation was overcome (Berlin 2000, 230-1). This 
theme of recognition—of the ‘many’ coming to comprehend their participation in the 
‘one’, and in each other—revived the Aristotelian emphasis on the actualisation of a pre-
existing potential. It was a key concern of the Romantics, the Idealists, and of Marx. On 
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the one hand, the Spinozan emphasis on pre-existing, ever immanent, interconnection 
remained. Yet freed of the constraints of an omnipotent god, and concerned more with 
the experience of individuality, the language of ‘expression’ sought to combine the two 
different emphases given by Spinoza and Herder. It involved the co-location, 
coincidence, or the co-recognition—and seeming contradiction—of both individuality 
and interdependence, and of continuity and change. 
Expression, then, for a particular being, involved some kind of movement towards 
Being. Any being was comprised by activity and becoming. A particular being could not 
be understood in the traditional, stable sense of substance, but only in terms of activity 
that was both already founded in Being, in the sense of the totality, and yet still striving 
towards fully or accurately reflecting or giving effect to that totality. The  realisation, 
development  and expression of a particular being as one with the totality was an 
expansive movement, an interaction with what, at an earlier stage of that movement, 
appeared separate and ‘external’. However, like the actualisation of Aristotle’s potential, 
the changes this expression brought shared the character of continuity, of having 
always, already, been a part of the totality. Expression, then, involved a re-cognition, a 
re-covering, of objects that were always, already, a part of the particular being. It was 
for this reason that Herder held that any action involved, reflected, or expressed the 
whole being of the actor and extended to her or his objects. An object altered or created 
by a person—or by a group of people—already, necessarily, expressed their entire 
character, and their ability to better, more fully, be that character—to better express 
their selves as part of the totality—involved a necessary, non-negotiable dependence 
on those objects.  
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Herder’s emphasis on particular beings introduced a necessary character to their 
engagement with apparently ‘external’ objects. It replaced the haphazard or accidental 
interactions of the various aggregates of Spinoza’s universe and gave the relationship 
between a person and his object direction as a movement towards the whole or totality. 
With Herder, ‘expression’ spoke of the connection between a being and an ‘external’ 
object as a dynamic intimacy. They comprised an expression or revelation, and not a 
fresh creation or change, notwithstanding the movement or expansion apparently 
involved. Ollman (1976, 16, 17), in explaining this feature of Marx’s dialectics, described 
this as involving an internal-relationship, one that was an ‘inner-action’, rather than an 
inter-action. A person’s artefacts were not ossified, detachable, inessential objects 
(Berlin 2000, 176), but part of that person. 
All particular beings were immersed in nature/substance. All of their actions expressed 
that immanent interconnection, whether consciously or not. 
This unity did not need to come to be—to come to exist—but only to be recognised or, 
more accurately, remembered or recovered, by humanity. In Herder’s view, modern 
society had interrupted that unity. Previously, there had been a closer identification 
between people and their objects: men ‘were all things: poets, philosophers, land 
surveyors, legislators, musicians, warriors’. In those days there was unity of theory and 
practice, of man and citizen, a unity that the division of labour destroyed; after that men 
became ‘half thinkers and half feelers’” (Berlin 2000, 227). 
The negotiation of this tension—of an immediate, yet unrecognised, interdependence 
between parts and whole—was to become the defining feature of Fichte and Hegel’s 
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works. It helped generate the Idealist school of thought. There, each particular 
consciousness was seen to be, in actuality, identical to the absolute or total 
consciousness. However, that identity only came to be appreciated or recognised 
through the efforts of the particular consciousness to comprehend that which, initially, 
appeared to be ‘external’ to it. For Berlin (2000, 229, 230), Herder’s response to this 
dilemma made him, together with Hamann, the “originator of the doctrine of the unity of 
art and life, theory and practice”, and a key influence on Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Marx 
and others.  
It was a doctrine founded in treating interdependence as an existing reality, and yet one 
incompletely experienced, making much of modern life characterised by a deep sense 
of frustration, and a search for the means to assuage it. Herder’s works focussed upon 
the latter—on better comprehending how central a sense of interconnection or 
‘belonging’ was to our human being. For him, a human being uprooted from its social 
and material environment would, like a plant removed from its traditional environment, 
wither and possibly die. Herder made ‘being at home’ more than a question of comfort. 
Rather, it was constitutive and went to the root of our being. A person or group denied 
their ‘roots’ experienced a profound sense of being undermined. Herder’s emphasis on 
belonging gave the sense of dis-location or dis-ease a central place. Whilst Herder 
focussed on how the experience of anxiety and pain provided an obstacle to the 
realisation of particular being, he also indicated that it could act as the very driver to 
secure the desired sense of expression and belonging. Contrary to the long tradition of 
treating anxiety in purely negative terms, the different poles of experience canvassed by 
the concept of ‘expression’ gave anxiety, limitation and pain a productive potential: more 
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than that, the Romantic and Idealist engagement moved anxiety to a central place and 
role.  
Herder’s vision of expressive being—and that of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Marx, 
following him—was of an incomplete being; a being deeply engaged in efforts to engage 
in the totality, which would always, necessarily, be incomplete. Herder’s sense of being 
was of a process of uneven development and uncertain becoming: 
At no single moment can he be said to be the whole man, rather he is always in a 
state of development, of progress, of becoming. One activity is increased by 
another, builds upon, or evolves from, the foregoing…We are always growing out 
of childhood, however old we may be; we are always in motion, restless and 
dissatisfied. The essence of our life is never fruition, but continuous becoming, 
and we have never been men until we have lived our life to the end (Barnard 
1969, 156-7, see also 171-2, 262-3).  
This remained true even for those who retained their ‘roots’. Being, for Herder, was an 
endless process of becoming—of moving beyond the particular to better ‘express’ the 
totality, and yet, by virtue of its character as a particular being, never able to fully effect 
the desired ‘expression’. On this basis, “a man’s life is one continuous series of 
changes…The species as a whole goes through a ceaseless metamorphosis” (Barnard 
1969, 282-3). Change was no longer antithetical to characterising a being, but central to 
it. This experience of becoming, moreover, was not a smooth or trouble-free one. Here, 
Herder expressed what was to become one of the central themes of Romantic thought: 
that becoming was both beautiful and a burden, involving what Richards (2002, 201-2) 
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catalogued as “strife”, in “a garden of mixed delights”, involving “an antagonistic and 
perpetual struggle”. 
Herder’s emphasis on the individual as a composition of various forces—the organism 
as an aggregate—became a common model in his time. Goethe, for example, held that 
“Each living thing is not a singularity, but a majority; even when it appears to us as an 
individual, it still remains an assembly of living independent essences” (Reill 2005, 138). 
Similarly, Schleiermacher, drawing on both Spinoza and Herder, characterised an 
individual entity as “nothing other than the cohesion, the identical combination of forces 
of a certain measure at a single point” (Lamm 1996, 34). Marx, when he asserted that 
the human essence was an ‘ensemble’ of relations, clearly borrowed from this revision 
of the definition and location of substance.  
Herder first expressed many of those themes that were to characterise the Romantic 
movement. As both Reill (2005) and Richards (2002) have emphasised, a shared 
fascination with the natural world and science, particularly the organic sciences as they 
developed, challenged the notion of reason as a universal foundation for knowledge and 
action.  
Much of that challenge, however, reflected the broader circumstances of that time. As 
noted above, the vigilance and active intervention of religious authorities and their allies 
only heightened the tensions and fragmentations of post-Reformation Europe. Those 
tensions were amplified both by the original emancipatory impulse signalled by the 
French Revolution, and by the experience of the Terror that followed it. The capacity to 
establish a safe, well-ordered society solely by reference to the dictates of reason was 
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widely doubted. The notion of reason as universal was widely contradicted by the 
instability of life at that time. The agrarian and Industrial revolutions had allowed the 
growth of the capitalist system and undermined much of the old economies that had 
stabilised life in previous times. The wars fought with Napoleonic France continued the 
uncertainty that had characterised the upheavals of the previous century, and reaffirmed 
the same desire to secure a place to which one could safely belong. 
Experimental science, whilst lending weight to the universality of reason, also 
challenged our capacity to know the world with any certainty. Those sciences reinforced 
the dubious status of our senses and direct empirical knowledge. Absent the discipline 
of reason, experimental science repeatedly demonstrated the deceptiveness of our 
senses. Yet, upholding this perspective demanded the contradiction of one of the tenets 
of experimental science—the supposition of a consciousness independent of those 
senses. Kant, in responding to the various threats to reason’s central status, held that 
reason had to be exercised by some capacity or consciousness that preceded 
experience. There could be no knowing or ‘representation’ before some ‘I’. Working 
from this distinction, Kant projected a dualist approach into the world: one in which our 
senses gave us some access to the phenomenal world, and which reason could judge 
and assess and provide us with some certainty. But this certainty was founded on a set 
of propositions which could not be tested—propositions suggested by reason as to how 
it worked, but which remained ultimately unknowable noumena. Here, in suggesting an 
underlying foundation that provided certainty, Kant effectively reintroduced the dualism 
that troubled that the traditional debates about substance since before Aristotle’s time. 
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 FICHTE AND SCHELLING 
Kant’s contribution set loose a debate that continues today. In his time, it led to the re-
invigoration of interest in Spinoza’s works, principally through the controversy 
surrounding Jacobi’s claim that Lessing had admitted being a ‘Spinozist’ (which 
continued to be identified with atheism and demonstrated the ongoing hostility and 
influence of the Christian churches late in the eighteenth century) (Beiser 1987, 44-7, 
Bowie 2003, 73). Nevertheless, the growing influence of those seeking to promote 
reason to the exclusion of religion meant that this controversy enabled the rehabilitation 
of Spinoza’s works (Vardoulakis 2011). Perhaps ironically, then, those works were to 
influence the Romantic challenge to the universality of reason. However, in promoting 
and defending a monist model of substance, Spinoza’s works also inspired many to 
seek to fulfil Kant’s work by characterising that singular substance in terms of 
subjectivity. 
Fichte was one of those who sought to complete Kant’s project. In his hands, the 
universal became the absolute ego. It underpinned all things. All particular beings or 
entities were attributes or creations of that ego. With Fichte, Kant’s emphasis on 
incomplete knowledge was retained, but without presupposing some insurmountable 
duality. Drawing on the debates concerning expression, Fichte presented the movement 
from the finite and limited to the infinite as a movement of consciousness. The 
realisation of the identity between a particular consciousness and the absolute or totality 
then became, in effect, an epistemic endeavour. With Fichte, encounters with what 
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appeared to be external and distinct from our being became the goad to better realise 
the identity between those obstacles and the particular ego and, over time, between that 
ego and the absolute ego. 
Fichte made explicit Descartes’ equation of subjectivity and divinity. Descartes had 
treated humanity as if it shared the divine nature. Fichte developed that equation in 
order to allow humanity to recognise itself in—to feel at home in—the world. He 
recognised, consistently with the tradition concerning ‘substance’, the obstacle that this 
discomfort or anxiety presented to the enjoyment of the good. In addressing this, like 
Herder, he asserted an original unity, and he founded this unity in subjectivity. With 
Fichte, subjectivity and substance were made of like kinds, with a distinction between 
particular subjectivities or egos, and the underlying, all embracing substance or 
‘absolute ego’. Like Spinoza’s ‘substance’ and its various attributes, expressed in 
different modes, Fichte’s ‘absolute ego’ was expressed to varying degrees in particular 
egos or particular individuals and societies. There was—and remained—an original, 
ongoing unity. Fichte argued that such a unity had to be presupposed as, in its absence, 
there was no capacity for self-recognition (Bowie 1993, 18-9; Seigel 2005, 366-7). 
Absent that original unity, he argued that there was no foundation for consciousness or 
thought. 
The very experience of consciousness or thought, however, involved a contradictory 
experience of separation from the world. Any thought about anything involved some 
determination or limitation—some separating out from the original unity: “thought itself 
instantiates limits” (Richards 2002, 151; Seigel 2005, 364). Thought was both 
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constitutive and limiting. In distinguishing one aspect of that unity from another, thought 
involved the creation of objects, including one’s self (self consciousness). That very 
creation, however, involved some extraction from, or division of, the original unity. The 
very act of self recognition, then, involved some limitation or diminution of one’s self—of 
one’s original unity and of one’s substance or essence. For Fichte, this evoked a sense 
of inadequacy and frustration: so much so as to make self consciousness a life-long 
process of self-revision, of revisiting and revising one’s self definition and constitution, 
drawn on by an underlying sense of an unrealised unity, which Fichte called the 
“intellectual intuition” (Bowie 1993, 23-4). In Seigel’s words (2005, 364), these 
encounters acted as “a spur, an incitement to further action”, repeatedly prompting a 
movement or process that could never be complete, making “...its being...an endless 
striving”. 
The ego was both development and becoming. Fichte treated the ego as active and in 
constant flux, in the same way Herder had treated the self. This self was historical and 
developing (Seigel 2005, 383). With Fichte, the polarities in the exploration of 
‘expression’ became those of consciousness. The tension central to considering being, 
whether considered from the identification of god and nature, that is, the totality, or 
considered from the perspective of particular beings, as had Herder, were internalised 
in the striving of consciousness to recognise itself. The experience of change, and of 
anxiety, limitation and pain, contrary to the traditional debate about substance, were 
confirmed as essential and as productive. The character of being was no longer the 
stable, serene security of separation, independence and continuity, but the uncertain 
striving of becoming.  
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Schelling expanded this vision. He took Fichte’s idea of the ‘absolute ego’ and 
transferred it to nature, making “nature...visible mind, [and] mind invisible nature” 
(Schelling cited in Bowie 1993, 39). He extended the sense of tension, incompletion and 
striving to nature by use of Herder’s concept of force, and supported that by an 
extensive engagement with the science of his time. In so doing, Schelling “synthesised 
materialism and vitalism” (Richards 2002, 293) —all of being became comprised of 
forces of attraction and repulsion, and characterised by the tensions and dynamism that 
pervaded Spinoza’s works. 
All of nature was comprised of forces. Any particular body was a “concatenation”, a 
“meeting point” or equilibrium of these forces (Bowie 1993, 37; Richards 2002, 143), 
and of uncertain duration. Schelling was at pains to point out that this equilibrium was 
no peaceful balance, but involved “a continuous exchange of resistance and strife” 
(Richards 2002, 310). It involved a life of tension in which: 
In every individual body attractive and repulsive forces are necessarily in 
equilibrium. But this necessity is felt in contrast to the possibility that this 
equilibrium should be disturbed. The ground of it can indeed be thought of as an 
endeavour of matter to escape from the equilibrium and yield to the free play of 
its forces (Schelling 2007, 148). 
Schelling translated Fichte’s dynamic of absolute ego and developing forms of self 
consciousness into an idea of nature as unlimited “productivity” and a variety of 
“products” (Richards 2002, 143). Substance, then, as it was for Spinoza, was equated 
with nature. However, in Schelling’s work, substance, in the form of nature, had become 
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permanent activity. A being did not enjoy a relatively stable, albeit vulnerable, existence 
for any duration: instead, being was in the process of constant re-creation. Schelling 
(cited in Bowie 1993, 36) suggested that we: 
Think of a river which is pure identity; where it meets resistance an eddy is 
formed, this eddy is nothing fixed but disappears at every moment and reappears 
at every moment. In nature nothing can be originally distinguished; all products 
are still, as it were, dissolved and indivisible in the universal productivity. 
Schelling heightened the sense that being was not only interdependent and fragile, but 
gave that fragility a dynamic character. He made that fragility purposive—part of the 
endless striving of the absolute ego to express itself. He, together with Hegel, as Taylor 
(1989, 301) put it, made the notion of expression central to of nature and thereby gave 
nature the character of a subject. 
Nature was productive of self-consciousness—or what Schelling called the “objective 
self” (Richards 2002, 152). This was the self as an abstraction from the whole, the self 
constituted through limitation. This experience of limitation, however, was 
unambiguously productive. Whilst consciousness was initially ‘unconscious’—simply a 
response to the resistance of the natural world (Bowie 1993, 48) —that very resistance 
was essential to the realisation of its inadequacy. Philosophy, then, for Schelling, again 
drawing on Fichte, was a history of developing levels of self-consciousness—a 
development of expanding concepts of the self in the face of, and in response to, the 
resistance of this process of objectification (Bowie 1993, 47). That history might be said 
to include the debates concerning substance—that, driven by the experience of 
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limitation and resistance to assertions of independence, philosophy’s insistence that 
substance was independent and free of uncertainty, anxiety and pain, was transformed. 
The resistance of the world was such, however, as to promote uneven development. 
The forms or expansiveness of consciousness varied throughout the world. This meant, 
for Schelling, that no single individual could represent a species—one only 
approximated the character of a species by considering an aggregate of those 
individuals (Richards 2002, 302). 
This resistance also grounded the unavoidable experience of desire and its frustration. 
To be conscious of the absolute would be to think without the limitations that comprise 
thought—it would be thought without determination or limitation or distinction—and thus 
not thought at all (Seigel 2005, 384). Self-consciousness, by its very character, 
comprised endless striving and endless becoming—approximations to the absolute 
which are always limited, and experienced in terms of suffering and frustration (Bowie 
1993, 33; Richards 2002, 153). The human essence, rather than independently 
constituted and maintained, was intimately bound up with limitation. 
 
SENSUOUSNESS AND SELF-TRANSFORMATION 
This process of becoming, then, whilst productive, was no simple, effortless transition: a 
change in consciousness was no easy feat. Here, the insights of the traditional debates 
concerning substance, and the recognition of the difficulty of dealing with uncertainty, 
anxiety and pain were respected and explored. Those experiences, whilst necessary for 
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the productive or fuller realisation of being, were no small obstacle: rather, the real 
difficulties they posed were explored. Romantic philosophers like Schelling appreciated 
that the intellectual intuition, whilst it could not be satisfied in any particular 
objectification—any particular form of consciousness—“actually requires the surrender 
of that consciousness” (Bowie 1993, 26). They recognised that it required a surrender of 
one’s self—of one’s stance in the world. It was not the product of some aloof, 
dispassionate, detached analysis, but an intimate agonistic experience. As Seigel 
(2005, 385) has suggested, it was not possible for an individual to fully express or 
manifest the totality, so much so that Schelling described the realisation of freedom—
that is, the expression of the absolute ego or totality, as requiring the ‘destruction’ or 
‘absorption’ of the individual, at least in the form of that individual’s then current 
understanding of himself. 
This self-surrender or dependence demanded an act that challenged self preservation 
and expression. It demanded the very denial of the substance or essence of the self 
and called for a form of expression that exceeded the self.  
Schelling only imagined one arena in which expression could take this form: art. In art, 
meaning is expressed in a concrete, accessible form, but expresses meanings—is open 
to interpretations—exceeding those of the artist who created it (Bowie 1993, 52). So 
open is a work of art to interpretation that what is expressed in it might be said to 
approach the absolute. Outside that arena Schelling considered the process of 
becoming—of ever broader, more encompassing forms of consciousness, and hence of 
philosophy—as an endless task. 
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Schelling, however, was not alone in this recognition and in seeking to reconcile the 
common experience of limitation and pain with a sense of some underlying unity. It was, 
for many of his contemporaries, one of their key concerns. It was central to Novalis’ 
work, who “detected a feeling of dependence on the absolute ego, if not a reflective 
awareness of it” (Richards 2002, 32), and proceeded to suggest that the encounter with 
nature was central to securing some sense of re-unification (Seigel 2005, 380). It was 
central to Goethe’s works too, who held that “we are conscious of such a unity: for we 
are conscious of being in a perfect state of health when we sense the whole and not its 
parts” (cited in Richards 2002, 455-6). It was explored at length by Schleiermacher, who 
argued that the self, through its encounter with limitation, discovered a sense of 
‘absolute dependence’ on the absolute, which Schleiermacher understood in terms of 
the Christian god. 
For Schleiermacher, the experience or “feeling of finite things” enabled the “feeling for 
being” to arise (Lamm 1996, 54) —the experience of limitation, anxiety and pain was not 
foreign to the character or continuity of being, but the means by which we could 
understand it. He recognised that this path to self-recognition involved the experience of 
self-surrender, even destruction, suggested by Fichte and Schelling. I will argue that this 
was the sense of transition through trauma that was to become central to the work of 
Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx. Hence, notwithstanding the critiques made by both Hegel 
and Marx of his work, Schleiermacher provides some useful illumination of what was a 
shared concern and, in broad terms, a shared solution. For Schleiermacher, the 
encounter with ‘finite things’ was potentially transformative. Thandeka, in her analysis of 
Schleiermacher’s works (1995, 96, 98), explains this encounter as creating a “state of 
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sheer openness”, because the shock of the encounter “strips” us of our ability to think or 
act. In that state, we share the passivity usually associated with the external world. 
Having lost the initiative as subject, we also lose the sense of distinction from the 
natural world.  
For Schleiermacher, the encounter with the objective world had a dramatic impact. It 
promoted a sense of reciprocity—interdependence—with other beings and of ‘absolute 
dependence’ upon god as the ground of being (that is, as substance). Sensuousness, 
or “feeling” as Schleiermacher termed it, enabled one to become conscious of one’s 
“immediate existential relationship” with god. (Schleiermacher cited in Lamm 1996, 184) 
This was to experience “absolute dependence” —to be conscious that one is “posited” 
(Lamm 1996, 189). Moreover, this discovery was not the product of reason or even of 
individual effort, but followed from the encounter with finite objects and their 
resistance—hence, the absolute or objective character of this dependence (Thandeka 
1995, 100). It was an encounter borne of interaction with the world—an “existential 
encounter” (Thandeka 1995, 13). Knowledge of being was inseparable from knowledge 
of nature, of the corporeal, as accessed through our senses (Lamm 1996, 54). 
Sensuousness made this capacity to encounter Being a central part of the human 
condition and, with it, made the prompts towards a different sense of substance and self 
(a recognition of interdependence and absolute dependence) immanent in life. Lamm 
(1996, 192), in considering Schleiermacher’s perspective, explained that, for 
Schleiermacher, the feeling of absolute dependence or interconnection could only arise 
through the experience of the resistance of the natural world. This made the potential 
for transformation something possible in everyday experience. 
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Hegel made this theme of encounter central to his work. The experience of an 
encounter with another, and that experience of limitation and restriction, was the point of 
Spinoza’s work—of determination by negation—from which the key elements of Hegel’s 
work in logic proceeded. The experience of a pre-rational consciousness, or one 
founded in the encounter with the world and in the experience of desire, of need for the 
world, also founded Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. There, building on Fichte and 
Schelling’s work, Hegel sought to resolve Kant’s dualism. The ‘I’ that reasoned was not 
separate to the sensuous self, but borne of struggle by and with it. Hegel reasserted a 
non-dualistic model of substance by founding the rational ‘I’ in the experience of 
corporeal need. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Spinoza’s inversion of substance made for a radical departure from the consensus that 
had dominated debates concerning substance stretching back to Aristotle. By means of 
a strict application of the traditional definition, with its emphasis on independence or 
self-sufficiency, Spinoza transposed the site of substance from individual or particular 
beings to the aggregate of all beings or nature. So elevated did the material world 
become in Spinoza’s vision that it attracted the language ordinarily reserved for the 
absolute, solitary god of Judaism and Christianity: substance—including materiality—
became immanent throughout all beings, immediately and diversely expressed by those 
beings, with that expression varying and shifting in its particular instantiations whilst 
remaining constant as a whole. Substance, for Spinoza, and the many influenced by 
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him, became the ‘one and the many’, with all beings originally and always 
interdependent, and yet varying in the manner and form in which that interdependence 
was exhibited or expressed. The inversion of substance, however, made change for 
particular beings (now known as ‘essence’) of far greater consequence: not only were 
they interdependent, but also vulnerable. No longer was a particular being rooted in its 
own, ‘internal’, solid substance, but an aggregate or ensemble of elements, enduring 
only so long as that combination continued. It shifted that being’s foundation from 
‘internal’ to ‘external’, whether that being was an individual or a group of like individuals, 
such as a species. It made particular being the site of the coincidence of forces, a nexus 
of tension and oppositions rather than harmonies.  
Being had become ‘external’: held together as an ensemble of components or forces 
through some shared mode or manner of being, and in the process matter ceased to be 
the stuff of foundations as traditionally conceived and became pure process—simple 
activity—itself. Being became less the changeless, eternal, fixed stuff of the universe 
and more the maintenance of this ensemble, this mode, this equilibrium; it became 
activity itself, a constant re-enactment, a re-constitution. All beings resonated with 
movement—a movement oriented outwards, towards those interconnections and distant 
foundations, that was described in terms of ‘expression’, ‘development’ and ‘becoming’. 
These terms became central to the Romantic and Idealist movements and, through 
them, Marx’s works. They reflected the tensions inherent in Spinoza’s inversion of 
substance: of the coincidence of experiences of deep interconnection, as well as 
tension and conflict; of an immanent, existing reality, as well as one that was yet to be. 
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They reflected desire as a defining characteristic of being—a defining experience of 
incompletion as both a source of frustration, and as a goad towards action.  
Any particular being only existed as a limitation of the all-encompassing substance—as 
some sub-set of relations carved or constituted out from the whole. That very act of 
creation, however, simultaneously made it an incomplete being—one torn apart from its 
roots in substance—and bound to experience that act of limitation/constitution as its 
inadequacy. It made for being as endless striving, as endless movement, as becoming 
that could never cease. Spinoza’s inversion, then, made desire and its frustration—
anxiety and pain—central to all being. Not only did it make the very constitution of being 
the instantaneous transition from the fullness of constitution to the emptiness of craving, 
but it made that craving an expression of that being, and its satisfaction of that 
craving—the overcoming of the lack or limitation—its self-destruction. To satisfy desire 
and move towards substance required the loss of the very self that founded that 
momentum. It made becoming an act of self-sacrifice, a giving up of being, a profound 
trauma. It suggested the difficulty, and tragedy, of becoming—and of the depth of 
difficulty involved in giving up limited forms of self-understanding or consciousness in 
order to achieve richer ones. It finally, thoroughly, addressed the very credible 
foundations for the traditional treatment of uncertainty, anxiety, limitation and pain as 
obstacles to the good. In doing so, it suggested the need for an act that exceeded the 
capacity of that particular being—an act of self-realisation that could not be enacted by 
that being. It made not only particular being, but becoming, deeply dependent on the 
‘external’ and made the experience of pain and trauma central to that transformation. It 
suggested the reasons why Hegel relied on the confrontation with death, and Marx on 
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the extremities of alienation, as the means by which we moved towards a more human, 
and more interdependent, existence. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – Hegel 
 
An exploration of Marx’s theory of ‘species being’ necessarily involves a consideration 
of Hegel’s influence on his work. Whilst the extent of that influence remains hotly 
contested in the scholarly literature by theorists such as Althusser (1996), Arthur (2003, 
2004a, 2004b), Colletti (1973), Levine (2012), and Reuten (2000), I argue that Marx 
drew on Hegel’s thought throughout his working life, in two respects. In the first 
instance, in Chapter Six I argue that Marx’s dialectic was founded in Hegel’s works on 
logic: in particular, that Marx’s references to ‘objective being’ in his early works (1975e, 
390) and to an ‘ensemble of relations’ in the theses on Feuerbach (1975g, 423) are best 
understood with reference to Hegel’s concept of being. It is only recently that scholars 
such as Arthur (2003, 2004a, 2004b) and Levine (2012) have concentrated on the 
influence of the earlier parts of the Science of Logic, where Hegel directly engages with 
the traditional arguments regarding substance. No one, excepting Ollman (1976, 2003), 
appears to have closely read Marx’s approach to being with regard to those parts of 
Hegel’s works. In the second instance, in Chapter Eight I argue that key passages in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit—namely the ‘master/servant’ dialectic and the 
‘unhappy consciousness’—suggest the foundations for Marx’s confidence that the 
experience of profound alienation and pain would promote ‘species consciousness’ (that 
is, a more interdependent understanding of the self). Whilst there has also been an 
extensive debate about the extent to which Marx drew on those passages, especially 
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the ‘master-servant’ dialectic, Hegel’s emphasis upon corporeal experience (in the key 
passages noted above) has attracted little attention in Hegel-Marx scholarship.  
In this chapter, I survey these two aspects of Hegel’s works in preparation for a detailed 
consideration of their influence on Marx in Chapters Six and Eight. I also place Hegel’s 
works in the context of the debate concerning substance, both in terms of the longer-
term tradition, and in relation to the more immediate prompts for Hegel’s work, with 
regard to relevant scholarship. Unsurprisingly, this scholarship also features much that 
is contested. The interpretation I present here is that which appears to have most 
influenced Marx. It is what Heidemann (2008, 1) has described as a form of ‘conceptual 
realism’ and gives a greater weight to Aristotle’s influence on Hegel. Beiser (2005, 65-6) 
and Stern (2002) adopt a similar approach. My interpretation places Hegel squarely in 
the Spinozan monist conception of substance, and as challenging Kant. Other writers, 
such as Taylor (1975), whilst writing within the Spinozan tradition, gave Hegel’s works 
(particularly the Phenomenology) what Glazer (2011, 482) and Pinkard (2004, 397) 
describe as a metaphysical, platonic characterisation. More recently, however, 
prominent scholars, such as Honneth (2008), Pinkard (2000b and 2004) and Pippin 
(1993 and 2011), place less emphasis on the metaphysical or logical character of 
Hegel’s works. Instead, they present Hegel as having continued and supplemented 
Kant’s work, rather than opposing it. This has been accompanied by what Heidemann 
(2008, 2) describes as a more “epistemological” reading, with a greater emphasis on 
textual context, albeit with varying outcomes. With McDowell (cited in Pippin 2004), for 
example, the master/servant passage in the Phenomenology is read as a metaphor or, 
as Pippin (2011, L237) put it, a “mythic confrontation”, for a process internal to 
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consciousness. On the other hand, Honneth (2008) and Pippin (2011), for example, 
even with their neo-Kantian reading, treat that passage as involving the external conflict 
of distinct combatants.  
For the purpose of my argument, I have mostly drawn on the metaphysical or logical 
argument, as that has the greater relevance to Marx’s understanding of ‘species being’. 
That argument suggests the ready ‘inversion’ Marx wrote of, given its greater 
consistency with Marx’s own materialist argument. This, however, is not as far a 
departure from other interpretations of Hegel as it may suggest. Almost all the key 
commentators highlight the key role of desire in Hegel’s works, and thereby, the power 
of something external to self-consciousness, to both thwart particular expressions of the 
self and act as the goad to the development of others. In particular, they refer to the 
manner in which desire served as a key influence and stage in the development of a 
more social self, whether or not Hegel allowed for the kind of individual freedoms that 
Kant, and those following him, insist upon.  
Hegel’s Science of Logic directly considered the debate about substance. Hegel, like 
Fichte, Schelling and others, sought to resolve the difficulties posed by Kant, who, in 
claiming that “an ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations” (cited by 
Bowie 2003, 23), had reinvigorated the traditional debate about substance. Kant’s 
distinction between the transcendental—a thing’s condition or conditions of possibility 
(Bowie 2003, 14)—and empirical renewed Descartes’ hierarchy of thought over 
extension (Beiser 2005, 104). As noted in Chapter Three, Kant, and those others 
working within Descartes’ heritage, insisted that the ‘I’ of self-consciousness—in some 
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form—had to precede our knowledge of every other thing (including our bodies) in order 
for there to be some capacity to make those observations. Whilst couched in terms of 
the quest for certain knowledge, Kant’s claims insisted on the independence of being—
or at least its non-corporeal aspect—from the balance of nature. His claims centred on 
the re-assertion of the shared concern of the traditional debate about substance. 
Hegel responded to Kant’s legacy by challenging the ‘immediacy’ or independence of 
the self. Rather than assume a certain unconditioned starting point, Hegel claimed that 
all being was mediated, such that no being existed independently of others (Bowie 
2003, 80, 82). He argued that Kant, in failing to consider the logic of concepts 
themselves, had not gone far enough with his critique (Beiser 2005, 156-7). Hegel 
argued that the completion of that critique revealed that no concept, representation or 
knowledge was complete until the system, as a whole, was revealed—that the 
determination of any concept, including that of an individual or consciousness, was 
necessarily incomplete and only determined by negation, as Spinoza had insisted. 
Drawing on the Spinozan inversion of substance, Hegel rejected the treatment of being 
as independent: he argued that being was comprised of an aggregate of properties or 
relationships. In Chapter Six, I argue that Marx’s (1975g, 423) “ensemble of relations”, 
for example, drew directly on this aspect of Hegel’s work.  For Hegel, no being was self-
sufficient. To know itself—to develop its self-consciousness—was then dependent on 
an encounter with an Other. It did not precede that experience (Bowie 2003, 86).  
Those same works present that aggregate or body as characterised by tension or pain, 
and place Hegel’s work in the same vein as that of Herder, Fichte, Schelling and others 
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who understood the difficulty and trauma with which the fullness of being would be 
expressed or realised. It is this recognition that shapes Hegel’s ‘master-servant 
dialectic’ and ‘unhappy consciousness’. In Hegel, those passages explore key moments 
of transition and recognition as the products of extended periods of pain and suffering. 
Hegel, through the Phenomenology of Spirit, challenged the primacy of self-
consciousness by presenting all consciousness as dependent on its interaction, in some 
way, with some Other. Pinkard (2000, 170-1) characterises the starting point of the 
Phenomenology as a rejection of the “isolated subject”, with “knowledge of the 
objective...then developed out of the subjective”. Rather, the starting point had to be an 
“already shared world”. 
Hegel, through the Phenomenology and his works on logic, identified the self with 
activity, and with engagement with the ‘external’ world. For Hegel, only the totality 
satisfied the core criteria of substance: all other beings were intimately bound up with, 
and dependent upon, other beings, so much so as to make being identical with activity 
or labour. Hegel, following on the initiatives of Fichte and Schelling, treated the 
foundation of this movement—the sensation of being incomplete or of desire—as a 
defining characteristic of being, rather than, as tradition had it, some compromise, 
contagion or pathology. Rather than something foreign to rationality, Hegel founded the 
development of self-consciousness and rationality in desire. This was, in many 
respects, the central theme of the Phenomenology of Spirit, where the repetitive 
experience of desire was seen to obstruct a certain, stable sense of self and to drive a 
search for a more secure foundation for identity. For Hegel, desire repetitively 
challenged that sense of self, founded in separation from the world, and in a rationality 
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distinct from our corporeality. It drove that search through states of denial—states in 
which others were enslaved in order to evade that uncertainty and instability, and states 
in which efforts were made to subordinate desire through ascetic disciplines. Here, 
again, like Herder, Fichte and Schelling before him, Hegel respected the traditional 
emphasis on the troubling—even disabling—human experiences of anxiety, 
incompleteness and pain, and on the popular investment in their evasion. Building on 
his predecessors’ insights, Hegel suggested some of the attraction—even 
advantages—of those efforts, and of the tenacity with which they were pursued.  
Hegel recognised the driving influence of desire and anxiety, and made it a central 
theme in his Phenomenology of Spirit. In particular, he confronted the difficulties in 
responding to those experiences. So fraught was the acquisition of a certain, stable 
expression of one’s self, with its demand for the sacrifice of one’s previous sense of 
self, that Hegel argued one would sooner impose that cost on another. The 
master/servant dialectic is Hegel’s famous, and widely debated, account of the lengths 
to which some people went to avoid bearing that cost. However, what has been less 
recognised is that Hegel’s wrestling with the demand for self-sacrifice did not end with 
that account. Instead, for Hegel, it only ended when extreme ascetic disciplines failed to 
still the experience of desire within one’s own body. In this chapter, I look to highlight 
the significance of those corporeal struggles to Hegel’s understanding of the fullest 
realisation of self, and to prepare the ground to suggest, later in this thesis, how readily 
that understanding supported Marx’s materialist ‘inversion’ of Hegel’s work.  
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This chapter focuses on those two key passages of the Phenomenology as key points 
of transition from ideas of a self based on the insistence on separation in much of the 
traditional debate about substance—the independent, self-reliant self—to a realisation 
of a more interdependent, and social, sense of self. That is, one based on mutual 
recognition and its embodiment in a range of social practices and institutions, an 
embodiment so profound that Hegel described it as the “ethical substance” (Taylor 
1975, 379). The Phenomenology also served as the justification and introduction to 
Hegel’s dialectic, which he detailed in his Logic and Science of Logic. These works 
distilled Hegel’s argument that the constitution of any particular being depended upon 
the continuity of its relationships with other beings. I argue they provided the direct 
foundation for Marx’s own version of the dialectic, and for the interpretation of key terms 
used by him in his consideration of ‘species being’, such as ‘development’ and 
‘becoming’.  
 
HEGEL ON BEING  
The Phenomenology served as a prologue to the Science of Logic, and it is here, and in 
the Logic, that Hegel directly addressed the debate about substance. Building on 
Spinoza, Hegel elaborated the critique of the emphasis on independence and, by way of 
tracing out the efforts to resolve its contradictions, expanded upon the concept of 
‘essence’ and provided the immediate materials from which Marx developed his own 
concept of the human substance. In the Logic, and in his lectures on the history of 
philosophy, we also find a detailed exposition of other concepts that are central to 
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Marx’s own theory, particularly those of ‘development’ and ‘becoming’. Throughout 
these works and the Phenomenology, we find a continued application of the concept of 
expression, and a reconciliation of the differing perspectives offered by Spinoza and 
Herder.20  
We will also see Hegel acknowledging the limitation and pain that had long featured in 
earlier philosophical work on substance. Hegel’s account highlights the profound 
influence of desire as an expression of the limitation of any particular being. Hegel also 
emphasised the costs incurred when denying those desires, with consequences like 
alienation and pain—costs so profound and so troubling as to found ways of living built 
on their denial and avoidance, and oppression of others and of the self to that end. 
Hegel went further, arguing that the experience of anxiety, limitation and pain held the 
promise of transformation through our inability to deny our corporeality, and our 
eventual surrender of a claim to independence in the face of its resistance. The 
acceptance of our corporeality was the catalyst enabling the acceptance of 
interdependence—of mutuality—as the essence of our being and, from there, the 
recognition and development of the social or, as Hegel described it, the “ethical” 
character of our being. From that point, desire left Hegel’s stage, revealing his project 
as one of rational freedom. It was, however, the very place to which Feuerbach and 
Marx were to return as part of their materialist ‘inversion’ of Hegel’s work. As indicated 
                                                          
20
 Unlike Althusser and Balibar (1997, 97, 186-7, 252), I argue that Hegel’s use of ‘expression’ had the 
opposite meaning to that of the traditional notion of ‘substance’ or ‘essence’, such that, rather than 
contradicting their notions of a ‘centre’ less combination or structure, it forms one of the terms Marx used 
to describe that structure. Furthermore, in Chapters Six and Seven, I argue that the Spinozan use of 
‘expression’ contributes to a richer understanding of that complex structure, particularly when considering 
the location of individuals within that structure. 
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above, it is for this reason that this chapter focuses on this particular selection from 
Hegel’s works. 
Hegel’s project is best understood as a critique of the traditional debate about 
substance which assumed the existence of some unique quality that was both separate 
from—and unaffected by—other, passing qualities. A ‘pure’ substance or being was not 
defined by its ‘accidental’ or temporary properties. Hegel’s critique, however, held that 
when substance or being was defined in such abstract terms, it was to equate it with 
nothing: 
The distinction between Being and Nought is, in the first place, only implicit, and 
not yet actually made: they only ought to be distinguished. A distinction of course 
implies two things, and that one of them possesses an attribute that is not found 
in the other. Being however is an absolute absence of attributes, and so is 
Nought. Hence the distinction between the two is…no distinction (1975, 128). 
On this criticism, Hegel built an understanding of the world and life that did not rely upon 
on the traditional assumption of separation. It was also the basis from which Marx was 
to build his theories of the self, corporeality and agency.  
Hegel proposed that once the idea of property-free, secret being or substance was 
abandoned, there could only be “determinate being”—being with some particular 
character (1969, 406, 409; see also 1975, 134). Being, then, necessarily involved a 
relationship with something else as the property of a thing only consisted in its 
difference to others. This character or property was not identical with the idea of an 
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inner, private, pure being, but an Other to it—a negation or contradiction of this 
presumed state of separation (1969, 395, 398, 418; see also 1975, z134, 135):  
Given something, and up starts an other to us: we know that there is not 
something only, but an other as well. Nor, again, is the other of such a nature 
that we can think something apart from it; a something is implicitly the other of 
itself…When we say “something else” our first impression is that something 
taken separately is only something, and that the quality of being another attaches 
to it only from outside considerations. Thus we suppose that the moon, being 
something else than the sun, might very well exist without the sun. But really the 
moon, as a something, has its other implicit in it (1975, z136).  
Hegel (1969, 441) illustrated this implicit Other using the idea of identity as relational 
using: 
The most trivial examples of above and below, right and left, father and 
son…Father is the other of son, and son the other of father, and each only is as 
this other of the other. 
The Other was a negation of the conventional idea of being or substance because it 
contradicted the assumptions of independence and separation. For every being, an 
Other was present and co-located because of their mutual reliance. 
Like Spinoza, Hegel referred to this relationship between being and its Other as 
‘essence’. Essence was “Being coming into mediation with itself through the negativity 
of itself”, its Other (1975, 162). It provided a way of envisioning the self that Seve (1978, 
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263) later characterised as Hegel’s version of a “Copernican revolution” —shifting the 
centre of being outwards and transforming the status of a relationship from mere 
accident to foundation. It provided, as we will see later, the basis for Marx’s more open, 
and more holistic account of the self. 
In the chapter on ‘Essence’ in the Logic, Hegel discusses  “the domain in which we see 
things not just by themselves, ‘immediately’, but as founded on an underlying basis...the 
manifestation of a thoroughgoing systematic web of necessary relations” (Taylor 1975, 
258). Hegel illustrated this with reference to both Democritean atomistic theory and to 
contemporary concepts of attraction, repulsion and force. Democritus’ atomism was 
seen to offer: 
… an inadequate notion...because it conceives [the] relation [of the atoms]...their 
combination, as purely contingent...some atoms ‘swerve’, and hence encounter 
others; whereas in reality, the [atoms] can only exist in relation to each other 
(Taylor 1975, 246). 
The “atomistic principle, according to which the essence of things was the atom and the 
void” treated the: 
… many [atoms as having]...affirmative being [and]...their relation to one another 
[as] a non-relation, [as] external to them...In this determination repulsion is an 
exclusion (Hegel 1969, 166, 170).  
However, this, as Hegel (1969, 170-2) explained, was an inadequate explanation: 
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The plurality is...non posited otherness, the limit is only the void, only that in 
which the ones are not. But in the limit they also are; they are in the void, or their 
repulsion is their common relation...They are...and they are only insofar as they 
reciprocally negate one another...This is not only a relating of them by us, an 
external bringing of them together, on the contrary, repulsion is itself a relating; 
the one which excludes the ones relates itself to them, to the ones, that is, to its 
own self (emphasis in original). 
This traditional approach to substance, with its emphasis on separation, was 
inadequate, not only for dealing with inanimate objects, but with animate ones: 
… the organism…is not exhaustively expressed…in the way anatomy analyses 
and describes [it]…In the systems constituting an embodied form…the organism 
is apprehended from the abstract side of lifeless physical existence: so taken, its 
moments are elements of a corpse and fall to be dealt with by anatomy; they do 
not appertain to knowledge and to the living organism. Qua parts of that sort they 
have really ceased to be, for they cease to be processes…The actual expression 
of the whole [of an organism], and the externalisation of its moments, are really 
found only as a process and a movement, running throughout the various parts 
of the embodied organism; and in this process what is extracted as an individual 
system and fixated so, appears essentially as a fluid moment. So that the 
anatomy which anatomy finds cannot be taken for its real being, but only that 
reality as a process, a process in which alone even the anatomical parts have a 
significance (Hegel 2003, 157).  
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In Hegel’s view (1969, 487), one part of a being did not exist without the other, nor did 
an animate object exist without inanimate objects. In other words, the properties (or 
predicates) of a being are its relations with other beings: 
… the property is this reciprocal relation itself and apart from it the thing is 
nothing…If, therefore, one is speaking of a thing or things in general without any 
determinate property, then their difference is merely indifferent, quantitative. 
What is considered as one thing can equally be made into or considered as 
several things; the separation or union of them is external. A book is a thing and 
each of its leaves is also a thing…The determinateness through which one thing 
is this thing only, lies solely in its properties… (1969, 490-1).  
Properties—‘external’ features—are what comprised a ‘thing’, and were not merely 
subordinate and incidental aspects of it, contrary to the traditional emphasis on some 
underlying, unchanging, substance. This ‘essence’ was “the truth of being” (Hegel 1969, 
389): 
The ‘this’ thus constitutes the complete determinateness of the thing, the 
determinateness being at the same time external…The thing as ‘this’ is…their 
merely quantitative relation, a mere collection, their ‘also’. It consists of some 
quantum or other of a matter, also of a quantum of another, and again of others; 
this connexion of having no connexion alone constitutes the thing (Hegel 1969, 
493-4). 
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A being was thus comprised of its contextual (or coinciding) properties—that is, its 
relationships with other things: 
This abstract universal medium, which we can call Thinghood…is nothing else 
than …a simple togetherness. This salt is a simple Here and at the same time 
manifold: it is white, and also pungent, also cubical in shape, also of a specific 
weight, and so on…It is, then, in truth the thing itself which is white, and also 
cubical, and also tart, and so on (Hegel 2003, 64, 68). 
However, like the mode or conatus which organised Spinoza’s aggregates, Hegel’s 
being was not any random combination of properties, but precisely those properties in 
relevant quantities (like its specific weight, size, etc.): 
Sugar is, of course, not the mere plurality of its different adjectives; but why 
should it be more than its properties in relation? When ‘white’, ‘hard’, ‘sweet’ and 
the rest coexist in a certain way, that is surely the secret of the thing. The 
qualities are, and are in relation (Bradley 1959, 16). 
For Hegel (1975, 516), a being or substance could not exist or act outside or 
independently of those relationships. Its ‘truth’ then lay in the mediation of these 
relationships. Its continuity—its essence—was constituted in that relational dynamic. 
The combination of this being and its Other—the stage at which the negation or 
contradiction of being by its Other was itself negated or resolved (the ‘negation of the 
negation’) —was the outcome of action. Once a being achieved unity with its Other—
“completed the circle of intermediation” (Hegel 1975, 179) —Hegel called it “existence”: 
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It follows from this that existence is the indefinite multitude of existents as 
reflected-into-themselves, which at the same time equally throw light upon one 
another – which, in short, are co-relative, and form a world of reciprocal 
dependence and of infinite interconnection…In this motley play of the 
world…there is nowhere a firm footing to be found: everything bears an aspect of 
relativity, conditioned by and conditioning something else…The existent is, when 
so described, a Thing (1975, 179-180).  
This unity, however, was always both an exception and temporary. Essence, for Hegel, 
was an incomplete state because the Other was both part of, and yet outside, it. 
Essence was “a still imperfect combination of immediacy and mediation…the sphere in 
which the contradiction, still implicit in the sphere of being, is made explicit”, but not 
resolved (1975, 165).  
 
LIFE AS PAIN 
It was out of this account of essence as becoming that Hegel understood the nature of 
pain. For Hegel, to understand a particular being demanded that one recognise the 
contradiction that resided within it. It was both founded in—and against—the totality of 
relations. Constituted by a variety of relations, its being depended upon an involvement 
with others that expanded towards the totality. Yet constituted, too, by a particular locus 
or intersection of those various relations, it was defined against those situated outside 
the arena carved out by those relations. For Hegel (1969, 770), “the living being is for 
itself this disharmony and has the feeling of this contradiction, which is pain”. To 
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penetrate to the ‘essence’ of being was to see that it was both complete and 
incomplete, absent those ‘extrinsic’ relations and their essential objects. It was to posit 
an essential incompleteness or defect—an ontological lack—at the heart of being, at the 
very site at which the tradition of debate about substance thought it to reside. It is this 
ontological lack that provides the foundation for Marx’s understanding of human agency, 
rather than need per se (Hegel 1967, 235; Seve 1978, 321). For Hegel (1969, 439): 
… everything is inherently contradictory…contradiction is the root of all 
movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within 
it that it moves, has an urge and activity. 
In this fashion, Hegel understood being as contradiction, movement and pain. Being 
was to be discovered in the expansionary movement from a narrow to a comprehensive 
set of relations. It was found in the movement from an incomplete or inorganic unity to 
an internal, organic unity, and in the movement from the contradictory state of essence 
towards the totality. It was to found being in desire and change: 
Animal wants and appetites…are the felt contradiction, which exists within the 
living subject, and pass into the activity of negating this negation which mere 
subjectivity still is. The satisfaction of the want or appetite restores the peace 
between subject and object. The objective thing, which, so long as the 
contradiction exists, i.e., so long as the want is felt, stands on the other side, 
loses this quasi-independence, by its union with the subject…Appetite is, so to 
speak, the conviction that the subjective is only a half-truth, no more adequate 
than the objective. It brings about the supercession of these finites: it cancels the 
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antithesis between the objective which would be and stay an objective only, and 
the subjective which in like manner would and stay a subjective only (Hegel 
1975, 269).  
However, and contrary to the traditional characterisation of substance, Hegel (1969, 
135) insisted that this experience of incompleteness need be neither disabling nor 
disheartening, but rather, act as a goad to action: 
The sentient creature, in the limitation of hunger, thirst, etc, is the urge to 
overcome this limitation and it does overcome it. It feels pain, and it is the 
privilege of the sentient nature to feel pain; it is a negation in its self, and the 
negation is determined as a limitation in its feeling, just because the sentient 
creature has the feeling of its self, which is the totality that transcends this 
determinateness. If it were not above and beyond the determinateness, it would 
not feel its negation and would feel no pain (emphasis in original). 
Hegel (2006, 235-6) drew on Aristotle’s concept of potential to capture the immanent, 
effervescent character of this drive: 
… there are two principal forms, namely, that of potency ...  and, secondly, that of 
actuality or, more precisely, energy...These are characteristics that crop up 
everywhere in Aristotle, and we must be familiar with them in order to grasp his 
meaning. Specifically, ‘potency’ is not ‘force’ but rather...‘capacity’ or ‘potentiality’. 
The Scholastics translated it as potentia. It is not an indeterminate possibility but 
is for Aristotle what is objective, what is implicit. The implicit is the idea, which is 
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also just potentia; for only energy...or form is what is active or that which 
actualises. In saying ‘essence’...we have not yet posited activity.  
The concept of essence described a bundle or ensemble of relations with a variety of 
objects and, through them, a range of contradictions that was experienced as pain or 
dis-ease. This, in turn, drove that being to repeatedly open itself to the ‘external’ through 
the very process of its self-expression:  
Since of necessity it has to be this subsistence, ie, to express, externalise itself, 
its expression takes the form that the other approaches it and incites 
it…Since…it must of necessity be this essential nature, which as yet it is not 
affirmed to be, this other comes forward soliciting or inciting it to reflect into self, 
to turn the pseudo-external factor into a factor of itself; in other words, this other 
cancels its external expression…Each of these two sides, the relation of inciting 
and the relation of the opposed determinate content, is on its own account an 
absolute process of permutation and transposition (Hegel 2003, 78, 84). 
This process, as Hegel thought (1970, 24z), was “development”, the “positing of what it 
is in itself…as an utterance or expression, a coming forth, or setting forth, a coming-out-
of-self”. It made change central to, rather than the contradiction of, continuity. It was: 
…the movement...by which that only is explicit which is already implicitly 
present…Thus e.g. the plant is developed from its germ…in the process of 
development the notion keeps to itself and only gives rise to alteration of form, 
without making any addition in point of content (Hegel 1975, 224z ). 
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This concept of development, while it drew on Aristotle’s work (Hegel 1994, 214), was 
indebted to Spinoza. Whereas Aristotle sought to present particular beings as enjoying 
the independence of substance, Hegel held all such beings were founded on, and 
deeply involved in, the totality. No ‘pure being’ existed—only beings bound up with 
others. All beings were engaged in a movement of deepening engagement with the 
‘external’ world as the only means by which to express their own essence—and in so 
doing, they expressed their existing dependence on the one, universal substance: 
The concept of development is a wholly universal concept. Development is the 
movement or vitality of spirit, of nature, because everything living, from the 
feeblest to the noblest, is development. The inner life of God in itself is this very 
development, for God in his universality determines himself, that is, God posits a 
distinction and brings himself to determinate being, to being for another. In this 
determinate being there is the eternal creation of the world...and at the same 
time there is absolute identity with self – an absolute movement that is at the 
same time absolute rest. God is an eternal mediating of himself with himself, an 
eternal coming together...of himself with himself....Absolute development, the life 
of God or of spirit, is simply a process, a universal movement and, as concrete, it 
is a series of developments. This series is not to be represented as a straight line 
but as a circle, a return into itself...The entirety of the progression, the goal in this 
development, is none other than spirit’s coming to itself, knowing itself...in that it 
has consciousness of itself, that it becomes object for itself, namely, brings forth 
what it is, and that it empties itself out, becomes wholly object for itself, wholly 
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discloses its innermost being, that it descends into its depth and, in doing so, its 
depth comes forth (Hegel 1994, 52, my emphasis). 
This not only applied to the absolute or the totality, but to particular beings as well: 
When we reflect on these statements we see that the human being, who was 
implicitly rational and who makes this rationality into the object, is nothing in 
addition to what he was at the beginning. What was implicit maintains itself and 
remains the same thing, and yet there is a vast difference (Hegel 1994, 214-5). 
This process, moreover, could not be understood in isolation, nor could particular 
beings: 
…Thus both the sides of the entire movement which were before distinguished, 
viz., the setting up of individual forms lying apart and undisturbed in the universal 
medium of independent existence, and the process of life – collapse into one 
another…The entire circuit of this activity constitutes Life. It is neither what is 
expressed to begin with, the immediate continuity and concrete solidity of its 
essential nature; nor the stable, subsisting form, the discrete individual which 
exists on its own account; nor the bare process of this form; nor again is it the 
simple combination of all these moments. It is none of these; it is the whole which 
develops itself, resolves its own development; and in this movement simply 
preserves itself (Hegel 2003, 101-2). 
The preservation of any particular being was, then, in effect, the continuity of a 
movement: 
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The object is in its essential nature the same as the process; the latter is the 
unfolding and distinguishing of the elements involved; the object is these same 
elements taken and held together as a single totality (Hegel 2003, 63). 
This process, and the terms Hegel used to grasp it—namely ‘expression’ and 
‘development’—require that “we…think pure flux”, a “flux of thorough-going change”, of 
“flux [as]…the substance of the independent forms” —that we regard life as “endless, 
infinite movement” and the self as “this very unrest” (2003, 92, 84, 100, 12, my 
emphasis). Here, Hegel (2006, 74-5) reached back to Heraclitus to present this being-
in-flux as ‘becoming’: 
Heraclitus says that everything is becoming, that becoming is the principle. This 
is contained in the expression ‘Being no more is than is non-being’ – this is 
precisely becoming, for becoming contains the identity of the two, of being and 
non being. By ‘becoming’ we understand arising and perishing; neither is on its 
own account, but they are identical...This unity is what is true. It is a great 
thought to pass over from being to becoming; it is still abstract, but at the same 
time it is also the first concrete element, that is, the first unity of opposed 
characteristics. The latter are thus restless in this relationship, for it contains the 
principle of vitality...This principle of motion itself is becoming, the stirring of the 
vitality of generation according to one aspect or another. 
The substance of a living being is best understood as activity, relationship and 
dependence: 
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It is an ancient proposition that the one is many and especially that the many are 
one. We may repeat here the observation that the truth of the one and the many 
expressed in propositions appears in an inappropriate form, that this truth is to be 
grasped and expressed only as becoming, as a process, a repulsion and 
attraction – not as being, which as a proposition has the character of a stable 
unity (Hegel 1969, 172). 
All beings, animate and inanimate, however, engaged in these processes of expression, 
development and becoming. The objects of each being’s expansionary movement were 
themselves engaged in movement. Spinoza had already highlighted the tensions then 
immanent in life. In like fashion, Hegel emphasised the central role of contradiction. It 
may equally aptly be considered in terms of resistance—of the contradiction posed by 
one particular being to another’s expression, development or movement.  
One can understand the potential of a thing—and its realisation of that potential—to be 
central to what that thing is. Everything has some potential to be realised and that 
potential is often realised inconsistently with the movements of other beings affected by 
it. The thing can be expected to move towards the unification of essence, of being and 
objects, to move towards a fuller expression of the totality, even when that conflicts with 
the movements of other things: 
If…an existence contains the Notion not merely as an abstract in-itself, but as an 
explicit, self-determined totality, as instinct, life, ideation, etc., then in its own 
strength it overcomes the limitation and attains a being beyond it. The plant 
transcends the limitation of being a seed, similarly, of being blossom, fruit, leaf; 
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the seed becomes the developed plant, the blossom fades away, and so on 
(Hegel 1969, 135). 
In his Science of Logic, Hegel (1969, 134) insisted that even a stone, as a determinate 
being, “transcends its limitation”.21 
On Hegel’s terms, animate and inanimate beings engaged in their own movement, their 
own expression, development and becoming. All beings had part of their essence 
located ‘outside’ their selves and were driven to unify the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
aspects of their essence—to organise themselves more securely or completely (1975, 
134, 135, 766). This made the experience of limitation and resistance an ordinary and 
unavoidable feature of development, in the combination of subject and object, which, in 
the case of human beings, Hegel (and later Marx too) described as the relationship 
between the individual’s ‘organic’ and ‘inorganic’ body.  
As Malabou (2005 64, 75) has noted, Hegel used the category of habit to refer to the 
regular ways in which this process of unification occurred: 
Habit is what gives a being the impression of its existence as something 
continuous, and this Hegel calls the “impression of selfhood”. Habit makes it 
possible to retain the changes that occur and to expect that they will recur…[It] is 
the process whereby the contingent becomes essential. 
The open character of being—as intimately involved in the ‘external’ and perpetually 
engaged in becoming—made any particular being ‘plastic’ (to use Malabou’s term). The 
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 Aristotle also treated “inanimates” as realising their potential (Lawson-Tancred 1998, 133). 
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relative independence of other beings, and their potential resistance to the movement 
towards unification that mark the stages of becoming, made all beings contingent. 
Rather than the pre-existing, pre-defined certainties suggested by the traditional debate 
about substance, Hegel, like Spinoza, made particular being an uncertain, even 
precarious, achievement: “Effected by habit, the singularity of the ‘plastic individual’ 
becomes an essence a posteriori” (Malabou 2005, 73-4). 
Continuity was no longer secured by a stable unity, but by a process or habit that, whilst 
tending towards repetition, was always vulnerable to the character of being as 
‘becoming’. The tension and productivity—the volatility in the sense of some imminent 
transformation—that characterised any particular being made, then, for a kind of 
inherent restlessness. It made it difficult for a being to find its ‘home’ in the world, as the 
stability preferred in the traditional debate about substance always remains a state to be 
achieved. To be was to experience this tension—the contradiction Hegel emphasised—
and to not feel ‘at home’ in the world. To be was to experience this pervasive 
discomfort—this pain. As Hegel emphasised (1969, 770), to live was to experience “this 
disharmony”, this “feeling of contradiction, which is pain”. Standing against the 
traditional approaches to substance, Hegel treated the experiences of uncertainty and 
pain, not as exceptions or pathologies, but as essential to being itself. 
One response to this pain, to the desire for stability and a world that consistently 
reflected back one’s self—a world in which one was ‘at home’— was to ignore or deny 
that pain. It was to impose its management on others—to enslave others to that end—or 
to deny its claims on one’s self and to pursue some kind of ascetic discipline. Hegel 
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explored the latter evasion in the Phenomenology. It was to seek to secure stability by 
ignoring the call of contradiction and desire—by dampening and denying the dual 
tensions of expression which, for Hegel, formed the foundation of the character and 
continuity of any being. This was, however, to deny one’s self—to engage in a self-
defeating act—in order to gain some sense of security and stability. In this sense, 
Malabou (2005, 75) could draw on Hegel to conclude: 
Man does not have a substance…The Hegelian man is above all a man of 
habits, and that means, paradoxically, a disappearing subject. The more closely 
habit is studied, the more it becomes clear that human subjectivity is constituted 
in self-forgetting; consciousness and will, under the influence of repeated 
practice, win their force through a kind of self-absenting. 
A being could secure some stability, some substance in the traditional sense, by 
imposing limits on its self—by separating itself from the world, and from others. 
Limitation here, again, in the sense of separation and boundaries, was central to the 
constitution of a particular being or self. It remained, however, a denial of one’s 
essence, of one’s immersion and participation in the totality, and one that was bound to 
fail because the very nature of one’s being was constituted by that involvement. A 
stable sense of being, like the human experience of selfhood, founded on a notion of 
separation, was both dependent upon, and pained by, limitation. It was an identity, 
however, by virtue of the movement immanent throughout all being, that was bound to 
be undermined, bound to be disrupted, forcing one from pain to pain, and from one 
grasp of self and identity, to reaching for another. Contrary to traditional approaches to 
189 
 
substance, it was a pathway that was destined to fail until the demand for separation or 
independence was abandoned—until being was re-conceived in the non-traditional 
terms of involvement and dependence, and one could feel at home in the world through 
feeling an identity with all the world. This was the pathway Hegel explored through his 
Phenomenology of Spirit.  
 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY 
It is for this reason that the Phenomenology has been properly described as the 
prologue to the Logic (Stern 2002; Taylor 1975, 221). It was an argument, drawn from 
the experience or phenomena of being, that revealed the foundations of the Logic. 
Moreover, as Taylor (1975, 137) has pointed out, it was an effort to explain and 
reconcile the two different dimensions of expression. It involved a certain self-concept 
and encounter with “realities on which [that particular person] depends” where those 
realities, however, do not meet the requirements of that dependence, but express 
something alien. 
The Phenomenology narrates a search for a world that reflects, expresses or provides a 
‘home’ for a particular understanding of one’s self. It is an account of the effort to 
experience substance, as traditionally understood in terms of separation, whereby the 
rational is treated as the human substance, and as free from corporeal influence. It is an 
account of an effort to secure a world that is free of desire, its uncertainties and 
demands. It is an account of the productivity of those efforts, of the civilisations they 
established, and of their failure. It is an account of the manner in which the failure to 
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secure a world that recognised or reflected back the traditional image of one’s essence 
ultimately forced the surrender of that image. As Taylor (1975, 148) put it, the realisation 
of this goal—of experiencing an identity with, rather than limitation by, the external 
world—could only occur when one saw oneself as an “emanation” of that world. It made 
the Phenomenology an account of the re-definition of the rational: one that embraced, 
rather than excluded, the corporeal. 
The embodiment of this Geist, or ‘Spirit’, was central to Hegel’s project. It was the 
movement through which the immanent interconnection, captured in Spinoza’s 
approach to expression, becomes embodied in the thought, culture, institutions and 
practices of a society—when the expression of being, in the sense emphasised by 
Herder, becomes identical with that of Spinoza. It was a movement in which the 
corporeal (or matter) played a central part. In the Phenomenology, Hegel (2003, 101, 
102,103) highlights the character of self consciousness prompted by corporeal 
experience—desire—and the failure to subordinate that desire:  
… self-consciousness is thus only assured of itself by sublating this other, which 
is presented to self-consciousness as an independent life: self-consciousness is 
Desire...In [the] state of satisfaction, however, it has experience of the 
independence of its object. Desire and the certainty of its self obtained in the 
gratification of desire, are conditioned by the object; for the certainty exists 
through cancelling this other; in order that this cancelling may be effected, there 
must be this other. Self-consciousness is thus unable by its negative relation to 
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the object to abolish it; because of that it rather produces it again, as well as the 
desire.  
Life turned on the experience of painful contradictions, which were addressed, in part, 
through an endless cycle of empty, temporary satisfactions. No sooner did one satisfy a 
desire, and affirm one’s sense of independence, than desire arose anew to contradict 
that sense of self. No sooner did one secure a sense of stability and independence—of 
substance—than the sensation of incompletion and need returned to undermine that 
sense of self. Hegel’s Phenomenology is an account of the attempt to assert the 
traditional characterisation of substance as separate and independent in the face of the 
challenges posed by matter, the experience of change, and the depth to which they 
challenged the desired stability and security of substance. As Berthold-Bond (1998, 38) 
argues, it: 
 … details the journey of self-discovery of consciousness...The various shapes 
consciousness takes on this voyage are each attempts to respond to the 
fundamental desire of all consciousness, the desire for self-unification, the 
overcoming of disparity between our actual situation in the world and our 
possibilities...Yet unity is a perpetually vanishing achievement: again and again 
the tantalizing possibility of security and certainty is lost. The self is never able to 
achieve a lasting satisfaction, a stable resting place – it is always incomplete, 
always in process of becoming, ever restless in desire, and “it is just this unrest 
that is the self”...This is the “tremendous power of the negative” which underlies 
the very ontology of human selfhood, the fundamental experience of discord 
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which is the dynamic element of all life, such that ”the life of spirit is not the life 
that...keeps itself untouched by devastation...[and] dismemberment...but rather 
the life that endures it and maintains itself in it”....22 
Hegel saw that corporeal experience repeatedly provided such a sense of contradiction 
in one’s self that it drove a search for other forms of certainty and stability—for other 
means to enjoy the sensation of substance. Throughout the Phenomenology, Hegel 
charted the basis for a change in self-consciousness—from the particular, abstract, 
separate individual to that dependent for her or his existence on the universal, which he 
called Reason. In doing so, as Beiser (2005, 185) and Jenkins (2009, 122) put it, Hegel 
was engaged in a radical critique of a central strand of the traditional debate about 
substance. Central to that critique was one of Hegel’s most striking and influential ideas: 
the master-servant dialectic.  
 
THE MASTER-SERVANT DIALECTIC 
The interpretation of this dialectic, however, remains one of the most complex and 
contested aspects in the scholarly literature on Hegel, and on the Hegel-Marx 
relationship. This is, in part, a reflection of its role as one of the most significant 
responses to Kant’s arguments, substituting a social foundation for individual, inherent, 
and thus, universal pre-existing rational capacities. In its identification of the individual 
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with a social substance or ‘ethical life’, it is also central to concerns that Hegel’s works 
legitimate an authoritarian state.  
These difficulties are exacerbated by the ambiguity of many of the terms used by Hegel, 
some of which are open to dramatically varied translations. The brevity of text, set forth 
in less than nine pages, has added to these difficulties, as does the apparent change in 
focus in the chapter. The latter has promoted ‘patchwork’ interpretations of the 
Phenomenology, with some treating chapter four, which contains the dialectic, as 
comprising a completely different work to the preceding chapters (Dudley 2008). Whilst 
contemporary research (such as Pippin 2011) favours a more integrated interpretation, 
these characteristics of the text limit the extent to which surrounding materials can be 
drawn on to aid its interpretation. Nevertheless, as the later research emphasises, these 
very difficulties make a close reading of the text a necessity. It is on the basis of such an 
attentive reading that I argue that there needs to be a greater emphasis on the role of 
the corporeal in understanding the Master-Servant dialectic. 
The herrschaft-knechtshaft dialectic was one stage in the search for a certain, stable 
sense of self defined in terms of rationality.23  That dialectic was founded in the search 
for certain knowledge of one’s self, and the effort to evade the influence of the corporeal 
was central to it. Springing from the experience of contradiction, Hegel (2003, 106, 107) 
argued that self-consciousness required the recognition of another self-consciousness, 
and that the dialectic was based upon the effort to sublate all others, so as to reveal the 
self as “a pure abstraction of existence”. It was an effort to secure “a standing negation, 
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whose otherness could be negated without its being abolished”, where desires could be 
met without the loss of the other. This was potentially available “in other men in so far 
as they recognise him as a human being” (Taylor 1975, 152). Unlike other objects of 
desire, another human being had the capacity to meet the desire for recognition without 
himself having to change. Securing this recognition as a free rational being, however: 
… consists in showing itself [self-consciousness] as a pure negation of its 
objective form, or in showing that it is fettered to no determinate existence, that it 
is not bound at all by the particularity everywhere characteristic of existence as 
such, and is not tied up with life (Hegel 2003, 107).  
It demanded the demonstration that one conformed to the traditional emphasis on 
separation or independence. 
This search ultimately involved the encounter between two self-consciousnesses, each 
one bent on proving its ‘abstract existence’. So intent was each on proving its 
independence or freedom from nature, it led to a “life and death struggle” (Hegel 2003, 
107). Proof of their self-concept—that their true selves, their substance, was distinct 
from the natural world—led them to place their lives at risk. That struggle concluded 
with one, the Servant, being forced to act for the other, and thereby assume 
consciousness “in the form and shape of thinghood”: 
The one is independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself; the other is 
dependent and its essence is life or existence for another. The former is the 
Master, or Lord, the latter, the [servant] (Hegel 2003, 108). 
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The Master could only secure his sense of identity—his sense of self as independent—
through oppressing another. A number of writers, such as McDowell (1996), understate 
the corporeal character of this encounter. Hegel was well-versed in politics and could 
readily have presented this encounter as a negotiation, which is the sense conveyed by 
the widespread focus on the conflict as one of social or normative recognition. However, 
I will show that these were not the terms used by Hegel. The struggle here was not just 
a normative or social struggle, but a fiercely physical one, so desperate had the 
protagonists become. Corporeal desire drove them to, and fuelled, that fight, as well as 
its resolution. I am not the first to make this point. The more recent emphasis on a close 
reading of the text has led to a number of writers highlighting the influence of the 
corporeal. Honneth (2008, 79, 82), for example, sees Hegel’s use of ‘desire’ as a 
reference to “corporeal activity” and the subject’s “own biological nature”. I think Pippin 
(2011, location 149), notwithstanding others’ criticisms of him24, best captures Hegel’s 
approach, in stating that Hegel deals with “a corporeal, historical, labouring subject...in 
the service of a further elaboration of the possibility of intentional consciousness”. That 
corporeal subject features throughout the first four of the Phenomenology’s eight 
chapters. Whilst, in Hegel’s presentation, the influence of the corporeal is surpassed by 
rationality, the literature has only recently begun to give due recognition to the corporeal 
in Hegel’s overall project. Through this chapter, I promote a better appreciation of that 
role. Hegel’s works provide a powerful argument that desire—notwithstanding our most 
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determined efforts to assert our freedom as pure rational beings, independent of the 
perceived corruptions of corporeal desire—is a vital, inseparable part of us.  
The subordination of the servant in the master/servant dialectic appears, in the first 
instance, as the master successfully asserting freedom from the corporeal and its 
uncertainties. However, Hegel presents the subordination of the Servant as inadequate 
to provide the Master with certainty. The capitulation of the Servant did not provide the 
required “standing negation” (Taylor 1975, 152). Instead of a stable experience of 
recognition, the Master returned to the cycle of desire. In Beiser’s words, the outcome of 
the struggle “degraded” the Master’s “status as a rational being” and “regressed” him 
back to his “animal desires” (2005, 189). The Master himself degraded the servant from 
an equal, like, rational being (at least potentially), to a mere instrument of the Master’s 
will, no different from the other objects used to satisfy his desires, and so unable to 
provide the desired stable experience of recognition (Beiser 2005, 188-9; Stern 2002, 
83-5). Here, the effort to confirm a sense of the self as separate and independent 
revealed its flaw—absent some permanent resistance, it left the Master in the unstable, 
uncertain grip of desire (Kojeve 1980, 24,).  
It would only be through restraint—through a different sense of self, one that did not rely 
upon independence, but on interdependence or mutual recognition—that this cycle 
could be stilled (Hegel 2003, 107-8). For Hegel, it was only with the substitution of a 
social form of certainty—mutual recognition—that the Sisyphus-like trial of corporeal 
experience could be escaped. The Master’s willingness to struggle to the death did not 
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secure his own certainty. It did not secure his freedom from desire. Indeed, rather than 
confirming his independence: 
… he really finds that something has come about quite different …It is not an 
independent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved (Hegel 
2003, 110).  
Here, notwithstanding the failure to uphold his self-concept, the person who gained 
most from the confrontation is the Servant. The Servant, by virtue of his subordination 
and its continuation in corporeal labour—that is, by virtue of his acceptance of limitation 
and restraint, and surrender of a demand for the independence of substance—
experiences a profound change in self-consciousness. In the first instance, his concept 
of himself as free and independent was overturned through subordination to the Master. 
However, the extremity of that experience—the confrontation with death—provided the 
possibility of developing an even stronger sense of independence:  
…because it has experienced this reality within it…not in peril or fear for this 
element or that, nor for this or that moment of time, it was afraid for its entire 
being, it felt the fear of death, the sovereign master. It has been in that 
experience melted to its inmost soul, has trembled throughout its every fibre, and 
all that is fixed and steadfast has quaked within it…[It had experienced the] 
complete perturbation of its entire substance, [the] absolute dissolution of all its 
stability into fluid continuity… (2003, 110).25  
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This is the experience—the trauma—Hegel thought to be central to the transformation 
of consciousness. This is because it forced the Servant to consciously confront “the 
simple, ultimate nature of self-consciousness”, which was “absolute negativity, pure 
self-referent existence” (2003, 110).26 In Taylor’s words (1975, 155), “the prospect of 
death shakes them loose”. For the servant the “transitoriness of life” is “brought home” 
(Stern 2002, 84). It had brought being and non-being together in unity: the idea of the 
self as absolutely free, together with the experience of absolute servitude (being for self 
contrasted with being for another—substance, as traditionally understood in terms of 
separation and independence, as contrasted with essence). Notwithstanding his 
dominion, the Master was unable to participate in this ‘negative dialectic’. 
In addition, Hegel insisted that this transformation was equally dependent upon this 
experience of fear being protracted over time in an intensely intimate way—through the 
restraint of desire (Taylor 1975, 154; Jenkins 2009; Stern 2002, 84). This protracted 
confrontation ensured the comprehensive dissolution of the Servant’s former sense of 
self: 
… this [servant]’s consciousness is not only this total dissolution in a general way 
[following from the fear of death]; in serving and toiling the [servant] actually 
carries this out…fear and service in general…are necessary. Without the 
discipline of service and obedience, fear remains formal and does not spread 
over the whole known reality of existence…If it has endured not absolute fear, 
but merely some slight anxiety, the negative reality has remained external to it, 
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its substance has not been through and through infected thereby. Since the 
entire content of its natural consciousness, has not tottered and shaken, it is still 
inherently a determinate mode of being… (Hegel 2003, 110, 111-2). 
However, this thoroughgoing restraint and discipline simultaneously provided the basis 
for the development of a stronger sense of self, a stronger self-consciousness, as it 
enabled the Servant to better experience the resistance or “independence” of the 
objects of his labour (2003, 109).27 The Servant, unlike the Master, was able to sublate 
the objects he worked on. He could annihilate their form and substitute a new one. As 
Hegel (2003, 110-1; my emphasis) put it, it was only: 
...Through work and labour, however, [that] this consciousness of the [servant] 
comes to itself. In the moment that corresponds with desire in the case of the 
master’s consciousness, the aspect of the non-essential relation to the thing 
seemed to fall to the lot of the servant, since the thing there retained its 
independence. Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and 
thereby unalloyed feeling of self. This satisfaction, however…is itself only a state 
of evanescence, for it lacks objectivity or subsistence. Labour, on the other hand, 
is desire restrained and checked, evanescence delayed and postponed; in other 
words, labour shapes and fashions the thing. The negative relation to the object 
passes into the form of the object, into something that is permanent and remains; 
because it is just for the labourer that the object has independence. This negative 
mediating agency, this activity giving shape and form, is at the same time the 
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individual existence…which now in the work it does is externalised and passes 
into the condition of permanence. The consciousness that toils and serves 
accordingly attains by this means the direct apprehension of that independent 
being as its self… Thus precisely in labour where there seemed to be merely 
some outsider’s mind and ideas involved, the [servant] becomes aware, through 
this rediscovery of himself by himself, of having and being “a mind of his own”.28 
However, for Hegel, the sense of self—of essence—acquired by the Servant in 
‘cancelling’ the form of an object remained inadequate. It remained a stage in the 
movement towards a sense of the self rooted in universal Reason. As such, more was 
needed. Hegel considered this in the section following ‘Lordship and Bondage’ - the 
‘Unhappy Consciousness’.  
 
THE UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS 
The interpretation of this passage is as complex as the Master-Servant dialectic. The 
‘unhappy consciousness’ (‘das ungluckliche bewusstein bewust’) is equally difficult to 
translate, with bewusstine bewust suggestive of a diversity of meanings, including 
awareness, knowledge, sense, cognition, deliberation, calculation, and consciousness. 
Moreover, with its central references to stoicism, scepticism and Christianity, it provides 
even stronger suggestions of a collective social experience than a practical, corporeal 
experience. My argument, however, is that close attention to the text demonstrates that 
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this remains a stage of the intimately corporeal experience explored in the foregoing 
parts of the Phenomenology, and which Honneth (2008, 77) describes as “the transition 
from a natural [or animal] to a spiritual [or rational] being”. 
‘The Unhappy Consciousness’ continues Hegel’s account of the Master-Servant 
relationship. The Servant, having secured a stable sense of self, remained enslaved. 
His experience of freedom or independence was “merely stoic independence, the 
independence of thought, and this finds, by passing through the process of scepticism, 
its ultimate truth in that form we called the ‘unhappy self-consciousness’ – the soul of 
despair” (Hegel 2003, 440).  The inability to resolve the contradictions of being 
produced this experience, one that Berthold-Bond (1998, 48) described as the “deepest 
descent into the anguish of self-division”. This, however, was where Hegel saw the 
potential for a different sense of the self to emerge. Contrary to the traditional negative 
characterisation of human anxiety and pain, Hegel, like Herder and those following him, 
saw that painful experience as essential to better comprehending our essence. 
In the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’, Hegel presents the continuing effort to secure an 
independent, free self with reference to stoicism, scepticism and Christianity—
references which were not only to systems of belief, but ways of life. Here, again, Hegel 
explored a set of senses of the self—of substance and essence—that treat the non-
corporeal as essential and the corporeal as inessential (Beiser 2005, 334n7; Jenkins 
2009, 127). Moreover, here, just as in the Master-Servant dialectic, Hegel emphasised 
the central role of corporeal resistance in transforming those senses of the self (2003, 
122). 
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The Servant, subject to domination, experienced a stoic sense of freedom, one that was 
“indifferent towards natural existence”, and thus “merely the notion of freedom, not living 
freedom itself” (Hegel 2003, 115)29. For Hegel (2003, 116), scepticism progressed 
beyond this through the recognition of this contradiction and the assertion of the full 
freedom of thought in negation, as “thinking which wholly annihilates the being of the 
world”. As a result, the contradiction previously “divided between two individuals, the 
lord and the [servant], [was] concentrated into one”, constituting the ‘unhappy 
consciousness’ (2003, 118-9). 
Hegel (2003, 119) explored the experience of alienation as “the Unhappy 
Consciousness, the Alienated Soul which is the consciousness of self as a divided 
nature, a doubled and merely contradictory being”. This consciousness involved a 
heightened effort to elevate itself beyond corporeal life by engagement with the 
“unchangeable” —an account of the influence of Christianity (2003, 120-2). This 
comprised a “triple process” (2003, 122).  
The first activity of this ‘triple process’ dealt with “pure consciousness” in the form of 
“pure emotion” and “infinite yearning” (2003, 123). That consciousness “merely [felt]” its 
objects, rather than “grasping [their] real nature” (2003, 124). As a result, it turned back 
on itself and became mere “self feeling”. This condition, in Hegel’s view, was that of 
‘desire’, which is determinate and tied to corporeal life, and paralleled the position of the 
Master (only now within the one consciousness). This first process thus turns to the 
second, “the condition of desire and labour” (2003, 124), which similarly parallels the 
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experience of the Servant in dealing with objects. In this condition, however, the object 
of Christianity—‘the unchangeable’ or god—cannot be cancelled and so cannot provide 
the parallel experience of confirmation of independence:  
The unhappy consciousness…finds itself merely desiring and toiling…its inner 
life really remains still a shattered certainty of itself; that confirmation of its own 
existence which it would receive through work and enjoyment, is, therefore, just 
as tottering and insecure (2003, 124-5, my emphasis). 
In a setting where desire and subordination co-exist and contradict each other, the 
effect of alienated labour is to promote a sense of one’s existence and abilities as a gift 
from “…the unchangeable ‘beyond’…” —a sense that one’s “faculties and 
powers…[are] an external gift [from]…the unchangeable” (2003, 125). The experience 
of alienation was seen to prompt the development of a sense of self that is profoundly 
dependent upon the ‘external’, rather than some internal, secure, personal essence or 
substance.  
This prompt, however, remained superficial in Hegel’s view because a sense of division 
from “the beyond” remained (2003, 126). The self then, in “appearance”, renounced the 
“satisfaction of its self feeling”, but had not done so in actuality (2003, 126). It remained 
subject to the instability and uncertainty of desire. Here, the self became conscious that 
“its actual performance ... becomes a doing of nothing at all” (2003, 127). In this 
withdrawal from corporeal labour and activity, the self was ultimately forced to become 
conscious of itself “in the functions of animal life” (2003, 127). That is, as Berthold-Bond 
(1998, 48-9) put it, “the self [discovered] ... that it is precisely its desire itself which is the 
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source of despair...The despairing soul thus comes to see its desire as the ‘enemy’ 
lurking within it, the source of its wretchedness, which it seeks to destroy”. Matter had 
long been the ‘enemy’ in traditional debates about substance. It was the source of the 
volatility—the change—the contradiction of the stable continuity that was seen as the 
‘truth’ of substance. Here, Hegel, in imagining a confrontation with matter, addressed 
the manner in which the traditional debate about substance had pathologised it. So 
critical was this issue—this rejection of tradition, that Hegel presented it as again 
another “fight to the death” (although, in the literature, it has not attracted any of the 
attention given to the more overt struggle presented in the preceding dialectic). Hegel 
presented the assertion of independence in the form of passive resistance to the 
corporeal, as an ascetic-like discipline, with “fastings” and “mortifications” (2003, 129) 
directed against its own bodily functions: 
These latter, instead of being performed unconsciously and naturally as 
something which, per se, is of no significance, and can acquire no importance 
and essential value in spirit – these latter, since it is in them that the enemy is 
seen in his proper and peculiar shape, are rather an object of strenuous concern 
and serious occupation, and become precisely the most important consideration 
(2003, 127). 
This “attempted immediate destruction of its actual existence”, however, was destined 
to fail: 
Since, however this enemy creates itself in its very defeat, consciousness, by 
giving the enemy a fixedness of being and of meaning, instead of getting rid of 
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him, really never gets away from him and finds itself constantly defiled (2003, 
128). 
This failure to overcome the corporeal as limitation and pain, however, enabled the 
development of a universal consciousness. Hegel (2003, 128) thought that “both the 
feeling of its misfortune and the poverty of its own action [were] points of 
connection…with the unchangeable”. This experience of negation drove the dialectic of 
becoming. In effect, having failed again, but on so intimate a level, the self was “stripped 
… of its Ego” and of its self “deception”. Here, again, in the face of failure, the self 
experienced itself as a gift with “gratitude”, and at the same time was forced to 
“[disclaim] all power of independent self existence” and to “[ascribe] this power as a gift 
from above…[and thereby] put off its unhappy condition” (2003, 129).  
The experience of alienated labour, unable to dominate the corporeal, including one’s 
own body, nonetheless had the potential to move beyond a sense of one’s self as 
independent to one grounded in a sense of ‘gratitude’ and interdependence. Berthold-
Bond (1998, 50) presented this experience as providing: 
...the possibility of resolution. It is precisely through the torment of experiencing 
the self as an utterly torn and divided nature that, as Martin Heidegger puts it in 
another context, “through the rift [of division], torn consciousness is open to admit 
the Absolute”...there is what might be called a narrative rift through which a 
therapeutic resolution of despair is admitted. 
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The extremity of corporeal pain—like the sharp extremities of desire or fear—confronted 
in the effort to embrace ascetic discipline, promoted a ‘rift’ or tear in that sense of self 
founded in the traditional emphasis upon separation. It disrupted the narrative in which 
the sense of self as independent, non-corporeal rationality was grounded. It was: 
… the tragic fate that befalls certainty of self which aims at being absolute, at 
being self-sufficient. It is consciousness of the loss of everything of significance 
in this certainty of itself, and of the loss even of this knowledge or certainty of self 
– the loss of substance as well as of self; it is the bitter pain which finds 
expression in the cruel words “God is dead”... (Hegel 2003, 440). 
Those ‘cruel words’—‘God is dead’— were drawn from a prominent theme in medieval 
mysticism that god (as Christ) had to die bodily in the world so as to be reborn in spirit. 
The phrase ‘God is dead’ pointed to the period between death and rebirth—a time of 
transition borne of “alienation, loss of self-certainty, loss of essential being, loss of 
substance...intolerable pain...[and] meaninglessness...” (Von der Luft 1984, 265, 266).  
Whilst, for Hegel (2003, 130), this experience did not complete the process (its full 
development is detailed in the balance of the Phenomenology), he thought it was the 
necessary catalyst for the “idea of Reason” to “arise”. It had brought separate self-
consciousnesses to the state in which “they could recognise themselves as mutually 
recognizing one another” (2003, 106). This was the “gift” Hegel (2003, 103, 104) 
referred to in the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’; the common objective of that and the 
preceding ‘Lordship and Bondage’ passage; the objective Hegel set out immediately 
before the latter passage commenced: 
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..A self-consciousness has before it a self-consciousness. Only so and only then 
is it self-consciousness in actual fact…What consciousness further has to 
become aware of, is the experience of what mind is – this absolute substance, 
which is the unity of the different self-related and self-existent self-
consciousnesses in the perfect freedom and independence of their opposition as 
component elements of that substance: Ego that is “we”, a plurality of Egos and 
“we” that is a single Ego. Consciousness first finds itself in self-consciousness – 
the notion of mind – its turning point, where it leaves the parti-coloured show of 
the sensuous immediate, passes from the dark void of the transcendent and 
remote super-sensuous, and steps into the spiritual daylight of the present. 
Hegel’s discussion of ‘Lordship and Bondage’ and ‘The Unhappy Consciousness’ 
offered an account of the process by which a sense of self as separate and 
independent—that is, in the traditional terms of substance—was revised. It provided an 
account that respected the attraction and resilience of this sense of self, but suggested 
the circumstances in which change might still occur. For Hegel, several elements were 
essential to enable that change: the consciousness of the other, and dependence upon 
that other to secure a sense of self (mutual recognition); the need for some profoundly 
traumatic experience to negate one’s sense of self as separate, independent and 
capable of domination; the need for prolonged servitude to thoroughly effect that 
negation; and the resistance of the corporeal to prompt the development of a new sense 
of self.  
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This transformation was not only considered in the Phenomenology. Hegel also 
considered it in his account of religion. In doing so, he continued to emphasise the 
transition from a sense of identity founded in separation and independence—
traditionally understood, in substance—to one founded in interdependence, and the 
central, productive role of pain and loss in effecting that transition.  
His consideration of Judaism, unsurprisingly, has clear parallels with Spinoza’s 
emphasis on the immanent, perfect god. In Hegel’s eyes, Judaism exaggerated the 
absolute character of god, and thereby the distinction from the balance of life. This 
approach, like those of the stoics and sceptics, promoted both pain and the potential for 
transformation. In Taylor’s words, Judaism so emphasised the “sublimity of God” as to 
deny any possibility of re-union, leaving man with a profound sense of incompletion and 
“absence” (1975, 498). 
Hegel’s consideration of the Greek religions, where the gods took on familiar human 
forms and faced familiar human limitations sees humanity face a world that is “no longer 
in unity with him”. It is an “alien land” with no prospect of securing unity, one that 
provokes a deeply painful experience of “pining” and “loss” (Taylor 1975, 502). 
Hegel’s account in chapter four of the Phenomenology suggests how alienated 
corporeal labour, in extremity, contradicts the idea of the separate, independent self and 
prompts recognition of a more interdependent sense of being. In particular, it suggests 
how the experience of corporeal pain can overcome that sense of self defined in terms 
of non-corporeal rationality (and in freedom from the corporeal). Hegel’s account of 
religion suggests a similar trajectory. 
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‘Prompt’ is used deliberately here to suggest a catalyst or possibility, but not a certainty. 
Hegel’s account recognised both the ambiguity of those prompts, and the capacity of 
ideas of separation to resist the contradictions they provide. The periods spanned by 
both the Phenomenology and Hegel’s account of religion both suggest the resilience of 
the notion of the separate self. Nevertheless, the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ also 
demonstrated how the very character of self-consciousness repeatedly produces these 
prompts—how a human existence regularly and necessarily contradicts our concepts of 
independence; that is, a human existence is one in which the potential to realise our 
interdependence is immanent. In considering this point, Taylor (1975, 159) emphasised 
how the corporeal, despite its rejection, “returns unceasingly and inescapably”, 
producing a sense of “oscillation” between contrasting experiences of independence 
and interdependence, and forcing a repeated process of redefinition. 
Indeed, the centuries-long span of Hegel’s account is more suggestive of our ability to 
ignore those corporeal prompts, notwithstanding their immanence. The loss 
experienced by the Greeks, for example, did not prompt a change in the Greeks’ 
understanding of the world. In his lectures, Hegel (1994, 95, 195, 231) repeatedly 
described the Greeks’ practice of slavery as evidence of their limited understanding of 
Spirit because they had failed to understand the universal freedom of humanity. It is but 
a short step to then wonder, with regard to the clear parallels with the Master/Servant 
dialectic in the Phenomenology, whether the enslavement of others insulated the 
Greeks from the very corporeal experiences that were essential to their transformation. 
These were conclusions that both Feuerbach and Marx, drawing on Hegel, would make 
forcefully. 
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This risk of oppression remains a central concern in the literature today. The tension 
between a sense of involvement with the world on the one hand, and separation from it 
on the other, is not unique to some distant past. Rather, it is part of the human condition 
as each of us is born into, and progresses to some form of self-consciousness in, a 
particular way of life. Taylor (1975, 382) points to the ongoing tension between the pre-
existing character of those norms and their dependence upon their continued adoption 
for their sustenance 
Siep (2008, 191) considers Hegel’s identification of the individual with his or her society 
to demand a “willingness to sacrifice rights” beyond those of even a conservative 
“communitarian renewal of classical political philosophy”. For Hegel, the mutually 
recognised norms, together with the institutions and practices that gave effect to them, 
constituted Spirit’s ‘objective’ body or what he described as ‘objective spirit’ and ‘ethical 
substance’ (sittlichkeit). Hegel’s description of the ‘ethical life’ in the Philosophy of Right 
suggests the risk that this identity might support a society that is equally oppressive to 
that of Ancient Greece, with its central reliance on slavery. There, he presents the 
individual as “an accident to substance” (1967, paragraph 145). Hegel (1967, paragraph 
152) also claims that, under conditions of sittlichkeit, “...the self-will of the individual has 
vanished, together with his private conscience which had claimed independence”.  
However, the central and express use of the language of substance suggests another 
interpretation. If Hegel had adopted that interpretation of substance where the 
‘incidents’ of substance are treated as peripheral and not essential to its being, then 
Hegel’s ‘ethical life’ might evidence a low regard for individual life. However, my 
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argument is that Hegel was firmly and deliberately entrenched in a different 
understanding of substance—one that emphasises interdependence and mutuality 
rather than independence and subordination. Hegel’s ‘identity’ of individual and society, 
or of ‘incidents’ and ‘substance’, then, was not an exhaustive or comprehensive one, but 
one which allowed considerable room for movement within its borders. The breadth of 
that movement is suggested by the broad historical periods that Hegel presented as 
representing a particular “ethical substance”, such as the ancient Greek and Roman 
civilisations (Siep 2008, 185). Each civilisation provided a recognisable dominant or 
habitual way of life, but are also equally known for the lives of individuals who worked 
both within, and against, that pattern.  
A more fulsome response to these concerns requires some careful consideration of the 
definition of the self or individual living this ‘ethical life’. My argument is that this person 
is not the independent Kantian individual that appears to be assumed in the literature. 
Rather, it is that person constituted by an “ensemble of relations”, to use Marx’s words 
(Marx and Engels 1998, 570). Whilst I do not claim that Marx and Hegel had an identical 
definition, there is more than sufficient common ground, given Marx’s substantial 
drawing on Hegel’s logic, to return to this issue in that context. Therefore, I will argue 
that, properly understood, Marx’s concept of the self allows room for considerable 
diversity and resistance.  
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CONCLUSION 
Hegel, like Spinoza, rejected the traditional debate about substance with its emphasis 
on separation and independence. To regard substance in that atomistic sense, with its 
relations to other entities as contingent and accidental, was, in Hegel’s mind, a fiction. 
Instead, he insisted on the centrality of the interaction and interconnection that 
characterises organic life. Substance was revealed to be a combination of relationships 
(which he, like Spinoza, called ‘essence’) and in a constant state of ‘development’, of 
more comprehensively inhabiting those relations and thereby moving towards 
expressing the totality, of ‘becoming’ its reflection. 
For Hegel, this made contradiction the principal characteristic of being. Rather than the 
stability and self-sufficiency preferred in traditional debates about substance, Hegel 
regarded the substance of particular beings as radically incomplete: to always be 
confronted with one or more needed objects, and to always, on securing one object, be 
confronted afresh with another needed object. Any being was always in the process 
of—labouring towards—becoming.  
The tension between the different dimensions of expression was made transparent, and 
reconciled in Hegel’s works. Hegel presented each particular being as bound up with, 
but not identical with, its other—as both immersed in the pre-existing immanent totality 
or substance, and yet not identical with it (and inadequate, or incomplete, with it). This 
was the central theme of the Phenomenology: the search for a world that reflects or 
expresses a particular self-image (that of substance in terms of independence) rather 
than that of the world as then existing—a search for a world in which that being could be 
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‘at home’. It is a search, however, that only ends with the surrender of that self-image 
and of that insistence on the stability and security of substance. 
Contrary to the traditional debate, Hegel made this tension, its pains, and the efforts to 
subdue or avoid it, defining characteristics of life. He made the themes of limitation and 
pain central to his work. A particular being was both constituted and frustrated by 
limitation. It was only by the assertion of some separation from the world and its 
demands that a being secured some continuous sense of self. It was only by the fixing 
and repetition of particular processes of unification of subject or being and object—
through habit—that it gained some sense of continuity of self, and yet those self-
constituting acts were also acts of alienation. They involved the suppression and denial 
of those relationships in which that self was founded, and on which it relied to secure its 
necessary objects. It involved processes of alienation from nature, from other human 
beings and, ultimately, from itself. 
These processes of denial, however, were bound to fail. To live was to be engaged in 
this expansive movement to incorporate new objects and new relations. The sensation 
of this need—desire—repeatedly worked to de-stabilise each constitution or limitation of 
self. Hegel presented an image of life in terms of tension and of pain, and in terms of 
the efforts to avoid that pain; efforts that became so desperate that they coloured the 
relationships between like beings and drove the effort to transfer the burdens of desire 
onto others. This was the foundation of Hegel’s Master/Servant dialectic: so desperate 
were two men to evade the demands of the corporeal that they were willing to risk their 
lives in the effort, and even more ready to enslave others to serve that end. So driven 
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were they by desire and their need to still its demands, violence and systematic 
oppression became institutions of expression of the core concerns of the traditional 
debate about substance—of securing some stability and identity for some at others’ 
cost.  
It was, however, this very subordination, and the sacrifice—in part—of the servant’s 
former sense of self that provided the greater experience of stability. However, in just 
the same way that the Master’s domination of the servant was insufficient, so, too, was 
that of the servant’s domination of the material he worked on. It did not relieve the 
servant of the demands of desire. The effort to deny those demands, temporarily stilled 
in the ‘Master/Servant’ dialectic, is resumed in the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’, as the 
servant confronts the experience of desire in his own body. However, even the most 
direct endeavour to conform to the traditional emphasis on separation and to dominate 
the material through ascetic disciplines then failed. It was only in the intimacy, 
immediacy and non-negotiability of the resistance of one’s own body—another fight to 
the death, taking the master/servant struggle to the internal—that one was finally forced 
to surrender one’s concept of one’s self and its constitution through limitation, 
separation and subordination.  
It was a pathway retraced, in key ways, by Marx, with his application of the dialectic, 
albeit with the unity of Hegel’s reason replaced by one grounded in the material world. It 
was a pathway that, particularly through Hegel’s Logics, provided Marx with some of the 
key terms he used to present his own understanding of the human substance or 
essence, including those of ‘expression’, ‘development’ and ‘becoming’. It was also an 
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approach that this chapter incompletely explores, as the balance of that pathway 
concerns the application of Hegel’s identification of universal reason, or the Ideal, as the 
substance or ground of the world. This chapter explores, in detail, a limited portion of 
the Phenomenology as that portion was of the greatest influence on Marx. It focuses on 
the issues that were central to the tradition concerning substance, and on the three 
questions directly addressing Marx’s work. In terms of the tradition of debate about 
substance, Hegel systematised Spinoza’s radical inversion of substance and further 
explored its consequences. He explored the troubling character of matter—and of the 
need or desire for it—thereby crystallising the difficult, yet productive, influence of both 
matter, and of anxiety, limitation and pain. In particular, this chapter explored the 
manner in which Hegel’s treatment traces out the themes of desire, limitation and pain 
considered in previous chapters, and suggests a response to the third of the questions 
this thesis addresses to Marx—that is, what explanations did he provide for the appeal 
of treating the non-corporeal as the human substance (and for the circumstances in 
which that appeal might be overcome and enable the adoption of a ‘more human 
language’)? 
Those influences on Marx are canvassed in the rest of this thesis. One final major 
influence on Marx’s thought needs to be considered first—Feuerbach. The substitution 
of the material for the Ideal, the influence of pain, and the oppressive means by which it 
was avoided were central to Feuerbach’s work. It was also through Feuerbach’s work 
that Marx ‘discovered’ the term he would use to describe the human substance—
‘species being’.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – Feuerbach 
Friedrich Engels, looking back on the early 1840s, wrote, “we were all Feuerbachians 
then” (Wartovsky 1977, xix). Marx enthusiastically wrote of, and corresponded with, 
Feuerbach, holding that “there is no other road...to truth and freedom except that 
leading through the Fire-brook [the Feuer-bach]” (cited in Hanfi 1972, 41-2). Yet a few 
short years later, in 1845, Marx wrote his theses on Feuerbach, proclaiming the 
shortcomings of Feuerbach’s thought.  
Since that time, many have approached Feuerbach through Marx: as Hanfi (1972, 1) 
put it, “read [Feuerbach’s philosophy] as a chapter in the book called Karl Marx”. Writers 
such as Althusser (1997), and Meszaros (1970) have treated Marx’s engagement with 
Feuerbach as merely a transitional ‘period’, and look to the theses and The German 
Ideology as a ‘break’ or ‘rupture’ from which the true or mature Marxism emerged. As a 
consequence, Feuerbach is rarely treated as having a serious contribution to make to 
our understanding of Marx. However, more recent scholarship, such as that of 
Breckman (2001, 2006), Brudney (1998), Caldwell (2009), Johnston (1995), and 
Leopold (2007), have paid more attention to Feuerbach’s works. Like them, I 
demonstrate here that Feuerbach’s works addressed some of the essential questions 
Marx also addressed. I will argue that Feuerbach shaped the development of Marx’s 
thinking in relation to the key questions addressed in this thesis. I share the position 
Wartovsky (1977, 1) sets out at the beginning of his Feuerbach: that, whilst weaknesses 
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in both style and substance detract from Feuerbach’s work, he should be treated 
“seriously” for the originality of his insights. 
In the early 1840s, Marx, Engels, and many others were all ‘Feuerbachians”, if by this 
we mean that Feuerbach gave expression to the radical freedoms promised by the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment. He covered ground that was, as Hans Kung has 
emphasised, previously “terra incognita” (Johnston 1995, 205). Hans Kung is one of 
those who have called for the originality and insight of Feuerbach’s work to be 
recognised. He argued that Feuerbach had progressed past the Enlightenment position 
in treating religion as “man’s self-worship”, rather than merely a “fraud” or “illusion” 
(1995, 205). 
It is for his work in relation to religion that Feuerbach is best known. It was his Essence 
of Christianity that made Engels and others “all Feuerbachians” (Wartovsky 1977, xix). 
Having begun his assault anonymously with his Thoughts on Death and Immortality, 
Feuerbach’s Essence was widely regarded as a tour de force. Having surveyed a range 
of key Christian beliefs, Feuerbach argued persuasively that those beliefs, whilst 
expressing genuine desires, were human characteristics projected (and exaggerated) 
on an imagined divine being. He also cogently argued, in the second half of the 
Essence, that the genuine human impulses expressed in religion were distorted and 
betrayed by the artificial abstractions of theological thought.  
This aspect of Feuerbach’s work is also one of the most widely recognised connections 
with Marx’s thought. Both criticised religion as distracting its adherents from a better 
understanding of experience, and understood its appeal in the comfort its beliefs 
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provided. Marx, in subsequently criticising Hegel’s works (particularly his ‘inversion’ of 
subject and predicate), drew that method of ‘inversion’ from Feuerbach: Hegel’s 
Absolute, like the gods Feuerbach considered, was a projection of human attributes. 
Feuerbach is also well-known for his rejection of Hegel’s idealism in favour of his theory 
of ‘sensuousness’. Feuerbach’s perceived claims to some form of immediate knowledge 
through the senses, independent of some cognitive mediation, together with Marx’s 
criticism of their ahistorical character, have no doubt contributed to the lack of interest in 
this part of Feuerbach’s work. They have, instead, been seen as a transitional influence 
on Marx’s road to a more credible materialism.  
Whilst Feuerbach’s works do lack depth in some instances, and fail to adequately 
address some key issues, they are worthy of a more detailed examination. This is 
particularly the case with his work in relation to philosophy, which both preceded and 
followed his more famous works on religion, as they reveal Feuerbach’s long-standing 
objection to abstract understandings of our humanity. Even whilst adhering to Hegelian 
thought, Feuerbach understood his task to be the “overthrowing from its throne the ego, 
the self in general” (letter to Hegel in 1828, cited in Breckman 2001, 1). In this, he 
stands within the reactions to Idealist thought that sought to provide a unified 
explanation of human experience by dismissing the significance of the corporeal. 
Feuerbach’s consideration of the corporeal gathers much more weight when illuminated 
by his long-standing objection to abstraction.  
Feuerbach’s work needs to be taken seriously. It needs to be understood as much more 
than a transition to Marx, but rather as an engagement with the character or substance 
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of ‘man himself’. Feuerbach’s work addresses those foundational issues that were 
Marx’s concerns throughout his life, namely how to understand the human substance or 
essence, and how that better understanding might come to be accepted.  
It is this insistence on our material character, together with his vigorous application—
and critique—of Hegel’s dialectics, that made Feuerbach’s work intensely interesting to 
Marx. Feuerbach’s work attends to some key elements of Marx’s thought. As such, they 
enable me to address those questions about Marx’s work posed in the Introduction to 
this thesis, rather than continue to explore those broader questions concerning the 
tradition of debate about substance that have been the focus of the preceding chapters. 
Those questions addressed to Marx’s thought, as set out in the Introduction, were: What 
critique did Marx make of the traditional debate about substance and its application to 
humanity (whereby the non-corporeal was treated as the human essence)? What 
alternative did Marx suggest (specifically, how did Marx seek to comprehend 
corporeality as central to the human essence)? What explanations did Marx provide for 
the appeal to treat the non-corporeal as the human substance (and for the 
circumstances in which that appeal might be overcome to enable the adoption of a 
‘more human language’)? 
In regard to Feuerbach’s works, I want to address the first two of the above questions. 
Above all, I look to consider the third question: why have the terms of the traditional 
debate about substance proved so resilient and how might they be replaced? 
Feuerbach’s most original contribution arose from his consideration of the relationship 
between our essence and the experience of pain, and goes a long way in illuminating 
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that third question. Feuerbach, drawing on Hegel, emphasised the ontological lack that 
stands at the root of the human condition and again, like Hegel, understood the pain—
the misery—it caused so many. It was Feuerbach’s recognition of that pain that inspired 
much of his work. It was not something that could be surpassed or sublated in the 
course of development, but something that stymied and defied development, trapping 
humanity in a prolonged adolescence. It trapped humanity within circles of fantasy and 
denial—fantasies of lives of godlike ease, free of limitation and pain. This was the 
illusion that comprised religious thought, but only the asserted solution, and not the 
pain, was illusory. Here, in much the same way as Hegel’s Phenomenology, the 
inescapable, unavoidable character of our corporeal tensions and pains provided a 
goad towards action, sometimes with oppressive results. Those tensions and pains, 
however, also bore promise, as they provided a consistent prompt towards change; 
towards recognition of our interdependence, and of our character as ‘species beings’. 
It is in this last respect that Feuerbach’s works contribute most to understanding Marx’s 
confidence that the long-standing prejudice, in favour of a separate, self-reliant ‘self’, 
would ultimately be replaced by one grounded in interdependence. Feuerbach’s work 
also goes far in suggesting why that prejudice has proven so resilient and difficult to 
replace.  However, these aspects are, by no means, Feuerbach’s only influence on 
Marx’s thought. Like Marx, having wrestled so intimately and earnestly with Hegel’s 
thought, Feuerbach’s turn to materialism provided much support to Marx’s own turn in 
that direction. Feuerbach, working out from Hegel wrestled with the ‘material’, and 
thereby ‘limited’ character, of human being, and developed the category of ‘species 
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being’ which Marx adopted to refer to the human essence as both limited—and 
constituted—by an ensemble of relations.  
The resistance of the corporeal loomed large in Feuerbach’s works, as it had in the 
early portion of Hegel’s Phenomenology. For Feuerbach, as for Hegel, the contradiction 
the corporeal presented to conventional ideas of the self made pain, or at least a 
profound discomfort or estrangement, endemic to existence, and a goad towards efforts 
to overcome it. Feuerbach’s efforts began within the Idealist tradition, and worked 
towards the rational reconciliation imagined by that tradition. That approach, however, 
was soon abandoned, as it provided no adequate place for that suffering, no adequate 
recognition for its influence and immanence.  
 
FEUERBACH’S CRITIQUE OF RELIGION 
Feuerbach, in his Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, railed against the Idealists’ 
privileging of the non-corporeal. If reason was to be treated as the foundation or 
essence of our humanity, Feuerbach (1986, 67) insisted that it be understood not as 
“beingless, colourless, and nameless”, but a reason “saturated with the blood of man”. 
This was not to be reason as affected by perception—a non-corporeal reason—as it 
was for Hume (Norton 1998), but a form of reasoning that included bodily sensations.  
That kind of reason, Feuerbach argued, would enable a better appreciation of human 
limitation and suffering as essential characteristics of our being, that were not 
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subordinated to demands and expectations of mastery through willpower or imagination. 
He called for “a more human language”: 
The philosophy of the future has the task of leading philosophy out of the realm 
of departed spirits back to the realm of embodied, living spirits; out of the godly 
felicity of a world of thought without neediness, back to the realities of human 
misery. For this purpose, the philosophy of the future requires no more than a 
human understanding, and human language’ (cited in Wartofsky 1977, 196). 
For Feuerbach (Johnston 1995, 63), the experience of particular beings was not the 
Idealists’ unlimited freedom, nor the independence claimed in the traditional debate 
about substance, but, rather, limitation. As Johnston (1995, 285) suggests his “… 
materialism asks us to accept with maturity our finite existence and the limitations of our 
existence in the world”. 
Feuerbach secured both his notoriety, and his attractiveness to Marx, in making this 
point. In Feuerbach’s view, the resistance and limitations of our corporeality meant that 
the continuity of humanity was not to be found in its individual specimens. For 
Feuerbach (1980, 162): 
Death is the manifestation of the fact that you are not a being without 
determination...and, thus, without limitation. As death negates you, it is the 
manifestation, the confirmation, the affirmation of your limit. 
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Death was the ultimate confirmation that the individual was unable to independently 
exist—and so could not be ‘substance’ in the traditional sense. Instead human being, 
substance and continuity were located in the species: 
Your determinate individual body, the organic body in the determinate singleness 
of its existence, as distinguished from the organic body in its species and 
essence, is a mortal, lacking, finite body...the organic body itself is absolutely 
without lack...it is an immortal, divine body. The organic body itself is the species, 
the essence... (1980, 94). 
Feuerbach rejected any claim to individual immortality and in so doing challenged the 
Christian belief in resurrection. Feuerbach’s engagement with religious belief, however, 
went much further. In his Essence of Christianity, he also challenged almost every other 
core article of the Christian faith. 
This challenge, however, was not simply a claim that Christianity was wrong or a 
delusion. It was not simply that the god category was an anthropomorphic projection. 
Feuerbach argued that the roots of this belief in a transcendent god and in the capacity 
to transcend mortality—as Christ was believed to have done—lay in a desperate flight 
from limitation, and that, mistaken though it be, the religious impulse was a meaningful 
response to the human condition. It was a response to the experience of limitation and 
of our being somehow bound up with something that was both immanent and 
transcendent. Like Spinoza, Herder and Hegel, Feuerbach tried to capture the tensions 
between the contradictory experiences of immediate participation in the totality, on the 
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one hand, and of incompleteness, yearning and inescapable movement towards greater 
involvement, on the other. 
Feuerbach thought all religions were open to this charge. This impulse, however, was 
not limited to religion. Feuerbach charted the flight from limitation from neo-platonic 
philosophy, and across the tradition concerning substance. He traced that evasion back 
to Idealist philosophy (1986, 45-7). Feuerbach (1986, 40-1) argued that “thought 
overstepped itself”, such that a truthful acknowledgement of human limitations was 
transformed into an independent being, where the subject of the acknowledgement 
became god, rather than the world. It was in this process, Feuerbach asserted, that we 
abandoned our recognition of the world, and of our limitations. This was the process by 
which human characteristics were projected onto an imagined deity.  
Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity characterised all religion as the projected human 
fantasy of absolute subjective freedom: as the fantasy of complete freedom from the 
restrictions of the natural or corporeal world, as the fantasy grounding substance, 
traditionally understood. For Feuerbach (1989, 207), “the secret of theology was none 
other than anthropology”. He argued that Idealist or speculative philosophy was merely 
a “rational mysticism” (1972, 86) —the continuation of the religious projection of human 
characteristics onto a super-human being (the Absolute Idea rather than god). It was 
another form of religious thinking.  
Religion was, in Feuerbach’s eyes, a characteristically human response to the 
experience and uncertainties of the human condition. It was the expression of, and flight 
from, corporeality, limitation and dependence. As Feuerbach put it “… dread of limitation 
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is dread of existence. All real existence, ie, all existence which is truly such, is 
qualitative, determinative existence” (1989, 15).  
Unable to accept this condition, human beings constructed a fantasy about freedom 
from that condition, and ascribed it, together with the ability to grace humanity with that 
same freedom, to the divine: 
All religions…rest on abstraction…Even the Homeric gods, with all their living 
strength and likeness to man, are abstracted forms; they have bodies, like men, 
but bodies from which the limitations and difficulties of the human body are 
eliminated…The Divine Being is the human being glorified by the death of 
abstraction…In religion man frees himself from the limits of life; he here lets fall 
what oppresses him, obstructs him, affects him repulsively…The divine being is 
the pure subjectivity of man, freed from all else…he is nothing else than the 
personal nature of man positing itself out of all connection with the world, making 
itself free from all dependence on nature (Feuerbach 1989, 97, 98, 99; see also 
2004, 30). 
For Feuerbach (1989, 136), this fantasy was developed to its greatest extreme by 
Christianity, which made nature an object of ‘horror’, and stigmatised any association 
with nature as diminishing human dignity. As Feuerbach (1989, 161) put it, “Separation 
from the world, from matter, from the life of the species, [was] therefore the essential 
aim of Christianity”. 
For Feuerbach (1989, 66), the Christian god: 
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… as an extramundane being, is…nothing else than the nature of man withdrawn 
from the world and concentrated in itself, freed from all worldly ties and 
entanglements…the consciousness of the power to abstract oneself from all that 
is external, and to live for and with oneself alone. 
The religious construction of god, particularly as the creator of the world from nothing, 
was also an expression of the human desire to escape limitation and pain: 
When thou sayest the world was made out of nothing, thou conceivest the world 
itself as nothing, thou clearest away from thy head all the limits to thy 
imagination, to thy feelings, to thy will, for the world is the limitation of thy will, of 
thy desire…Thus, subjectively, thou annihilatest the world; thou thinkest God by 
himself, ie, absolutely unlimited subjectivity, the subjectivity or soul which enjoys 
itself alone, which needs not the world, which knows nothing of the painful bonds 
of matter. In the inmost depths of thy soul thou wouldst rather there were no 
world, for where the world is, there is matter, and where there is matter there is 
weight and resistance, space and time, limitation and necessity (Feuerbach 
1989, 109-110; see also 2004, 45). 
Moreover, despite the impact of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and the debates 
that continued to rage in his own time, Feuerbach asserted that Western philosophy 
retained this character, and that it reached its extreme exaggeration in Idealist thought. 
The dominant ‘language’ applied to describe humanity—that of freedom and 
independence—continued the trajectory of religious thought and of the traditional of 
debate about substance. It was based on the idea that humanity in its truest, purest, 
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form—that is, in its essence—was free of all corporeal (or other) limitations. It was, as 
Feuerbach pointed out, a fantasy of humanity as divine—as not limited by the profane 
and earthly.  
 
FEUERBACH ON HUMAN BEING 
For Feuerbach, the influence of religious thought was readily apparent in many of the 
debates within German philosophy during his time, and extended to the concept of 
‘happiness’. For Feuerbach, the  idea  that one  could secure  a consistent state of 
happiness, as distinct from the long-standing belief that happiness was a fleeting state, 
and one outside control and subject to ‘hap’ (the hazards of nature and god) (McMahon 
2006, 10-13), was another expression of the flight from limitation. He saw it as the ‘wish’ 
for: 
‘… a heaven in which all limits and all necessity of Nature are destroyed and all 
wishes are accomplished; a heaven in which there exist no wants, no sufferings, 
no wounds, no struggles, no passions, no disturbances, no change of day and 
night, light and shade, joy and pain…a God…without appellation, because the 
object of their wishes is not a named, finite, earthly happiness, a determined 
enjoyment, such as the…enjoyment of beautiful music…but…a transcendental 
[enjoyment]…the enjoyment of an infinite, unlimited, unspeakable, indescribable 
happiness. Happiness and divinity are the same thing (2004, 71, emphasis in 
original). 
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It was a wish—expressed in exaggerated terms—for the experience of a pain-free 
existence, in terms that resonated strongly with traditional approaches to substance.  
Feuerbach, however, insisted that we are not divine, and that the religious aspiration to 
happiness was an illusion because we are, and always will be, limited beings. In this 
sense, limitation is synonymous with having qualities. This idea is central to 
Feuerbach’s criticism of Hegel’s Logic and Phenomenology of Spirit. Feuerbach says 
that Hegel’s concept of ‘nothing’—as the contradiction to ‘Being’—assumed that any 
being had to have some qualities in order to exist. Feuerbach (1972a, 72-9, 88-9, 92-3) 
assumes that we need to start with a determinate, rather than fantastic or speculative, 
being: a being that is a bundle or ensemble of qualities—that is, relationships. This also 
assumes the limitations of corporeal or material being. However, for such an 
interdependent being, limitation goes beyond the sense of external boundary its 
ordinary usage suggests, because, as Feuerbach (1980, 74-5) indicates: 
… the limit does not exist as externally circling, as the fence around a field; it is 
the middle that is proper and central to a reality. Thus, everything in nature is 
what it is, not because of the matter out of which it is constituted, but, rather, 
because of the determinate proportion, manner of unification, and degree of 
mixture of the matter...this...measure...penetrates everything, determines 
everything, dwells in everything... [A fish] lives in a determinate climate, in a 
determinate element, water, but, again, not in any water, but in a determinate 
spring, river or sea. Ocean water is just as much water as that which flows in a 
river, and yet this fish, just because it can never escape the limit that is the centre 
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of its nature, the limit that determines and includes everything that exists in it, can 
live only in this and no other water’. 
To understand being as interdependency is to understand limitation as a thoroughgoing 
aspect of being. Contrary to the separation and purity of substance (as traditionally 
understood), being is to include those relationships with others and so conceive of any 
determinate or concrete being as open and in flux. The very constitution of an 
interdependent being makes relationships with others—and so the experience of limited 
control of one’s self—essential, ‘internal’ and unavoidable. This made: 
The ego...corporeal…[and] ‘open to the world’ by no means ‘through itself’ as 
such, but through itself as a corporeal being, that is, through the body. In relation 
to the abstract ego, the body is the objective world. It is through the body that the 
ego is not just an ego but also an object. To be embodied is to be in the world; it 
means to have so many senses, ie, so many pores and so many naked surfaces. 
The body is nothing but the porous ego (Feuerbach 1972b, 142-3).  
The character of any particular being, then, depends on the nature of its constituent 
relations, in just the manner Spinoza had thought several centuries before: 
Being, determinateness, limitation are posited together with one another; only 
nothingness is without limitations...There is only one weapon against 
nothingness, and this weapon is the limit; it is the only stable point of a reality, 
the only bulwark of its being...everything in nature is what it is, not because of the 
matter out of which it is constituted, but, rather, because of the limitation of the 
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indeterminate matter, because of the determinate proportion, manner of 
unification, and degree of mixture of the matter...If the mode of unification of 
those realities that are called the elementary constituents of a thing changes, if 
this determinate mode changes together with the proportion of the elements that 
are limited by this determinate mode, then the thing itself changes (Feuerbach 
1980, 74, my emphasis). 
It is for this reason that Feuerbach (1986, 24) credited Spinoza with beginning modern 
philosophy. 
For Feuerbach, like Hegel, the character of any particular being was bound up with its 
various objects, and constituted by that being’s relationships with them. Contrary to the 
traditional debate about substance, a particular being was not independent of the 
‘external’ objects to which its predicates (or properties) referred, but was fundamentally 
bound up with them: 
Being is not a general notion that can be separated from objects. It is one with 
that which exists. It is thinkable only through mediation; it is thinkable only 
through the predicate on which the essence of the object is based…The fish 
exists in water; you cannot, however, separate its essence from this being [i.e. 
the water]…Being after its removal from all the essential qualities of the objects is 
only your conception of being – a being that is made up and invented (1986, 42). 
It is with this sense that Feuerbach (cited in Wartofsky 1977, 408), like Hegel before him 
and Marx after, asserted that “the physiologist has to violate life…to make it an object of 
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his inquiry and his observation”. It was on this basis that Feuerbach objected, stating 
that “all abstract sciences mutilate man” (cited in Hanfi 1972, 285). 
As Zawar Hanfi (1972, 22) has pointed out, Feuerbach’s anthropology provides for a 
mutual openness between a being and its objects, so much so that it can be said that 
the object itself can enter into the being. They are, in that sense, a single being.  
Each being’s very existence is bound up with its relationships with its objects, and the 
limitations that follow from them. To consider their absence as a goad to action, then, is 
potentially misleading—it suggests a choice, a pathway to continued existence in their 
absence. Feuerbach’s coupling of being and ‘nothingness’ is intended to convey the 
absence of any such choice in just the same way Hegel presented that interdependence 
in his Logics. Feuerbach, like Hegel, intended to convey the depths to which all being is 
shaped by that desire, and the depth to which any being is denied comfort in this world, 
absent its placation. It was to not only place this ontological lack or insecurity at the core 
of our character, but to reveal that character as unavoidably conscious of, even 
obsessed by, that absence. It was to suggest that the character of our humanity is not 
one of control, of the security and confidence of our ability to render this world in our 
image, and to serve our comfort, but as irretrievably, inescapably, anxious. 
The essence of our humanity entails a consistent experience of insecurity and 
uncertainty, as the very composition of the self is such that it is never completely subject 
to ‘internal’ control, or stable. To be is to never be ‘free’ of the external. It is to never 
enjoy the security and independence of substance. The character of the human 
condition—as a being in flux—makes uncertainty, rather than stability and control, the 
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state towards which we gravitate (muted, however, by the institutions and practices of 
habit).  
As Feuerbach and Marx (and others) recognised, these ‘religious’ beliefs are, however, 
“not only an escape from reality, but a method of dealing with it” (Kamenka 1970, 66). 
They help to make sense of, and live within, a painful world. They act as an ‘opiate’ 
which, like Freud’s ‘intoxicants’ and the ideologies criticised by Marx, anaesthetises one 
to the contradictions, anxieties and pains of existence.  
Understood as a flight from the experience of limitation, religious belief is popular and 
addictive because it meets a human need—an aspect of the human condition—in 
negotiating the uncertainties and openness of being, as does the traditional debate 
about substance. Johnston (1995, 127) has described this recognition as the “positive 
core” of The Essence of Christianity:  
…. Feuerbach takes religion seriously [and saw]...a body of fundamentally 
human truth embedded within religion which must be recovered if men and 
women are to live fully human lives (emphasis in original).30 
These beliefs “relieve intolerable stress…[and] overcome the feeling of helplessness” 
(Malinowski cited in Kamenka 1970, 68). As such, they have a profound and 
widespread therapeutic effect, because they provide a means by which: 
                                                          
30
 Brudney (1998) comes to a similar conclusion. 
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… man acquires emotional comfort not only [in terms of a] simple fantasy, but by 
shaping the whole of his knowledge into an ordered scheme [upon it] (Kamenka 
1970, 67). 
Our notions of being or substance provide the foundations of all our thought and all our 
engagements with the world. They are the foundations on which we build and order our 
knowledge of, and actions in, the world. Yet, as Johnston (1995, 286) has observed, 
this flight, and its comforts, comes at a cost:  
The materialist disenchantment of the world also demands that we accept the 
finite, limited nature of our human being, and all that this entails. Feuerbach does 
not so much deny the therapeutic or edifying potential of Christianity (or any 
other transcendent religion), as refuse to accept that this edification is 
valuable...[In his view] by refusing to accept our finitude and our limitations, we 
deny ourselves the opportunity to develop and realise our full potential as mortal, 
human beings. 
  
FEUERBACH ON THE LIMITATIONS OF CRITIQUE 
At the least, Feuerbach’s work is valuable for the insight he provided into the resistance 
likely to occur when criticising these ‘religious’ ideas.31 Feuerbach argued that the need 
of a limited, interdependent being for stability is so fundamental, so central to its very 
                                                          
31
 The ‘re-enchantment’ of the world witnessed since the late twentieth century, with the growth in both 
traditional and non-traditional, or ‘new age’, forms of religion and spirituality, the prominence with which 
local and international conflicts have been associated with religion, together with the popular interest in 
the occult, astrology and magic, are demonstrative of the resilience of these beliefs. 
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sense of being, that to describe the forms in which it is secured as merely ideas can fail 
to convey the strength of the grip with which they are held. Its visceral sensitivity is well 
conveyed by Feuerbach’s imagined reaction of ‘horror’ to the perceived reduction of 
human dignity that would follow any compromise of the privileging of mind over body in 
the traditional debate about substance. Its rejection, he said, would be ‘intestinal’.  
This was not only because these ideas provide a sense of stability, continuity and 
control, but because the experience of separation upon which they rely was, for 
Feuerbach, the soil in which all human consciousness arises, and is thereafter 
expressed and confirmed. These beliefs were embraced so deeply because they were 
grounded in the immediate, concrete experience of being: the contradictions 
experienced in corporeal being, its pains and tensions. These experiences are part of 
the human condition and are repeated and reinforced daily. They are experiences that, 
once rendered comprehensible, are as fundamental and unquestionable to our mode of 
life as the very ground beneath us. They provide what Kamenka (1970, 67) has called 
“an ordered scheme” of things. Feuerbach (1972b, 144) described this as: 
… the original and most essential antithesis, an antithesis necessarily connected 
with the ego, [the antithesis provided by] the body, the flesh. The conflict 
between the spirit and the body alone is the highest metaphysical principle; it is 
the secret of creation and the ground on which the world rests. Indeed the flesh 
or, if you prefer, the body has not only a natural-historical or empirico-
psychological meaning, but essentially a speculative, metaphysical one. For what 
else is the body if not the passivity of the ego? And how are you going to deduce 
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even the will and the sensation from the ego without a passive principle? The will 
cannot be conceived without something striving against it; and in all sensation, 
however spiritual, there is no more activity than passivity, no more spirit than 
flesh, no more ego than non-ego. 
For Feuerbach, this was to experience being as contradiction. It was the experience of 
intersection: of discovering the self as a site of contradictions. It was the experience of 
the body as the inescapable locus of any engagement with the world—as a part of our 
essence. It is how we gain a sense of our self—a universal or constitutive experience. 
However, it is not, as Margaret Archer (2000) has pointed out, how we make sense of 
that experience. She asserts that the range of concepts with which we make sense of 
the experience of corporeal contradiction are negotiable and diverse. They too, are 
‘externally’ sourced. They are drawn from the world around us, as contemporary beliefs 
and practices—habits and ways of living—they are copied, taught and imposed upon 
each infant by the society into which she or he is born.32 
This is the insight provided by Feuerbach’s focus on human belief. Our ideas about our 
selves are not derived either from abstract, universal, reason or from objective science 
reflecting some kind of empirical reality. As such, they cannot be dislodged by mere 
critical thinking or efforts at ‘consciousness-raising’. Rather, they, and the traditional 
debate about substance upon which it rests, express a phenomenology based on a very 
                                                          
32
 The suggestion that the experience of corporeal contradiction is a universal human experience does 
not entail that the ways in which different people make sense of that experience are identical. They will 
reflect the relationships in which the infant is born, and hence those of her or his parents and other 
teachers and initiators into the social world. As such, the terms on which the infant makes sense of this 
experience will draw on relationships of class and other positions, such as those relating to gender, and 
will reflect their diversity. 
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human experience of the world, as re-interpreted through a distorting idealist and 
mechanical lens. This suggests why the separatist approach to the world—the 
traditional approach to substance—has been both so resilient and so popular. That is, it 
reflects ‘real’, unavoidable, universal human experiences. It reflects a ‘common’ sense. 
It also indicates why the potential resistance to a non-dualist model is, and will be, so 
strong, and why the effort to critique and replace it will be substantial. Any such attempt 
is likely to be denounced as nonsense. Its rejection will draw on vestigial, primal roots, 
such that the effort to replace it will need to draw on equally profound and common 
foundations, those elements that constitute our ‘species being’. 
 
SPECIES BEING 
Feuerbach saw those foundations in the all-too-human experience of extreme pain and 
death. The absolute limit of any particular being—mortality—was, in Feuerbach’s eyes, 
the catalyst by which we discover that our substance did not reside in our separate 
selves, but in the species. In the experience of uncertainty, limitation and pain we do not 
confront a pathology or flaw, so much as our very essence. In confronting death—that 
is, the realisation that there is no individual infinity—each human individual is faced with 
the location of continuity, of infinity, in the species (Feuerbach 1980, 17), rather than in 
its separate self. For Feuerbach (1980, 132), in confronting death, a person faced 
absolute, undeniable limitation and that his ‘true being’ was ‘determination’. The 
experience of substance—traditionally understood as separation—was only 
experienced once: 
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You exist as pure I, as pure self, you exist only for yourself but once, and this 
moment is the moment of not-being, of death...But the nothingness, the death of 
the self at the moment of isolation, at the moment it wishes to exist without the 
object...is the revelation that you can only exist with and in the object (1980, 
126). 
This revelation, however, was not limited to the time of death: “death [could] be 
conquered before death” through the experience of limitation and of pain (1980, 126). 
Pain, in Feuerbach’s eyes, was the means by which we moved to realise our character 
as ‘species beings’. Pain could produce a confrontation with being itself: 
In every pain, the species celebrates the triumph of its unique actuality...There 
are more philosophy and reason in your pains and sighs than in your whole 
understanding. You really philosophize only when you moan and cry out with 
pain. The only sounds of wisdom that come from you are the sounds of pain. For 
in your pain, you assent to and affirm the essence, the species, the absolutely 
perfect universal, the actuality of which you deny in your understanding. Your 
pains and sighs are the only ontological arguments that you can furnish for the 
existence of God. The only lecture halls of the philosophy of time are hospitals 
and sick bays...you experience pain...because you experience limit and absolute, 
not-being and being all at once. In the feeling of determinate lack, you possess at 
once the feeling of the nothingness of the totality of your single being on its own 
and the feeling of sole lordship and reality of the substance that is perfect in itself 
(1980, 95).  
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Extreme pain tears and strips away the layers we have constructed about our selves 
until all that remains is a remnant, an abstraction. It is in extreme “pain, [that we] assent 
to and affirm the essence, the species, the absolutely perfect universal, the actuality of 
which [we] deny in [our] understanding” (1980, 95). It is in pain that we discover that our 
foundation lies outside our will. 
Feuerbach and Marx share their witness and response to the experience of pain—to the 
misery in which so much of humanity seems to be mired, and resigned. This 
commitment resonates in strains of anger and of grief and compassion that run through 
their works, and in their railings against the false comforts of ideas that deny the 
influence of that pain and legitimate and accommodate the practices that cause it. 
Echoing the critiques Epicurus and Lucretius made of the false needs and unnecessary 
conflicts thereby generated, Feuerbach also called for a way of life grounded in 
experience, rather than illusion. Instead of a flight from our materiality, our corporeality, 
and its pains and tensions, Feuerbach, like his Roman predecessors, called for a 
mature, honest engagement with that dimension of our experience and our being. It was 
this integrity to lived experience—this commitment to responding to the experience of 
pain—that made Hegel’s sublation of corporeal experience intolerable for Feuerbach. 
That sublation discounted and devalued the impact of pain through merging it in some 
gradually emerging, encompassing and comforting comprehensive rationality. It 
suggested that the pains of this world, the contradictions that Hegel named as the 
essence of being, were destined to pass and merge into the order of a rational universe. 
It dismissed, devalued and diminished the lives of those who remained mired in that 
pain. Feuerbach’s great contribution was to ‘invert’ that order and to place that 
239 
 
experience of pain, uncertainty and anxiety at the foundation of our humanity, and to 
thereby reveal so much of the Western traditions in theology and philosophy as a 
response to that foundation. Pain, for Feuerbach, was central to the human essence. 
Religious thought, including traditional approaches to substance, however, in its varied 
and continuing forms, was no mere illusion—it was grounded in a real human need, in 
the grappling with that need, and the dependencies and vulnerabilities it entailed. It 
reflected the tensions between transcendence and immanence others had explored in 
terms of expression—the sense of a self that exceeded the forms of its current, or at 
least conscious, deployment. Like Hegel, Fichte and others before him, Feuerbach 
understood these tensions as both painful and productive, as a goad to action and a 
search for some place or way to be ‘at home’ in the world. Like those others, Feuerbach 
appreciated the discomforts of material being, and the endless strivings its desires 
seemed to burden us with. Unlike those others, however, and on terms that resonate 
with the convictions expressed by Epicurus and Lucretius before him, Feuerbach 
located the potential to resolve those tensions and pains, and discover that sense of 
‘home’, in our corporeality itself. The pains and tensions of material, corporeal being 
were not to be resolved by dismissing and devaluing that aspect of our being, but by 
means of the disruptions and contradictions it makes of our illusions; the prompts by 
which the pains and uncertainties and anxieties of corporeal existence reveal the 
limitations of our ideas of our selves and our substance, and remind us of our intimate 
inescapable interdependence. They remind us of our ‘species being’. 
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CONCLUSION 
Feuerbach’s consideration of ‘religious thought’ was, in large part, an engagement with 
the traditional debates concerning substance. Drawing deeply on Hegel, Feuerbach 
rejected the conventional emphasis on ‘separation’ and ‘independence’, and asserted 
the priority of interdependence. Like Hegel, and Fichte and Schelling, Feuerbach 
respected the long-standing objections to the experience of uncertainty, limitation and 
pain, so much so as to treat them as central and promising, rather than as a pathologies 
or compromises. So insistent was Feuerbach on recognising the significance of pain, it 
grounded his claim that substance was located in the material, rather than the Ideal, 
world. He was true, however, to the long-standing tradition of treating matter as 
volatile—as the source of unpredictable, often transformational, change—and believed 
that gave a more truthful expression of Hegel’s dialectic. The contradictions and 
movements driven by desire were not exceptions or passing phases, as Hegel treated 
them, but the very essence of our character. 
Working within the long-running debate concerning substance, Feuerbach, reaching 
back to Aristotle, found that the limitations of particular beings meant that their essence, 
their continuity, could only reside in their species. Feuerbach made limitation a central 
category and a thematic focus. In this respect he emulated Epicurus and Lucretius 
before him. Limitation marked the boundary between being and non-being. Limitation, 
for Feuerbach, as it had been for Fichte, was both constitutive, and yet somehow 
simultaneously a betrayal, of being. It made being and pain co-terminous. Pain was 
endemic to the human condition, so much so, that much of human life was engaged in 
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responding to it. This was the central theme of Feuerbach’s works on religion: that 
religious thought and practice was an effort to deny—and a hope to eventually flee—the 
experience and pain of lives that were defined by limitation. This, for Feuerbach, was 
the essence of religion—the effort to evade the confrontation demanded by being—and 
the basis for its failure.  
Marx, in later demanding that the focus of political debate shift from religious to political 
(and thence economic) thought, developed and expanded Feuerbach’s critique. 
Likewise drawing on Epicurus, Lucretius and Hegel, Marx developed the conception of 
humanity as both limited and open, as bound up with others, and other things, to such 
depth as to make the tensions in those relationships an intimate goading pain. Drawing 
more deeply on Hegel to better envisage our humanity as labour—as the ongoing 
endeavour to reconcile those conflicting relationships—Marx better understood the 
breadth and intimacy of that interaction, as it had changed over time. He took 
Feuerbach’s emphasis on corporeal limitation and pain and amplified it, and, in so 
doing, anticipated a greater potential for that pain to realise a revolutionary potential. 
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CHAPTER SIX - TOWARDS A MORE HUMAN LANGUAGE :  
MARXIAN OBJECTIVE BEING 
Ludwig Feuerbach, when reflecting on the pains and tensions of a material, mortal 
being, called for “a more human language”: one concerned with “the realm of embodied, 
living spirits” and responsive to “neediness…[and] the realities of human misery” (cited 
in Wartofsky 1977, 196). Like Feuerbach, Marx’s early works were concerned with the 
search for such a ‘human language’ and reflected a keen awareness of the difficulty of 
the task. In 1844, Marx (1975d, 276-7) complained that: 
We would not understand a human language and it would remain ineffectual. 
From the one side, such a language would be felt to be begging, imploring and 
hence humiliating. It could be used only with feelings of shame or debasement. 
From the other side, it would be received as an impertinence or insanity and so 
rejected. We are so estranged from our human essence that the direct language 
of man strikes us as an offence against the dignity of man, whereas the 
estranged language of objective values appears as the justified, self confident 
and self-acknowledged dignity of man incarnate (emphasis in original). 
However, the difficulties in understanding this ‘human language’ go deeper than mere 
offence. 
Plamenatz, in Karl Marx’s Philosophy of Man (1975, 118), went so far as to describe 
them as seeming, to the “common-sense reader”, a “sheer abuse of language”. 
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Leopold, with regard to “the writings of the young Marx”, highlighted the difficulties and 
attractions of Marx’s work. For him: 
the writings seemed...to possess two signal properties: they were suggestive, 
that is, they gave the impression of containing ideas worthy of further 
consideration; and they were opaque, that is, their meaning was far from 
transparent...[particularly] Marx’s account of human emancipation (Leopold 2007, 
1, 183). 
These reactions arise, in part, because those writings are fragmented, “abbreviated and 
opaque” (Leopold 2007, 183), and are often located in manuscripts that were not 
intended for publication. They also reflect the way Marx drew on the tradition of debate 
about substance and few have recognised this. 
Ollman is one of the few modern writers who have done so. He captured the challenges 
anyone reading Marx (without reference to the traditions Marx drew on) faced: 
The most formidable hurdle facing all readers of Marx is his “peculiar” use of 
words. Vilfredo Pareto provides us with the classic statement of this problem 
when he asserts that Marx’s words are like bats: one can see in them both birds 
and mice (1971, 3). 
In this chapter, I begin to spell out my argument that Marx worked within a ‘peculiar’ 
tradition—that his approach to understanding the human condition drew upon, and 
contributed to, the tradition of arguments concerning the concept of substance, and its 
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corollary, essence. Like Ollman (1976, 3), I argue that “without a firm knowledge of what 
Marx is trying to convey with his terms, one cannot properly grasp any of his theories”. 
This is not readily apparent from Marx’s works. In part, as indicated above, this is 
because of the ‘peculiar’ ways in which Marx used words. This is also why many of 
those who have considered Marx’s thought in this area have not done so with reference 
to the tradition of debate about substance. Leopold, for example, claimed that “Marx’s 
use of the term [‘species being’] appears largely straightforward and intelligible” (2007, 
184), but made no reference to substance.  
Finally, one possibly greater obstacle to my claims is the status of those ‘early’ works in 
which many of the relevant discussions are located. Many writers, foremost amongst 
them Althusser (1996) and Colletti (1973), have argued that those works were 
overshadowed, if not completely superseded, by Marx’s later, more ‘mature’ works. 
However, I think that Marx’s works evidence a remarkable continuity. This is not to claim 
that the terms used by Marx to express his views did not change. Rather, it is to argue 
that the issue he sought to resolve and consider in relation to substance remained 
consistent. Marx rejected the traditional characterisation of being in terms of 
independence in favour of one based on a profound interdependence and openness to 
other people and the world.  
This is a controversial position. Since Althusser (1996) first claimed that there was an 
“epistemological break” in Marx’s thought evidenced in the theses on Feuerbach and 
The German Ideology, the argument has been made that Marx’s earlier works are 
fundamentally flawed. The ‘break’ or ‘rupture’ argument as made by Althusser was 
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essentially that Marx’s later works, beginning with The German Ideology, abandoned 
the humanist, idealist, elements said to characterise his previous works in favour of 
historical materialism. Althusser treated Marx’s use of ‘essence’ in those early works as 
a “universal attribute”, and hence a form of idealism (1996, 228).33 Moreover, he argued 
that Hegel’s methodology could not be adopted without being tainted by idealism’s 
influence. It was, in Althusser’s words, part of the same “ideological field”. In its stead, 
Althusser (1996, 82) held that Marx applied “a logic of actual experience and real 
emergence” (emphasis in original). 
However, the difficulty with these claims is that they provide little recognition of Marx’s 
own words. Marx (cited in Fraser 1997, 82) emphasised how Hegel’s Logic had assisted 
him in developing the Grundrisse. In relation to Capital, Marx (cited in Fraser 1997, 101) 
explicitly praised Hegel, and held that he had discovered the “rational kernel within the 
mystical shell” of Hegel’s thought. For Lenin (cited in Fine 2001, 72), this influence was 
so obvious that he claimed “it is impossible completely to understand Marx’s 
Capital…without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of the Logic”. 
Nevertheless, as Arthur (2004a, 2) has recently pointed out, Marx’s words were “cryptic” 
and provide no straightforward resolution of the debate.  
Moreover, the core of Althusser’s argument—that the theses on Feuerbach and The 
German Ideology marked a significant change in Marx’s focus and key concepts—has 
some merit. The degree to which they depart from his previous works, however, has 
                                                          
33
 As previously noted in Chapter Four, this interpretation mistakenly understood Hegel’s use of 
‘expression’ in terms of the traditional definition of substance. For the reasons given in Chapters Three 
and Four, I argue that Hegel used the term in the Spinozan sense, which ‘inverted’ the traditional 
approach and gives Hegel’s methodology a character much more consistent with the methodology 
Althusser attributes to Marx. 
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been exaggerated. This was also the conclusion reached by Fromm, who, while 
insisting on “continuity”, noted that Marx’s works did evidence “changes in concepts, in 
mood, [and] in language” (2004, 23, 64). Meszaros similarly argued that Marx’s works 
demonstrated “the most remarkable continuity”, and rejected the ‘rupture’ argument as a 
“highly undialectical separation” (1970, 220, 217; 2008). Nevertheless, he still 
recognised “Marx’s intellectual development” over time (1970, 232). Lucien Seve 
considered this issue in detail, given its central importance to his project of developing 
the foundations for a Marxist psychology. Seve (1978, 71), while rejecting Althusser’s 
arguments for a radical ‘break’ and for uninterrupted continuity, agreed there were 
‘ruptures’: 
But, at the same time, [held] it is unquestionable that...the succession in these 
ruptures in continuity marks out a continuous effort to master an unchanged 
domain of the real with transformed concepts...[such that] throughout his life 
Marx never stopped taking up again and reincorporating the pre-1845 materials, 
particularly the 1844 Manuscripts, by reworking them. 
Rather, Seve argued for a ‘transmutation’: i.e. a shift from an internal, natural essence 
seemingly determined by its concept, to an external, changing essence determined by 
the historical, changing ‘ensemble of social relations’. For Seve: 
It must be said...that what defines Marxism is the inversion of the speculative 
relation between the human essence and social relations, with all the theoretical 
consequences which this leads to in the conception of man (1978, 80, 99). 
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His conclusion was: 
It is therefore a case not of an abandonment but of a scientific transfiguration of 
the concept of man; the concept of human essence is to have a meaning for 
mature Marxism, quite a new meaning, a materialist and dialectical meaning: the 
essence is not abstract but concrete, not ideal but material, not natural but 
historical, inherent not in the isolated individual but in the ensemble of social 
relations’ (1978, 119-120). 
However, Seve, like Meszaros, Wood (2004), and even Althusser, did not consider 
Marx’s use of ‘essence’ in the light of the broader tradition of arguments concerning 
substance. Instead, these writers tended to equate ‘essence’ with the traditional 
emphasis on separation and continuity, treating it as having the unchanging character of 
a ‘nature’. They failed to consider the manner in which Marx drew on the broader 
tradition to understand ‘essence’ in far more open, interdependent terms. 
The argument for continuity is even stronger for those who have considered that 
broader tradition. Those writers, such as Arthur (2003, 2004a, 2004b), Levine (2012), 
Reuten (2000) and Smith (1999), who have considered Hegel’s engagement with that 
tradition, particularly through his Science of Logic and Logic, reject Althusser’s claim 
that Hegel’s method cannot be separated from its content or his ideology. They hold 
that Hegel’s method—that is the demonstration as to how “a given whole…reproduces 
itself” (Arthur 2004a, 64)—is independent of the subject-matter of its application. In 
Marx’s hands, it comprised, in Levine’s (2012, 31) words, the “isolating [of] the core 
social relationships which sustained and preserved a social totality”. Arthur (2003, 
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2004a, 2004b), Carver (1976), Reuten (2000), Smith (1999), and Williams (2003) hold 
that Capital (at least) is a clear application of that method. Levine (2012), Van Leeuwen 
(1972, 1974) and Williams (2000) go further, claiming that the application of Hegel’s 
logic was a consistent feature of Marx’s works, including his doctoral dissertation.  
It is my argument that Marx’s works, at least from his doctoral dissertation in 1841, 
evidence (if anything) a continuous effort to critique the abstract, independent concept 
of human being promoted by political economists, and to replace it with a much more 
concrete, corporeal, interdependent vision. In this and the next chapter, I argue that 
Marx consistently pursued this project across the three broad stages in which his works 
have commonly been considered. The first stage began with his doctoral dissertation 
and ended with the 1844 Manuscripts. It concerned Marx’s consideration of ‘objective 
being’—that any being was so intimately involved with its necessary objects as to make 
them part of its very constitution. These are often referred to as Marx’s ‘early’, or 
immature works. The second stage embraced Marx’s theses on Feuerbach in 1845 and 
the preparation of The German Ideology in 1846, and is read as part of Marx’s 
supposed ‘turn’ to a historical materialism. My argument, however, is that these works 
were logical developments from his previous work. In particular, I point out the 
important, unrecognised, continuing consistencies between Feuerbach’s and Marx’s 
works. The final stage concerns those works subsequently produced by Marx—in 
particular, The Grundrisse, An Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy and 
Capital. I suggest that these ‘mature’ works are an application of the framework 
developed over the two preceding stages: having determined that the human essence is 
that “ensemble of social relations” (1988, 570), that varying mode of production that 
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mediates the permanent relationship between humanity’s organic and inorganic bodies 
(namely, the human body and the balance of nature), Marx then drew on that framework 
to analyse the then current capitalist mode of production. In short, I argue that Marx 
never abandoned the concept of being that was central to his early works—‘species 
being’—and its largely unrealised potential remains available to us today. 
As such, here I focus on the first stage of Marx’s project: his rejection of the traditional 
characterisation of substance in terms of separation and independence, and hence 
‘essence’ in the sense of a fixed nature. I want to illuminate his characterisation of being 
in terms of an aggregate of relations and becoming, which Marx called ‘objective being’, 
by reference to previously established, and more open, concepts of substance. In doing 
so, this chapter sets the foundations for a later and more detailed exploration of ‘species 
being’ and the centrality of the corporeal (in Chapter Seven). Here, I detail the critique 
Marx made of the traditional debate about substance and its application to humanity. I 
also address the question: what alternative did Marx suggest (specifically, how did Marx 
seek to comprehend corporeality as central to the human essence), by setting out the 
framework within which he was positioned to treat the material as part of the human 
essence? The manner in which Marx then, in the second stage of his work, drew on 
Feuerbach and others to ‘invert’ this framework (to ground the human substance in the 
corporeal, rather than the non-corporeal, and in the dominant mode of production) can 
then be considered in Chapter Seven.   
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MARX’S CRITIQUE OF ABSTRACTION 
One of Marx’s consistent emphases was his critique of abstraction—involved, for 
example, in the practice of treating one aspect of a being as determining that being’s 
character, independently of the influence of all other aspects of that being. As such, it 
was a critique of the core premise of the traditional debate about substance—that there 
was some singular, particular quality or feature that lay under, supported and 
determined all other aspects of a being, yet was not reliant upon or affected by those 
other aspects. 
This position was central to Marx’s doctoral dissertation. There he argued against 
Democritus’ determinism, but also qualified the asserted ‘freedom’ of the atom by 
means of his critique of Epicurus, in which he rejected treating the atom as completely 
independent of other atoms. On the face of it, Marx’s dissertation interrogated the 
competing materialist theories of Democritus and Epicurus, and demonstrated a 
preference for the latter. As Schafer has noted (Schafer 2006, 14, 16, 40), it served as a 
mechanism to promote a Hegelian model of expressive being over more mechanistic 
models. In doing so, it has appeared to fit squarely “within the limits of Young Hegelian 
thought”, as noted by Burns (2000) and Kolakowski (2005, 86-7). On this basis, it has 
been treated as having only historical relevance, and certainly not as a source of 
illumination for Marx’s more ‘mature’ theory. In part, once again, this may have followed 
from the “vagueness of the text” (Stanley 1995, 157), yet a number of writers 
nevertheless recognise the ‘germ’ or ‘embryo’ of Marx’s enduring interests in the 
dissertation. Some, like Stanley, go so far as to claim that “the same qualities that 
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contemporary critics are so anxious to bestow upon the Eleven Theses are largely 
present in Marx’s first work” (1995, 158). At the very least, I claim that the dissertation 
evidences the early stages of Marx’s lifelong opposition to any understanding of being 
founded in abstraction. 
In the earlier portion of his dissertation, Marx argued that being was not simply defined 
in terms of determination, and still enjoyed some freedom—that the movement of the 
atom was best understood in terms of the ‘swerve’ rather than the ‘fall’, and as 
comprising some “pregnant vitality” (Schafer and Marx 2006, 15). It was not the 
mechanistic object, moved solely by external influences, but somehow self-sufficient 
(Marx cited in Schafer 2006, 15). For Marx “the motion of falling [was] the motion of 
non-self-sufficiency” (cited in Schafer 2006, 112). 
This, however, was only part of Marx’s argument. In his thesis, he proceeded to criticise 
the one-sidedness of Epicurus’ model and its emphasis on abstract individuality. This 
critique is, in one respect, clearly Hegelian: Marx asserts that every particular being, 
every atom, only exists in the bundle or intersection of a range of relations (in a network 
of attractions and repulsions). Marx rejected the characterisation of the atom as 
independent and self-sufficient (Stanley 1995, 155-6). Rather, the atom, like any 
particular being, was only realised in the midst of its relation to the ‘external’, even if in 
‘negative’ terms of repulsion (Schafer 2006, 53-4): 
We now consider the consequence that follows directly from the declination of 
the atom. In it is expressed the atom’s negation of all motion and relation by 
which it is determined as a particular mode of being by another being. This is 
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represented in such a way that the atom abstracts from the opposing being and 
withdraws itself from it. But what is contained herein, namely, its negation of all 
relation to something else, must be realised, positively established. This can only 
be done if the being to which it relates itself is none other than itself, hence 
equally an atom, and, since it itself is directly determined, many atoms. The 
repulsion of the many atoms is therefore the necessary realisation of the lex 
atomi [law of the atom] (Marx cited in Schafer 2006, 116, emphasis in original). 
On this basis, Marx (cited in Schafer 2006, 130-1) rejected any conceptualisation of 
being in independent, self-sufficient, or abstract terms: 
If the atom is considered as pure concept, its existence is empty space, 
annihilated nature. Insofar as it proceeds to reality, it sinks down to the material 
basis which, as bearer of a world of manifold relations, never exists but in forms 
which are indifferent and external to it. This is a necessary consequence, since 
the atom, presupposed as abstractly individual and complete, cannot actualise 
itself as the idealising and pervading power of the manifold. Abstract individuality 
is freedom from being, not freedom in being. It cannot shine in the light of being. 
Marx’s critique of abstraction continued to feature strongly in the 1844 Manuscripts, in 
his discussion of the abstract character of political economy. In the first manuscript, 
‘Wages of Labour’, Marx characterised the “separation” of “capital, landed property and 
labour” as a “necessary, essential and pernicious” feature of capitalist system. He 
criticised the English and French political economists for treating that separation as 
“natural” or justified as a result of their narrow, abstract, approach to the issue: 
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It goes without saying that political economy regards the proletarian…as nothing 
more than a worker. It can therefore advance the thesis that, like a horse, he 
must receive enough to enable him to work. It does not consider him, during the 
time when he is not working, as a human being. It leaves this to the criminal law, 
doctors, religion, statistical tables, politics and the beadle (1975e, 288). 
This critique continued throughout Marx’s life, and figured prominently in the second 
and third stages of his works.  
In like fashion, it informed Marx’s criticism of Idealist thought in The German Ideology—
that Idealism was founded on the artificial separation of the unity of existence. In Marx’s 
words: 
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real 
premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are 
the real individuals, their activity and the material condition of their life, both those 
which they find already existing and those produced by their activity...Where 
speculation ends, where real life starts, there consequently begins real, positive 
science...When reality is described a self-sufficient philosophy loses its medium 
of existence. At the best its place can only be taken by a summing-up of the most 
general results, abstractions which are derived from the observation of the 
historical development of men. These abstractions in themselves, divorced from 
real history, have no value whatsoever (Marx and Engels 1998, 36-7 and 43). 
254 
 
In the Grundrisse, Marx (1973, 264-5) criticised both economists and socialists for 
making the same error in regard to the relationship between society and economic 
conditions: 
Proudhon, for example ...[states that]: “For society, the difference between 
capital and product does not exist. This difference is entirely subjective, and 
related to individuals”...Thus he calls subjective precisely what is social; and he 
calls society a subjective abstraction. The difference between product and capital 
is exactly this, that the product expresses, as capital, a particular relation 
belonging to a historic form of society. This so-called contemplation from the 
standpoint of society means nothing more than the overlooking of the differences 
which express the social relation...Society does not consist of individuals, but 
expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals 
stand. As if someone were to say: Seen from the perspective of society, there 
are no slaves and no citizens: both are human beings. Rather, they are that 
outside society. To be a slave, to be a citizen, are social characteristics, relations 
between human beings A and B....Proudhon...abstracts from just the specific 
difference on which everything depends. 
In the Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx (1975h, 2) continued to 
expound the same critique, directly addressing political economy’s reliance on the 
fictitious, abstract, independent—or substantial—individual: 
The individual and isolated hunter or fisher who forms the starting point with 
Smith and Ricardo, belongs to the insipid illusions of the eighteenth century...the 
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period in which this view of the isolated individual becomes prevalent, is the very 
one in which the interrelations of society...have reached the highest state of 
development. Man is in the most literal sense a zoon politikon, not only a social 
animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society. 
The recovery of these lost or neglected relations was central to Marx’s discussion of his 
method. In the course of criticising the methodology of political economy in the 
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx (1975h, 16) sketched his own 
method: 
we shall proceed from the imaginary concrete to less and less complex 
abstractions until we get at the simplest conception. This once attained, we might 
start on our return journey until we would finally come back to [the concrete], but 
this time not as the chaotic notion of an integral whole, but as a rich aggregate of 
many conceptions and relations. 
Revealing and contesting the distortions following from this process of abstraction—
from the practice of treating things in terms of the traditional approach to substance—
profoundly shaped the architecture of Capital. Beginning with what appears to be an 
example of substance, traditionally understood, in the form of a commodity—a thing that 
exists independently—Marx then proceeded to draw on Hegel’s logic to explore each of 
the multiple relations that gave it its character (Arthur 2004a, 2004b; Fracchia 2004; 
Smith 1999).34  
                                                          
34
 Whether the starting point is the commodity as a use-value, exchange-value, or as capital, is still 
subject to debate (Arthur 2004a and 2004b, Reuten 2000). 
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The critique of abstraction—and, by implication, the traditional approach to substance—
was a central, continuing emphasis in Marx’s works, and forms part of the answer to the 
first key question of this thesis: what critique did Marx make of the traditional of debate 
about substance and its application to humanity (whereby the non-corporeal was 
treated as the human essence)? Marx’s critique of abstraction implied a view of the 
traditional approaches to substance as incomplete; that is, as an abstraction that 
neglects central features of our humanity, and enables the abstracted features to be 
treated as the essence of our humanity. In the balance of this chapter, I consider the 
alternative approach applied by Marx, and map out what Marx considered to be a more 
comprehensive framework to capture all that comprises being.  
 
OBJECTIVE BEING: INCORPORATING THE ‘EXTERNAL’  
The second key question is: what alternative did Marx suggest?35 I will argue, over the 
remainder of this chapter, that Marx considered being as the composite or aggregate of 
its various relations. This has the effect of making the participants in, or objects of, 
those relations ‘internal’ to being. I will argue that, in the first stage of his work, Marx 
adopted the foundational terms of Hegel’s Logic and that this, together with a range of 
key terms (such as ‘expression’) suggest a concept of human being that is the opposite 
of substance, as traditionally understood. 
                                                          
35
 The second question also asks how Marx sought to comprehend corporeality as central to the human 
essence. This follows from Marx’s adoption of the aggregate or ensemble of relations as his model of the 
human essence, which is the focus of the balance of this chapter. Once that foundation has been 
discussed here, the manner in which Marx applied it to give a central emphasis to corporeality will then be 
discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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For Marx, the essential character, the essence, of a being was not separation or 
independence—not the traditional approach to substance—but interdependence. This 
essence was not some separate, unchanging, dimension of a being, but the aggregate 
of its relationships with other beings. Just as Spinoza, Herder, Goethe, Schelling and 
others had argued, a being that had no object was not, in Marx’s eyes, a living being. A 
living being, for Marx, was an ‘objective being’. For every being, an other or object was 
present and co-located because of their mutual reliance. Just as Hegel, in considering 
the argument for ‘pure’ being, held that a being with no object—no relationship to 
another being—was the equivalent of nothing, Marx (1975e, 390) argued that: 
To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being with natural 
powers means that he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being and 
of his vital expression, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous 
objects. To be objective, natural and sensuous and to have object, nature and 
sense outside oneself…A being which does not have its nature outside itself is 
not a natural being and plays no part in the system of nature…A non-objective 
being is a non-being.  
For Marx (1975e, 389), to be a living being was to be so intimately involved in and so 
dependent upon the ‘external’ or independent world of objects as to blur the borders 
between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’: 
An objective being acts objectively, and it would not act objectively if objectivity 
were not an inherent part of its essential nature. It creates and establishes only 
objects because it is established by objects, because it is fundamentally nature. 
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In the act of establishing it therefore does not descend from its ‘pure activity’ to 
the creation of objects; on the contrary, its objective product simply confirms its 
objective activity, its activity as the activity of an objective, natural being. 
To be a living being was, for Marx, to have its essence ‘outside’ itself. It was to be 
profoundly open to, and dependent upon, objects that are ordinarily considered to be 
separate and external—it incorporated ‘external’ objects as part of its self. A particular 
being was better understood as dependent, rather than independent—as an 
interdependent, ‘objective’, being. A being that existed independently of any other thing 
was a fiction: 
Man lives from nature, ie nature is his body, and he must maintain a continuing 
dialogue with it if he is not to die. To say that man’s physical and mental life is 
linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of 
nature (Marx 1975e, 328, my emphasis). 
This connection was not the relationship found between two separate things. Objects 
were of man’s essence—they were needed “to complete…existence and to realise 
essence…” (Marx 1975d, 267). The relationship between man and nature was an “inner 
relation”: 
The longing for these…objects, i.e. the need for them, shows each owner…that 
he stands in another essential relation to the objects…that he is not the particular 
being as he imagines, but a total being and as a total being his needs stand in an 
inner relation to the products of the labour of others – for the felt need for a thing 
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is the most obvious, irrefutable proof that that thing is part of my essence (1975d, 
267, my underlining). 
This concept of ‘objective being’ was central to Marx’s concept of human being. Just as 
Hegel held that no ‘pure’ being existed—only in mediation or relationship with its various 
objects—Marx’s ‘objective being’ did not exist separately to its objects. As Foster (2008, 
67, 68) has pointed out, and as Arthur (2008) and Hartsock (2008) have agreed: 
Marx’s basic ontological scheme for understanding the world, as with Hegel, was 
one of internal relations…For Marx, each thing consists of the totality of its 
relations. 
These relationships are not the aloof, hardy independence of the traditional approach to 
substance, but that of essence—of being constituted by, and open to, its relationships 
with what, in traditional terms, are seen as separate. Meszaros (1970, 170) has 
emphasised this point: 
...a being’s nature is not some mysteriously hidden “essence”, but…the 
necessary relations of the objective being to its objects. 
To be human, then, in Marx’s eyes was indistinguishable from the various relationships 
any person had with his various objects—those objects were not in an ‘external’ relation 
to it, but an ‘internal’ one. An ‘objective’ being was one comprised of a range or 
aggregate of relationships. From this, it can be readily appreciated that Marx’s 1845 
characterisation of the human essence in his sixth thesis on Feuerbach as “the 
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ensemble of social relations” suggests an essential continuity between the first and 
second stages of his work.36 
Ollman has stressed how this emphasis on externality and separation was the focus of 
Marx’s critique, as well as presenting one of the major obstacles to understanding 
Marx’s work: 
This is really the nub of our difficulty in understanding Marxism, whose subject 
matter is not simply society but society conceived of “relationally”. Capital, labour, 
value, commodity, etc., are all grasped as relations, containing in themselves, as 
integral elements of what they are, those parts with which we tend to see them 
externally tied (1976, 14). 
Ollman points out that, for those who start “with a conception of factors as logically 
independent”, their interaction is then an “intrusion”, whereas, for Marx, interaction is, 
properly speaking, inneraction’ (1976, 16, 17). Richard Levins has similarly emphasised 
that the relation between the parts “is not mere ‘interconnection’ or ‘interaction’ but a 
deeper interpenetration that transforms them” (2008, 35).  
This interpretation of Marx is not uncontested: Gould (1980), Schmidt (1971) and Wood 
(2004) argue that Marx posited a greater division between a being and its objects. All 
three emphasise the role of social relations in Marx’s works, and tend to treat them as 
distinct from the individual-nature relationship. Whilst Wood does not consider this issue 
in any detail, Gould and Schmidt appear to rely on traditional concepts of substance, 
possibly reflecting Aristotle’s influence on Marx. In my view, however, their accounts fail 
                                                          
36
 This continuity is considered in detail in the next chapter. 
261 
 
to explain the strength of the connection that Marx placed between those various 
relations, and exhibit a form of abstraction. In particular, they do not consider how the 
social may be seen as generated out of the individual-nature relationship, which, as I 
argue in Chapter Seven, is central to Marx’s account. 
 
NATURE – MAN’S ‘INORGANIC BODY’ 
Marx’s approach made human being so open that he treated nature as humanity’s 
“inorganic body” (1975e, 328, 329). Here, ‘inorganic’ recognised some degree of 
separation, but not a profound or ontological one. Contrary to its dismissal by Wood as 
“highly metaphorical”, “hyperbolic” and “exaggerated” (2004, 177), Plamenatz’s 
dismissal of Marx as “speaking absurdly” (1975, 82), and the arguments made by some 
‘green’ or ecological writers, such as Clark (2001), man’s organic body, whilst physically 
separate to his ‘inorganic body’, was functionally so dependent on the latter as to make 
them a unity. For Marx (1975e, 328): 
The universality of man manifests itself in practice in that universality which 
makes the whole of nature his inorganic body, (1) as a direct means of life and 
(2) as the matter, the object and the tool of his life activity. Nature is man’s 
inorganic body, that is to say nature in so far as it is not the human body. Man 
lives from nature, i.e. nature is his body, and he must maintain a continuing 
dialogue with it if he is not to die. To say that man’s physical and mental life is 
linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of 
nature.  
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Here, Marx’s use of “organic”, together with his reference to nature as the “tool of his life 
activity”, suggest that he was drawing on the classical Greek understanding of ‘organ’ 
as an integrated extension of the body: 
In ancient Greek usage, the word organ (organon) also meant tool, and organs 
were initially viewed as ‘grown-on tools’ of animals – whereas tools were 
regarded as the artificial organs of human beings...Characteristic of the natural-
dialectical worldview of the ancient Greeks was the recognition of a close 
relationship between tools as extensions of human beings and the organs of 
animals, because they were both part of the general process of species 
adaptation to natural conditions (Foster and Burkett 2000, 408). 
Moreover, Marx’s use of ‘organic’ and ‘inorganic’ needs to be understood with reference 
to Hegel’s works and their influence upon him. As Foster and Burkett (2000, 411) have 
argued: 
In Marx’s dialectical understanding, in which he was heavily influenced by Hegel, 
all of reality consists of relations, and any given entity is the summation of the 
relations of which it is a part…In this sense the organic body of humanity (like all 
species) includes within itself the inorganic conditions of its existence, which may 
at first appear (in a society characterised by the alienation of human beings and 
of nature) as mere “external” things. 
This extended, inorganic, body does not resemble the independent, self-contained 
entity featured in the traditional debate concerning substance. Instead, it represents the 
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depth and breadth of involvement explored by Spinoza and those who worked within his 
legacy—a view of being as open and interdependent.  
A living body then, as both Hegel and Marx recognised, comprised both its organised, 
internal or ‘organic’ dimension and its disorganised, external or ‘inorganic’ dimension. It 
is, however, one body—the dependence of the organic on the inorganic for its 
realisation is so intimate, as Hegel argued in his Logics, that the two cannot be 
considered as distinct. To do otherwise is to consider the being in the abstract—as Marx 
put in his doctoral dissertation, to consider “freedom from being, not freedom in being” 
(cited in Schafer 2006, 131).  
The continuing salience of this understanding is clear in Marx’s later works. In the 
Grundrisse, Marx presents a history of the relationship between man’s organic and 
inorganic body in the course of considering the changing character of property. For 
Marx, the first form, that of the family or “natural” community, made property appear, for 
the individual, as “the objective, nature-given inorganic body of his subjectivity” (1973, 
473). This description remained unchanged, even with the emergence of the second 
form of property—that evolving with towns—with “the earth in itself” described as the 
“inorganic nature of the living individual” (1973, 474). For the worker, “he himself is not 
only the organic body, but also the subject of this inorganic nature” (1973, 488). Marx 
insisted that: 
It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic 
conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and hence their appropriation 
of nature, which requires explanation or is the result of a historic process, but 
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rather the separation between these inorganic conditions of human existence 
and this active existence…Property thus originally means no more than a human 
being’s relation to his natural conditions of production as belonging to him, as his, 
as presupposed along with his own being; relations to them as natural 
presuppositions of his self, which only form, so to speak, his extended body’ 
(1973, 489; see also 473, 474, 485, 488, 490, 491, my emphasis). 
What was ‘unnatural’ was the form of property which was sustained within the capitalist 
mode of production, and its separation of the individual from his inorganic body. Even in 
Capital, Marx’s most ‘mature’ work, “nature becomes one of the organs of [man’s] 
activity, which he annexes to his own bodily organs, adding stature to himself in spite of 
the Bible” (1976, 285). 
 
SUFFERING, VULNERABLE HUMAN BEING 
However, to consider a living being on those terms —of an aggregate or ensemble of 
relations—goes further. It imports the vulnerability of Spinoza’s aggregates to the 
depths of every being, whether animate or inanimate. It makes the experience of pain 
and uncertainty endemic to the human condition. It makes being precarious.  
Contrary to the long-standing effort in traditional approaches to substance to exclude 
the volatility and uncertainty of material existence, I argue that Marx’s conception of 
human being in terms of an aggregate of relationships made the experience of 
uncertainty, anxiety and pain a persistent, troubling feature of human experience. 
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Contrary to the deep, stable, internal security emphasised in the traditional debate 
about substance, Marx (1975e, 389, 390) envisioned a fundamentally contradictory, 
unstable being passionately—and painfully—dependent upon needed objects: 
… as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, 
conditioned and limited being, like animals and plants. That is to say, the objects 
of his drives exist outside him as objects independent of him; but these objects 
are objects of his need, essential objects, indispensable to the exercise and 
confirmation of his essential powers…To be sensuous, i.e. to be real, is to be an 
object of sense, a sensuous object, and thus to have sensuous objects outside 
oneself, objects of one’s sense perception. To be sensuous is to suffer (to be 
subjected to the actions of another). Man as an objective sensuous being is 
therefore a suffering being, and because he feels his suffering, he is a 
passionate being. Passion is man’s essential power vigorously striving to attain 
its object.  
Marx (1975e, 375) emphasised that these “feelings, passions, etc are not merely 
anthropological characteristics in the narrower sense, but…truly ontological affirmations 
of…essence (nature)”. To be an objective being was to be an open, unsettled, 
vulnerable being. It was, in the terms suggested by Spinoza, the Romantics and the 
Idealists, to be profoundly, inescapably bound up with what was, in traditional terms, 
‘external’. Objective being was constituted out of a range of varying relations, and to 
experience those relations, as Schelling put it, as “a continuous exchange of resistance 
and strife” (cited in Richards 2002, 310). It was to have its centre of gravity located in 
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the ‘external’ and in the tensions that, in traditional conceptions, had been located in the 
subordinated volatility of matter and the inconsequential, ‘incidental’, passing moments 
of change. It was to experience the constitution of the self by some uncertain, un-fixed 
limitation or setting off against the relations within which that self was positioned, and 
yet to experience that limitation as some form of self-sacrifice. It was to experience the 
“felt contradiction” Hegel (1975, 269) placed at the heart of being, together with the 
goad or “urge to overcome this limitation” (1969, 135). This was the foundation for 
Schelling’s use of the expression ‘objective being’—of a self constituted and 
simultaneously pained by limitation and abstraction—and thereby committed to an 
endless striving in an effort to secure its fullest sense of self. In contrast to the 
independence and self-sufficiency of substance, traditionally understood, Marx’s 
adoption of a more open conception founded being in the movement from the 
contradictory state of essence or inorganic unity towards an internal, organic unity.  
The resolution of this contradictory state—the satiation of this ontological need and 
passion/pain—is the movement from essence to notion, and inorganic to organic unity. 
Contrary to the traditional emphasis in locating substance in the unchanging, Marx’s 
expansive approach—his treatment of nature as man’s ‘inorganic being’—located being 
in the very process of change. It made activity central to being human and reinforced 
why still life—abstracted studies of isolated individuals —cannot capture the human 
essence. It also demonstrates how unity of being—the aggregation of organic and 
inorganic bodies—is a state of perpetual striving.  
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Marx uses terms like ‘powers’, ‘capacities’, ‘appropriation’, ‘expression’, ‘realisation’, 
‘development’ and ‘becoming’ to describe this process, thereby amplifying this open 
characterisation of being. They provide a rich description of being in such open, 
interdependent terms as to render Marx’s rejection of the traditional approach to 
substance unambiguous. They are, I argue, just the kind of “peculiar terms” Ollman had 
in mind when referring to Pareto’s complaint that one could see both “birds and mice” in 
Marx’s words (1971, 3). They are words, however, that few writers have given sufficient 
attention, with reference to the tradition of arguments concerning substance—such that 
the openness, fragility and potential of human being, as Marx envisioned it, has been 
overlooked. These words are, I suggest, the basis for much of the ‘suggestive’ character 
Leopold (2007, 1), and others, find in Marx’s works. 
 
POWERS, CAPACITIES AND ‘KRAFT’ 
For Marx, the movement towards the unification of our organic and inorganic bodies 
depended upon the use of a person’s ‘powers’ and ‘capacities’: 
As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand equipped 
with natural powers, with vital powers, he is an active natural being; these 
powers exist in him as dispositions and capacities, as drives (Marx 1975e, 389). 
However, Marx does not elaborate on what he means when he talks about ‘powers’, 
‘dispositions’, ‘capacities’ and ‘drives’, despite frequent reference to them. They can be 
read in terms of the traditional debate about substance so as to suggest a pre-existing 
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ability—something ‘internal’ to the being and opposed to the world around it: a 
distinguishing feature. Most discussions of Marx’s works—such as those by Wood 
(2004), and even Ollman (1976)—have tended to assume that this is what Marx meant.  
I argue, however, that Marx’s use of ‘powers’ and ‘capacities’ is better understood as 
accentuating the instability and dependence of objective being. ‘Power’ and ‘capacity’ 
here should be understood in terms of Aristotle’s concept of ‘potential’, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, and the late eighteenth century concept of ‘kraft’ or ‘force’, and so 
suggesting an openness and an essential, constitutional tie to the ‘external’, a sense of 
being in process and movement and not in some solidly established self.  
Aristotle considered ‘power’ and ‘capacity’ as part of his theory of potential (which would 
have been very familiar to both Hegel and Marx,37 and their intended audiences). The 
categories of ‘power’, ‘capacity’ and ‘potential’ are alternative translations of the same 
Greek word, dunamis (Lawson-Tancred 1986, 118; Lawson-Tancred 1998, lvi ), and 
suggestive of a connection. Their use by Hegel (1970, 323) in this sense is suggested 
by his explanation of ‘power’ in terms of possibility, as “secret forces which are still 
slumbering”, and the parallels between Aristotle’s and Hegel’s approaches to 
substance. Both preferred the ideal form of the being as its substance, yet both 
recognised the pervasive, troubling influence of the material world. Both proposed 
                                                          
37
 Marx was both conversant in, and respectful of, Aristotle’s works, as was Hegel, although they differed 
on some key points. Marx was educated with considerable depth in Attic philosophy (Meikle 1985, 1991; 
Pike 1999, 21, 49), as was demonstrated by his doctoral dissertation, and his repeated express 
references to Aristotle (2006b, 80, 90-3, 97, 102, 111, 136, 140 and 192; 1975e, 356; 1973, 134, 160; 
1976, 253, 267, 444, 532, 997, 1041; Pike 1999, 16, 21-2; McCarthy 1992, 1, 2, 40; Depew 1981, 136-7, 
139; Ollman 2003, 3). Hegel drew heavily on Aristotle’s works, particularly De Anima, and is said to have 
considered himself as “Aristotle redividus” (McCarthy 1992, 59; Depew 1981, 134, 135, 137, 140). 
However, as discussed in the preceding chapters, they differed in one crucial respect: Aristotle broadly 
advocated the traditional concept of substance. 
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alternatives to the traditional emphasis on separation with regards to substance that 
brought their ideal and matter together in a volatile, changing combination.  
As I discussed in Chapter Two, Aristotle’s concept of ‘potential’ does not imply a 
separate or independent foundation for being. Instead, the mutual dependence of 
matter and form on each other to constitute being, together with the dependence of 
potential upon the presence of an external catalyst for its realisation, accentuate the 
open, interdependent character of ‘power’ and ‘capacity’. Matter, in Aristotle’s hands, 
transformed the character of substance, shifting it from the firm, fixed substrata towards 
process, flux and interdependence. This intimate dependence was heightened by 
Aristotle’s use of terms such as ‘privation’ and ‘suffering’ to describe the impact of the 
absence of those necessary, although external, conditions.  
Moreover, Marx often drew on the language of ‘kraft’ or ‘force’ in the context of 
describing powers and capacities. As we saw in Chapter Three, new developments in 
physics, geology, biology and other sciences in the eighteenth century suggested a 
higher degree of interaction and interdependence between objects than previously 
appreciated. The discoveries in relation to magnetism, particularly the forces of 
attraction and repulsion, were widely influential and became key descriptive and 
explanatory terms within the Romantic movement. They suggested an underlying, 
universal connection—an openness—that was generally described as ‘force’. This 
term—‘force’—or ‘kraft’ in German, drew on Latin roots which extended its meaning to 
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‘strength’, ‘ability’, ‘faculty’ and ‘power’ (Clark 1942, 740).38 Moreover, the work of 
Leibniz, Herder and the Romantic movement made ‘kraft’ a widely adopted term. Nature 
itself had become, as Schleiermacher expressed it, a “system of forces” (Lamm 1996, 
168). Any particular being, including an individual human being, could be treated as an 
aggregate of forces. Those terms reinforce the Aristotelian suggestion of an open, 
interdependent being, with their portrayal of being in terms of a universal, connecting 
dynamic. Herder made this sense of dependence plain, in asserting that: 
Pure, naked capability which, even without impediment, is still no real power but 
only capability, is like an empty sound, or like ‘plastic forms’ which give form, yet 
themselves are not forms. If the most negligible amount of positive power is not 
combined with the capability, then there is nothing – the word is a purely 
academic abstraction (cited in Barnard 1969, 133i). 
In the first stage of his works, Marx used the term ‘force’ in contexts consistent with the 
sense of openness and interdependence that is central to kraft. It is evident in early 
works, like The Holy Family, where the organic characterisation was expressly preferred 
over a mechanical one: 
Among the qualities inherent in matter, motion is the first and foremost, not only 
in the form of mechanical and mathematical motion, but chiefly in the form of an 
impulse, a vital spirit, a tension – or a “Qual,” to use a term of Jacob Bohme’s - of 
matter. The primary forms of matter are the living, individualizing forces of being 
                                                          
38
 See also Beiser 1987, 148, 230, and Lamm 1996, 28, 33 and 168-9, where ‘kraft’ is alternately 
translated as “power” and “force”; Kamenka’s translation of a passage from The Jewish Question differs 
from that set out below, in substituting “power” for “forces” (1970, 117-8). 
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inherent in it and producing the distinctions between the species (Marx and 
Engels 1975, 128, my emphasis). 
As early as 1843, in The Jewish Question, Marx (1975b, 234) described human 
emancipation—securing a truly human existence—as the re-assembly of those forces: 
Only when real, individual man resumes the abstract citizen into himself and as 
an individual man has become a species-being in his empirical life, his individual 
work and his individual relationships, only when man has recognised and 
organised the forces propres [translated by the editor as “own forces”] as social 
forces so that social force is no longer separated from him in the form of political 
force, only then will human emancipation be completed.39  
Marx continued to use ‘force’ in this same sense in his later work. In the Grundrisse 
(1973, 464-5), he equated ‘force’ with ‘capacity’ in describing the extremity to which, to 
constitute ‘wage labour’ under capitalist system, the capacity to labour needed to be 
distinguished from its objective conditions. In those circumstances: 
Living labour capacity belongs to itself, and has disposition over the expenditure 
of its forces, through exchange…What the free worker sells is always nothing 
more than a specific, particular measure of force-expenditure 
[Kraftausserung]…As a totality of force-expenditure, as labour-capacity, he is a 
                                                          
39
 Note that Kamenka (1970, 117) regards this passage as clear evidence of Feuerbach’s influence—
which, suggests, in turn, that of Leibniz and Herder. Note also that Kamenka’s translation of the same text 
varies slightly: he translated ‘kraft’ as ‘force’ in ‘social force’ and ‘political force’ as ‘power’ (1970, 118). 
Translations of Marx’s works also suggest the use of kraft through references to ‘vital forces’, although 
these terms appear much less frequently than ‘powers’ and ‘capacities’. 
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thing…belonging to another, and hence does not relate as subject to his 
particular expenditure of force, nor to the act of living labour.  
In Capital, Marx (1976, 283) used both the concepts of ‘potential’ and ‘forces’ to 
characterise: 
...the labour process independently of any other specific social formation…[as] a 
process by which man…mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism 
between himself and nature…[where] man…confronts the materials of nature as 
a force of nature. He sets in motion the natural forces which belong to his own 
body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of 
nature in a form adapted to his own needs. Through this movement he acts upon 
external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his 
own nature. He develops the potentials slumbering within nature, and subjects 
the play of its forces to his own sovereign power. 
Similarly, the dependence of a potential on its object is evident in Marx’s discussions of 
‘labour power’ and ‘labour’, and in his contrast between ‘living’ and ‘dead’ labour. The 
capitalist system not only maintained human beings in an incomplete, alienated state, 
but relied upon the exaggeration of that privation for its continued operation: human 
beings were reduced to ‘labour power’—to mere, bare capacity or potential, the 
possibility of—but-not-yet—human being (which, when activated, became ‘living 
labour’—the source of all value within capitalist society).40 Under the capitalist system, 
                                                          
40
 Marx’s concepts of “dead”, or “objectified”, labour and “living labour” reinforce the centrality of the 
concept of kraft/force to all his works, as they appear to be derived from the concepts of “living” and 
“dead” forces introduced by Leibniz and modified by Kant. Both Leibniz and Kant used these terms to 
273 
 
the ‘vital forces’ that comprised and maintained a human being were artificially 
separated out—‘abstracted’ in the sense of ‘torn apart’—from the aggregate of forces 
that made up a person 41. 
For Marx (1976, 1052, 274), “labour [was] an expression of labour-power”. Labour-
power was a potential which did not exist until “activated…through labour”. It became “a 
reality only by being expressed”. That expression, however, was dependent upon its 
essential objects: 
When we speak of capacity for labour, we do not speak of labour, any more than 
we speak of digestion when we speak of capacity for digestion. As is well known, 
the latter process requires something more than a good stomach. When we 
speak of capacity for labour, we do not abstract from the necessary means of 
subsistence (1976, 277). 
Together, these suggest that, contrary to the suggestions of stability and continuity 
conveyed by a conventional understanding, Marx’s use of ‘powers’ and ‘capacities’ is 
better understood as kraft, and accentuating the openness and interdependence of 
objective being. Here, power and capacity suggest an essential, constitutional tie to the 
‘external’, a sense of being in process and movement and not the independent, 
unchanging substance. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
locate the presence of motion—of change—in bodies. In Leibniz, the difference was between a body 
without motion and one with motion. Kant modified this to indicate the source of that motion—“dead force” 
was force that originated outside the body, whilst “living force” originated within it (Meld-Shell 1996, 22-4). 
Marx appears to have used these terms to distinguish between labour power as objectified in an object (in 
capital) and the “living force” that originated in “living labour” —and to express the dependence of the 
former on the latter: “Capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour” (1976, 
342; see also 289, 315 and 993; 1973, 576-7).  
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APPROPRIATION 
Marx referred to the process by which a being entered into unity with its object, and so 
completed its essence, resolved its contradiction and achieved some secure, stable 
identity, as ‘appropriation’. In this section, I argue that Marx’s presentation of this 
process further emphasised his open, interactive characterisation of being. Marx argued 
that the process of appropriation was not the straightforward enjoyment of exclusive 
possession or ownership, but much more open—a process in which an object could be 
appropriated in many varied ways, including simultaneously by a number of people. 
Marx’s view of appropriation, while only touched on briefly by him, suggests an 
enormous variety of relationships between ‘being’ and ‘object’ and so an equally varied 
range of forms for ‘objective being’. Considered with the open character of ‘objective 
being’, of a being that is always incomplete and striving to secure its many objects and 
many relationships, Marx’s sketches of appropriation suggest a being with an 
extraordinary openness to the world. 
When he wrote of the human essence as ‘activity’ or ‘labour’, Marx was referring to 
appropriation. It formed the process by which the very being of the aggregate or 
interdependent being was constituted and maintained. The relations that comprised that 
ensemble or intersection—that incomplete unity of being and object—were expressed 
and fulfilled through appropriation:  
All his human relations to the world – seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, 
thinking, contemplating, sensing, wanting, acting, loving – in short, all the organs 
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of his individuality…are…in their approach to the object the appropriation of that 
object (Marx 1975e, 351)42. 
Moreover, the manner in which an appropriation occurred was not fixed, but varied. It 
could involve the exclusive possession and use of the object (including its consumption 
and destruction) or merely its apprehension through one or more of the senses. Hegel, 
in his Philosophy of Nature (1970, 406), had indicated that it could involve the 
construction of an ‘external’ object (an artefact): 
Here, an external object, something belonging to the animals’ non-organic 
nature, is assimilated: but in such a manner that at the same time it is also left to 
remain as an external object. Thus the constructive instinct…is a self-
externalisation, but as a building of the form of the organism into the outside 
world. 
For Marx (1975e, 353), the forms of appropriation could be as varied as the objects: 
The manner in which they become his depends on the nature of the object and 
the nature of the essential power that corresponds to it; for it is just the 
determinateness of this relation that constitutes the particular, real mode of 
affirmation. An object is different for the eye from what it is for the ear, and the 
eye’s object is different from the ear’s. The peculiarity of each essential power is 
precisely its peculiar essence, and thus also the peculiar mode of its 
objectification, of its objectively real, living being (emphasis in original). 
                                                          
42
 See also Marx 1973, 774, which also provided that appropriation could simply be “mental”. 
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Appropriation, then, was not limited to the creation of artefacts or the transformation of 
materials. It was one of those terms Ollman described as bearing a ‘peculiar’ meaning. 
Extending to “seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, contemplating, 
sensing, wanting, acting, loving” (Marx 1975e, 351), appropriation captured all human 
relations to the ‘external’—all of the relations between organic and inorganic bodies. It 
was that degree of relation that involved the unification of being and object, even if that 
unity remained physically separate and could be simultaneously enjoyed by others 
(herein lay the rationale for communal or communist forms of appropriation over private 
ones).  
 
REALISATION AND EXPRESSION 
However, whilst the appropriation of an essential object unified a person’s inorganic 
essence and addressed the ontological void that motivates and drives them, it did not 
render that person stable, separate or independent. Whilst Marx described the effect of 
an appropriation as a ‘realization’ and ‘expression’ of the self, this was not in the sense 
of any closure or stability. Rather, I argue that these two terms also express the open, 
incomplete character of the human essence and accentuate its thoroughgoing, 
unavoidable, constitutive interdependence. 
On the face of it, ‘realization’ and ‘expression’ suggest a sense of conclusion and 
completion. Much of Marx’s use of these words appeared to express this sense: a 
person needed objects “to complete [his] own existence and to realize [his] own 
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essence” (1975d, 267); a worker’s product was “his life-expression” and the 
“externalisation of his life”.43  
Marx’s language suggests the attainment of an end—a stable, independent self, no 
longer dependent upon the ‘external’, no longer participating in a broader way of life. It 
does not suggest the reciprocal influence of being and object—rather, the former 
dominating the latter and bending it to its end. Nor does his language suggest the 
ongoing influence of the ‘external’, but of independence from it. It suggests a dominant, 
separate private self, rather than the interdependent self. This appears to be the way in 
which Wood (2004) has interpreted ‘expression’. 
Marx provides no clear explication or exegesis of his use of terms like ‘realization’ and 
‘expression’, notwithstanding his frequent and consistent use of them throughout his 
works. However, here again, I argue that Marx was drawing on the tradition of debate 
about substance. His use of ‘expression’ and ‘realization’ reflected the continuation and 
development of the Aristotelian tradition by Spinoza, Leibniz, Herder and Hegel, and the 
resistance to the abstractions of Enlightenment thinking expressed by Vico, Hamann, 
Herder, Goethe and the Romantic Movement. Its influence on Marx, particularly in his 
critique of alienation44 and his vision of an emancipated society (discussed below), was 
profound (Berlin 2000, 227). 
For Marx (1975e, 390), a real being was always, already, involved in and expressed 
through its objects:  
                                                          
43
 Both “realize” and “express” describe the process of objectification (Marx 1973, 289, 462, 470), See 
also Marx 1975d, 267; 1975e, 324; 1976, 993. 
44
 Marx’s theory of alienation is considered in Chapter Seven. 
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To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being with natural 
powers means that he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being and 
of his vital expression, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous 
objects.  
An ‘objective being’ was deeply bound up with its objects and reliant upon them for its 
realisation: “he is not the particular being as he imagines, but...as a total being his 
needs stand in an inner relation to” those objects as they are needed to 
“complete...existence and to realise...essence” (1975d, 267).  
This deep involvement in one’s objects made for an equally deep involvement with 
others—it involved others intimately in one’s expression. Marx was at pains to point out 
that: 
It is above all necessary to avoid once more establishing ‘society’ as an 
abstraction over against the individual. The individual is the social being. His vital 
expression...is therefore an expression and confirmation of social life. Man’s 
individual and species-life are not two distinct things (1975e, 350). 
Plamenatz (1975), and others, recognise the ‘external’ dimension of ‘expression’ in this 
social sense: in particular, in terms of a need for recognition by others. Plamenatz even 
suggested a deeper sense of connection in describing it as “spiritual” (1975, 94, 102), 
but did not explore its ontological status in Marx’s thought. 
Marx drew on ‘expression’ and ‘realisation’ to convey the sense of tension, volatility, 
movement and involvement considered in Chapter Three: a sense of a drive or 
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extension that never reaches completion. The terms reflect, on the one hand, the 
Aristotelian/Herderian sense of an emerging ‘internal’ character. On the other, they 
position that potential as ‘external’ in the Spinozan and Idealist sense of an immanent 
totality of relations, and the manner in which they draw a being ‘out’ of itself. They 
suggest a being that was always, ever, involved in the ‘external’, but with an increasing 
degree and intimacy. They gesture to a fundamental unrest and tendency towards 
expansion. 
Expression, then, for Marx, was founded in a deep relationship with what might 
ordinarily be considered separate to being. It was intended to convey a profound 
intimacy. So much so, that, when “we...produced as human beings...In my production I 
would have objectified the specific character of my individuality and for that reason I 
would…have enjoyed the expression of my own individual life during my activity” 
(1975d, 277). Our activity, our objectification, however, also served another’s needs, 
such that: 
In the individual expression of my own life I would have brought about the 
immediate expression of your life, and so in my individual activity I would have 
directly confirmed and realized my authentic nature, my human, communal 
nature. Our productions would be as many mirrors from which our natures would 
shine forth (1975d, 277-8). 
The expression and realisation of one individual was bound up with that of others, so 
much so as to involve reflections of each other. 
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Marx made the same point again in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 
1844—expression was not an individual dynamic, but rather a dialogue: 
If we assume man to be man, and his relation to the world to be a human one, 
then love can be exchanged only for love...Each one of your relations to man – 
and to nature – must be a particular expression, corresponding to the object of 
your will, of your real individual life. If you love unrequitedly, ie, if your love as 
love does not call forth love in return, if through the vital expression of yourself as 
a loving person you fail to become a loved person, then your love is impotent, it 
is a misfortune (1975e, 379), 
Marx’s use of ‘expression’ to convey this intimate connection between a person and his 
objects continued throughout his works. It is clearly evident in the Grundrisse, 
particularly in Marx’s discussions of alienation: 
Indeed, living labour itself appears as alien vis-a-vis living labour capacity, whose 
labour it is, whose own life’s expression...it is, for it has been surrendered to 
capital in exchange for objectified labour, for the product of labour itself (1973, 
462). 
These terms—’expression’ and ‘realization’—are key parts of a vocabulary of 
thoroughgoing, unavoidable, constitutive interdependence, and were used to emphasise 
the openness and overlapping of what is ordinarily conceived as separate, independent 
and optional.  
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DEVELOPMENT 
The emphasis on the open, incomplete, character of the human essence is equally 
suggested by Marx’s (and Hegel’s) use of the term ‘development’ (‘entwicklung’). This 
term, together with ‘expression’ and ‘realization’, formed the suite of terms they both 
used to describe the outcome of an appropriation. Entwicklung, like kraft, has a variety 
of meanings. It can mean development within a life-cycle stage (that is, evolving), 
producing, expanding, expansion or growth. 
Marx provides no clear explanation of the meaning of ‘development’ in the first stage of 
his works, notwithstanding his frequent use of it throughout those works. Its meaning—
and the continuity of Marx’s thinking—is clarified in his later works. 
In The German Ideology, Marx (Marx and Engels 1998, 47-8) discussed appropriation in 
the course of setting out the three “premises of all human existence”. The first premise 
was the production of the means to meet needs. The second was that appropriation did 
not involve completion: rather, “…the satisfaction of [a]…need…leads to new needs…”. 
With regard to the concept of ‘objective being’, this suggests that the very act of 
appropriation—of securing the desired object and meeting a need—can be understood 
as changing the relationship of an ‘objective being’ with that object. As such, it changes 
one of the relations that comprises that being—and thereby changes (‘develops’) that 
being. Dietzgen (1928, 198), a philosopher whose works Marx endorsed (Dietzgen 
1928, 15; Ollman 1976, 36-37), drew out the manner in which this volatility followed 
from the character of ‘objective being’: 
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Here is a drop of water. Look how different it is according to the different things 
with which it is connected. It cannot be what it is without a certain 
temperature…In fat the drop remains compact, in salt it divides infinitely, runs 
usually downhill, and in a loaf of sugar, uphill….Without a connection with the 
earth, with its temperature and gravitation, this drop and all others would 
disappear in the bottomless abyss and have no existence. Thus, the forms of 
things change according to their connections. 
This interpretation is suggested again by Marx’s use of ‘development’ in The Grundrisse 
(1973, 494). In the course of the preservation of the ‘old community’ and hence old 
means of production, its destruction or supersession necessarily followed. Marx made it 
clear that: 
Not only do the objective conditions change…the producers change, too, in that 
they bring out new qualities in themselves, develop themselves in production, 
transform themselves, develop new powers and ideas, new modes of 
intercourse, new needs and new language. 
The same approach is suggested again in Capital. Changes in objective conditions—
namely, an inhospitable or challenging climate – ‘spurs man on to the multiplication of 
his needs, his capacities, and the instruments and modes of his labour’, unlike the 
tropics, ‘where nature is too prodigal with her gifts’ (1976, 649) 
Development, despite its ordinary connotations of completion and stability, appears to 
have meant just the opposite for Marx. The appropriation of a needed object is not a 
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resolution nor an ending, but an increase in complexity; a broadening rather than a 
closure, an increasing neediness and dependence, rather than independence and self-
sufficiency. Contrary to the “[prevalent] view of the isolated individual” in an advanced 
industrialised society as separate and independent, Marx viewed it as the “very one in 
which the interrelations of society have reached...their highest state of development” 
(1975h, 2). 
 
BECOMING 
On its face, ‘becoming’ or ‘werdens’, like other terms discussed in this chapter, suggests 
a sense of conclusion and completion. Marx’s use of it to describe the communist state 
in the 1844 Manuscripts suggests that interpretation: 
Communism is the positive supersession of private property as human self-
estrangement, and hence the true appropriation of the human essence through 
and for man; it is the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, ie, 
human being...it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and 
nature, and between man and man, the true resolution of the conflict between 
existence and being, between objectification and self-affirmation, between 
freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the 
riddle of history and knows itself to be the solution. The entire movement of 
history is therefore both the actual act of creation of communism – the birth of its 
empirical existence – and, for its thinking consciousness, the comprehended and 
known movement of its becoming (1975e, 348).  
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Marx provided no clear explanation of ‘becoming’ in his early works. However, here 
again, I argue that Marx was drawing on the tradition of debate about substance. His 
use of the term reflected its use by those who preceded him, such as Herder and Hegel, 
such that, notwithstanding contrary indications, Marx’s use of the term involved the 
conception of being in terms of continuous flux—of being as permanently open to, 
interdependent with, and changing in response to, the world about it. In this section, I 
argue that Marx characterised being in terms of openness and constant interaction and 
change—i.e. as ‘becoming’—rather than the closed, unchanging, independence of 
substance, as traditionally conceived. I argue that the concept of becoming is both the 
culmination of the chain of concepts discussed so far in this chapter—from power or 
capacity to appropriation to expression/realisation and then development—and 
complements Marx’s critique of abstraction.  
The term ‘becoming’ had acquired a well-established meaning within the philosophical 
traditions that Marx drew on. It was a vision of ever-incomplete being, evident, for 
example, when Herder characterised mankind: 
At no single moment can he be said to be the whole man, rather he is always in a 
state of development, of progress, of becoming. One activity is increased by 
another, builds upon, or evolves from, the foregoing…We are always growing out 
of childhood, however old we may be; we will always be in motion, restless and 
dissatisfied. The essence of our life is never fruition, but continuous becoming 
(cited in Barnard 1969, 156-7). 
Moreover, in Herder’s eyes: 
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The strife of becoming would be the eternal lot of human nature...the dialectic of 
freedom and necessity would sow a garden of mixed delights, aims and values 
that would grow in an antagonistic and perpetual struggle, perhaps never 
achieving final harmony (cited in Richards 2002, 201-2). 
As we have seen, the same emphasis on ‘becoming’, and its difficulties, shaped the 
works of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Their use of the term conveys a sense of being in 
terms of process, rather than stability and closure.  
Hegel made this plain. Referring back to Heraclitus, Hegel (2003, 92, 84, 100, 12) 
emphasised that it requires that “we…think pure flux”, a “flux of thorough-going change”, 
of “flux [as]…the substance of the independent forms” —that we regard life as “endless, 
infinite movement” and the self as “this very unrest”. This instability arose directly from 
the character of being as an aggregate of relations and interactions—the vision that was 
central to Spinoza and to those who worked within his legacy. Hegel pointed out that: 
...this truth is to be grasped and expressed only as becoming, as a process, a 
repulsion and attraction – not as being, which as a proposition has the character 
of a stable unity (1969, 172).  
This is not to ignore Hegel’s or Marx’s confidence in a future resolution of these 
tensions. It is only to assert that, pending that resolution, Marx’s use of ‘becoming’ does 
not suggest a smooth, inevitable unfolding of some independent or pure essence, but 
the tensions and vulnerabilities of an open, dialectical being.  
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Drawing on Marx, then, it can be argued that an understanding of a living being is one in 
which life is not adequately described in terms of stability or self-sufficiency, but rather 
as activity, relation and dependence. Life is then less a question of the objects artificially 
created by abstraction from context, but of the intimate, mutual influence of participants 
in a relationship. Life then involves an intimate ‘internal’ influence by ‘external’ things 
and boundaries and borders recognised as points of reference, imposed for our 
convenience, and abandoned as each incorporation begs their further extension.  
Jonas’ suggestion (in Grosz 1994, 11) that this fluidity and dynamism is analogous to 
that of a flame captured well the concept of becoming, and its contrast to the traditional 
debate about substance: 
...the permanence of the flame is a permanence, not of substance, but of process 
in which at each moment the ‘body’ with its ‘structure’ of inner and outer layers is 
reconstituted of materials different from the previous and following ones so the 
living organism exists as a constant exchange of its own constituents and has its 
permanence and identity in the continuity of this process. 
‘Becoming’, in this sense, reflects the tensions and dynamics of power and capacity, 
expression and realisation. The moment of constitution of any particular being—of its 
expression in Aristotle’s sense—is a moment of passing satisfaction as it equally 
involves an experience of inadequacy and loss. To carve one’s self out—to abstract 
one’s self from the bundle of relations from which it is comprised—is an act of partial 
self-sacrifice, of dismemberment, accentuating the feelings of loss and pain that Fichte 
287 
 
and then Hegel had emphasised, feelings that prevented any feeling of being ‘at home’ 
in the world.  
The nature of a being can then be considered as ‘becoming’. The moment of satiation, 
satisfaction and completion for a passionate, objective being, becomes so fleeting as to 
be illusory. The completion of the dialectical movement—the organic unification of being 
and object—changes a key relationship, a key component in the constitution of that 
being and thereby changes that being. 
This characterisation becomes clearer in Marx’s later works. In the Grundrisse Marx 
(1973, 488) contemplated unlimited becoming (courtesy of kraft): 
what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, 
pleasures, productive forces, etc, created through universal exchange? The full 
development of the human mastery over the forces of nature…The absolute 
working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presuppositions other than the 
previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the 
development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a 
predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one 
specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has 
become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? 
In this approach: 
Everything that has a fixed form, such as the product etc...is merely a moment, a 
vanishing moment, in this movement. The direct production process itself…as a 
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moment. The conditions and objectifications of the process [as]…themselves 
equally moments of it, and its only subjects…the individuals, but individuals in 
mutual relationships, which they equally reproduce and produce anew. The 
constant process of their own movement, in which they renew themselves even 
as they renew the world of wealth they create (1973, 712, my emphasis). 
The communist state, then, was to involve the “positive supersession [or 
‘transcendence’] of private property” and end of alienation. It was to be the “genuine 
resolution of the [conflicts]” involved in “the true appropriation of the human essence”, 
freeing that process of appropriation from the obstacles involved in alienated 
relationships, and enabling one to “do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in 
the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after 
dinner...without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic” (Marx and Engels 
1998, 53). It was not an end to the openness and constitutional instability of our being, 
but of enabling its free realisation. 
This is why Marx’s key term for that endeavour came to be ‘labour’ in his later works. 
Marx (1975e, 389, 390) envisaged humanity as “suffering”, “needy” and “passionate” as 
these words best captured the dependence of any being on its objects—they were not 
optional or external, but essential. Securing those objects, however, did not end this 
state but renewed it—meeting one need served to create another. It made substance 
the state of ‘becoming’ and permanently committed this ‘suffering’, interdependent, 
being to the activity of securing its needed objects. It made being one with activity or 
‘labour’.  
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Marx’s comprehension of being was the direct opposite of that underlying the traditional 
debate about substance. It was not stable, secure or independent, unaffected by other 
beings. Rather, it was open and interdependent—far more a process than a settled 
state. It was ‘becoming’ and the mechanism of that ongoing process of unification and 
change was ‘appropriation’ or ‘labour’. It was for this reason that Marx (1975e, 395) 
praised Hegel’s insights, notwithstanding their alienated terms, for recognising that the 
character or essence of our humanity was labour: 
Therefore, in grasping the positive significance of the negation which has 
reference to itself, even if once again in estranged form, Hegel grasps man’s self-
estrangement, alienation of being, loss of objectivity and loss of reality as self-
discovery, expression of being, objectification and realisation. In short, he sees 
labour – within abstraction – as man’s act of self-creation and man’s relation to 
himself as an alien being as the emergence of species-consciousness and 
species-life (emphasis in original). 
It is for this same reason that Marx regarded the extremity of the capitalist mode of 
production, with its separation of workers from their needed objects and their reduction, 
in so many ways, to just the capacity to labour—‘labour power’—as the most advanced 
stage of human development. In its extremity, it exposed the essence of our being. This 
essential, unavoidable character of labour is one of the great continuities across all 
stages of Marx’s works. 
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CONCLUSION  
Marx’s search for a ‘more human language’45 was founded in a vision of a humanity 
intimately involved in the world. In the first stage of his works, drawing on Hegel’s 
Logics, his concept of ‘objective being’ is of a being deeply bound up with, and 
dependent upon, its various objects. It is a vision of an interdependent being, immersed 
in the world, rather than abstracted and torn from it: a being so involved in that world as 
to make nature its ‘inorganic body’. It was not secure, stable or changeless, but 
constantly in, and open to, change, with all the fragility and tensions that the works of 
Spinoza, Herder, Hegel and others had suggested. 
It is also a vision of a being wrestling with the necessity and pain of limitation—as 
having some sense of self by virtue of some form of boundary and limitation, and yet 
unable to live with that amputation, that vivisection, of itself. Marx’s vision of being is 
founded in pain—in the experience of ever, always, feeling incomplete. It is an image 
that resonates with the legacies of Spinoza’s thought, and his emphasis on the 
openness, vulnerability and fragility of being. It is an image of constant yearning, of an 
essential yearning, of seeking, to use Hegel’s terms, to be ‘at home’ in the world, and of 
the endless nature of that task. It is a vision of being founded, not in the stability and 
security of favoured in the traditional debate about substance, but in movement and 
constant effort to secure some unity, some security, only to find that yearning renewed 
in the moment of its satisfaction and expression. Contrary to the more commonplace 
understandings of the key terms Marx used to describe being, ‘powers’, ‘capacities’, 
‘appropriation’, ‘expression’, ‘realisation’, ‘development’ and ‘becoming’ speak of an 
                                                          
45
 See Marx 1975d, 276-7. 
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open, vulnerable, fragile, needy being. They speak of interdependent being: of a being 
that, lacking its necessary objects, is incomplete, is “no being” (1975e, 390); a being so 
fragile, Marx realised, that, absent the support of others, it could not exist. That 
realisation marks the transition from the first to the second stage of Marx’s work—the 
recognition that an ‘objective being’ could only survive as a ‘species being’ and in 
cooperation with others of its kind. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN – TOWARDS A MORE HUMAN LANGUAGE: 
MARXIAN SPECIES BEING 
 
In 2005, Fracchia, after surveying attempts over the previous twenty-five years to “offer 
a historical-materialist account of human nature”, argued that those attempts had 
“stalled” because they were “not materialistic enough and [had] failed to grasp Marx’s 
materialist conception of history by its corporeal roots” (2005, 24, 35). He went on to 
quote Terry Eagleton as “best summarising” the “daunting challenges” this involved. 
Eagleton (1990, 197) had characterised Marx’s “massive undertaking” as “animated” by 
the following question: 
What if an idea of reason could be generated up from the body itself, rather than 
the body incorporated into a reason which is always already in place? What if it 
were possible, in a breathtaking wager, to retrace one’s steps and reconstruct 
everything – ethics, history, politics, and rationality – from a bodily foundation? 
Marx’s works were just that ‘wager’. His thinking about ‘objective being’, which I 
addressed in Chapter Six, provided him with the means by which to pursue it. With this 
foundation, Marx was able to recognise the influence of our ‘corporeal roots’ and to 
outline and sketch that reconstruction—one in which the corporeal is no longer 
considered an obstacle or hindrance to our humanity, but rather as the foundation of its 
character, its fragility and promise. 
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Here, I address the second key question posed in the introduction to this thesis: what 
alternative did Marx suggest to the traditional approach to substance and, in particular, 
how did Marx make the case that corporeality was central to the human essence? I 
have already argued that Marx criticised the traditional approach to substance as 
incomplete and as an abstraction that neglects the most central features of our 
humanity. This, in turn, enables the non-corporeal to be treated as our essence, 
independent of all other things, by abstracting it from—that is, ignoring—its intimate, 
inescapable ties to the balance of existence. In place of the traditional formulation of 
substance, Marx—drawing on the legacy of Spinoza, the Romantic movement, Hegel, 
and others—understood human being as ‘objective being’ comprised of a range or 
“ensemble” (1975g, 423) of relationships, such that the objects of those relationships 
were not external or foreign to our being, but part of its essential constitution. 
Marx built on this foundation to demonstrate that this intimate involvement in the world 
makes our being precarious and deeply dependent on the cooperation of others, so as 
to secure a stable relationship with the objects of those relations, including those 
objects that form part of nature. The very ontological openness and incompleteness of 
our being renders the common labour under a common mode of production essential to, 
and pervasively, intimately influential over, our very constitution. I will argue that this 
very dependence on other people to constitute and maintain our selves founded Marx’s 
understanding of ‘species being’, and explains his central emphasis on the mode of 
production.  
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This dimension of Marx’s works—the precarious, unstable and fragile character of our 
being—has not been well recognised in the literature. In part, this is because of a failure 
to consider Marx’s works in light of the tradition of debate about substance, which 
allows assumptions of stability and independence to exert a lingering effect, such that 
the insufficiently exorcised ghosts of political economy’s ‘abstract man’ continue to 
appear to somehow stand outside of the relations that comprise them. To treat Marx’s 
works as part of the tradition of debate about substance is to crack open this resilient 
kernel of that debate, and is an essential first step to fully comprehending Marx’s intent. 
It is to reveal the fragility and vulnerability of every being, and the immanent risk, so well 
marked by Spinoza, of that being’s compromise and collapse. It is to reveal that 
creature’s deep dependence on what, traditionally, is considered external to it. In those 
‘external’ relations, our stability and continuity resides. Those relations, which Marx 
described as the dominant mode of production, exercise a permanent, pervasive 
influence. It is, equally, to note the promise and beauty of being: to participate so openly 
in many relationships is to participate in a near-boundless potential. It is to approach the 
breadth and promise of ‘expression’ in the manner in which Spinoza, borrowing from 
theological traditions, used it—it is to imagine being with the reach formerly reserved to 
gods. 
Marx, by ‘inverting’ Hegel’s dialectic, grounded our being in the world. He made matter 
relevant. In adopting the language of materialism, with its emphasis on the volatility of 
matter, Marx made our bodies matter. No longer was our corporeality one relation 
among many. The centrality of this influence has, however, not always been recognised 
by commentators on Marx’s work. Whilst the necessity of the corporeal is acknowledged 
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without hesitation, it tends to only be in the sense of the most basic sense of a limiting 
need— as suggested by Agnes Heller (1974)—and an obstacle to be overcome. The 
treatment of the corporeal in the literature still, too often, resembles Feuerbach’s 
‘religious thought’—that which imagines human fulfilment in terms of the disembodied, 
immortal lives of gods, rather than as inseparable from our limitations and mortality. If 
only by omission, our corporeality is still, too often, treated as an obstacle to be 
overcome, or an instrument to enable other pleasures. It still, too often, is treated as 
disappearing from relevance and influence in ways reminiscent of Hegel’s treatment of 
desire. The engagement with Marx’s works has failed to recognise the aches and pains 
of the corporeal, and their role in our emancipation: we remain so enamoured of our 
non-corporeal achievements and challenges.  
Here, I trace the basis on which Marx’s theory of ‘objective being’ incorporated the 
corporeal. I consider the shift in Marx’s language from ‘sensuous’ to ‘material’ being, 
which incorporated the classical Greek understanding of matter as active and volatile. It 
marks the parallels between materialist philosophy and that criticising the traditional 
debate about substance, with particular regard to Feuerbach’s influence, so as to 
present Marx’s materialism as an expansion and reinforcement of his treatment of 
objective being. This chapter also draws out the way that instability permeates each 
individual being and makes the experience of alienation and of anxiety inherent risks of 
the human condition.  
 
296 
 
INCORPORATING THE CORPOREAL 
Marx rejected the traditional approach to substance, with its emphasis on separation 
and abstraction from the world. In its place, he insisted that the only real being was an 
‘objective being’—one that had its “nature outside itself” (1975e, 390). In this way, he 
expanded the extent of each being’s involvement in the world around it. With the 
foundation of any particular being no longer restricted to some underlying, independent 
substance, the various objects of the relations that comprised its being became 
incorporated into that being. In particular, the material or corporeal could no longer be 
treated as distinguishable from a non-corporeal human essence, and therefore, 
discardable. Rather, with Marx’s ‘objective being’, it became central. 
However, notwithstanding his debt to Hegel, Marx found a prime example of the 
“German disease” (Marx and Engels 1998, 29). Like Herder and Feuerbach, Marx was 
concerned to avoid confusing the convenience and comfort of our concepts with reality, 
and thereby “purchase clarity at too high a price” (to paraphrase Berlin 2000, 188). 
Hegel, notwithstanding his appreciation of the breadth and interdependence of being, 
privileged a concept of being over its actual experience. As Feuerbach had objected 
before Marx, Hegel’s Logics had concerned a contest of concepts, rather than of 
concepts and reality. “Truth”, for Feuerbach (cited in Johnston 1995, 87): 
...consists not in unity with its opposite, but rather in the refutation of the same. 
The dialectic is no monologue of speculation with itself, but rather is a dialogue of 
speculation and empirical reality…The opposite of Being – in general, just as the 
Logic considers it – is not Nothing, but sensuous, concrete being. 
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It was on this basis that Marx argued in the 1844 Manuscripts (1975e, 397) that: 
...the whole of the Logic is proof of the fact that abstract thought is nothing for 
itself, that the absolute idea is nothing for itself and that only nature is something. 
In The German Ideology, Marx similarly criticised the manner in which the corporeal 
world, once canvassed in his theory, had been ‘sublated’ by Hegel because it had been 
subsumed in, and subordinated by, what Marx called “the rule of the concept” (Marx and 
Engels 1998, 29). As such, as Marx expressed it in Capital, Hegel’s approach to the 
dialectic was “standing on its head” and needed to be “inverted, in order to discover the 
rational kernel within the mystical shell” (1976, 103). 
A consistent application of Hegel’s own dialectics demanded, as Feuerbach (1986, 67) 
insisted, a broader view of the human essence and of reason, one which treated a 
“reason saturated with the blood of man”, rather than “a beingless, colourless, and 
nameless reason”. To consider any particular being as interdependent—as an 
aggregate of relations—made the corporeal central. As Feuerbach emphasised, “in 
relation to the abstract ego, [the dialectic made] the body…the objective world” (1972b, 
142-3). It was that which, at least in the first instance, ensured the coherence and 
continuity of a being, and brought Feuerbach (1989, 91) to ask: 
...Is there, in general, any other force, the opposite of intelligence, than the force 
of flesh and blood – any other strength of Nature than the strength of the fleshly 
impulses…Nature…is nothing without corporeality. The body alone is that 
negativing, limiting, concentrating, circumscribing force, without which no 
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personality is conceivable. Take away from thy personality its body, and thou 
takest away that which holds it together. 
Marx, building on Feuerbach, went further and grounded the human essence in nature 
as a whole: 
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real 
premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are 
the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life, both 
those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity…The 
first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human 
individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of 
these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature (Marx and 
Engels 1998, 37). 
This was Marx’s ‘inversion’ of Hegel’s Logic. The breadth of Hegel’s concept of being 
was not captured by reason, however defined, but by the breadth and variety of 
existence itself.  
 
A CENTRAL, PERVASIVE INSTABILITY 
In recognising the centrality and significance of the corporeal, and in refusing Hegel’s 
sleight of hand by way of ‘sublation’, Marx not only incorporated the corporeal into 
being, but made it a prominent feature. Contrary to the quiet subsidence of desire from 
Hegel’s dialectic following the trials and revelations of the Unhappy Consciousness, the 
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rigorous application of Hegel’s own Logics resurrected desire in all its troubling 
character. No longer could desire—the consciousness of incompletion and drive to 
resolve it—be readily wrestled into obedience. No longer was it to be disciplined in the 
manner demanded by St Augustine. Desire, and its reminders of our incompletion and 
imperfection, could no longer be dismissed and devalued. To consider being 
dialectically, in terms of an aggregate or ensemble of relations, was to make the 
inescapable instability of being—called desire—a central feature of being. It was to 
highlight the fragility and vulnerability of each particular being—our character as 
“suffering”, “passionate” beings (Marx 1975e, 389. 390). 
This was not an uncommon view in Marx’s time. It was one consequence of Spinoza’s 
inversion of the traditional approach to substance. If nature or the totality alone enjoyed 
the stability and security that characterised that concept, then all other beings, to some 
degree, unavoidably experienced instability and insecurity. The model of all beings as 
interdependent and constituted by an aggregation of various relations could be found in 
the works of Herder, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Goethe and others. So, too, could an 
appreciation for the tensions and uncertainties that this entailed. The two went hand in 
hand. Schelling noted that being, understood in this way, entailed “a continuous 
exchange of resistance and strife” (Richards 2002, 310) and, in doing so, echoed 
themes explored since the earliest expressions of Western philosophy. Even in 
Epicurean philosophy, the relations between atoms were characterised by conflict 
(Asmis 2008, 148). As Hegel (Hegel 1969, 770) had emphasised, to live was to 
experience “this disharmony and…contradiction”. 
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This recognition of resistance, strife, conflict and contradiction was further amplified by 
Marx’s adoption of the language of materialism. In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx asserted 
that sensuousness “must be the basis for all science” (1975e, 355), adopting 
Feuerbach’s advocacy for a greater recognition of the intimate involvement of man and 
nature—of man’s organic and inorganic bodies. The language of ‘sensuousness’, 
however, did not capture the volatility of matter or the essential role of human labour. It 
was an incomplete realisation of Feuerbach’s own demand that the concept of being be 
contrasted with sensual experience. Feuerbach’s was a contest between concepts, 
which Marx criticised as a “contemplative” view of nature, and one that inadequately 
recognised the degree to which our organic and inorganic bodies had become 
intertwined (Marx and Engels 1998, 46). Such ‘sensuousness’ did not capture the 
openness and instability of the body, nor the manner in which its ‘suffering’ prompted a 
much more active engagement and expression on its part. Shifting from the language of 
‘sensuousness’ to materialism in The Holy Family, in the theses on Feuerbach and The 
German Ideology, Marx maintained the emphasis on the intimate involvement of man 
and nature, but heightened the sense of conflict and instability inherent in that 
relationship. Moreover, Marx did not only rely on the recent proponents of materialist 
views, such as Bacon and Locke, but on a tradition of argument he saw as dating back 
to the early Greeks. This is readily apparent from Marx’s frequent reference to both 
ancient and recent references in the course of his works, including in his praise of 
Bacon: 
The real progenitor of English materialism and all modern experimental science 
is Bacon…Anaxagoras and his homoeomeriae, Democritus and his atoms, he 
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often quotes as his authorities (Marx and Engels 1975, 128, emphasis in 
original). 
Marx’s comprehension of materialism drew on both its old and new proponents. The 
new aided best Marx’s critique of dualist views of being. The old, however, better served 
the purpose Marx shared with Feuerbach: it better enabled him to express the open, 
vulnerable and volatile character of being, and the defining role of the corporeal therein.  
The Greeks gave matter a very active role. Aristotle considered matter to be the active 
aspect of substance. It was, however, so dynamic that Williams described it as “a 
negative entity, like a negative charge or a negative number, which neutralizes and 
obliterates, saps and subtracts” (cited in Pike 1999, 32). It wore against the influence of 
form, eventually, inevitably, wearing it down and bringing about its dissolution. Matter 
was volatile. It was always, ever, on the brink of change. It was unstable: so much so 
that Aristotle only imagined its stabilisation through some kind of violence. Aristotle’s 
preference for stability, notwithstanding his recognition of the influence of matter, gave 
his hylomorphism a kind of disciplinary violence. Stability in being demanded the 
imposition of form over unruly matter. It demanded a constant effort or labour to 
maintain its unity. 
Marx, by adopting the language of materialism, was reinforcing the point he made 
through using the language of essence. A fuller comprehension of the nature of being—
one that expanded beyond the abstractions of substance—not only included the 
corporeal in a non-dualistic conception of being, but was much more unstable and 
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uncertain. Marx’s materialism did not supersede his philosophical thought, but extended 
it. 
 
SPECIES 
This emphasis on instability and volatility, as Epicurus and Lucretius had recognised, 
highlighted the limitations and mortality of any particular being. This was the point of 
Schelling’s presentation of particular beings as products caught up in nature’s ongoing 
productivity, and as the temporary, formless eddies that appear momentarily in a river’s 
passage. Spinoza made the same point in his consideration of the limited and uncertain 
duration of particular beings in the face of eternal substance. For the Romantics, 
Feuerbach, and for Marx, drawing on that same tradition, the volatility of the corporeal 
and accompanying fragility of being meant that continuity or immortality did not reside in 
the individual, but in a larger aggregate of relations, the species. This was a central 
theme of Feuerbach’s Thoughts on Death and Immortality where he insisted that: 
Your determinate individual body, the organic body in the determinate singleness 
of its existence, is a mortal, lacking, finite body...the organic body itself is 
absolutely without lack...it is an immortal, divine body. The organic body itself is 
the species, the essence (1980, 94). 
This ‘species being’ was not that of some natural type or essentialist ‘essence’. It was 
not the site of biological identity and replication. It did not comprise the repetition of an 
unchanging pattern or the unfolding of designs inscribed by means of genetic codes or 
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some fixed Aristotelian potential. With regard to the then current debates concerning 
‘species’ ( as we saw in Chapter Three), a ‘species’ was simply a larger aggregation of 
relations—a larger abstraction from the totality—and enjoyed a relative semblance of 
stability, as compared to particular beings, simply by virtue of its closer approximation to 
the totality. For Feuerbach and his contemporaries, ‘species’ did not involve the sense 
of a rigid fixity, but was more a term of reference and one that was understood as a 
larger, and therefore less volatile, combination of relations within the totality. 
 
MODE OR HABIT 
The species, however, remained less than substance. It was not independent or self-
sufficient, but also deeply dependent on its ‘external’ relations. Herder, in considering 
the endurance of any particular being, emphasised the dependence of that being on its 
climate and habitat. It was dependent on the continuity of its surroundings. For Spinoza, 
that endurance turned on the continuity of the dominant mode of relation of its 
constituent parts, which he described in terms more suggestive of coincidence and 
momentum, than self-sufficiency or stability. So insecure was this being for Hegel that 
he located its continuity in habit—a continuity so uncertain that it could only be 
confirmed in retrospect; so much so, that Malabou characterises the Hegelian essence 
as only ascertainable ex post facto (2005, 73-4). Marx, in characterising the key 
features of materialism in The Holy Family, drew on this same sense of habit. In his 
view, Condillac, in expanding on Locke’s discoveries, had: 
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...proved not only that the soul, but the senses too, not only the art of creating 
ideas, but also the art of sensuous perception are matters of experience and 
habit. The whole development of man therefore depends on education and 
external circumstances (Marx and Engels 1975, 129). 
The continuity of any particular being or group , as Feuerbach recognised in Thoughts 
on Death and Immortality, depended upon the way in which their constituent parts were 
unified:  
...everything in nature is what it is, not because of the matter out of which it is 
constituted, but, rather, because of the limitation of the indeterminate matter, 
because of the determinate proportion, manner of unification, and degree of 
mixture of the matter...If the mode of unification of those realities that are called 
the elementary constituents of a thing changes, if this determinate mode changes 
together with the proportion of the elements that are limited by this determinate 
mode, then the thing itself changes (1980, 74, my emphasis). 
Like habit, this ‘mode’ or ‘manner of unification’, can be thought of as a way of securing 
the necessities of life—in effect, as a way of life. This understanding follows from the 
Spinozan inversion of substance. This is how Deleuze (1988, 122, 123), drawing on 
Spinoza, understood a being as an aggregate or ensemble maintained through a 
particular habit or way of life: 
…to be in the middle of Spinoza is to be on this modal plane - which implies a 
mode of living, a way of life…The important thing is to understand life, each living 
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individuality, not as a form, or a development of a form, but as a complex relation 
between differential velocities…a composition of speeds and slownesses on a 
plane of immanence. In the same way, a musical form will depend on a complex 
relation between speeds and slownesses of sound particles. It is not just a matter 
of music but of how to live: it is by speed and slowness that one slips in among 
things, that one connects with something else. One never commences; one 
never has a tabula rasa; one slips in, enters in the middle; one takes up or lays 
down rhythms….  
Marx, drawing more consistently on this same insight—that the composition of any 
being is a particular ensemble of relations maintained in a particular manner—
heightened the emphasis on the latter and hence on the extrinsic character of any 
being. So central was this habit that it grounded Marx’s assertion in his theses on 
Feuerbach. Marx writes: 
the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual…it is the 
ensemble of the social relations (1975g, 846, 570). 
Marx located the human essence ‘externally’ to its individual specimens. So significant 
was the tension between our ‘organic’ and ‘inorganic’ bodies, between humankind and 
the balance of nature, that stability and continuity for the human self was only 
possible—at least outside the ‘temperate’ areas—when we clothed ourselves in social 
structures, when we imposed a comforting layer between ourselves and the ruder 
elements. So open is our organic body that we only gained some stability in being—
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some certainty in appropriating the objects we needed—through adopting a shared, 
consistent approach to meeting those needs.  
This is not to suggest that this ‘clothing’ was a secondary act—something undertaken 
by human beings after striving in the world for some time. Rather, it was the “first 
historic act” (Marx and Engels 1998, 47): the first act in history or, more accurately, an 
act that has been part of the human condition since the emergence of humankind. We 
have been so vulnerable to the vagaries of the ‘external’ world, so deeply affected by it, 
that co-operation, of some kind and scale, has always been a condition of our very 
being. To be human was to be thrust into an “ensemble of social relations” (1975g, 
423—no individual existed independently of them. The very foundation of our being, of 
our existence—our corporeality—has demanded this co-ordination and co-operation. As 
Lukacs (1978) affirms, our social being is founded in this corporeal or ‘objective’ being. 
To be human has always comprised some social mediation between our organic and 
inorganic bodies, and the duration of that existence, that form of life, has depended 
upon the strength and stability of the mode by which those relations were organised. 
 
STABILISING BEING – THE MODES OF PRODUCTION 
It is for this reason that Marx described a mode of production—a mode of relating to our 
inorganic natures—as a mode of life. He insisted that: 
This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the 
reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite 
307 
 
form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a 
definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. 
What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they 
produce and with how they produce. Hence what individuals are depends on the 
material conditions of their production (Marx and Engels 1998, 37). 
This activity, this expression, turns on what Marx described as ‘appropriation’. As I have 
already noted, the development of any being follows from the unification of the elements 
of its essence—from the appropriation of its necessary objects. The manner, or mode, 
of appropriation is not then an activity of an otherwise established being, or “internal 
dumb generality” or genus as Marx described it in his sixth thesis on Feuerbach (1975g, 
423). Rather, it is the mode by which that being is constituted, and persists. It is its 
being, its existence. It is not secondary, an act by a being, but primary: the 
establishment, and re-establishment, of that being. For Marx (Marx and Engels 1998, 
62): 
This sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse, 
which every individual and every generation finds in existence as something 
given, is the real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as “substance” 
and “essence” of man. 
A mode of production, of appropriation, then, is not a quarantined part of our existence 
or our selves. It is our substance. It provides the pulse and breath of our lives, setting a 
rhythm that does more than pervade and affect a life: it is life. It is the first, last and 
defining act of our lives. It is the levy-bank against the uncertainty and threat of our 
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corporeality. Unseen, unthought-of of, but pervasive, universal and defining, it buoys us 
up and enables us to bear the weight and gravity of our bodies. Against the constant 
movement of the world about us, and of our necessary objects away from us, our mode 
of production enables us to draw our selves together. 
So central is this rhythm to understanding Marx, that Lefebvre claimed that the “analysis 
of rhythms” constituted a new “science, a new field of knowledge” (2004, 3). Lefebvre 
wrote of the “dressage” or education of human beings which filled: 
...the place of the unforeseen, of the initiative of living beings…Space and time 
thus laid out make room for humans, for education and initiative: for liberty. A 
little room. More of an illusion: dressage does not disappear. It determines the 
majority of rhythms. In the street, people can turn right or left, but their walk, the 
rhythm of their walking, their movements, do not change for all that (2004, 39, 
40-1). 
From this perspective, the body sounds out a rhythm with the regularity of a metronome 
(2004, xii). 
We are engaged in this necessary self-constituting activity, which unifies our organic 
and inorganic nature, from our infancy. Notwithstanding the potential variety of forms of 
appropriation, the demands of our inorganic nature impose a co-operative regime. One 
is born into a way of life, a mode of production, into a division of labour, a division of 
tasks concerning the domination and appropriation of nature: 
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...each stage contains a material result, a sum of productive forces, a historically 
created relation to nature and of individuals to one another, which is handed 
down to each generation…which on the one hand is indeed modified by the new 
generation, but on the other also prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives 
it…a special character. It shows that circumstances make men just as much as 
men make circumstances (Marx and Engels 1998, 62). 
One grows up in a particular place and time exposed to and educated in its rhythms of 
action and its customary objects, completing one’s essence—one’s being—in the 
manner in which those rhythms and objects permit. One is born into an existing way of 
life, which is modelled, taught and enforced. A mode of production is not merely a mode 
of activity for adults, but a mode of life that shapes a society, from youngest to oldest, 
even if they do not directly participate in its core activities. Merleau-Ponty (1968) wrote 
of the body and the self as the accumulation of these rhythms. He considered these to 
provide a “style”, as “the continual auto-production of schemes in the body’s mobilizing 
of itself [that] ‘gives our life the form of generality and prolongs our personal acts into 
stable dispositions’” (1968, liv)46. 
A particular society’s way of life provides an organising rhythm: it shepherds and corrals 
its individual members into particular positions and in particular directions. It does so 
with sufficient consistency to significantly contribute to the continuity of their constitution. 
Like a piece of music, its rhythms provide a means for people to coordinate their 
movements, but it does not dictate those movements. It is only at a larger scale that one 
                                                          
46
 Bourdieu (1977), too, has founded much of his work on the formative influence of habit. 
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can entertain the possibility of a comprehensive, determined matrix of relations 
constituting the human—in the sense of species—essence (and, with that, laws 
governing their conduct). It was on this basis that Spinoza could stress interdependence 
and still allow for individuality: the latter formed one configuration within the broader 
configuration of the species (which, in turn, sat within the total configuration of nature) 
(Hampshire 2005). 
The expression of our humanity, of our very selves, is not an abstracted activity, but a 
corporeal one—an activity between our corporeal body and its objects in accordance 
with a commonly accepted mode or manner. The manner in which that activity occurs—
and the manner in which we conceive of it, and of our selves—shapes our bodies and 
ourselves in ways that remain with us outside of the dimensions of our labours (paid 
and unpaid). It is not a mantle we can discard or a character we cease to play, but a 
rhythm—promoting a shape—that permeates the balance of our existence. 
 
HISTORICAL BEING - A HISTORY OF CHANGING MODES 
Marx sought to demonstrate the centrality of this rhythm—of the mode of unification of 
organic and inorganic bodies—by tracing its development and variation across human 
history. A change in the means of production—such as the advent of steam engines—
enabled the emergence of a new mode of unification, a new form of co-operation and 
mediation, and hence new forms in the very practice and expression of life. So profound 
was the influence of the mode of production, that Marx described the balance of social 
relations as “superstructure”: 
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The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness 
(1975h, 425).  
This is not a determining or causal relationship, but one of deep and pervasive 
influence. To have suggested otherwise would have been to repeat the Idealists’ error.47 
Marx made the relationship a little clearer in his Contributions To A Critique of Political 
Economy, where he described the influence of the dominant mode of production in 
terms of conditioning—but not determining—life: 
The totality of the relations of production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure 
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of 
production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and 
intellectual life (1975h, 425).  
In the Grundrisse, he used terms suggesting an even more indirect influence: 
In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates 
over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a 
general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their 
                                                          
47
 This was the point of Althusser and Balibar’s (1997, 97, 100, 101, 108, 188) insistence on rejecting any 
simple or mechanistic understanding of the influence of the mode of production in favour of notions of 
“complexity”, “relative autonomy”, “intersection”, “correspondence, non-correspondence…displacement 
and torsion” and “overdetermination”. 
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particularity. It is a particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every 
being which has materialized in it (1973, 106-7).  
This is not to deny the tendencies and trends Marx saw in the workings of history and 
economic relations, but to recognise these as general directions or momentums, and 
not exhaustive prescriptions or predictions. 
Once the notion of separation or substance is abandoned, openness and fluidity 
become equally key descriptors of our selves, as does our corporeality. Once we 
appreciate the extent of that openness, and the corresponding diminution in control it 
involves, the significance of our efforts to secure some control, some stability, loom 
large—as do, correspondingly, the objects of those efforts. Those efforts, and their 
objects, speak to a permanent, profound tension in the human constitution. 
Marx’s history of different modes of production is not a history of technological, 
economic or social change—it is a history of this tension and the manner in which our 
predecessors have lived it. It is a history of how human beings have come to be, and 
become. Marx’s concern with this history was to demonstrate the depth and influence of 
this tension. His effort to promote a materialist history was an effort to promote the 
recognition of our inorganic natures and to demonstrate that to be human was to be 
intimately, inescapably, involved in ‘external’ nature, rather than independent of it: 
…it is quite obvious from the start that there exists a materialist connection of 
men with one another, which is determined by their needs and their mode of 
production, and which is as old as men themselves. This connection is ever 
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taking on new forms, and thus presents a ‘history’…In the whole conception of 
history up to the present this real basis of history has either been totally 
disregarded or else considered as a minor matter quite irrelevant to the course of 
history. History must, therefore, always be written according to an extraneous 
standard; the real production of life appears as non-historical, while the historical 
appears as something separated from ordinary life…With this the relation of man 
to nature is excluded from history and hence the antithesis of nature and history 
is created… (Marx and Engels 1998, 49 and 62-3). 
Fracchia makes this same point in discussing Marx’s aphorism that “people make their 
own history, but not always as they please”, and acknowledges that: 
Marx generally intended this to refer to socially determined 
capacities…and…social limits and constraints…But, behind changing social 
capacities such as the specific character of technology, it is the set of corporeal 
capabilities that establishes the possibilities for humans to make their own 
histories; and beyond the changing limits of inherited socio-cultural conditions, it 
is the set of corporeal constraints, the needs and limits embedded in the human 
corporeal organisation, that prevents humans from making their histories as they 
please (2005, 43). 
One of Marx’s key criticisms of Feuerbach was that Feuerbach’s materialism—his 
‘sensuousness’—failed to sufficiently recognise this interaction and its impact. 
Feuerbach, in disclaiming others’ flight from the corporeal, had himself paid insufficient 
attention to how that relationship changed over time. One consequence of that 
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emphasis was his failure to appreciate the breadth of interaction between our ‘organic’ 
and ‘inorganic’ body. Feuerbach, as Marx pointed out: 
...does not see that the sensuous world around him is not a thing given direct 
from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the 
state of society; and, indeed, [a product] in the sense that it is an historical 
product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each 
standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its 
intercourse, and modifying its social system according to the changed needs. 
Even the objects of the simplest ‘sensuous certainty’ are only given him through 
social development, industry and commercial intercourse (Marx and Engels 
1998, 45). 
In place of this incomplete, abstracted history, Marx offered a history of the movement 
of different modes of relation between our organic and inorganic bodies. Marx’s 
consideration of the division between, for example, city and country, pointed not merely 
to a change in modes or location, but to a movement away, a distancing and separation 
from, our ‘inorganic’ bodies—a process of containment, of abstraction, and of forgetting 
the corporeal.  
 
THE CORPOREAL’S CONTINUING RESISTANCE 
This distancing makes it easy to miss Marx’s recognition of the ongoing human 
vulnerability to nature, its ‘inorganic’ body. It makes it easy to accept the sometimes 
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triumphant tones of Marx’s history of human development at face value, and not see its 
twin character as a history of human struggles against the vagaries of nature. It makes it 
easy to miss the first historic act of production pictured by Marx as the ready domination 
of the world, instead of an ongoing effort to stabilise a world, a society and one’s self.  
Marx presented Capitalist humanity as dominating and transforming nature, so powerful 
had human powers of appropriation become. His writings conjure up images of a world 
that was comprehensively shaped and formed by human activity: 
The bourgeoisie…has created more massive and more colossal productive 
forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of nature’s forces 
to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam 
navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for 
cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground – 
what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces 
slumbered in the lap of social labour? (Marx and Engels 1988, 214). 
This vision of a thoroughly subjugated ‘natural order’ can also be found in Marx’s 
description of the communist state. Marx (1981, 959) characterised it as one with a 
shrinking “sphere of necessity” and an expanding experience of freedom; one in which: 
...nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become 
accomplished in any branch he wishes, [where] society regulates the general 
production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another 
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, 
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criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, 
fisherman, shepherd or critic (Marx and Engels 1998, 53). 
The openness and choice Marx imagined in communist society relied on a mode of 
production that seems to have almost transcended nature: a mode of secure, prolonged 
domination. It suggests a stable self, one able to—given this predictable environment—
engage freely in agency. Absent a conscious application of the dialectic and a 
deliberate recognition of the reasons why Marx emphasised a materialist approach, it is 
easy to imagine as Marx seemed to imply that the communist state was one in which 
history ends—as a mode of existence in which the sphere of freedom was, in practice, 
independent of that of necessity (that is, of inorganic nature). It suggests that stability 
and independence would, on balance, come to better characterise our being than 
openness and becoming.  
This impression is reinforced by Marx’s frequent use of terms like ‘subjection’ and 
‘domination’ in relation to humanity’s ‘inorganic’ body, and often in combination with 
expressions of confidence in ‘progress’. The confidence that science, developed and 
applied on a cooperative basis, would “shrink” the “sphere of necessity” (1981, 959) was 
central to his vision of the future, and was expressed from the 1844 Manuscripts 
through to Capital. It can also be seen to be fundamental to his view of humanity, as 
conveyed by his life-long repeated references to Prometheus, who brought fire—and 
with it the capacity to subdue nature—to humankind. 
Yet for all of Marx’s triumphant Modernist claims there remained a caution, a 
consciousness of the volatility and immanent, gravity-like resistance of nature. 
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Humankind’s ‘inorganic’ body was not a domesticated, safely disciplined, body. Whilst 
Marx portrays humanity as the victor, the very descriptions he provides—and the 
permanent relationship they depict—are subject to the restrictions imposed by nature. In 
Capital, Marx (1976, 649) recognised that: 
Even if we leave aside the question of the level of development attained by social 
production, the productivity of labour remains fettered by natural conditions. 
Any being, including human beings, lived and acted within this tension. This tension is 
the essence of need, the drive towards appropriation and becoming. It is, as Hegel 
(1970, 385) pointed out, the essence of the human self: “a being which is capable of 
containing and enduring its own contradiction”. 
It is this notion of an uncertain, insecure unity that grounded Marx’s adoption of the 
concepts of ‘objective being’ and ‘species being’ and his emphasis on the mode of 
production. The human condition consists of this ongoing tension and resistance, as 
managed and stabilised, from time to time, by different modes of production. 
This sense of nature’s ongoing resistance founded both Hegel and Marx’s explanations 
of the absence of industrialisation outside of Europe. The European experience of 
dominating nature was, in their view, a response to the resistance of the ‘inorganic 
body’. As Marx put it: 
Where nature is too prodigal with her gifts, she “keeps him in hand, like a child in 
leading strings”. Man’s own development is not in that case a nature-imposed 
necessity. The mother country of capital is not the tropical region, with its 
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luxuriant vegetation, but the temperate zone…It is the necessity of bringing a 
natural force under the control of society…of appropriating or subduing it on a 
large scale by the work of the human hand, that plays the most decisive role in 
the history of industry (Marx 1976, 649). 
Here nature is presented as shaping man—and playing the ‘most decisive role’ in doing 
so. Absent nature’s denial of basic human material needs Marx imagined man as 
lacking initiative. Absent nature’s resistance to human need in Europe, there would 
have been no prompt for display of human agency signified by Western industrialisation.  
Nor did this resistance end with industrialisation. Sheasby (2001, 2004a and 2004b), 
referring to Marx’s later correspondence, has demonstrated how Marx was concerned 
with modern agricultural processes. That concern was evident in Marx’s comments in 
Capital and his belief that nature could not be exploited without reservation, making 
those processes destructive: 
All progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing 
the worker, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil 
for a given time is progress towards ruining the long-lasting sources of that 
fertility. The more a country proceeds from large-scale industry as the 
background of its development, as in the case of the United States, the more 
rapid is this process of destruction. Capitalist production, therefore, only develops 
the techniques and the degree of combination of the social process of production 
by simultaneously undermining the original sources of all wealth - the soil and the 
worker (Marx 1976, 638). 
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This emphasis on the struggle to maintain the form or body against decay was also 
central to Marx’s reflections upon reproduction. Reproduction was, for Marx, an equally 
permanent condition of human existence and being as production: 
...the first premise of all human existence [is]…that men must be in a position to 
live to ‘make history’…The second point is that the satisfaction of the first need, 
the action of satisfying and the instrument of satisfaction which has been 
acquired leads to new needs…The third circumstance which, from the very 
outset, enters into historical development, is that men, who daily re-create their 
own life, begin to make other men, to propagate their kind…These three aspects 
of social activity are not of course to be taken as three different stages, but just 
as three aspects or...three ‘moments’, which have existed simultaneously since 
the dawn of history and the first men, and which assert themselves in history 
today (Marx and Engels 1998, 48-9). 
Reproduction involved individuals addressing the ever-renewed needs of the body for 
food, water, and rest, and the species reproducing itself. It was the ever-present 
underside of production—the unavoidable, non-negotiable minimum for ongoing 
‘productive’ activity. Its cost was the base line above which surplus value could be 
created, making it the essential other to capital. Marx (1976, 277) emphasised that, 
“when we speak of capacity for labour, we do not abstract from the necessary means of 
subsistence. The value of labour was equated with that of the means of subsistence, 
and varied with it. On the contrary, their value is expressed in its value” (1976, 274, 276-
7). The unavoidable cycle of reproduction limited the excesses of capitalist practice to 
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ensure the regular renewal of workers’ labour power—every worker needed rest and 
nourishment: 
...by [reason of] the physical limits to labour-power. Within the 24 hours of the 
natural day a man can only expend a certain quantity of his vital force…During 
part of the day the vital force must rest, sleep; during another part the man has to 
satisfy other physical needs, to feed, wash and clothe himself (Marx 1976, 341). 
There was much that the body could be compelled to do, but there were limits on its 
elasticity: its resistance compelled compromise on those demands. The body 
consistently resisted both the will and the impulse to social conformity: it imposed 
“certain insuperable natural obstacles” (Marx 1976, 599). 
This recognition of nature’s ongoing resistance follows from the conceptual foundations 
of Marx’s work. The conceptual framework that enabled Marx to see human being in 
terms of relations and of ongoing change also required a comparable vision of the 
balance of the natural world. 
In large part, nature resists humanity because its various beings involve some degree of 
potential, if only in Spinoza’s sense of momentum or conatus, together with an 
openness or exposure to change. Drawing on Aristotle, one can understand the 
potential of a thing—and its realisation of that potential—to be central to what that thing 
is. Everything has some potential to be realised—regardless of any human intention 
regarding it. The concept of expression, from both the perspectives of Spinoza and 
Herder/Aristotle, is immanent with movement and change. To draw on Hegel, the thing 
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can be expected to move towards the unification of essence, of being and objects, even 
when that conflicts with any human will. In Marx’s conceptual framework, all beings—
animate and inanimate—must be understood as engaged in their own movement to fulfil 
their potential or express their being. As part of man’s inorganic body—notwithstanding 
its capacity to serve human purposes in a more integral way—all of nature must be 
seen to also move to its various rhythms, with their potential to conflict with human 
purposes. All of nature must be seen as pregnant with resistance. For Aristotle—and 
the other philosophers considered in the preceding chapters—matter (or nature) was 
not the docile instrument of form or human will, but the object of constant compulsion: 
the stability or continuity of a being or even a species was never a fait accompli, but a 
constant achievement—an activity. Moreover, it was always an ‘uphill’ effort—fighting 
the gravity of the corporeal, its domestication was always insecure and liable to failure.  
 
THE SOCIAL DOMINATION OF NATURE? 
This is a controversial interpretation. Marx wrote of the ‘domination’ of nature sufficiently 
often as to suggest a different view, reflected in various debates, like that between 
Clark, and Foster and Burkett. Clark (2001, 433), relying on Marx’s use of ‘inorganic 
being’ (amongst other things), argued that Marx had “a certain antagonism toward 
nature” and sought to dominate it. Foster and Burkett (2001) contest this view. 
Writers like Clark have not given sufficient weight to the influence of the problem of 
substance.  If Marx’s specific comments on the ongoing resistance of the corporeal are 
considered, together with his critique of practices of domination and the dialectical 
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character of his work, it is clear that Marx’s vision was not built on an idea of 
domination, or on the unqualified celebration of technology or progress. Castree (2000) 
and Foster and Burkett (2000) make the same argument: the extreme modernist view is 
not reconcilable with Marx’s dialectical perspective, particularly as he expressed it when 
characterising nature as humanity’s ‘inorganic body’. Considered in context, Marx’s 
references to domination appear to mean more conscious or informed management 
(with increasing success) than unrestricted domination. Grundmann (1991, 5) described 
this as a project of “conscious control”. 
Domination, in this sense, registered something closer to Hegel’s concept of sublation—
surpassed and somehow encompassed in something superior, but still present and 
operative. It is in this sense that Marx’s critique of Feuerbach’s vision of unchanging 
nature and his recognition of its continued resistance can be reconciled: pure or pristine 
nature has been sublated to, and incorporated in, the capitalist mode of production, but 
nature or matter has not been extinguished nor lost its volatility or resistance. 
This is not to deny that Marx had his “modernist moments” that were, when compared to 
his more dialectical discussions, suggestive of “horrific crudities” (Benton 1992, 9). His 
familiarity and frequent reference to Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound has been seen by 
many as an expression of extreme modernism, given the association of Prometheus, 
and his theft of fire from the gods, with a celebration of human technology (Kolakowski 
2005, 337-339). However, Foster (1995, 2) persuasively argues that to view Marx in that 
way would be to neglect the Romantic influence on the Promethean myth (and on 
Marx). He claims that Prometheus was a popular model in Romantic thought, not just 
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because of his association with technology, but primarily because he openly rebelled 
against the gods. According to Foster, this latter characteristic was equally emphasised 
by the classical Greeks, with Aeschylus and Plato presenting Prometheus as 
championing their favoured social classes (see also Sheasby 1999). 
Treating Prometheus as a rebel against authority, especially religious authority and its 
flight from limitation, implies a vision of humanity as something less than gods—as 
material beings who cannot escape the trials and limitations of their mortality. This is 
consistent with Marx’s praise of Epicurus, as well as his critique of him. Marx, like 
Epicurus, criticised religion for promoting false, harmful beliefs: beliefs that created 
‘empty’ desires and needs (which was the way Marx characterised need in Capitalist 
society). However, Marx went on to criticise Epicurus for his subordination of nature in 
his religious-like pursuit of tranquillity, or ataraxy. The tensions and trials of existence 
could not be evaded through some self-sufficient life because those conflicts are the 
chains with which, like Prometheus, we are bound up for eternity. Rather, like the atoms 
caught up in—and constituted by—relations of attraction and repulsion, human beings 
cannot secure peace and security through independence. To be human is to be situated 
in the tension and resistance of being. 
The resistance and volatility of the corporeal is what made Marx’s ‘objective being’ a 
‘suffering’ being. Marx’s vision is at once expansive and agonistic in ways resembling 
the thoughts of the Romantics and Idealists who preceded him. It is a vision of being 
that is expansive and fragile.  
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MEDIATION 
However, even for those who do not expressly rely on the domination of nature, Marx’s 
emphasis on the social, particularly on the ‘socially mediated’ character of the 
relationship between an individual and the balance of the natural world, has led writers 
like Gould (1980), Schmidt (1971) and Wood (2004) to miss or underestimate the 
ongoing influence of the corporeal and the fragility of the individual. The concept of 
‘mediation’ lends itself too readily to interpretations that are consistent with the 
traditional debate about substance, and suggestions of some separation or freedom 
from other participants in a relationship. Once expressed in terms of a social character, 
‘mediation’ too readily suggests that nature is totally eclipsed by social relations. Marx’s 
criticism of Feuerbach’s characterisation of nature reminds us that: 
Even the objects of the simplest “sensuous certainty” are only given to him 
through social development, industry and commercial intercourse. The cherry-
tree, like almost all fruit trees, was…only a few centuries ago transplanted by 
commerce into our zone, and therefore only by this action of definite society in a 
definite age has it become a “sensuous certainty” for Feuerbach…the nature that 
preceded human history, is not by any means the nature in which Feuerbach 
lives, it is nature which today no longer exists anywhere (Marx and Engels 1998, 
45 and 46). 
Marx’s concentration on social relations in his later works, particularly Capital, is just 
one of the persistent themes we find in his work. 
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However, to treat mediation as a relation between two absolutely separate things is to 
make the error of abstraction. It is to ignore Marx’s own characterisation of the 
relationship between our conceptions of different aspects of being as “moments” or 
“aspects”, rather than “stages” (Marx and Engels 1998, 48). It is to prefer the abstract 
over the concrete—to fall prey to the “German disease” (1998, 29). It is to miss the 
manner in which the multiple, manifold relations that comprise the concrete or ‘real’ are 
not truly separate, but ever present, ever influencing, each other. Hegel, in The Science 
of Logic (1969, 496-7), described this interaction in terms of porosity and 
interpenetration: 
Therefore where one of these matters is, the other also is, in one and the same 
point; the thing does not have its colour in one place, its odorific matter in 
another, its heat matter in a third…but in the point in which it is warm, it is also 
coloured, sour, electric and so on. Now because these matters are not outside 
one another but are in one ‘this’, they are assumed to be porous, so that one 
exists in the interstices of the other. But that which is present in the interstices of 
the other is itself porous…they are a multiplicity which interpenetrate one another 
in such a manner that those which penetrate are equally penetrated by the 
others. 
The relations that comprise a being are no mere aggregate or ensemble, combined and 
coordinated without contamination, influence or merger. Rather, as Feuerbach (1980, 
74-5) emphasised, they have an effect that pervades a being: 
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For the limit does not exist as externally circling, as the fence around a field; it is 
the middle that is proper and central to a reality...this...measure...penetrates 
everything, determines everything, dwells in everything... it can never escape the 
limit that is the centre of its nature, the limit that determines and includes 
everything that exists in it. 
A century and a half later, Lukacs made this same criticism:  
Above all, social being presupposes in general and in all specific processes the 
existence of inorganic and organic nature. Social being cannot be conceived as 
independent from natural being (1978, 7). 
Both Schmidt and Geras emphasise that to treat nature otherwise is to succumb to 
idealist thought. Schmidt, in The Concept of Nature in Marx (1971, 69), emphasised 
that: 
The specifically Marxist discovery that historical relations are objectified in the 
form of the commodity can be misinterpreted so as to produce the idealist 
conclusion that…the world is [only] composed of relations and 
processes…[Rather], the mode of existence…always...presupposes a natural 
substratum irreducible to human social determinations. 
Similarly, Geras, in Marx & Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend (1983, 96-7), argued 
that an emphasis on the social that presented an “absolute distinction” or “divorce” from 
the natural world was also Idealist. By contrast, a “genuine materialism” emphasised the 
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very opposite, with human beings “…’irredeemably’ rooted in a given biological 
constitution; absolutely continuous with the rest of the natural world”. 
Notwithstanding the hegemonic character of the capitalist mode of production, and the 
social relations which constitute it, the human body has not lost its character— its 
volatility—nor has the individual, corporeal, body lost its fragility. It is an immanent, 
ever-present, feature of our existence.  
 
FEUERBACH AND THE CONTINUITY OF MARX’S PROJECT 
I have set out to show that there is an essential continuity in Marx’s project, at least 
insofar as it dealt with the characterisation of the human condition, nature or essence. 
The principal obstacle to this argument, however, appears to be Marx’s own explicit 
critique and apparent rejection of Feuerbach’s philosophical-anthropology.  
That critique appears unambiguous in Marx’s sixth thesis (1975g, 423) which, given its 
centrality and influence, warrants quotation in full: 
Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human 
essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the 
ensemble of the social relationships. Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism 
of this real essence, is consequently compelled: 
1. To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as 
something by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human 
individual. 
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2. Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus”, as an internal, 
dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals. 
However, Marx’s characterisation of Feuerbach as promoting an essentialist concept of 
the self—with the human essence ‘naturally’ located in each individual—is demonstrably 
incorrect. In Thoughts on Death and Immortality in 1830, Feuerbach had clearly 
asserted: 
Being is abundance that is rich in relations; it is meaningful union, the 
inexhaustible womb of the most manifold connections. That which exists must 
exist with, in, and for another (1980, 122). 
Moreover, he had expressly stated that the unity and continuity of these relations was 
dependent upon their external mode of unification: 
...everything in nature is what it is, not because of the matter out of which it is 
constituted, but, rather…because of the…manner of unification…of the matter...If 
the mode of unification…changes…then the thing itself changes (1980, 74, my 
emphasis). 
In The Essence of Christianity, published in 1841, he had similarly emphasised: 
Man is nothing without an object…the object to which a subject essentially, 
necessarily relates, is nothing else than the subjective’s own, but objective, 
nature (1989, 4). 
Similarly, in 1843’s Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, Feuerbach argued that: 
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The essence of a being is recognised, however, only through its object; the 
object to which a being is necessarily related is nothing but it own revealed being 
(1986, 9). 
This had the consequence that “being is as varied as the objects that exist” (1986, 41). 
Marx was familiar with all these works and expressly referred to the latter two in the 
theses and in the relevant portion of The German Ideology in which he presented his 
critique in detail. As I have argued, Feuerbach was consistent in rejecting the traditional 
emphasis on separation and, in particular, the denial of the location of the human 
essence in any single individual. Breckman (2001) and Johnston (1995) understand 
Feuerbach’s work in these terms, with Johnston (1995, 201) insisting that: 
to say that the essence of man “is the ensemble of social relations” is 
fundamentally consistent with Feuerbach’s own conception.  
There are, however, three important clues that suggest that Marx intended to make a 
much narrower point than the sixth thesis suggests. In the first instance, the opening 
sentence of that thesis refers to the ‘religious essence’. Feuerbach’s Essence of 
Christianity, with its focus on religious thought, does tend to refer to a general human 
essence, without reference to the more sophisticated discussions contained in his other 
works. As a criticism of the Essence, the sixth thesis has some traction.  
The second clue supporting this narrower application is Marx’s clear intention to shift 
the focus of popular debate—including that of the Young Hegelians—away from a 
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critique of religious and theological thought towards political thought. In Marx’s (Marx 
and Engels 1998, 35) view: 
...the entire body of German philosophical criticism from Strauss to Stirner is 
confined to criticism of religious conceptions….The Young Hegelians are in 
agreement with the Old Hegelians in their belief in the rule of religion. 
The introductory section to Marx’s lengthy critique of Feuerbach in The German 
Ideology (Marx and Engels 1998, 34) stated that its purpose was “...to bring out clearly 
the pettiness, the parochial narrowness of this whole Young Hegelian movement”. 
Given that Feuerbach’s popularity was almost entirely based on the Essence, Marx’s 
sixth thesis might be seen to be focussed on that public debate, rather than addressing 
the whole of Feuerbach’s work. 
The third and most significant clue is that, whilst the other substantive criticisms made in 
the theses were repeated in The German Ideology, the claims made in the sixth thesis 
were not. Given that the theses were taken from Marx’s notebooks and were never 
intended for publication (Johnston 1995), the omission seems likely to have been 
deliberate and best characterised as an outcome of Marx rethinking his critique. 
The substance of Marx’s other criticisms of Feuerbach were that his concept of the 
human essence was neither ‘active’ nor historical. As Marx summed up his complaints 
in The German Ideology: 
As far as Feuerbach is a materialist he does not deal with history, and as far as 
he considers history he is not a materialist (Marx and Engels, 1998, 47). 
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For Marx, the “chief defect” was that “the thing” was “conceived of only in the form of the 
object” and “not as sensuous human activity” (1975g, 421-2). It was presented as 
“given” and not “as a product of activity and hence history” (Marx and Engels, 1998, 45). 
In particular, he considered that Feuerbach “naturalises everything and does not see 
nature as a product of history and activity” (1998, 66). 
These comments, however, constitute a better explication of their shared approach to 
substance, having regard to the volatility of both man’s organic and inorganic bodies, 
rather than a wholesale abandonment of Feuerbach’s thought. To consider any being 
as a bundle or ensemble of relationships is to open it up to the world. It is also, as 
Spinoza recognised, to make it fragile and vulnerable. It is, however, as the Romantics 
and Idealists recognised, to also be engaged in an ongoing effort to better secure its 
self—to better realise and express the various relations of which it is comprised. It was 
to make that being always liable to change and active in pursuing it—and hence a being 
with a history. 
Without question, Feuerbach did not adequately develop these aspects of their shared 
interests in corporeality and substance. Feuerbach clearly understated the volatility of 
nature, and the impact of the interaction between our organic and inorganic bodies. He 
tended to use language that suggested a single form for the human essence (at least in 
the Essence) and a relatively unchanging nature. However, when regard is given to the 
works Marx drew on as a whole, and to those many detailed instances in which he 
considered the character of the human substance, it is clear that Feuerbach did not 
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assert that substance or essence took on the character of a ‘dumb genus’ or ‘reside[d] 
in isolated individuals’.  
In short, Marx’s sixth Thesis on Feuerbach exaggerated his critique of Feuerbach. Marx 
subsequently refined it in preparing his arguments for publication in The German 
Ideology. This reading better reflects Marx’s own abilities and diligence, and better 
reflects Feuerbach’s published positions. It might also be said to reflect, once again, the 
difficulties of understanding Marx’s works without reference to the ‘peculiar language’ of 
the tradition of substance. 
 
ANALYSING CAPITALISM AND THE CONTINUITY OF MARX’S PROJECT 
Marx’s critique of Feuerbach is, however, only one of the objections to my claim that 
there is an essential continuity in Marx’s project. The other, and possibly greater, 
obstacle is the focus and content of those works that comprise the last stage of Marx’s 
work. Their overwhelming focus on economic matters suggests a profound, and 
permanent, abandonment of the philosophical framework and of much of the content of 
the first stage of Marx’s works. 
However, I want to argue that the final stage of Marx’s works, including Capital, involves 
an application of the concept of human being settled in the second stage of his works. 
That concept was founded on objective being, which rendered the essence or 
substance of being extrinsic to each individual, and thereby made that individual open 
and vulnerable. It opened up being far beyond Hegel’s homogenous Idea to one that 
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incorporated matter with all its volatility and on such a scale—once that openness was 
extended to the balance of nature—that amplified the fragility and neediness of being. It 
made human being dependent upon cooperation—on being social—so as to secure, 
through a common form of mediation with nature, some stability and continuity in life. It 
shifted the locus of being from its traditional, internal, independent locus, to one that 
was external and interdependent. It shifted its character from the unchanging sameness 
of substance to the unceasing labour of becoming, and thereby a notion of being with a 
discernible history. The question then became what, having regard to current 
circumstances—current history—that mode of cooperation had become, and, with it, 
what had become of the character of our being.  
Marx addressed that question in the Grundrisse, A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, and Capital. They each reflect a commitment to critique the abstract 
model of human being promoted by political economy. They reflect a search for the best 
approach to present being as an ensemble of relations specific to the capitalist mode of 
production. In doing so, they marked a search to make sense of the world in a way that 
contradicted the common-sense certainty that the traditional debate about substance 
sought to give to the world.  
In the first lines of the introduction to The Grundrisse, Marx announced that “Individuals 
producing in society – hence socially determined individual production – is, of course, 
the point of departure” (1973, 83). He immediately proceeded to criticise the ahistorical 
character of the “individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, with whom Smith and 
Ricardo begin” (1973, 83), and to justify a different approach based on those 
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“characteristics” that are “common” to “all epochs of production”, namely the “identity of 
the subject, humanity, and of the object, nature” (1973, 85). It is noteworthy that, in the 
course of this discussion, Marx observed that “...the more deeply we go back into 
history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear 
as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole” (1973, 84). 
Later in that introduction, under the heading ‘The method of political economy’, Marx 
(1973, 100) returned to the question of beginnings: 
It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real 
precondition, thus to begin, in economics, with e.g., the population, which is the 
foundation and the subject of the entire social act of production. 
This, however, he held “proves false”, as the population itself is an abstraction. A 
correct analysis would involve the consideration of different classes, but that, too, would 
demand consideration of the “elements on which they rest” (1973, 100). Thus, to begin 
with the population would be to consider a “chaotic conception”. In its place, Marx 
sought a “simpler category” (1973, 102). Having considered “labour” (1973, 103), he 
concluded that “capital…must form the starting point” (1973, 107). 
Marx begins with capital (and, in particular, the commodity) in his next major work, A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. It seems, however, that Marx was still 
wrestling with his desire to critique the Robinson Crusoe-like individualism of political 
economy, as the second paragraph of the preface refers to “a general introduction” that 
he had drafted but then decided to omit, as it “anticipated results which still have to be 
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substantiated” and would be “confusing” to the reader (1975h, 424). That ‘general 
introduction’ was the Grundrisse (1973, 188).  
The continuity of Marx’s endeavour is evident in Capital, with its opening (and 
organising) discussion of the commodity. It clearly reflects Marx’s intention to 
“examine…the capitalist mode of production, and the relations of production and forms 
of intercourse that correspond to it” (1976, 90). 
With “the ultimate aim” of “revealing the economic law of motion of modern society” 
(1976, 92), Marx begins that unravelling through his analysis of the commodity, and its 
dual character of having both a use-value and an exchange value—concepts which 
draw on the understanding of human being developed over the first two stages of his 
work. Throughout Capital, labour, as the creator of all value, and as the essence of our 
humanity, figures prominently. Marx defines “labour” as: 
...the creator of use-values, as useful labour, [and]…a condition of human 
existence which is independent of all forms of society: it is an eternal natural 
necessity which mediates the metabolism between man and nature, and 
therefore human life itself (1976, 133). 
Later in the text, the influence of Marx’s prior work is clear: 
The labour process…is purposeful activity aimed at the production of use-values. 
It is an appropriation of what exists in nature for the requirements of man. It is the 
universal condition for the metabolic interaction between man and nature, the 
everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence, and it is therefore 
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independent of every form of that existence, or rather it is common to all forms of 
society in which human beings live (1976, 290). 
As such, this condition—the necessity to labour—forms the basis for assessing the 
humanity of any society. It provides the standard against which any mode of production, 
as a mode of living, may be judged. Capital evidences Marx’s compliance with the 
concept of the human essence he developed over the first two stages of his work, with 
particular attention to the findings of the second of those stages, and hence a focus on 
activity in the particular historical context. It does not evidence the abandonment or 
supersession of that work. Rather, parallel discussions in the Grundrisse demonstrate 
that it founds the distinction between use and exchange values: 
Before it is replaced by exchange value, every form of natural wealth 
presupposes an essential relation between the individual and the objects, in 
which the individual in one of his aspects objectifies himself in the thing, so that 
his possession of the thing appears at the same time as a certain development of 
his individuality: wealth in sheep, the development of the individual as shepherd 
(1973, 221-2). 
 
THE SELF 
From his earliest works, Marx was concerned to elucidate the character of our humanity 
and to contest the poverty of political economy’s conception of that character. That 
endeavour led to the mammoth and uncompleted project of Capital, with its focus on 
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those relations that, whilst ordinarily considered external, Marx asserted to be of our 
essence. Having considered that “ensemble of relations”, we can return to and better 
explore Marx’s life-long desire for a “more human language”’ (1975d, 276-7) —one that 
better describes the character of our humanity, and of individuality. 
The foundation for comprehending any individual human being remains Marx’s concept 
of ‘objective being’, as outlined in the sixth Thesis on Feuerbach: any being is an 
“ensemble” of “relations” (1975g, 423). This is a being that is profoundly open to the 
world and interdependently constituted with those other beings with whom it participates 
in relationships. This is what Gramsci understood of Marx’s answer to the question, 
‘what is man?’: 
...one must conceive of man as a series of active relationships (a process) in 
which individuality, though perhaps the most important, is not, however, the only 
element to be taken into account…The individual does not enter into relations 
with other men by juxtaposition, but organically, in as much, that is, as he 
belongs to organic entities which range from the simplest to the most complex. 
Thus Man does not enter into relations with the natural world just by being 
himself part of the natural world, but actively, by means of work and 
technique…So one could say that each one of us changes himself, modifies 
himself to the extent that he changes and modifies the complex relations of which 
he is the hub. In this sense the real philosopher is, and cannot be other than, the 
politician, the active man who modifies the environment, understanding by 
environment the ensemble of relations which each of us enters to take part 
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in…one’s own individuality is the ensemble of these relations’ (cited in Hoare and 
Nowell-Smith 1971, 352). 
As Gramsci observed, to characterise a person as an ensemble of relations is not to 
merge them in some indiscriminate whole. To conceive of a person in these terms is not 
to deny some distinction from the balance of existence—only to suggest that distinction 
does not require separation. This was the very point Spinoza (2002c, 849) made when 
referring to a worm living in a person’s blood: 
That worm would be living in the blood as we are living in our part of the 
universe, and it would regard each individual particle of blood as a whole, not as 
a part, and it could have no idea as to how all the parts are controlled by the 
overall nature of the blood. 
Rice (cited in Lamm 1996, 33) pointed out that Spinoza allowed for individuality not in 
terms of separation or independence, but in terms of an active “network” of relations 
with others. 
To conceive of the self as a bundle of relations is to conceive of distinction in the midst 
of connection by considering the self as a unique space, rather than an isolated, 
separate space. Each ‘bundle’ or ‘ensemble’ of relations constitutes a unique 
combination. It enables us, to use Marx’s words, to conceive of “true individuality” 
(1975d, 265, 269): 
...though man is a unique individual – and it is his particularity which makes him 
an individual, a really individual communal being – he is equally the whole, the 
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subjective experience of society as thought and experienced (Marx cited in Mitias 
1972, 247). 
That uniqueness is amplified by the passage of time and activity—that is, history. The 
constant change in the self’s contextual relations makes each particular ensemble, as 
constituted at each point of time, a unique event: 
Individuals have always and in all circumstances stood on their own feet, but they 
were not “unique” in the sense of not needing one another: their needs...are such 
as to make them mutually dependent, and so they have been obliged to enter 
into relationships. This they did not as pure egos but as individuals at a particular 
stage of development of their productive forces and needs, which were in turn 
determined by their mutual intercourse. In this way their personal, individual 
behaviour towards one another has created their existing relationships and 
renews them day by day...The history of an individual cannot be detached from 
that of his predecessors or contemporaries, but is determined by them (Marx 
cited in Kolakowski 2005, 139). 
The uniqueness of a particular bundle provides sufficient distinction from the balance of 
the world to allow both for identity and agency.  
This character of being—including its volatility and resistance—is, however, not 
captured well by the term ‘ensemble’ (as in a musical ensemble playing). It suggests a 
smooth coordination, which is far from the implications of Marx’s theory. To describe 
being in terms of interdependence provides some better illumination, and captures 
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some sense of its fundamental dynamism. However, it may be better to describe being 
in terms of an intersection than an ‘ensemble’ or even interdependence, so as to 
capture the ‘internal’ tensions and conflicts of the various relations. 
“Intersection” is one of the terms proffered by Althusser and Balibar (1997, 214, 220) in 
their endeavour to conceive of individuality, consistent with their notions of the totality, 
as a “complex combination” of “overdetermined”, yet “relatively autonomous” structures. 
To describe an individual in terms of an “intersection” captured the sense in which they 
saw the various “levels” of structure within capitalist society as only shaped by the mode 
of production in “the last resort” and otherwise interacting in terms of “peculiar relations 
of correspondence, non-correspondence, articulation, dislocation and torsion” (1997, 
108).  
To consider being in terms of an ‘intersection’ better captures Spinoza’s model of a 
body as a precarious aggregate, influenced by external forces, with varying integrity and 
cohesion and with its parts (relations) sometimes drawn in contradictory directions.48 It 
allows a better appreciation of the depth and extent of the influence of those relations, 
as suggested by Hegel: 
Therefore where one of these matters is, the other also is, in one and the same 
point…they are assumed to be porous, so that one exists in the interstices of the 
other…they are a multiplicity which interpenetrate one another in such a manner 
that those which penetrate are equally penetrated by the others (1969, 496-7). 
                                                          
48
 Negri (2004, 42-45) repeatedly uses “intersection” to describe the self within Spinoza’s perspective. 
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The relations that comprise a being are no mere aggregate or ensemble, combined and 
coordinated without contamination, influence or merger. Rather, as Feuerbach (1980, 
74-5) emphasised in his consideration of the limitations that constitute a being, they 
have an effect that pervades a being: 
For the limit does not exist as externally circling, as the fence around a field; it is 
the middle that is proper and central to a reality...this...measure...penetrates 
everything, determines everything, dwells in everything... it can never escape the 
limit that is the centre of its nature, the limit that determines and includes 
everything that exists in it. 
The relations that comprise a being and that constitute the limit that distinguish it from 
the totality, can interact, with the potential for those interactions to support some, and 
interfere with other, relations.49 Hegel’s works have been criticised by others as 
“monologic” (Bakhtin 1986, 147, 162) and as an “aerial view” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 87, 
89) for failing to consider the interaction of the multiple relationships that comprise a 
particular being, making it a more complex ‘bundle’ than Hegel’s description suggested. 
Seve (1978, 120), however, allowed for just this effect in stating that the “internal” 
reproduction of “external” relations might be “contradictory, fragmented and incomplete”. 
The spaces opened up by the interference—or contradiction—of these ‘operational’ or 
                                                          
49
 Althusser and Balibar, notwithstanding their exploration of notions of ‘intersection’ and interference 
between different ‘levels’ of a particular society, do not present that interaction in such thoroughgoing 
terms. Whilst maintaining Marx’s insistence on the influence of the mode of production, their emphasis on 
the ‘relative autonomy’ of the different ‘levels’ limits the extent to which they can explore that influence. In 
this regard, their work continues to reflect the traditional doctrine of substance. They tend to give 
excessive weight to the borders or limits—the incidents rather than the substance—of each ‘level’ as the 
only site of interaction, rather recognising the immanent pervasive influence of the mode of production. In 
Chapter Nine, I argue that this follows from an insufficient emphasis on Marx’s materialism. Having 
neglected the centrality and volatility of the corporeal, Althusser and Balibar fail to treat the relationship 
with the corporeal—the mode of production—as equally pervasive.  
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active relations are the spaces in which possibilities for reflection and agency exist. This 
is the conclusion that Meyers also reached, approaching the idea of an intersectional 
self from a feminist perspective. The ‘internal’ interaction of a person’s various 
constitutive relations created opportunities for agency, particularly when some of those 
relationships enjoyed a privileged position (in Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 153, 156, 
and 160). In that view, a white woman disadvantaged by her gender relations, may be 
able to enjoy agency by means of an advantaged relation, such as race. 
For these reasons, it may be better to define the self as an ‘intersection’ of relations, 
rather than Marx’s ‘ensemble’ with its connotations of orderly coordination. The 
advantage of this perspective can be appreciated by analogy with a road intersection: 
vehicles (relations) enter such an intersection with an orientation to pass through 
without interference, but are frequently changed whilst in that intersection. Some of 
those changes are not significant when compared to the relation as it stands outside the 
intersection—but at intersections delays, interference, damage and sometimes 
destruction are experienced. Each particular being is a unique place created by the 
intersection of external relations, but it is not a space those relations traverse with 
immunity or without contradiction. 
This point is vividly conveyed by Lefebvre’s conception of the body in terms of 
“polyrhythmia” (multiple rhythms), “eurhythmia” (united rhythms) and “arrhythmia” 
(conflicting rhythms) (2004, 16)50: 
                                                          
50
 Lefebvre is not the only writer in the Marxist tradition to consider these relationships in terms of rhythm. 
Althusser and Balibar (1997, 100) also refer to the influence of the mode of production, and of the internal 
dynamic of the different ‘levels’ in terms of rhythm. Negri (1991, 70, 154, 180, 188) also uses the term to 
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Every more or less animate body and a fortiori every gathering of bodies is 
consequently polyrhythmic, which is to say composed of diverse rhythms, with 
each part, each organ or function having its own in a perpetual interaction that 
constitutes a set (ensemble) or a whole (un tout). This last word does not signify 
a closed totality, but on the contrary an open totality. Such sets are always in a 
“mestastable” equilibrium, which is to say always compromised and most often 
recovered, except of course in cases of serious disruption or catastrophe (2005, 
89). 
These images of intersections and ‘polyrhythmia’—as sites of interaction, orchestrated 
towards harmony, but never securely, and often interrupted – are more consistent with 
the open, interdependent characterisation of being and the rejection of arguments for 
some immune sanctuary of ‘pure’ substance. Being human, even in that ‘ensemble’ of 
social relations that grant continuity, involves the thoroughgoing, constitutive experience 
of tension, of the demands and contradictions of ‘external’ relations. To consider being 
in terms of an intersection or ‘polyrhythmia’ captures Marx’s insistence from his earliest 
works—his doctoral dissertation—that being not be considered in terms of a peaceful 
existence or ataraxy, but as the product of a range of attractions and repulsions. It 
better captures Marx’s own emphasis on suffering and alienation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
describe the interaction of bodies with Spinoza’s system. However, they do not develop the concept any 
further. 
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ALIENATION: AN INHERENT INSECURITY 
To consider being as pervasively influenced by its various constitutive, and sometimes 
contradictory, relations makes the experience of alienation and anxiety an inherent 
hazard of the human condition, rather than the exception suggested by the traditional 
debate about substance and its undivided, unchanging, character. To consider any 
being as comprised of its various relations, and to allow for their interaction and conflict, 
is to make the character of any being uncertain, and bound up with other participants in 
those relations. It is, to some degree, to be denied control of one’s deepest self. 
To experience alienation was, for Marx, a consequence of treating an object, through 
which a person has expressed his powers, as if that object were external or separate to 
him: 
It is entirely to be expected that a living, natural being equipped and endowed 
with objective, i.e. material essential powers should have real natural objects for 
the objects of its being, and that its self-alienation should take the form of the 
establishment of a real, objective world, but as something external to it (1975e, 
388-9). 
Alienation involves a loss of control of self-expression: 
...as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, 
exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot 
escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must 
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remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood (Marx and Engels 
1998, 53). 
To alienate a person from his object was to “[tear] away from him his species life, his 
true species-objectivity” (1975e 329). 
To experience alienation is to be radically incomplete. Lacking one’s necessary 
objects—or like Hegel’s slave—to be unable to fully assimilate or appropriate them, 
makes life “radically insecure” in just the sense intended by Heidegger (Barrett, 1990, 
136): denied the capacity to unify one’s self, and yet conscious of and desiring that 
completion, is to experience anxiety in its extremity. It is to confront the very uncertainty 
the idea of substance—whether in traditional or dialectical terms—is intended to 
placate. It is to experience the tensions that Spinoza, Herder and Hegel canvassed by 
means of the term ‘expression’—to be inescapably involved in the totality, but be unable 
to fully realise that involvement. It is to experience some profound inadequacy or lack in 
being in just the pervasive sense of mood that Heidegger used to describe anxiety, and 
Fichte and Schelling wrote of a self conscious of its incompletion. It is, in the absence of 
the stabilising effect of habit or a mode of production, to face both the contradiction that 
lies at the heart of being and the possibility of its radical transformation. This is not, 
however, as Lukacs (1968) and Meszaros (1970, 251 and 282) have argued, to 
“liquidate the historicity of an inherently historical, objective being” and assert a “frozen  
ontology” —it is not to universalise alienation as experienced under capitalism. Rather, 
in just the same way that Marx held that labour was a necessity of the human condition, 
but varied over time and with different modes of production, it is to assert that the open, 
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interdependent character of being—as understood by Marx—made its security and 
stability essentially uncertain and variable.  
It is this potential of extreme alienation that Marx saw as underwriting the promise for 
revolutionary change—for the change from the popular perception of self in terms of 
independence to those of interdependence—that is, ‘species consciousness’—and is 
the subject of the next chapter of this thesis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Drawing on Spinoza, Hegel, and others, Marx presented an alternative theory of being 
human in which the certainty and continuity, previously sought in the traditional terms of 
substance, shifted from independence, separation and sameness to interdependence, 
involvement and change. Marx adopted and modified Feuerbach’s concept of ‘species 
being’ to arrive at an account of an objective interdependent being. Having conceived of 
being as a bundle or aggregate of relations in which the objects of those relations were 
not ‘external’, but were the essence of being, Marx readily presented that essence as 
incorporating the corporeal.  
To be an objective being—a being that is inseparable and indefinable apart from its 
objects—was to be a being founded in interdependence and not the independence and 
stability traditionally associated with substance. It was to be a being so open and so 
fragile—so threatened by its inorganic body’s resistance—that its stability and continuity 
was dependent upon that social and cooperative endeavour, that joint effort to secure 
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necessary objects, that Marx called the mode of production. It was this insecurity, this 
inability to thrive independently, that made these social relations the foundation of the 
substance of our humanity. Those relations were not secondary or optional. They were 
not activities undertaken as an act of an established being, but the very acts that 
constituted, stabilised and preserved that being. They provided not an optional rhythm 
that could be taken up or left, but the pulse of being itself that organised and stabilised 
being, and enabled the engagement in, even the focus on, other relations and activities.  
This is not to present that rhythm as the only pattern by which our beings are 
constituted. The openness of interdependent being, and the variety of relations that 
comprise it, leaves open the possibility that those relations may themselves clash. 
Given this potential, and, with it, the potential for change in the constitution of a being, 
Marx’s model might better be understood in terms of an intersection than an ensemble. 
Both represent the organising influence of the mode of production and the character of 
any being as that unique combination of relations, but the metaphor of an intersection 
better captures the freedom of movement—and possibilities for change—that remain 
within that constellation. It also suggests how alienation, as the experience of loss of 
control over a key relationship, and anxiety, as the uncertainty that follows in one’s 
sense of self, might best be seen as inherent to the human condition and as enabling its 
endurance of loss and its potential transformation. As such, it provides the basis upon 
which I can address the final key question of this thesis: what explanations did Marx 
provide for the appeal of treating the non-corporeal as the human substance (and for 
the circumstances in which that appeal might be overcome and enable the adoption of a 
‘more human language’)? 
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CHAPTER EIGHT – TOWARDS A MORE HUMAN LANGUAGE: 
MARXIAN SPECIES CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Marx argued that our character or substance as human beings was embodied in an 
ensemble or intersection of various relations, such that tension and uncertainty were 
endemic to the human condition. In this chapter, I argue that this renders the need for 
some way to ‘make’ sense of that pain an equally essential feature of the human 
condition. In this way, Marx explained the functionality of ‘religious beliefs’. Religious 
ideas were, as Feuerbach argued, a ‘flight’ from mortality and limitation. So painful were 
mortality and limitation that these beliefs—these defences—were not readily overturned. 
It was only in the extremity of corporeal pain—in the grip of the irrational—that these 
rationalisations could be overcome. On this point, Marx agreed with Epicurus and 
Lucretius, Feuerbach and Hegel. Real possibilities for change, including emancipatory 
change, emerge when we are overwhelmed by the corporeal. This, I argue, was the 
foundation for Marx’s interest in Hegel’s Phenomenology, especially the ‘Master-
Servant’ dialectic and the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’. That is, it is only in the face of 
such extreme corporeal pain that the surrender of one’s prior sense of self and the 
recognition of one’s dependence on the ‘external’ becomes possible. I argue that the 
centrality of the idea of corporeality for Marx, together with his dialectical account of 
objective and ‘species being’, provided the foundations for his confidence that a ‘more 
human language’ would be adopted.  
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Whilst there are some suggestions in Marx’s works that the experience of class conflict 
and of class solidarity would prompt the emergence of class consciousness, Marx 
places equal, if not greater, emphasis on the restraining effects of ideology. It appears 
that Marx placed his confidence in the eventual transformation in the processes of the 
capitalist system itself: that its repeated crises would betray its own contradictions and 
so immiserate the workers as to force—by means of that clear confrontation—a change 
in attitude. It is my argument, however, that this interpretation is not materialistic enough 
and fails to give sufficient weight to the catalyst-like effect of corporeal pain itself. It is 
not sufficiently materialistic, as it does not approach the issue with that breadth of 
openness that comprises objective being. Further, it fails to consider the intimate 
influence of the corporeal on our consciousness, developed, as that is, through the 
intimate experience of contradiction that grounded Marx’s notion of praxis. That intimacy 
is far better conveyed by McNally’s (2004, 149) explanation that: 
...for both Marx and Hegel, dialectics [which, for McNally, includes praxis] 
pertains not to the study of objects and events “out there”, in the independently 
existing objective world, but also to self-understanding, to the ways in which we, 
as human agents, are already out there (and the ‘out there’ in us), the ways in 
which knowledge of self and world coincide. Dialectics accomplishes this by 
grasping human activity as the moment of intersection and interpenetration of 
subject and object... 
It is my argument that Marx believed that the experience of corporeal pain, in extremity, 
acted to overwhelm any sense or idea of the self as separate to the corporeal, and 
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imposed, in its stead, an inescapable recognition of individual limitation and deep 
dependence on others. 
 
RELIGIOUS THOUGHT – LIVING WITH INSTABILITY AND ANXIETY 
The experience of corporeal pain, however, had long been denied any moral or 
educative priority. That denial tended to take the form of a desire for, and belief in, 
immortality. However, the philosophers Marx drew on rejected this belief, and its 
corollary that the human essence was not subject to corporeal limitations and would, at 
some point, be free of them, and their pains too. Those philosophers recognised that 
these beliefs founded the long-standing assertion that the substance or essence of our 
humanity was free of that pain, and of the corporeal dimension through which it was so 
often experienced. Those beliefs made the influence of the corporeal a kind of burden 
on our existence that demanded, in some way, some rectification or relief, if only 
through treating that burden as temporary. 
For Epicurus and Lucretius, this was the central function of religious thought, and hence 
their criticism of that thought. Epicurus argued that the failure to accept that all 
substance was comprised of aggregates of material atoms was the foundation of our 
suffering. In particular, he argued that the inability to accept our involvement in the 
natural world and our mortal, limited character was the foundation of the experience of 
anxiety, and the production of insatiable, self-defeating appetites, including that for 
immortality.  
351 
 
It was this rejection of religion—of the flight from corporeal limitation—as an ‘empty 
desire’ that Marx emphasised in his review of Epicurus. For Marx (2006b, 89-90):  
Philosophy…will never grow tired of answering its adversaries with the cry of 
Epicurus: “Not the man who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he 
who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious”.  
Marx (2006b, 154) made clear what that ‘impiety’ was in his comments on Plutarch’s 
critique of Epicurus: 
In the masses, who have no fear of what comes after death, the myth-inspired 
hope of eternal life and the desire of being, the oldest and most powerful of all 
passions, produces joy and a feeling of happiness and overcomes that childish 
terror [of death]. 
Epicurus, in dismissing those hopes, had ‘confirmed’ that ‘terror’ (Marx 2006b, 154). 
Most commentators on Marx’s views of religion, like Geoghegan (2004), McKnight 
(2005), and Toscano (2010), miss this point and seem to be left guessing at Marx’s 
meaning when he wrote that religion reflected real suffering and acted as a source of 
comfort. To Marx, they impute the Enlightenment view that religion was an irrational, 
infantile superstition, readily remedied by a disciplined rationality. However, the 
problem, for Marx, was just the opposite: namely, an excess of rationality. 
Epicurus, Lucretius and Feuerbach had each located the strength and popularity of 
beliefs in a being free from corporeal restrictions in the anxiety concerning mortality—an 
existential anxiety—that concerned constitutional or foundational issues of being, and 
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not something so readily escaped as infancy or adolescence, nor subordinated so 
readily by some exercise in logic. In just the same way as Marx and those before him 
sought to express the constitutional tensions of intersectual being, so, too, did they 
suggest—or at least imply—the immanence and inescapability of the ‘terrors’ of those 
tensions. They cannot be overcome. No society develops in such a way as to be free of 
them.  
Feuerbach’s contribution is particularly important in this regard. In his view, those 
‘childhood’ terrors were not overcome by Enlightenment rationality, notwithstanding its 
confident proclamation of a new, universal and ‘rational’ maturity by the likes of Kant 
(1784). Feuerbach demonstrated that the efforts to escape those ‘terrors’ were not 
limited to religion per se, but shaped Western philosophy, in both ancient and modern 
times. For Feuerbach, this effort to deny the pain of corporeality constituted a core and 
persistent theme in Western religious and philosophical thought. His early works trace 
the history of key elements of Western philosophy, including those concerning 
‘substance’, as a flight from corporeality, limitation and death by means of a fantasy of 
pure, true or highest being. Moreover, for Feuerbach, this flight was not only 
characteristic of ancient philosophy and Christian theology, but of modern philosophical 
thought. This is why he treated the concepts of reason, happiness and progress as 
expressions of this longing for freedom from limitation and pain. 
Marx saw that continuity as reflected in the belief in the independent, non-corporeal self. 
It reflected the same hierarchy as the belief in immortality, namely that the pains 
associated with finitude and limitation are some kind of corruption or contamination that 
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could, and should, be disciplined or evaded. The attraction and resilience of this 
tradition, notwithstanding the variations in the forms it has taken, reflects the 
constitutional character, and so repetitive experience, of the profound anxiety and 
insecurity that is at the very heart of ‘species being’. 
Marx understood the influence of these beliefs. So deep does the need to comprehend 
pain run, that it is bound up with our very comprehension of our selves. So deeply 
bound up are these beliefs, they have made alienation—the denial of our dependence 
on the corporeal, on others, and on our society—an assertion of our essence. This was 
the foundation of Marx’ criticism of political economy which equated alienated labour 
with all labour, and treated alienation as the norm (1975e). 
 
RELIGIOUS THOUGHT, ALIENATION AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 
However, Marx anticipated that these beliefs would, nevertheless, be self defeating. In 
promoting an idea of our humanity as an unlimited non-corporeal, internal and  
individual preserve, these ‘religious’ beliefs promote attitudes and activities of 
abstraction and separation—they promoted an ideal of life, and a way of living, that 
severed our links to our human essence. Moreover, in responding to the interdependent 
character of our being—the unavoidable pull and push of those relationships in which 
we are situated and comprised—they deny the essentiality of those relationships. They 
deny that things external to our skin—our ‘inorganic’ body in the material world and in 
society—are essential. They make strangers of humanity and nature, of each human 
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being and her or his necessary objects. Their effect, as Marx (1975e, 329, 342) said, is 
to:  
…[estrange] man from his own body, from nature as it exists outside him, from 
his…human essence…[making] what was formerly being external to oneself, 
man’s material externality…the act of alienation. 
This was the critique Marx made of religious thought in The German Ideology: 
The only reason why Christianity wanted to free us from the domination of the 
flesh and “desires as a driving force” was because it regarded our flesh, our 
desires as something foreign to us (cited in Geras 1983, 62). 
He made the same point about Christianity in Capital, on substantially the same 
grounds: “Christianity, with its religious cult of man in the abstract, more particularly in 
its bourgeois development, ie in Protestantism…is the most fitting form of religion” (cited 
in Toscano 2011, 16). 
Here, and notwithstanding his theses on Feuerbach, Marx demonstrated his debt to 
Feuerbach’s influence: this continuity concerning religious thought has been noted by a 
number of writers, such as Brien (2009), and Geoghegan (2004). 
Marx asserted that this ‘religious’ attitude makes the alienation—the separation—of 
those parts of our selves an assertion of the human essence or substance. He 
appreciated that, in doing so, this attitude asserts a vision of humanity that only served 
to narrow and deplete it. In particular, he appreciated that the insistence on 
independence and separation in ‘religious thought’—including in relation to the 
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corporeal—was self-defeating, as it involves an attempted flight from our constitutive 
relations. It encouraged a dis-membering that was (and remains) impossible to fully 
achieve. 
For some modern commentators, like Ignatieff (1997, 38, 51, 54), the modern Western 
idea of the separate self is only achieved by doing “a certain violence” to oneself and 
others. The precarious character of intersectual being provokes a cycle of violence—an 
intensification of the flight from intersectual being. It is an enterprise or endeavour that, 
in the face of its insecurity, in moments of greater instability, provokes desperate 
attempts to fend that failure off. It provokes the kinds of extremity that Lucretius (2008, 
4.1079-89) long ago saw following from similar false needs and producing selfish, 
abusive relationships: 
Yea, in the very moment of possessing, surges the heat of lovers to and fro, 
restive, uncertain; and they cannot fix on what to first enjoy with eyes and hands. 
The parts they sought for, those they squeeze so tight, and pain the creature's 
body, close their teeth often against her lips, and smite with kiss mouth into 
mouth, because this same delight is not unmixed; and underneath are stings 
which goad a man to hurt the very thing, whate'er it be, from whence arise for 
him those germs of madness. 
 
With regard to contemporary efforts to discipline the body, it is not difficult to see 
parallels with Lucretius’ critique of erotic love and the manner in which it demanded the 
absolute possession and abuse of the other. Martha Nussbaum (2009, 174) presents 
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Lucretius’ view in just those terms. She presents him as seeing the lovers experiencing 
the need for the other as a weakness and seeking to end it through “complete 
possession of the other”. 
The same desperate lengths can be seen in the ‘fight to the death’ in Hegel’s 
Master/Servant dialectic, and in the exaggerated ascetic disciplines of his ‘Unhappy 
Consciousness’. They can also be seen in the deliberate self-deprivations and eating 
disorders of too many young people today. There is a comfort—a sense of confirmation, 
of warding off the threats of dissolution—provided by the belief in the separate, 
independent, non-corporeal self, but it is an incomplete comfort. The character of being 
as becoming or flux repeatedly disturbs that comfort and security. The corporeal 
(desire) arises and threatens repeatedly, and ‘religious thought’ leaves us unprepared 
for, and ill-equipped to, tolerate that challenge, prompting renewed flight from the 
corporeal and renewed investment in that ‘religious thought’. 
The ‘religious’ foundations of the concept of the independent, non-corporeal self—in 
particular, its roots in the ‘terror’ of mortality—suggest why idea of the self has been so 
popular and resilient, and why its replacement by intersectual being cannot occur by 
some simple substitution of one concept for another. It will not occur simply by virtue of 
a rational or educative encounter. As Feuerbach and Marx (and others) have 
recognised, these religious beliefs are “not only an escape from reality, but a method of 
dealing with it” (Kamenka 1970, 66). They help to make sense of, and to live within, a 
painful world. They act as an ‘opiate’ which, like Freud’s ‘intoxicants’, anaesthetise one 
to the contradictions and anxieties of existence.  
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Marx appreciated the needs met by these religious beliefs in terms rendered famous by 
repetition: 
Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering 
and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed 
creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is 
the opium of the people. (Marx cited in Foster, Clark and York 2008, 33). 
Giving up those beliefs would not be a simple task. As Marx emphasised, “To call on 
them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a 
condition that requires illusions”. (Marx cited in Toscano 2010, 9) 
The notion of the independent, non-corporeal self is both popular and addictive because 
it meets a human need—an aspect of the human condition—in negotiating the 
uncertainties and openness of intersectual being. Malinowski (cited in Kamenka 1970, 
68) understood that this belief “relieve[s] intolerable stress…[and] overcome[s] the 
feeling of helplessness”. As such, it has a profound and widespread influence. It is a 
means by which, as Kamenka (1970, 67) emphasised, “…man acquires emotional 
comfort not only [in terms of a] simple fantasy, but by shaping the whole of his 
knowledge into an ordered scheme [upon it]”. 
Given its foundational significance, the challenges regularly presented to this ‘imperfect’ 
understanding by unstable, intersectual being does not result in either its radical 
revision or abandonment. Instead, they prompt further investment and fresh endeavours 
to conform to it, so deep does its influence run.  
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RESISTANCE TO CHANGE AND THE ‘ORIGINAL AND OLDEST ANTITHESIS’ 
Marx recognised that mere education or the raising of awareness about the 
inadequacies of religious solace would not be enough to promote change. They were 
not ideas and practices that could be reformed through relations of sympathy, or by 
enacting some version of the liberal idea of the social contract.51 The need of a 
corporeal, dependent being for stability is so fundamental, so central to our very sense 
of being, that Marx’s analogy with an opiate is apt and illuminating. The comfort it 
provides, regardless of any contradictions the user may become aware of, is addictive 
and any attempt to give it up is traumatic and aggressively, and creatively, resisted. 
These ideas are held so deeply that the Idealists treated them as almost 
indistinguishable from the self—they are held so deeply that change, as Schelling saw 
it, would amount to the surrender, even death, of that self. Feuerbach captured this 
visceral sensitivity in his imagined reaction of ‘horror’ to the perceived reduction of 
human dignity that would follow any compromise of the hierarchical separation of mind 
and body. It is the reason why Marx (1975d, 276-7) anticipated the intestinal rejection of 
a more ‘human language’ as “an impertinence or insanity”.  
The aversion to pain, and investment in comforting beliefs, runs deep for Feuerbach 
and Marx, but not just because those beliefs provide a widely embraced sense of 
stability, continuity and control. It is also because they reflect the very processes by 
which the actual sensation of self was originally experienced, comprehended, and 
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 Even as reformulated by Rawls (1972), his suggested imagined negotiation still takes the separate self 
for granted 
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thereafter acted on. For Feuerbach and Marx, the belief in the independent, non-
corporeal self is so strongly held because it is grounded in the immediate, concrete 
experience of corporeal being. However, its attraction is not only as a comfort against 
the instabilities experienced after the constitution of the self, but the means by which we 
come to perceive of our selves as somehow distinct from the rest of the world. That 
understanding arises through the practical experience of the contradiction and clash 
between the corporeal and non-corporeal. From the beginning until the end of our lives, 
it is generated and revisited, although rarely significantly revised, through the clash 
between our ideas of the world, and the sensations we experience in acting in reliance 
on those ideas. It is what Marx called ‘praxis’. For Marx (1975g, 423), “all 
mysteries...find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of 
that practice”. Praxis, as Ollman (2008, 11) considered it, comprised consciously acting 
in the world in reliance upon a belief, and in the process both changing the world and 
testing the belief. However, it is more than that. Jha better captures its significance in 
describing praxis as “transcendence” (2010, 217): it “cannot be grasped...as mere 
manipulation or modification of things”. It is, as McNally (2004, 149) described it in the 
quotation at the beginning of this chapter, “the moment of intersection and 
interpenetration of subject and object”, whereby both are changed. Kolakowski (2005, 
1169) similarly characterised praxis. It is the process of becoming that follows from the 
appropriation of one’s object, as described in Chapter Six, which constitutes both the 
confirmation of that being and its change. This is not a process that occurs at some 
distance from one’s self. It is the site of the revisiting of the self, and involves the 
possibilities of both continuity and change. It has the potential to be so transformative as 
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to seem like the surrender or death of one’s self, as suggested by Schelling (Seigel 
2005, 385). 
Feuerbach presents that experience of contradiction and transformation as a part of the 
human condition from the earliest moments of our consciousness. He (1972b, 144) 
described it as: 
…the original and most essential antithesis, an antithesis necessarily connected 
with the ego...the body, the flesh. The conflict between the spirit and the body 
alone is the highest metaphysical principle; it is the secret of creation and the 
ground on which the world rests. Indeed the flesh or, if you prefer, the body has 
not only a natural-historical or empirico-psychological meaning, but essentially a 
speculative, metaphysical one. 
‘Original’, here, was not a historical reference, but a reference to the very foundation of 
our being. The experience of contradiction precedes any clear ‘idea’ of our self, at least 
in terms of one adopted from a common language, when as infants, even embryos, we 
encounter a surface or edge or object that resists us. Having once ‘made’ sense of that 
experience in terms of separation and distinction, it is an approach to the world that is 
then revisited, repeated and reinforced every day of our lives, albeit with different 
objects. This resolution, Wartovsky (1977, 376) points out, was not something 
independent of activity and not simply “an idea or thought”, but the “direct encounter” 
between sensibility and consciousness: it is not something the ‘I’ observes from the 
distance of some border or separation, but “the original locus of being itself, a 
spatiotemporal here and now”. It is an experience, once rendered comprehensible in 
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terms of individuation or separation from the world, that is as fundamental and 
unquestionable to our mode of life as the very ground beneath us. 
As Marx (1975g, 423) insisted in his eighth Feuerbach Thesis, it was only through 
praxis that so central and profound a belief could be challenged.  
Marx understood that any belief in the separate, independent self was not founded in 
logic or exclusively derived from abstract, universal, reason or objective science. As 
such, he understood that this idea could not be undone by some kind of autopoietic act 
of rational criticism. Rather, the belief expresses a very human experience of the world. 
This suggests why the dualist, separatist approach to the world has been resilient and 
popular. It reflects ‘real’, unavoidable, universal human experiences and to this extent it 
reflects a ‘common’ sense. It also indicates why Marx understood that the potential 
resistance to a non-dualist model is, and will be, strong and why the effort to critique 
and replace it will be substantial. Any such attempt is likely to be denounced as non-
sense. Its rejection will draw on vestigial, primal, roots, such that the effort to replace it 
will need to draw on equally profound and common personal experience. 
 
RATIONALITY, IDEOLOGY AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
Marx did not provide any clear explanation as to how ‘class’ or ‘species’ consciousness 
was to replace the emphasis on separation and independence. On occasion, Marx 
thought such consciousness would arise in the course of the conflict between different 
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classes as a part of the development and operation of capitalism. In The German 
Ideology, Marx (Marx and Engels 1998, 60) forecast: 
...a stage when productive forces and means of intercourse are brought into 
being which, under the existing relations, only cause mischief, and are no longer 
productive but destructive forces...and connected with this a class is called forth 
which has to bear all the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages, 
which is ousted from society and forced into the sharpest contradiction with all 
other classes; a class which forms the majority of all members of society, and 
from which emanates the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental 
revolution, the communist consciousness. 
For this class, the proletariat, “the condition of life forced upon [its members] becomes 
evident to [them], for [they are]...sacrificed from youth onwards” (Marx and Engels 1998, 
88).  
Here, Marx seems to imply that the development of ‘class’, and thence ‘species’ or 
‘communist’, consciousness, was the product of a conscious, logical or rational 
evaluation prompted, even, necessitated, by the increasingly harsh conditions 
experienced under the capitalist system. However, the foundation of our sense of 
ourselves as separate in praxis, together with Marx’s emphasis on the deadening or 
restrictive influence of ideology, suggest that the development of class consciousness, 
and thereby species consciousness, would never be a simple rational process. For 
Marx (Marx and Engels 1998, 68), ideology comprised the “ideas of the ruling 
class...[given] the form of universality and present[ed] as the only rational, universally 
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valid ones”. These ideas—this logic or rationality—suggest that something more was 
required. 
Marx (1976, 1068) emphasised that, compared to other species, none surpassed 
humanity in its capacity to “Irish”, that is, delude, itself. Our capacity to reason could 
serve to both free and oppress us. Something more than reason—however provoking 
the conditions of work and life were for many workers—was required: something that 
could break the circularity of rationalisation. Corporeal pain was, in extremity, that 
mechanism. Our corporeal character made that potentiality an immanent, rather than 
exceptional, aspect of our lives. 
 
ALIENATION AND INSTABILITY – THE HUMAN CONDITION 
I have argued that the unstable, resistant character of our corporeal, inorganic body 
made some form of social interaction—a mode of production—necessary. It was the 
means by which our very being was constituted and given some stability and security. 
That interaction, however, only stilled and stabilised the species or society as a whole, 
and not its individual members, and then only on terms repeatedly compromised by the 
very process of becoming and, in extremity, crises. Whilst all benefited from interaction 
within the mode of production, not everyone either made an equal contribution of labour 
or received an equal share of the benefits. Participation did not mean an end to the 
experience of the tension and pain that characterises intersectual being. This was 
certainly the case for the capitalist system and the modes of production preceding it. 
Notwithstanding the advances each mode made in stabilising the relationship between 
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our organic and inorganic bodies, the changes came at no little cost, and, in Marx’s 
view, tended towards a concentration of that wealth—of that stability, security and 
freedom—among an increasingly small number of people. Marx’s history of changes in 
the mode of production was as much a history of increasing oppression, an increasingly 
uneven distribution of the burden of our corporeality and our open, interdependent 
character, as it was a history of securing a greater control of nature.  
Even enjoying the benefits of increased productivity Marx and Engels described in the 
Communist Manifesto (1988), humans remained intersectual beings—constitutionally 
exposed to and unable to escape the tensions and contradictions of the relations that 
comprise us. We remain the ‘passionate’, ‘suffering’, beings Marx described in 1844 
Manuscripts. We retain the character of ‘objective being’, exposed to that suffering 
inherent to being. As Hegel, before Marx, had held, the very character of being means 
to live with, and to seek to comprehend, the pains of our contradictions. We remain 
exposed to the destabilising effect emphasised by Schelling, Fichte and others—the 
manner in which those tensions denied a being rest, the sense and comfort of being ‘at 
home’. The character of an objective or intersectual being was such as to make the 
experience of anxiety, alienation and pain a consistent feature of the human condition 
and, as such, an ever-present potential catalyst for change. 
It was the extremity of this instability—the manner in which it permeated the life 
experience of the swelling ranks of wage labourers—that made the emancipation of the 
proletariat contain “universal human emancipation” (Marx 1975e, 333). However, as 
Mulholland (2009, 319-320) has noted, the dismissal of the foundation of the 
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emancipatory potential of the proletariat, in its “assumed correspondence, when 
idealised in thought, with certain philosophical abstractions”, has led to “strangely little 
attention” being given to Marx’s confidence in this potential. My argument is that Marx 
saw that potential as founded in their corporeal or material experience. Mulholland 
(2009, 329) makes the same point, arguing that the “debilitating insecurity” promoted by 
the capitalist system so affects the proletariat’s very being as to compel them to act. 
For Mulholland, paying attention to the conditions of existence was a consistent feature 
of Marx’s work. Engels had asserted in The Conditions of the Working Class in England 
that it was “the insecurity of his position, the necessity of living upon wages from hand 
to mouth, that in short which makes a proletarian of” the English working man (cited in 
Mulholland 2009, 328-329). Mulholland reminds us that the same concern featured in 
The Holy Family (already cited above) and in The German Ideology. With reference to 
the Communist Manifesto, Mulholland (2009, 331) pointed out Marx’s recognition that: 
Well before it develops collective volition, the proletariat has “instinctive 
yearnings…for a general reconstruction of society”. 
Mulholland (2009, 334) argues that Marx founded the ultimate development of working 
class consciousness in a “psychological desire for security”. 
However, I argue that Marx’s confidence had ‘deeper’ roots, and that his belief that the 
proletariat would develop a form of consciousness with revolutionary potential was 
founded in his theory of ‘species being’. The character of that being is instability and 
flux. Marx had argued in The German Ideology: 
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the conditions of existence, the mode of life and activity of an animal or human 
individual are those in which its “essence” feels itself satisfied…if millions of 
proletarians feel by no means contented with their living conditions, if their 
“existence” does not in the least correspond to their “essence”, then [they]…will 
prove this in time, when they bring their “existence” into harmony with their 
“essence” in a practical way, by means of a revolution (cited in Mulholland 2009, 
330). 
The realisation of class and species consciousness is not an abstractedly rational 
exercise, but one driven by the experience of being. It is a matter, as Marx put it in The 
German Ideology, of ‘feeling’ and how those sensations and experiences drive us 
towards an understanding of the world. If production was the first—and continuing in the 
sense of foundational—act, as Marx asserted in The German Ideology, then finding 
some way to live with, or make sense of, that pain was equally part of that act. 
 
THE PROMISE OF ALIENATION 
In short, alienation was a precondition for change. Marx appears to have expected the 
extreme alienation of capitalism to provide an experience that was sufficiently common 
and compelling to overcome the independent sense of self and so provide a momentum 
for emancipation.  
The distinction drawn by Margaret Archer between our experience of our selves, and 
the concepts we apply to interpret them, is useful here. Archer (2000, 126) has 
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described the experience of contradiction as the very foundation of both self-
consciousness and of logic. Like Feuerbach, she treats that experience as an “original 
antithesis”. It is a universal or constitutive experience and how we gain a sense of our 
self. However, Archer points out that this experience does not dictate how we 
subsequently make sense of that experience. Archer (2000, 124) stresses that “a major 
distinction [should be] made between evolving concepts of the self, which are indeed 
social, and the universal sense of self, which is not, being naturally grounded”. 
For Marx, our character as corporeal beings rendered imperative some means of 
securing our stability and continuity a part of the human condition.52 That need may be 
described as constitutive. It followed from the inherent tensions and contradictions of 
the intersecting relationships that comprise any being. However, how that need is met—
the terms of the ideas and practices, the mode of life, that provide that sense of 
continuity—is not predetermined, and involves some degree of negotiability (depending 
on, amongst other things, the state of nature).  
Marx anticipated that alienation would influence a growing number of people in such a 
pervasive, primal and painful way, as to provide an experience of corporeal/non-
corporeal contradiction that could not be made sense of in terms of separation. He 
seems to have expected that the pain of alienated labour would reveal the free, 
separate liberal individual as a non-sense and a form of self-mockery: a concept and 
aspiration that bore no resemblance to the labourers’ lives. He anticipated that same 
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 The reference to continuity and not a continuous self is intended to acknowledge that the modern 
emphasis upon the separate self is only one such regulative idea. Other anthropologies and ontologies—
such as those of the early and pre-industrial societies referred to by Marx and Engels (1988), have served 
(and can serve) to provide this sense of continuity. 
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experience, given its corporeal and social character, to provide an experience of 
limitation and interdependence—to provide the prompt and materials from which to 
make a different sense of their selves. Marx imagined the pain of alienated labour 
undertaken within the capitalist mode of production to be transformative. 
 
THE PROMISE OF ALIENATION – THE MASTER/SERVANT DIALECTIC 
In so doing, Marx drew heavily upon Hegel’s discussion of the process of testing and 
revising one’s concept of one’s self in the Phenomenology of Spirit, especially the 
section entitled ‘Lordship and Bondage’. For Marx (1975e, 382-3, 385-6), the 
Phenomenology was the “true birthplace and secret” of Hegel’s works: 
The Phenomenology is...concealed and mystifying criticism, criticism which has 
not attained self-clarity; but in so far as it grasps the estrangement of man – even 
though man appears only in the form of mind – all the elements of criticism are 
concealed within it, and often prepared and worked out in a way that goes far 
beyond Hegel’s own point of view. The ‘unhappy consciousness’, the ‘honest 
consciousness’, the struggle of the ‘noble and the base consciousness’, etc etc, 
these separate sections contain the critical elements – but still in estranged form 
– of entire spheres, such as religion, the state, civil life and so forth...he...grasps 
the nature of labour and conceives objective man – true, because real, man – as 
the result of his own labour. The real, active relation of himself as a real species-
being, is only possible if he really employs all his species-powers...and treats 
them as objects, which is at first only possible in the form of estrangement. 
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It was only when one treats part of one’s self as separate—treats a ‘power’ as an 
‘object’—and attempts to put that partition into practice, that one is forced to discover 
the flaw in that treatment. One is forced to discover that part cannot be separated, 
subordinated and neglected, but remains part of one’s being. 
As I have already shown, Hegel explored the manner in which one sense of self might 
be surrendered for another through the dialectic of the Master/Servant: Chris Arthur 
(1983) reminds us that Hegel distinguished between ‘slave’ (sklave) and ‘servant’ 
(knecht). Marx drew heavily on that account, although his materialist ‘inversion’ of it led 
to consciousness of a different universal, namely ‘species being’. This difference 
between their accounts is well known, but their mutual reliance upon the corporeal as 
central to the change in consciousness is not.  
Hegel’s famous Master/Servant discussion is an account of the process by which a 
sense of self as separate and independent is revised. It provides an account that 
respects the attraction and resilience of this sense of self, but suggests the 
circumstances in which change might still occur. For Hegel, several elements were 
essential to enable that change. These included the consciousness of the other, and 
dependence upon that other to secure a sense of self (mutual recognition); the need for 
some profoundly traumatic experience to negate one’s sense of self as separate, 
independent and capable of domination; the need for prolonged servitude to thoroughly 
effect that negation; and the resistance of the corporeal to prompt the development of a 
new sense of self.  
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Hegel’s account stresses the way in which alienated corporeal labour, in extremity, 
subverts the idea of the separate, independent self, and prompts recognition of more 
dependent sense of being. ‘Prompt’ is used deliberately here to suggest a catalyst or 
possibility, but not a certainty. Hegel’s account recognises both the ambiguity of those 
prompts, and the capacity of ideas of separation to resist the contradictions they provide 
(it is this continuing attraction that leads to the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’). This account 
also demonstrates how the very character of self-consciousness repeatedly produces 
those prompts—how a human existence is necessarily one where our concepts of 
independence are regularly contradicted. In short, a human existence is one in which 
the potential to realise our interdependence is immanent. 
It is easy to see the parallels between Marx’s account of alienation and Hegel’s 
treatment and, from there, to understand the manner in which Marx expected species 
consciousness to arise. It is also easy to see some surprising parallels in their mutual 
reliance upon the contradictions provided by the corporeal and how Marx’s reliance 
upon Hegel was closer to an adjustment than the radical revision suggested by his 
references to ‘inversion’. This reliance was so close, in fact, as to suggest Marx did not 
need to provide an account of the emergence of ‘species being’ for Hegel had, in large 
part, already done so. 
This is even more likely when the breadth of discussion, both within the Idealist tradition 
and elsewhere, concerning the conflict between concepts or consciousnesses of the 
self and their practical enactment, is considered. This conflict or tension was seen as 
the driver of change in both the Idealist and Romantic traditions. Fichte, for example, 
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exemplified the Idealist perspective in his characterisation of the struggle of the self to 
fully express itself. Hegel captured the extremity of this conflict in the confrontations with 
death that figured so prominently in his Phenomenology. The concept of ‘expression’, 
as used by rationalists like Spinoza and Leibniz, and in the works of the Romantics, 
similarly grappled with the tensions between different states of enactment of being. 
These tensions, and their capacity to promote change, were central to debates within 
Marx’s time: so much so as to require no repetition by him. 
Marx did, however, reverse some aspects of Hegel’s account. Rather than initiate the 
change in consciousness with a life and death struggle, Marx ended with it. Following 
Hegel, Marx treated the experience of servitude, even within alienated relations, as 
initially experienced as one of independence—that of the ‘free’ labourer. Having been 
born into a capitalist mode of production, participation in its relations involved no change 
in status for a worker. Rather, the extremity of alienation, over time, worked to 
undermine her or his self-image as an independent individual. The process of 
alienation, rather than confirming the previous shock to consciousness, became the 
means of its undoing. However, rather like Hegel’s Servant, a person experiencing 
alienation within the capitalist system could resist its prompts to change by re-
discovering, re-interpreting and re-inventing a sense of independence. Here, like 
Hegel’s Servant, Marx imagined that this resilience could only be overcome in the face 
of extreme and inescapable corporeal deprivation. Marx expected this to follow from 
capitalism’s inevitable and escalating drive for surplus value and, with that, its 
increasing encroachment upon the private sphere and upon the person’s health, 
wellbeing and capacity for reproduction. 
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Marx understood capitalism’s extremities of alienation—its extreme application of the 
fantasy of freedom and separation—as the forge within which we could encounter the 
substance of our humanity. It was the delusional, anorexic, excessive shedding of our 
objective (or corporeal) selves that would push us towards the precipice of recognition. 
In short, he expected that the capitalist system would, ultimately, to remain its self—the 
system that grows through the accumulation of capital—devour its self, its very means 
of production. The relations of production, in other words, would confront the dilemma of 
Hegel’s ascetic consciousness, driven to try to deny its very bodily functions. In order to 
‘be’, capitalism relies upon its relations of production to create surplus value. These 
relations, in turn, are reliant upon wage earners surviving on the lowest possible level of 
subsistence wages. Absent the expansion of new markets, new profits would be 
produced by greater efficiencies, which would often extract more from existing workers 
or replace them altogether. Marx imagined that, as capitalism became a world system, it 
would approach the exhaustion of those growth opportunities and, with that, eventually, 
confront the limitations of the corporeal.  
Marx’s confidence in the transformative potential of the corporeal is rooted in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology. It was the failure, in practice, in living out the denial of desire, and of 
our corporeality, having done all that was possible to give effect to those denials. The 
concept of the independent, non-corporeal self, founded as it is in experience, cannot 
be readily dispelled by logic. To attempt to do so is to remain, most often, within the 
self-supporting, and blinding, confines of that logic. It is to remain mired in the deceits of 
ideology. It was only through praxis—a praxis grounded only in extremity—that so 
central and profound a belief could be challenged. 
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THE PROMISE OF ALIENATION – PAIN 
The promise of alienation ironically acknowledges the character of corporeal being as 
both a way of being within an intersection of relationships, and as the push/pull and 
limitations of those relationships. Mortality, as the absolute limit of being in individual 
terms was, in Feuerbach’s eyes, the catalyst by which we discover that our substance 
did not reside in our separate selves, but in the species. In confronting death—that is, 
the realisation that there is no individual infinity—an individual was also confronted with 
the experience of continuity, of infinity, in the species (1980, 17). For Feuerbach (1980, 
132), in confronting death, a person faced absolute, undeniable limitation and that his 
“true being” was “determination”. Moreover, this revelation was not limited to the time of 
death, but could follow from the experience of limitation and of pain (1980, 126). For 
Feuerbach, pain was the means by which we moved to realise our character as ‘species 
beings’ because it produced a confrontation with being or substance itself:  
…you experience limit and absolute, not-being and being all at once...you 
possess at once the feeling of the nothingness of the totality of your single being 
on its own and the feeling of sole lordship and reality of the substance that is 
perfect in itself (1980, 95). 
Feuerbach, however, did not clearly say how this experience of pain effected the 
change in the sense of self. Having located the potential for transformation in the 
experience of pain and separation, it was but a small step for Marx to return to Hegel 
and draw on his dialectic of consciousness. This return, however, involved Marx’s most 
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pointed divergence from Hegel’s account. The invasive and destabilising effects of the 
corporeal—desire—faded from prominence in the Phenomenology with the emergence 
of modern society. It had been surpassed, sublated—still present and preserved—but 
was no longer a significant influence. Hegel assumed a certain economic efficacy and 
equity within the modern state—expecting that the majority of people would have their 
corporeal needs met, at least enough as to end the common experience of corporeal 
insecurity. Marx squarely contradicted this assumption. In his view, the processes of the 
modern state worked to the opposite effect, dramatically heightening the impact of the 
corporeal and the experience of an insecure, unstable self. Moreover, his materialist 
‘inversion’ suggests another dimension to his critique: that, irrespective of the bounty of 
the state, irrespective of the mode of production, the corporeal (Hegel’s Desire) 
remained a continuing source of instability and insecurity—a continued prompt towards 
a different sense of self. 
Marx’s theories of alienation, derived from Hegel’s reflections on the ‘Master/Servant 
relationship’ and the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’, developed Feuerbach’s insights into the 
importance of corporeal activity and resistance and the primacy of that experience as 
our anchor, axis and portal into the world. Corporeal labour, at the extremity of 
enslavement or alienation, has the potential to directly challenge the idea of the 
independent self by forcing a confrontation with limitation and pain. Hegel (2003, 124-5) 
held that it had this potential, even in the absence of life-threatening circumstances, as: 
The unhappy consciousness...finds itself merely desiring and toiling; it is not 
consciously and directly aware that so to find itself rests upon the inner certainty 
375 
 
of its self, and that its feeling of real being is this self-feeling. Since it does not in 
its own view have that certainty, its inner life really remains still a shattered 
certainty of itself; that confirmation of its own existence that it would receive 
through work and enjoyment is, therefore, just as tottering and insecure. 
In forcing a confrontation of labourer and object within alienated conditions, the labour 
process forces a confrontation with the contradictions of the modern idea of the self. 
Labour is the process—the action or praxis—of the unification of being and object, of 
the appropriation of the object, in which we confront and express our humanity. This is 
the strength of the central emphasis placed by Hegel and then Marx upon activity. 
Corporeal activity—labour—provides for this confrontation, and for the conflict of the 
experience of alienation, of having the object of one’s expression torn away. The 
subsistence wages proffered in place of the objects of labour are no real substitute. 
Offered at minimal levels, they provide limited capacity to secure one’s needed objects. 
Moreover, the appropriation effected by means of that ‘pimp’, money, as Marx described 
it in the 1844 Manuscripts (1975e, 375), is never the equivalent for the expressive act of 
appropriation. Labour, as daily experienced in a capitalist mode of production, 
potentially provided the extremity of objectification—of alienation from one’s necessary 
objects—that Marx saw as the ‘secret’ of Hegel’s Phenomenology.  
 
THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF PAIN 
In his early work Marx (1975e, 389-90) described the human condition as both 
“passionate” and “suffering”. Those experiences were of the human essence, as our 
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corporeality made a person dependent upon certain objects and painfully incomplete 
without them. To live without them, to live in separation from one’s necessary objects, 
was to experience alienation. The prolonged experience of that pain was, for Marx, 
potentially transformative. However, Marx did not explain why corporeal pain had that 
potential or why it could overcome the resilient belief in an independent, non-corporeal 
self. 
Some insight is suggested by the works of Epicurus and Lucretius. They held that, in 
extremity, sensation served to disrupt the circularity of rationalisation. Sensation could 
force us to make a different sense of our experiences and overcome false, distorting, 
unsettling social beliefs. As Nussbaum (2009, 199) has pointed out, their argument is 
that an event can have such dramatic impact as to completely disrupt established ways 
of thinking and acting, when “the soul is left raw and unprotected, simply perceiving 
itself”. That is, such an event can render our pre-existing concepts so inadequate to 
explain that experience as to force their surrender and the search for new meaning. 
Epicurus’ (and Lucretius’) accounts of sensation enabling access to the real, even when 
distorted by false beliefs, suggest some grounds for Marx’s confidence in the revelatory 
character of material labour and his recognition of those sensations’ mediation and 
distortion by false beliefs (together with the difficulty of altering those beliefs). Marx’s 
(2006b, 43, 98) emphasis on praxis echoes his description of Epicurus’ treatment of the 
senses as “heralds of the [truth]”. This suggestion gains further weight when Hegel’s 
Phenomenology is considered, given the catalytic function that corporeal pain served in 
those accounts.  
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Scarry’s book, The Body In Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (1985), 
directly considers the transformative potential of pain. Fracchia (2008, 38) identified her 
as “one of the few critics…whose work follows Marx in his corporeal turn”. Beginning 
with the frequently challenged production of pain through processes of destruction 
(torture and war), Scarry (1985, 22) proceeded to consider the neglected moral 
significance of creative processes. In doing so, she provided some further insight into 
the intimate relation between alienation and pain, and to the centrality of “expression”, 
to a corporeal, objective being: 
All intentional states…take intentional objects: the more completely the object 
expresses and fulfils (objectifies) the state, the more it permits a self- 
transformation…conversely the more the state is deprived of an adequate object, 
the more it approaches the condition of physical pain (1985, 261).  
Scarry (1985, 171) explored the connections between labour and pain: in her view, 
“work [was]…a diminution of pain: the aversive intensity of pain becomes in work 
controlled discomfort”. This diminution, however, is dependent upon the person being 
able to appropriate that object or to enable what Scarry described as a “referentiality” or 
reciprocity between creator and object. Within alienated relations of labour, however, 
that reciprocity is absent, and work is painful. It is this aspect of Scarry’s work that 
grounds the intimate connection between her reflections and those of Marx. As Scarry 
(1985, 258) herself put it: 
If the monumentally complex substance of Capital were to be described in a 
single sentence, it could be described as an exhausting analysis of the steps and 
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stages by which the obligatory referentiality of fictions ceases to be obligatory: it 
is an elaborate retracing of the path along which the reciprocity of artifice has lost 
its way back to its human source. 
Both Marx and Scarry were deeply engaged with elucidating the circumstances in which 
that reciprocity could be re-established. Alienation and its pain were central to their 
thought. These experiences provided the catalyst for the concept of the independent, 
non-corporeal self to ‘totter’ and fall. Scarry went further than Marx, though. She argued 
that it was in the extremity of pain or alienation that the corporeal ‘betrayed’ the 
separate sense of the self: 
The ceaseless, self-announcing signal of the body in pain, at once so empty and 
undifferentiated and so full of blaring adversity, contains not only the feeling ‘my 
body hurts’ but the feeling ‘my body hurts me’…Pain is a pure physical 
experience of negation, an immediate sensory rendering of ‘against’, of 
something being against one, and of something one must be against (1985, 47, 
52)  
In pain, the corporeal betrays our sense of self. In pain, just as Hegel imagined, two 
senses of the self clash ‘internally’. Whilst corporeal pain can be ambiguous and 
reconciled with a dual sense of self in many situations, in extremity, however, it has the 
capacity to overwhelm the distance and sense of separation on which that 
understanding relies. 
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Above all, in Scarry’s view, the extremity of pain dissolves the boundary between inner 
and outer senses of the self by overwhelming our sense of boundaries and separation 
(1985, 53). She saw pain as overwhelming and extracting the self from the privacy and 
security of the ‘internal’, notwithstanding its determined resistance. Pain reversed the 
dualist hierarchy, compromised our abstracted individuated independence, and undid 
our sense of self. In doing so, it returns us to the ‘original’ experience of the clash 
between the unlimited, non-corporeal with the limitations of the corporeal. However, in 
that extremity, we do without the ready resolution provided by the dominant model of 
the self. Pain overwhelms, disrupts and destroys the common-sense, unquestioned 
status of that perspective on the world. It does so to such an extent that Scarry 
describes it as overwhelming and obliterating language. Its rawness renders previous 
ways of making sense of the corporeal obsolete: 
Physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing 
about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and 
cries a human being makes before language is learned (1985, 4). 
Extreme pain gives us access to our prelinguistic state. It denies us the capacity to 
speak in terms of our former concepts. It tears and strips away the layers we have 
constructed for our selves until all that remains is a remnant, an abstraction. In 
Feuerbach’s words (1980, 95), “in [our] pain, [we] assent to and affirm the essence, the 
species, the absolutely perfect universal, the actuality of which [we] deny in [our] 
understanding”. 
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For Marx, the extremity of alienation also reduces us to an acute human abstraction; a 
person deprived of objects, with little left to give (only her or his labour). With that labour 
alienated—given over to another’s control—it strips us of that remaining sense of 
separation. In extremity, it returns us to the state in which we first made sense of painful 
contradiction (the ‘original’ experience), but stripped of the capacity to draw comfort 
from the dominant way of making sense of that experience. Kojeve, in his lectures on 
Hegel’s Phenomenology (1980, 22 and 47-8), emphasised just this point: 
There is nothing fixed in him. He is ready for change; in his very being, he is 
change, transcendence, transformation, ‘education’; he is historically becoming 
at its origin, in his essence, in his very existence...Through animal fear of death 
(angst) the [Servant] experienced the dread or the Terror...of Nothingness, of his 
nothingness. He caught a glimpse of himself as nothingness, he understood that 
his whole existence was but a ‘surpassed’...a Nothingness in Being. Now...the 
profound basis of Hegelian anthropology is formed by this idea that Man is not a 
Being that is an eternal identity...Hence the [Servant], who – through fear of 
death – grasps the (human) Nothingness that is at the foundation of his (natural) 
Being, understands himself, understands Man better than the Master does. 
This is the contradiction Marx relied upon as the catalyst for a different consciousness. 
Whilst Marx concentrated on economic cycles—booms and busts—without detailing 
their connection to a revolutionary consciousness, that consciousness rested on the 
non-negotiable demands of the corporeal. In an economic crisis, the capacity to ensure 
the subsistence of all people, and not just the proletariat, was put in jeopardy. In such a 
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crisis, the potential to confront the demands of the corporeal becomes much greater 
and, with it, a greater capacity for a new way of thought.  
This extreme experience does not, however, simply produce a blank slate. Hegel’s 
dialectic of the master/servant and the ‘unhappy consciousness’ suggests that the 
experience not only denies the capacity to adhere to the notion of the abstract, 
independent self, but drives a recognition of one’s dependence on others or, as Hegel 
(2003, 109) put it, we get “a gift from above” that leads us to acknowledge that we owe 
our life to others. The development of consciousness charted in the Phenomenology as 
mutual recognition suggests that it is the “ego that is ‘we’, a plurality of egos and ‘we’ 
that is a single ego” (Hegel 2003, 103, 104). This provides the foundation of 
consciousness as part of, and dependent upon, one’s species. It is the argument of this 
thesis that it is equally the foundation for Marx’s description of communist humanity in 
the Grundrisse (1973, 242-3): 
...they are not indifferent to one another, but integrate with one another, have 
need of one another; so that individual B, as objectified in the commodity, is a 
need of individual A, and vice versa; so that they stand not only in an equal, but 
also in a social, relation to one another. This is not all. The fact that this need on 
the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other, and vice versa, and 
that one is capable of producing the object of the need of the other, and that 
each confronts the other as owner of the object of the other’s need, this proves 
that each of them reach beyond his own particular need etc, as a human being, 
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and that they relate to one another as human beings; that their common species 
being is acknowledged by all. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For Marx, the long-standing idea of the self as independent and free of corporeal 
limitation was both flawed and oppressive. It presented alienation as a virtue and 
expression of the human essence. Its flaws and inadequacies, as a descriptor of the 
human condition, destined it to fail. He recognised, however, that this concept, and its 
consequential oppressions, would not be readily overturned as they are founded in the 
human condition. They are founded in the tensions, conflicts and pains that are inherent 
to an interdependent or intersectual corporeal being. They are founded in the daily 
experience of contradiction and resistance and effort—in the common experience or 
sensation of life. As such, Marx recognised that these beliefs and oppressive practices 
are not based on logic, and will not be responsive to it. Those beliefs were, for Marx, 
and those he drew on, so deeply founded, that only death or severe pain could undo 
them. For Marx, the transformative potential of pain—or alienation—lay within their 
oppressive extremities. Whilst not explained by him, the works of Epicurus, Lucretius, 
Hegel and others suggest that this ‘twin edged’ potential lies in the capacity of pain to 
overwhelm us and to deny, without limitation, our capacity to master and ‘make’ sense 
of ourselves. It lies in the loss of capacity to extricate ourselves from, and hence our 
forced confrontation with, the corporeal or material world. 
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CHAPTER NINE – A More Human Language 
 
This thesis is borne of everyday experience, and seeks to respond to the pain, joy and 
promise of that experience. Through it, I seek to respect that pain, which has so often 
been dismissed as unspeakable, at least in polite company. I seek to promote a 
language, a way of speaking of a human life, and of human dignity, that does not brand 
that pain as negligible or bearable without the simple decency of acknowledging its 
presence, and its difficulties. More than this, I seek to celebrate those joys and 
moments of exuberance that are too often trivialised as leisure or relief, and as shallow 
and unrevealing. I seek a language that values that pleasure and does not dismiss its 
promise. To that end, I have explored both the meaning and the potential of Marx’s 
theory of ‘species being’. 
In doing so, perhaps inevitably, a larger discussion has been entered: one that finds, in 
the expanse of human experience in the world, surprising resonances between the 
anxiety and pain of nineteenth-century factory workers and the aches and efforts of 
artisans and artists. Whilst the arc between them might appear long and wide—to adopt 
the words of Martin Luther King (in Washington 1986, 52)—it shares the common 
trajectory of repetition and of an absorbing, transforming immersion: a sense of unity 
within, and expansion beyond, the boundaries of previous experience. I argue that 
corporeal experience, whether in extremity or exhilaration, has the potential to take us 
beyond our current understanding of our selves. It has the potential—even in its more 
ordinary daily repetitive rhythms and prompts—to suggest a different way to make 
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sense of our selves: a way to embrace that part of our selves we call the corporeal and 
restore it to a full human dignity, and to end the schism that has divided the Western 
sense of the self. A ‘more human language’ will not only be inclusive of the corporeal, 
but borne of experience within it.  
For all the pains, anxieties and difficulties that follow from our intersectual, 
interdependent being, there lies, by virtue of the same vulnerability, the capacity to 
exceed our limited understandings of our selves. There is the potential to experience a 
sense of unity, of immersion and expansion, of “ontological synchronicity” (Howe, 2003, 
99), as the corporeal is of the essence of our being. 
That, essentially, was the key claim made by Marx. The foundation of our selves, of our 
actions, and our pains and our joys, resides in our unity with the world and in a knowing 
or conscious engagement in that unity. To be human is not to be separate, independent 
or self-reliant. It is not to be distinct from the world—however described—but intimately 
bound up with it.  
So intimate was this connection for Marx that he regarded the world as our inorganic 
body. So deeply dependent are we on that body that it makes us a ‘suffering’, 
‘passionate’, vulnerable being, one that can only enjoy stability and security through the 
social interaction Marx described as the mode of production. Moreover, this open, 
involved character of being makes the experience of interdependence and of 
limitation—of always being bound up in others and the world, rather than free of all 
constraint—an ongoing one, and a repetitive goad to action. It has driven an effort to 
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subdue the world and free us from the pangs and punishments of desire and of 
vulnerability.  
So successful has this social ordering of nature become that it is easy to overlook—or 
reject as pathologies or minor exceptions—its ongoing resistance, and the ebb and flow, 
clash and contradiction of those various relations or forces that comprise a society and 
its members. Like a consistent rhythm, the profound influence of our corporeal character 
is easily forgotten in the face of the melodies played out within its frame, yet the 
corporeal remains a defining feature of the human condition. 
In this thesis, Marx’s theory has been explored, given its focus on inverting the privilege 
that has long been given to the location of our identity in the non-corporeal, and as 
separate from the world about us. It has been used to immerse our selves in our world 
and in those around us, in the hope that we recognise that nothing—not a human or any 
other being—exists independently in this world, but only in an ever increasingly 
complex, fragile, and extraordinary interdependence. It has been explored in order to 
promote a better recognition of the essentiality, diversity and promise of the corporeal, 
and an acceptance that it is not some burden upon, or contamination of, our essence, 
but central to it, and to its richest realisation. Looking to the future, and in response to 
debts present and past, it is hoped these explorations will help promote welfare policies 
that recognise both our interdependence and our corporeality and the influence both 
have on any person’s capacity to act. In particular, I hope this thesis demonstrates that 
the ideals of independence and self-reliance do not serve to promote human welfare or 
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wellbeing. All of these hopes rely upon making a new sense of our being—a sense 
which, for most, will seem non-sense.  
The realisation of these hopes turns upon changing the way we think, speak and act 
concerning the corporeal. It requires a more corporeal, and, thereby, ‘more human 
language’. This development of “a human understanding, and human language” was 
the task Feuerbach (cited in Wartofsky 1977, 196) asserted in 1843. Marx (1975d, 276-
7) took up that task, appreciating that: 
We would not understand a human language and it would remain ineffectual. 
From the one side, such a language would be felt to be begging, imploring and 
hence humiliating. It could be used only with feelings of shame or debasement. 
From the other side, it would be received as an impertinence or insanity and so 
rejected. We are so estranged from our human essence that the direct language 
of man strikes us as an offence against the dignity of man, whereas the 
estranged language of objective values appears as the justified, self confident 
and self-acknowledged dignity of man incarnate (emphasis in original).  
Marx, drawing on Hegel and others, appreciated that our activity in the world, as driven 
by a fundamental, constitutional lack or incompleteness—a dependence—made the 
corporeal inescapable, and essential, to all that we are, and can be. He appreciated that 
the scale of the corporeal’s resistance had shaped all previous human experience in its 
demands—a resistance that required the capitalist marshalling of human activity and 
resources on an unprecedented scale. Marx appreciated the uneasy, deep-seated 
instability of the relations between our organic and inorganic natures. It is the same 
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unease that is central to the long tradition of debate concerning ‘substance’. Marx’s 
works hint at the depth of that dis-ease or anxiety that is characteristic of the human 
condition and the way in which a valorisation of the corporeal “would be received as an 
impertinence or insanity and so rejected” (1975d, 276-7).  
Through this thesis, I seek to progress that same task—the promotion of ‘a more human 
language’—and mindful of those difficulties described above. I am mindful that it 
contests a way of ‘making sense’ of our selves—and of our experiences of conflict and 
contradiction—that is well founded in our experience as corporeal creatures, and from 
which many take great comfort.  
Yet this thesis is founded in hope drawn from the very source of those difficulties—the 
shared pains and anxieties of our existence. Drawing on Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx’s 
legacy, and on the insights of feminist and existentialist works, I believe there is hope 
for a different and better sense of our selves from what we have, so often, valued least 
and avoided so diligently. In those times in which our sense of our selves as embodied 
minds, as minds dominating bodies, is overwhelmed through pain, illness or injury, we 
are forced to confront our limitations. We find ourselves out-of-step, outside the ordinary 
rhythms in which we are our known selves, those rhythms with which we ordinarily 
experience the relations between our corporeal and non-corporeal selves, and between 
our organic and inorganic bodies. We find a sense of self for which we have no words 
(or none that preserve a sense of our full, dignified humanity). In those spaces—in 
those extremes—Hegel, Marx, and others such as Scarry, have found the opportunity to 
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make a new sense of our sensations of self. They found promise in limitation and 
failure.  
In this chapter, I look to build on the foundations laid by Marx. I argue that the potential 
of corporeal experience to prompt a different understanding of our selves is far more 
immanent and promising than Marx realised. Drawing on feminist, existentialist and, to a 
lesser degree, postmodern and post-humanist scholarship, I argue that the experience 
of corporeal instability and anxiety is a much more everyday experience, and offers a 
greater opportunity for change, than Marx allowed for, given his emphasis on extreme 
conditions. This is not to ignore the intensity with which the corporeal is now disciplined. 
The same literature highlights the manner in which the discipline of the body has 
become one of the most prominent features of contemporary Western society. It is, 
however, to argue that the openness and vulnerability of our bodies to discipline is also 
the site from which we can experience our selves in ways that contradict the Liberal 
view, with its foundations in the traditional debates about substance. I argue that those 
corporeal contradictions continue to provide prompts towards transformation and that 
those prompts, if combined with a different way of making sense of them—a more 
human language—hold the promise of the development of a more just and 
interdependent way of life. 
 
AN INHUMAN LANGUAGE 
Marx viewed the proletariat as the class that could—and would—speak for all. He 
anticipated the extremity of alienation as providing them with an awareness of their 
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essential (inter)dependency. He anticipated this consciousness not just as a class 
consciousness, but as a truly human or species consciousness. Western society, 
however, has not reached the extremity of alienation anticipated by Marx, at least not to 
that extent necessary to secure species consciousness. The emergence of the modern 
welfare state and consumer society has served to blunt (for most) the extremity of 
deprivation anticipated by Marx. This is not to say, however, that Marx’s confidence was 
misplaced. The prompts provided by the corporeal, as relied upon by Hegel, Feuerbach 
and Marx, remain. Moreover, I argue that those prompts, if considered in light of other 
schools of thought, particularly feminist, existentialist and post-humanist thought, are far 
more frequent and immanent than Marx realised. The promise of transformation is not 
limited to extreme circumstances, but is also present in other places and practices of 
corporeal repetition. There is, in those places and practices, a surprising beauty to be 
seen and explored within the trajectory, if not the actual terms, of Marx’s theory. There 
the promise of the open, fragile, character of our being and of the beauty of the full 
realisation of our interconnections is suggested. 
The corporeal prompts towards a different sense of self are not limited to the proletariat 
or to the relations highlighted by Hegel, Marx and Scarry. The roots of those prompts in 
desire (in a sense of incompletion and of inadequacy to independently salve that desire) 
are paralleled by other experiences of the corporeal, such as illness and disability. 
Those suffering from chronic illnesses report similar reactions to those experiencing 
betrayal and disruption in extremity. Kleinman (cited in Shildrick 1997, 168) considered 
how serious illness challenges our unconscious reliance on the “fidelity of our bodies”, 
so much so that illness seems a “betrayal” placing us “under siege”. Margrit Shildrick 
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(1997, 168-9), drawing on Drew Leder’s work, similarly described the body as ordinarily 
invisible to us—an “absence” —with illness “forcing” a new awareness of the body, 
“...but that new awareness is not integrated into the sense of self; rather, the body is 
perceived, but remains other: ‘The body is no longer alien-as-forgotten, but precisely as-
remembered, a sharp and searing presence threatening the self’…”. The experience of 
disabling or limiting pain or illness betrays our belief and experience of the corporeal as 
a mechanism subject to the non-corporeal’s ‘beck and call’. It betrays the separation 
and freedom of the non-corporeal self. Havi Carel (2008, 7, 38), in recounting the onset 
of lymphangioleiomyomatosis, a rare disease that progressively reduces lung functions 
with fatal effect, described how she “relinquished the sense of control over [her] life that 
[she] previously had” and how she “lament[ed] [her] helplessness, [her] body’s betrayal”. 
Disabling pain and illness reveals our unity and interdependence—the incapacity of the 
non-corporeal to be realised in the absence of the corporeal. They reveal the intimate 
involvement of the corporeal in the non-corporeal, breaching the imagined boundaries, 
and highlighting the immanence of non-being within being. They demonstrate that our 
non-corporeal character does not meet the traditional insistence on separation. The 
corporeal, in its dysfunction, “totters and shakes” (Hegel 2003, 111-2) the independent 
sense of self, in a manner comparable to that suffered by Hegel’s Servant and Marx’s 
proletariat.  
Accounts of others who do not conform to the traditional debate about substance speak 
of a similar experience of difference and resistance. Their experiences range from 
chronic illness, disability, old age and poverty, to women’s experiences of menstruation 
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and menopause. Each involves a grinding, continuing confrontation with the resistant 
rhythms of our corporeality. Each speaks of the volatility of the body and its betrayal of 
the traditional debate about substance. Each speaks of a different way of making sense 
of our selves, and of a more promising, more humane, experience of that corporeality.  
Many women have written of experiences of their bodies that canvass a different sense 
of the corporeal and of the self. Most women, from a young age, are regularly reminded 
of the assertiveness of their body, and the need for its maintenance and care. They 
experience a life in which the cycles of fertility assert themselves and regularly (absent 
intervention) contravene the imagined barrier of mind and matter, non-corporeal and 
corporeal, of dominator and dominated. For example, Martin (2001, 93) points out that: 
problems arise precisely where menstruation does not belong, according to our 
cultural categories: in the realms of work and school outside the home…[Many 
women find this a “hassle”.] The “hassle” refers to the host of practical difficulties 
involved in getting through the day of menstruating, given the way our time and 
space are organised in schools and places of work. 
It is also, often, the experience of menopause. Here Martin (2001, 177) again points out 
that: 
The general cultural ideology of separation of home and work appears…when 
women are embarrassed at having their menopausal state revealed publicly 
through hot flashes. As with the hassle of menstruation, women are asked to do 
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what is nearly impossible: keep secret a part of their selves that they cannot help 
but carry into the public realm and that they often wear blatantly on their faces. 
Theirs is an experience, if aired and considered, that richly contrasts the assumptions of 
non-corporeal freedom and independence, and demonstrates that lives of expression, 
meaning and worth do not have to be founded in domination of the body and the 
corporeal world. Women’s experiences provide for an alternative sense of substance. 
As Martin (2001, 197 and 200) has argued: 
women…have it literally within them to confront the story [society] tells us with 
another story, based in their own experience…Because of the nature of their 
bodies, women far more than men cannot help but confound [the] distinctions [of 
nature versus culture] every day…Women interpenetrate what were never really 
separate realms. They literally embody the opposition, or contradiction, between 
the worlds…Because their bodily processes go with them everywhere, forcing 
them to juxtapose biology and culture, women glimpse every day a conception of 
another sort of social order. 
Bordo (2003, 36) makes a similar point. It is an experience of limitation that has too 
often been unjustly amplified by the imposition of labours of corporeal care on women – 
of cooking, cleaning and caring for others. It is, however, that same immersion in the 
demands of the corporeal that has enabled so many women to make a different sense 
of their selves. It has, as Carol Gilligan (1993) has explored, enabled some women to 
experience and explore a mode of being based upon care, rather than domination – a 
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mode that promises a more representative image of our humanity and a sense of self 
founded in interdependence.  
To consider, even briefly, women’s experience of corporeality is to glimpse the poverty 
of the ideal of independence that founds the traditional debate about substance. If we 
expand that consideration to the diverse experiences of the aged, those with disabilities, 
and those in poverty, for example, it reveals how few lives the equation of the human 
substance with the non-corporeal represents. Moreover, it is to appreciate that this 
definition of the human substance involves an act of profound cruelty, as it denies most 
people of the respect and dignity that follows from embodying the ideals of our truest 
humanity. 
This was Marx’s objection to the liberal foundations of political economy. As canvassed 
in previous chapters, Marx objected to an abstract definition of our humanity—one that 
focussed on the non-corporeal, such as the will, and treated it as independent of the 
corporeal. As such, his objection was to the liberal conception of humanity, and its 
foundations in the traditional debates about substance. This “language of objective 
values” reflects our alienation from “our human essence” (1975d, 276-7), and does not 
describe the majority of humanity. It sets a standard for recognition that most cannot 
comply with. The failure to recognise this, notwithstanding that these people contribute 
to a shared life through the dominant mode of production, makes for an unequal burden. 
It makes for an oppressive, inhuman language and oppressive way of life. This was the 
core of Marx’s criticism, and a language he was confident would, in time, given the 
experience of the pain of alienation, be abandoned.  
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AN IMMANENT POTENTIAL 
Marx’s dialectical model of the self emphasises the ‘needy’ character of humanity and 
describes that character as ‘passionate’, so as to highlight the extent it is shaped by 
need. In Marx’s view, the corporeal was always incomplete, always in the process of 
change. Whilst the mode by which that character’s demands are met might change, 
those demands remained immanent. Whilst they could be subordinated, postponed and 
distorted, the material character of the human condition limited the extent of any such 
negotiation. At base, the corporeal sought to realise its potential, even when opposed 
by the non-corporeal.  
Marx’s descriptions of the working class bore out that underlying resistance. Whether 
through his descriptions of the deformities following from alienated labour or the chronic 
illness and malnutrition following from inadequate wages, the underlying critique was 
that capitalist practices did not meet the foundational needs of the human condition. 
Those descriptions documented the resistance of the corporeal to early capitalism.  
My argument is that the experience of extreme corporeal pain, and thereby the potential 
to realise a different sense of self, is a far more common experience than Marx 
acknowledged. Moreover, I argue that potential can be realised outside the extremities 
imagined by Marx. The volatility of the corporeal means that it challenges the borders 
and disciplines that found the traditional approach to substance every day. 
Notwithstanding the demands of our will, the resistance of the corporeal is 
commonplace, ongoing and effective. We awake to its demands for expulsion (urination 
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and defecation) and incorporation (eating), which are repeated throughout the day. 
Throughout the day we experience its demands for rest, which we often combat in 
varied ways, only to ultimately succumb to them as the day nears its end. The corporeal 
sets the limits of our days and our activities—not our will. 
The immanence and impact of the resistance of the corporeal is evidenced by the great 
range of social prohibitions and expectations that deny dignity and acceptance to those 
who expose the body’s unruly character before others. Cregan (2006, 30-1) emphasises 
these restrictions wide and powerful application: 
The fact that people feel so ashamed of incontinence, uncontrolled flatulence, 
and any of the other infirmities of ageing or disability, is a direct product of the 
internalisation of…civilizing standards…This kind of dictum…leads to the 
pathologisation of what are essentially natural bodily functions. Incontinence, 
impotence and even pregnancy thereby become…conditions to be treated and 
contained. 
This discipline or domestication of the body is a key fixture of modern society, as 
illustrated by Foucault’s work (1980, 1990a, 1990b, 1995). As Susan Bordo (2003, 149) 
has argued, our “contemporary culture appears more obsessed than previous eras with 
the control of the unruly body”. In these times: 
preoccupation with fat, diet and slenderness are not abnormal…[and] may 
function as one of the most powerful normalising mechanisms of our century, 
ensuring the production of self-monitoring and self-disciplining “docile bodies” 
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sensitive to any departure from social norms and habituated to self-improvement 
and self-transformation in the service of those norms (2003, 186). 
The centrality of this discipline reflects Foucault’s (1990, 94-96) recognition of the 
presence of resistance, or at least its potential, however muted, wherever power is 
exercised. Considering feminist perspectives, Shildrick (1997, 16) observed that the 
discipline of the body may “evidence detachment, even indifference”, yet it equally 
reflects “a persisting anxiety posed by the threat of corporeal engulfment”. So pre-
occupied have the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries been with the discipline of 
the body, Bordo (2003, 150, 153) characterises that concern as “a central modus 
operandi for the control of contemporary bourgeois anxiety…”. 
This is, as Cerni (2007) points out, a function of the mode of production that now 
dominates in Western societies. With much of the direct or productive labour now 
undertaken outside of the West, the mode of production that Cerni describes as service 
capitalism remains profoundly disturbed by the corporeal, notwithstanding the supposed 
freedom gained through that form of production: 
Their power [that of ‘the unproductive body and the objects it consumes’], 
although reduced to that of banal, familiar and immediate objects, is much more 
close and suffocating…even as it feels liberated from formal social sanctions, the 
unproductive self is continually assailed by feelings of personal anxiety, by 
insecurities about its own, most intimate personal existence…The body, the 
object, has become prison and limit to our experience (2007, paragraph 43). 
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To be accorded dignity in our society is then dependent on a person’s ability “to hide 
organic [or corporeal] processes” (Douglas cited in Cregan 2006, 105). However, 
feminist writers, such as Grosz (1994), Shildrick (1997) and Bordo (2003), have pointed 
out how precarious that dignity is, given how little the corporeal reflects the traditional 
debate about substance. Far from being controlled and not influencing or challenging 
our will: 
Bodily fluids flow, they seep, they infiltrate; their control is a matter of vigilance, 
never guaranteed. In this sense, they betray a certain irreducible materiality; they 
assert the priority of the body over subjectivity…They are undignified, nonpoetic, 
daily attributes of existence…that all must…face, live with, reconcile themselves 
to (Grosz 1994, 195). 
The everyday challenge presented by the corporeal has been extensively explored by 
Julia Kristeva. Kristeva (Cregan 2006, 96) describes the pre-linguistic (and underlying) 
state of the subject as the ‘Chora’, which is chaotic and involves no sense of the 
separate, independent self. That self is a cultural acquisition, and follows the process of 
learning a culture of “distance and detachment” —an acceptance and discipline of what 
is “good” and what is seen as “bad”: 
That rejection is played out through abjection. Abjection is a semiotic (linguistic), 
but also an embodied, phenomenon. It is the rejection of and revulsion at what 
both is and is not the body. This largely centres on bodily wastes because this is 
a point at which the infant understands that those products are not “me”. Blood, 
bile, phlegm, faeces, mucus, etc, are both of the body and not the body. They are 
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abject and abjected. Dealing with this evidence of the body’s boundaries is both 
necessary and dangerous to the self-constituting subject. One must abject 
(expel) the waste and enter the clean and ordered symbolic state to function 
effectively as a social being. But at the same time, the abject hovers at the 
margins of life, never fully abolished: one bleeds, one is sick, one shits. Abjected 
matter is a remnant of the uncontrollably chaotic Chora, which threatens to 
“irrupt” into (disrupt) the symbolic order (Cregan 2006, 96). 
The corporeal consistently challenges the independent, non-corporeal self. It constantly 
sheds, leaks, expels and demands our attention. It constantly contravenes the boundary 
upon which that sense of self is founded. Inevitably, regularly, the corporeal overwhelms 
the boundaries we imagine for it. It makes the threat of non-being, of not being the free 
imagined self, immanent: 
The indeterminacy of body boundaries challenges that most fundamental 
dichotomy between self and other, unsettling ontological certainty and 
threatening to undermine the basis on which the knowing self establishes control 
(Shildrick 1997, 34). 
Existentialist writers, such as Sartre (2003, 2007), considered the threat to a dignified or 
“authentic” human life in very similar terms. For the Existentialists, a dignified human life 
demanded a life lived with an awareness of the “radical duality between the human and 
the non-human” (Olson 1962, 135). That is, one that asserts the freedom of the human 
from the balance of the world. It is a life that conforms to the demands of the traditional 
debate about substance. Sartre saw this “authentic” existence as threatened by an 
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unnameable, potentially overwhelming presence. Olson (1962, 39) summed up Sartre’s 
view of the in-itself, Being: 
as a soft, shapeless dough or paste, something ugly and even obscene which 
threatens to engulf us…a solid and impervious mass, something hard and 
impenetrable before which we can only stand agape 
Olson (1962, 39)emphasised that, for Sartre: 
the in-itself is not a neutral something…from which man has nothing to fear. It is 
rather an absurd or contingent being of which we are constantly aware…and 
which poisons our existence, as Sartre’s choice of the word 
“nausea”…sufficiently indicates. The hero of the novel Nausea is made to say of 
this experience: “It took my breath…At one blow it was there…The diversity of 
things, their individuality, was nothing but an appearance, a varnish. The varnish 
had melted. What was left were monstrous soft masses in disorder, naked in 
frightening nudity”. 
Sartre’s language bears a marked resemblance to that used by some feminists, such as 
Elizabeth Grosz, to describe the leaky, disorderly body. My argument is that this 
similarity brings out the ground of the threat perceived by the Existentialists. It is the 
threat posed by the corporeal to the independent sense of the self, which contradicts 
the traditional approach to substance. It is the underlying, pervasive sense of “radical 
insecurity” Heidegger described (Barrett 1990, 136). Sartre’s language suggests the 
corporeal and its excess beyond the concepts we invent for it, its excess over the limits 
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our concepts imagine apply to it, and its threat to the imagined primacy of the non-
corporeal. This similarity is readily apparent in Grosz’s (1994, 194, 195) explanation that 
corporeal anxiety involves a “horror of submersion, the fear of being absorbed into 
something which has no boundaries of its own” —the disturbance and threat provoked 
by the corporeal because it refuses to conform to “the notion of an entity”. 
This is the anxiety explored by the Existentialists—the fear of that which cannot be 
named or categorised, which cannot be known and thereby made subject to control. It is 
the fear of that which is not a being within the Western tradition of substance. As Tillich 
(2000, 36-7) put it: 
…anxiety has no object, or rather, in a paradoxical phrase, its object is the 
negation of every object…He who is in anxiety is, insofar as it is mere anxiety, 
delivered to it without help…The only object is the threat itself, but not the source 
of the threat, because the source of the threat is nothingness… 
It is the threat posed by the corporeal to the independent concept of the self; a threat 
that cannot be readily located within the terms of a separatist, or substantive, ontology; 
a threat for which we have no concept. 
Once the threat of engulfment is understood in this way—as the threat posed by the 
corporeal to the independent self—Existentialist thought, with its emphasis on the 
immanence and potential of anxiety and anguish, reinforces my argument that the 
catalyst for a more human, or authentic, life may not be so remote nor extreme as 
death, extreme pain or extreme alienation. It may be immanent in life and far more 
401 
 
commonplace and accessible.53 Contrary to their focus on exceptional situations, I 
argue that the experience of corporeal resistance and limitation is no farther away than 
the kitchen sink or toilet. It is the constitutional experience, which is born of the need to 
re-constitute or reproduce our being—our independence in the traditional sense of 
substance—every day. 
This emphasis on the immanent, everyday influence of the material world is a central 
feature of recent post-humanist scholarship. Post-humanism presents the corporeal as 
active and resistant. It highlights the ‘stand-in-the-wayness’ of matter (Hodder 2012, 
L515) or the ‘negative power…of things’ (Bennett 2010, 190) and their ‘intransigent’ 
(Coole and Frost 2010, 1), ‘resistant’ and ‘recalcitrant’ (Bennett 2010, 190) character. 
This scholarship presents matter’s ‘positive, productive power’ (Bennett 2010: L191) 
and vitality (Bennett 2010, L21, Fraser et al 2005, Thrift 2008, 67). Matter is treated ‘as 
a transformative force in itself’ (Tuin and Dophyn 2010, 164) and ‘as a moving force, as 
push’ (Thrift 2008: 67). It is not merely resistant, but ‘dynamic’, ‘exuberant’, and 
‘effervescent’ (Barad 2007, 170, 177). For post-humanist writers, such as Coole and 
Frost (2010, 10), matter is engaged in ‘choreographies of becoming’ in which ‘”matter 
becomes” rather than…“matter is”’. So prominent and pervasive is the influence of 
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 The Existentialists emphasise the experience of finitude and instability as a catalyst for the realisation 
of a more human life. They argue that this experience is necessary to distinguish one’s self from the 
inauthenticity of habit—to distinguish one’s self from the relationships that, in their view, framed and 
deadened it. Grounded in an emphasis on anxiety and anguish, they asserted that the realisation of the 
independent self relied upon the anticipation—or imagination—of the one experience of pain and 
limitation, of non-being, that they saw as truly individual: one’s own death. However, one does not have to 
consider so abstract an experience—so unimaginable an experience—as one’s own death. Whilst the 
Existentialists justifiably understood the imagination of one’s own death as a catalyst for passion, they did 
not need to rely upon so abstract an experience. In part, they focus on the extraordinary event of death 
because they overemphasise the anaesthetising effects of habit upon the ordinary course of life. It is also 
because their Cartesian emphasis—with the exception of Heidegger—blinded them to the basis of the 
fear of death, which I argue, drawing on Marx and Feuerbach, is our corporeal experience. It blinded 
them to the proximity of other catalysts for a more human existence. 
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matter, that Elizabeth Grosz (cited in Hodder 2012: 1538) observed that ‘we need to 
accommodate things more than they accommodate us. Life is…the adaptation…to the 
exigencies of matter’. 
Whilst, absent extremity, the resistance of the corporeal may not produce the raw 
prelinguistic state Epicurus or Scarry imagined, my argument is that it will, through its 
volatility and instability, repeatedly provide prompts for a new understanding of the 
corporeal and, thereby, of the self. Grosz (1994, 118, 119) described this immanent 
potential in the course of criticising approaches that treat the body as a passive text, in 
referring to: 
a certain resistance of the flesh, a residue of its materiality left untouched by the 
body’s textualization…a [causality] or flesh outside of or prior to inscription, 
something which somehow, being unthought, resists determinate production. 
The experience of limitation and contradiction is commonplace. It is a part of our 
constitutive or reproductive processes and is not limited to the extremities discussed by 
Marx. The flowing, becoming character of our bodies repeatedly contradicts the idea of 
‘substance’ and prompts us towards a different language. The corporeal, as expressed 
in all the complexities of a mode of production, a way of life, provides prompts towards a 
different sense of self. Those prompts, whilst not so ready a catalyst as the extremities 
imagined by Hegel, Marx and Scarry, are part of the everyday experience of our 
corporeality. They make the potential for transformation—for a challenge to our current 
way of life—immanent, so much so that the discipline of the corporeal is likewise 
necessarily asserted and re-asserted every day.  
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Having regard to Marx’s works, and those he drew on, I have argued that our corporeal, 
intersectual character makes anxiety an endemic feature of the human condition. The 
instability of our bodies repeatedly challenges their treatment in terms of ‘substance’. 
They demand a constant discipline. In all cases, however, the permanent, 
comprehensive suppression of our corporeality is an impossible task. The corporeal is 
volatile. It is ever and always on the point of, and in the process of, transformation. It is 
always in the process of becoming. The body is not the passive, mechanical instrument 
of the separatist imagination, but the product of life-long vigilance and discipline. It is not 
the imagined domination of the non-corporeal, but a life-long losing battle, a condition of 
endemic anxiety. For the independent self, for that sense or concept of being, it is a life 
that is always under threat of disproof and annihilation, of non-being. It is a life of 
anxiety but, for that reason, also one of promise.  
 
THE OPENNESS OF HABIT 
This is not to claim some irresistible or irreversible effect for the prompt provided by the 
corporeal. That could only be seen as misconceived and naïve, considering the 
longevity of the capitalist system, and of patriarchy, amongst other oppressive social 
relations, which clearly demonstrate that the prompt has not realised its potential. 
Habit—ways of living and producing—has clearly resisted the promptings of the 
corporeal, at least in terms of any fundamental change to the outcomes of those 
relations.  
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As intersectual beings, we gain our continuity and apparent substance, in the traditional 
sense, from the discipline and support of habit. As explored above, Marx, drawing on 
Hegel, understood the essence of any being to be externally located in its objects, and 
the becoming—the activity and agency—of that being turning on unification with those 
objects. Hegel called the regular ways in which that process of unification occurred 
‘habit’. 
Marx, drawing on Hegel, pointed out that this process of unifying essence comprised 
activity, and that this activity was characterised by a particular style of action, a way of 
life or a mode of production into which each human being was born and lived. It was this 
mode of activity that provided the continuity in the self from the ‘outside’.54 The strength 
and momentum of habit—of a mode of production—is why Marx’s reference to a 
particular society as an ‘ensemble of relations’ was so apt: so steadying are its rhythms 
that participating members work together, producing a co-ordinated performance, one 
that tends to overshadow any individual discord.  
Habit could then be seen to deaden the sensitivity to opportunities for change. Habit, by 
its nature as repeated activity, can be seen to continue to discipline the individual, 
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 This emphasis on continuity through habit or repeated processes figures centrally in post-humanist 
scholarship. which, drawing on the works of Deleuze (Bennett 2010, Cheah 2010, Thrift 2008), Haraway 
(Braidotti 2010, Kruks 2010) and Latour (1993), explores notions of being founded on regular processes 
of unification. Building on Latour’s concepts of ‘hybrids’ and ‘actor networks’ (1993, Bennett 2010, Hodder 
2012, Thrift 2008), Haraway’s ‘cyborgs’ (Braidotti 2010, Kruks 2010), and Duleuze and Guattari’s 
‘assemblages’ (Bennett 2010, DeLanda 2006, Thrift 2008), these scholars refer to ‘assemblages’ 
(Anderson et al 2012, 173, Delueze and Guattari cited in Bennett 2010, L146, Hodder 2012, L1221), 
‘entanglements’ (Barad 2007, L19, Hodder 2012), ‘configurations’ (Hodder 2012, L367), ‘congealments’ 
(Barad 2007, 151), ‘condensations’ (Barad 2007, 167) and ‘nodal points’(Barad 2007, 167, Hodder 2012, 
L1298). They emphasise their instability as ‘throbbing confederations’ (Bennett2010, L468) that they are 
always on the cusp of change, always ‘becoming’ (Barad 2007, 150, Bennett 2010, L801-2, Coole and 
Frost 2010, 10) and so continuously engaged in processes ‘of assembly and disintegration’ (Coole and 
Frost 2010, 10) and ‘de-constitution and reconstitution’ (Delueze cited in Cheah 2010, 86). 
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bending the potential for change emerging from corporeal contradiction back towards 
the mould and mentality of the dominant way of life. In this sense, Malabou (2005, 75) 
drew on Hegel to conclude that: 
The Hegelian man is above all a man of habits, and that means, paradoxically, a 
disappearing subject. The more closely habit is studied, the more it becomes 
clear that human subjectivity is constituted in self-forgetting; consciousness and 
will, under the influence of repeated practice, win their force through a kind of 
self-absenting.  
The Existentialists describe this in terms of lifelessness or inauthenticity. For those who 
imagine a person conscious of, and resenting, these restrictions, but overwhelmed by 
them, the repetition of habit, of a mode of production, of alienated labour, might better 
resemble the punishment of Sisyphus. It might resemble the imposition, by forces 
beyond contest, of a tortured life of pointless effort.  
In those circumstances, it is easy to imagine that the sparks of initiative and resistance 
that are inherent in becoming will ordinarily be blown out by the sheer weight or 
momentum of habit. However, the influence of habit, or a mode of production, is not so 
comprehensive. It does not determine and still every tension and every contradiction in 
every individual. Moreover, a habit—or a mode of production—only has a stabilising or 
limiting effect because of the openness of individual beings (their openness to ‘external’ 
influences), which also involves openness to contrary influences, and thereby change. A 
habit or mode is not just the punishment of Sisyphus: a fruitless, painful repetition. 
There is promise and beauty in repetition. Alienated, repetitive labour is not just 
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comprehensive lifelessness or resignation, but an arena of potential transformation. 
This is a key suggestion from Hegel’s Master/Servant dialectic. There, repetition, the 
subjection to ongoing labour, enabled transformation and was of equal import to the 
‘shock’ of subordination in effecting that change. 
Richard Sennett (2008, 175) has aptly named the comfort and productivity of repetition 
as “rhythm”. As in music or dance, rhythm provides the basis upon which we construct 
the melody of our lives. It provides the stability from which we can identify and engage 
in our chosen projects and activities. It is the basis for the experience that Scarry 
described, and many experience, as disembodiment, of being relieved of what Bordo 
(2003) has called the “unbearable weight of being”. It provides relief and enables some 
agency. Moreover, as each endeavour succeeds, it has a highly productive effect on 
agency. As Scarry (1985, 262) has emphasised, it is “self-amplifying”. 
The intersection of structural relations in each unique individual space makes that space 
not only a site of continuity and consistency with its broader, constituting, social 
relations, but also the site of their potential contradiction. Whilst habits—or modes of 
life—tend to provide stability and consistency on the scale of the social, their 
intersection in each individual self can tend to the opposite effect, making the self the 
site of contradiction. As I have argued, once this interaction of constituent relations is 
contemplated, the potential for those interactions to support some (and interfere with 
other) relations within the self can be allowed for. The spaces opened up by the 
interference—or contradiction—of those relations can then be understood as the spaces 
in which possibilities for change exist. For those reasons, I have suggested that the self 
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is better understood as an ‘intersection’ of relations, rather than Marx’s ‘ensemble’, with 
its connotations of comprehensive coordination. I have also suggested that an even 
better metaphor might be that of a road intersection: at intersections, delays, 
interference, damage and sometimes destruction are experienced; hence ‘intersectual’, 
rather than ‘ensemble’, being emerges as a more effective metaphor.  
That said, the larger social structures and processes of habit, the subject of much of 
Marx’s later work, are also unstable. Rather than endless, inescapable, uninterrupted 
repetition, Marx saw the larger ‘ensemble of relations’ constituted by the capitalist 
system as characterised by a tendency to crisis. The consequences of any such crisis—
the ‘booms’ and ‘busts’ of the capitalist system—would then (and do) reverberate 
through the various participants (to varying degrees), amplifying the ‘fault lines’ upon 
which those intersectual selves stand.  
 
THE PROMISE OF HABIT 
A life of habit, of living within a particular mode of living, of production, is not a rigid or 
static existence. Not only can one not step in the same river twice, as Heraclitus 
maintained, one cannot maintain a habit. Like a spinning top, absent renewal, its 
balance and speed are destined to decay, degrade and change, and, with them, the 
influence they exert upon us. The strength and promise of habit is then, surprisingly, its 
finitude. 
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In the midst of its discipline and restraint, a habit is also an opening up. For habit to 
exert its influence, its objects must be open to the ‘external’, and so capable of profound 
change. This makes the experience of repetition not that of absolute fixation or 
limitation, but an arena of transformation, even if the pace of that transformation is as 
slow as a seaside’s erosion. The experience of repetitive labour is, likewise, not a place 
of comprehensive alienation, lifelessness or resignation. In the midst of oppression, the 
tinder and spark of creativity and resistance remain. It was this combustible potential 
that Marx comprehended in identifying the transformative potential of alienated labour. 
This potential is the product of the ongoing, unavoidable friction between a worker and 
his or her object. Both Marx and Hegel relied upon that experience of resistance to 
ground the process for a new consciousness, but its promise is not limited to the 
extremity of threat or oppression they relied upon. It is, as Richard Sennett suggests in 
The Craftsman, a product of the condition of homo faber—humanity as a being that 
makes artefacts. That is, it is a potential of interdependent, corporeal being.  
Sennett (2008, 227-8) makes a useful distinction between a boundary and a border. 
The former is intended to exclude; the latter to, selectively, permit exchange. Moreover, 
what appear to be boundaries—distinct, unchangeable separations—are often 
transformed into borders, simply by virtue of the encounter between the differences they 
embody. Sennett (2008, 228) illustrates this by reference to the walls of medieval cities. 
Built to mark the extreme periphery of what was treated as the essence of the city—its 
central buildings and spaces—the medieval city wall became the place where those not 
of the city interacted with those entitled to reside within it. Moreover, this encounter was 
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inevitable: a city was dependent upon those outside it to provide so much of its 
corporeal necessities. Hence, an imagined absolute boundary setting the ‘substance’ of 
the city always tended to be porous and partake in the nature of a border.  
Habit is a means of imposing continuity upon the changeable, and discipline upon the 
free: it is a process of boundary making and keeping. As such, its being—like the 
medieval wall—is comprised of the relation of difference: it draws on both the characters 
of continuity and change, discipline and freedom. 
Building on this distinction, Sennett (2008, 209) suggests that a site of corporeal 
resistance could be understood as a boundary or border. In his view, such a site, like a 
boundary, was a place of contradiction—of the adjacent positioning of two unlike 
domains and, hence, a site of potential transformation (2008, 210). It is not a great leap 
to draw a comparison with corporeal labour: it is the encounter of the ever-adjacent 
domains of the corporeal and non-corporeal. In facing the resistance of an object, and 
our limited ability to shape it to our desires, we dwell in that border zone, or “working 
space” considered by Sennett. It is the same zone in which Hegel has the servant, after 
his initial subordination, dwell. For Sennett (2008, 211), it is this dwelling in contradiction 
and resistance that provides the potential for knowledge of one to affect the other; for 
knowledge of limitation within the corporeal to leak and move through the porous border 
of dualism to affect the way we consider our humanity. 
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However, Sennett (2008, 160-1) argues that this productivity is dependent upon a 
capacity to accept, and dwell patiently in, error—a capacity to accept limitation.55 For 
Sennett, this capacity is a consequence of the positive engagement of the craftsman—
the unalienated character of her or his labour provides the commitment to overcome 
frustration and persevere. However, the obligation to work, even in alienated conditions, 
does not render Sennett’s reflection irrelevant: even for an alienated worker, the 
commitment to persevere towards a resolution remains, notwithstanding it is, in part, 
imposed from without. This issue provides even less difficulty when one accepts that 
alienation is rarely exhaustive, but leaves some, often much, room for positive 
investment in work.56 It is the manner in which this capacity to work with resistance 
develops and succeeds—transforms the boundary into a border—that speaks of 
potential for knowledge of the corporeal to shift domain and undermine the dominance 
of the traditional approach to substance.  
The craft of glassblowing served as Sennett’s illustration. Drawing on the experience of 
Erin O’Connor, he described how, in order to make a more complex wineglass, she had 
to change her awareness of her body in relation to the materials she worked on. 
O’Connor found that she had to experience a “continuity between flesh and glass”, to 
become “absorbed in” it, to “become the thing on which [she was] working” (Sennett, 
2008, 173, 174). She had to lose awareness of her body as separate to the glass and 
“be in the thing”. It was also critical that she did not focus on the material as it then was, 
                                                          
55
 Here, too, one can recognise echoes of the strategies proposed by Epicurus and Lucretius, as 
discussed in chapter two 
56
 In fairness to Sennett, it must be emphasised that he argued that the contemporary work practices of 
separating “head and hand”, that is, design and labour, harmed the “head” (the development of skill). 
Sennett does not go so far as to assert that the separation leaves no room for mental engagement (2008, 
45). 
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but to anticipate what it was becoming—she had to engage in “corporeal anticipation” 
(2008, 174-5). This capacity to become actively absorbed in the changing material was, 
moreover, dependent upon repetition.  
Repetition enabled a transformation, a boundary crossing-conversion. Sennett’s 
argument (2008, 175) reveals that repetition, far from being the punishment of 
Sisyphus, can be more than an instrumental good: 
We might think, as did Adam Smith describing industrial labour, of routine as 
mindless, that a person doing something over and over goes missing mentally; 
we might equate routine and boredom. For people who develop sophisticated 
hand skills, it’s nothing like this. Doing something over and over is stimulating 
when organised as looking ahead [in the sense of corporeal anticipation]. The 
substance of the routine may change, metamorphose, improve, but the emotional 
payoff is one’s experience of doing it again. There’s nothing strange about this 
experience. We all know it; it is rhythm. 
Rhythm has a beauty of its own, and it is a beauty that is enjoyed and accessed on an 
everyday basis by many people. This is not an exceptional experience, but an everyday 
immersion and prompt. This is the ‘human life’ Lucretius urged us to ‘yield’ to.  
I differ from Sennett in one respect, however. His work suggests the domination of 
matter by thought—the manipulation of the ingredients for a glass into the intended 
form. Implicit in this effort, however, is a recognition of the resistance provided by those 
raw materials. Absent a surrender of the abstract idea of the glass and immersion in the 
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sensation of the material, the glassblower failed to achieve her ends. It was only in her 
yielding to, and being informed by, the resistance of those materials—that is, through a 
form of praxis—that she was able to successfully manipulate them. She had to enter 
into an interdependent relationship. 
 
THE PROMISE IN PLEASURE 
I have argued that the experience of corporeal pain has the potential to prompt a 
different understanding of our substance and selves. In experiencing our absolute 
dependence on others to sustain our selves, extreme pain forces home the 
interdependence of bodies we previously believed were independent of each other. 
Moreover, I have argued that this pain need not be as extreme as suggested by Marx’s 
work, and that the prompts towards that sense of self are far more everyday and 
immanent. I also want to suggest that something of that potential also resides in our 
experiences of corporeal joy and pleasure. Indeed, I want to suggest that those 
experiences may give us a glimpse of the exhilaration that a fully interdependent life, 
and one that values and embraces our corporeality, might provide.  
Much of Sennett’s insight into the corporeal reflects his experience as a musician. His 
work as a philosopher has drawn much from the adjacent presence of those two 
domains within his life. Similar insights come from the life of a person who studies both 
philosophy and dance. The experience of the joy and beauty of dwelling, and working, 
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with resistance, is a common exhilaration for both a musician and dancer57 (and, as 
Howe indicates, for many involved in like activities, including sports). In both music and 
dance, there is the experience of a “physical boundary” (Howe 2003, 100). In both, the 
acquisition of skill involves repeatedly reaching for a particular resonance—the effort to 
bridge that boundary. For a dancer, it is often the capacity to draw a particular line from 
finger to toe, to rotate through one’s hips whilst preserving that line, or trace the perfect 
arc across a floor. Undertaken to become a particular image or ideal, repetition is, 
however, not merely a process of learning or discipline, but, once at a certain level of 
skill, a pleasure in itself. It is the pleasure of immersion and losing the sense of 
separation of mind from body and body from floor (or partner) that Sennett (2008, 173, 
174) described as the “continuity between [one’s own] flesh”, and that of one’s partner 
and the floor. It is that sense of expansion and presence across the extent of the dance 
floor that flows from this corporeal immersion and ceasing to treat that floor as ‘other’. 
Howe (2003, 93), in considering the experience of professional athletes, called this “the 
experience of reaching the self out beyond its apparent boundaries”. It is the pleasure of 
feeling simultaneously deeply ‘in’ one’s body and expanding well beyond it. It is an 
experience of limitation and repetition that is equally one of expansion and escape. 
Martha Graham, in her film A Dancer’s World, spoke of this promise—and the beauty—
of working with corporeal limitation and resistance as a freedom achieved through 
rhythm, repetition or discipline: 
                                                          
57
 The consideration of dancers’ experiences seems even more appropriate when the parallels within 
Greek ontology are drawn. Stone points out the manner in which they equated form and rhythm, with the 
former passing and decaying, and that Plato expressly used dancing as an illustration of their relationship 
(2006, 100-1). 
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It is here in the studio that the dancer learns his craft...The dancer is realistic. His 
craft teaches him to be. Either the foot is pointed or it is not. No amount of 
dreaming will point it for you. This requires discipline. Not drill, not something 
imposed from without. But discipline imposed by you on you yourself. Your goal 
is freedom, but freedom may only be achieved through discipline. In the studio 
you learn to conform, to submit yourself to the demands of your craft so that you 
may finally be free (cited in Morris 1996, 35). 
It is an experience that suggests a different description to Sennett’s ‘stimulation’, 
although equally positive. Howe (2003, 99) points out that the goal is not a crude 
discipline or domination, with its emphasis on separation. Rather:  
The goal...is not victory over one’s body at all...It is unity: the regaining, for those 
brief moments for which it lasts, of perfect immediacy between body and mind. 
The point...is to limit, and even to close, the distance between self and 
body...[and to enjoy] that absolute freeing sense of ontological unity that can only 
occur when mind and body are wholly in sync with each other, when intention is 
translated into effect seemingly without effort or intervening formulation of means 
or method...moments of ontological synchronization. 
This sensation of being ‘in’ one’s body, and of the expanse of being it invites, can be 
understood as another experience of the “opening” described by Heidegger (1996). This 
is the opening of the clearing Heidegger spoke of, prompted by the experience of the 
dysfunctional tool. Here, the body is an instrument that resists and creates the 
opportunity to better perceive that tool, an opportunity for a better sense of Da-sein, for 
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a more human language. Whether a craftsman working with wood, clay or glass, a 
musician working with, and against, the resistance of her fingers, or the dancer seeking 
a particular movement of his leg, in each case the corporeal prompts the opening of a 
different world in the same way as an ill-suited tool. 
This is not to say that replacing the independent, non-corporeal sense of self is within 
as easy a reach as Heidegger’s hammer. It is to say that the prompt—the catalyst—
provided by the corporeal is. It is to say that it is as commonplace as our daily corporeal 
activity and that we need not look for it solely in those places dominated by pain or 
oppression. It is to say that some shapes and forms and suggestions of the full beauty 
of our humanity, and the tender, expressive, fragility of our interdependence, is also 
expressed in other relations that comprise us. It extends to the pleasure of the 
craftsman, lost in concentration on his task. It includes the discipline of the dancer, 
immersed in the perfection of a movement. It is as everyday and familiar to us as the 
pleasure of our stride. It is, as Sennett, pointed out, the pleasure we find in rhythm. It is 
the process, the rhythm, by which we stabilise and unify our selves. 
 
A MULTIPLICITY OF RHYTHMS  
I look to build upon Marx’s insights into the implications of our corporeality: in particular, 
Marx’s realisation of the unavoidable, pervasive and profound influence of the mode of 
production as the mode or rhythm by which we stabilise our being. That mode of 
production sounds a rhythm that permeates an entire society. Its influence, however, 
still allows for the co-existence of other modes of being, other forms of engagement 
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between our organic and inorganic bodies. It allows for the recognition that different 
human capacities and characteristics may be created and maintained in a different 
mode, thus stabilising a particular society. In fact, the greater the success of a particular 
society’s stabilisation of its inorganic body, the greater that capacity for diversity will be. 
Lukacs (1978, 96-7) also saw this as following from the increasing power and 
complexity of capitalist system. In his view: 
It is…not difficult to see that, the more developed a society is, the broader and 
more ramified are the mediations that link the teleological project of labour with 
its actual accomplishment, and the role of chance must correspondingly 
increase. The chance relationship between natural material and its socially 
determined working-up often fades, and even seems to disappear in very far-
reaching mediations…yet the element of chance still increases in the individual 
alternatives; and this is all the more so, the more ramified these become, the 
more removed they are from labour itself, and the more their content is oriented 
to inducing men to a further mediation by way of a mediating act.58 
I have used the image of rhythm to convey the pervasive influence of a mode of 
production. Within Marx’s ‘sphere of freedom’—and in lesser spheres of freedom, in 
those less alienated aspects of other societies—that metaphor allows the imagination of 
a less urgent, slower paced rhythm, resembling the drawn out swings of a great 
pendulum. Once established, its momentum—its habit—demands less discipline, and 
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 This experience of ‘fading’ following from the distance between volatile nature and lived experience in 
capitalism might explain the emphasis on the autonomy of different ‘levels’ or spheres of activity that 
appears in Althusser and Balibar’s (1997) work. 
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allows a longer interval of time between its soundings. It provides the space for other 
rhythms, other sounds, other modes of being, much like the manner in which two 
separate recordings of music are often mixed or ‘mashed up’ so as to make one piece 
of different rhythms and melodies. It provides the space for a more complex ‘ensemble’.  
It provides a frame within which to understand the experience of gender, race, or 
disability, for example, as each involving particular forms of access to inorganic 
nature—forms that, in some instances, have a far greater influence upon a particular 
individual or group than that characterising the society in which they live. Here, 
corporeality continues to found the human condition, including the interdependence of 
our organic and inorganic bodies, yet allows room for different modes of the two 
relating, depending on the different ways in which different peoples, with different life 
experiences, have learned to make sense of their selves.  
It allows for the recognition of the existence of different sensations of the self—and 
different ways of then making sense of one’s self—and, with those, a range of other 
contradictions to that sense of self based on separation, independence and self-
reliance. It enables an appreciation that, for many, that mode of being most influencing 
their life—such as traditional ideas of femininity and the resulting obstacles confronting 
women in paid employment—involves a very different experience of being, of making 
sense of their selves, and a substantial experience of prompts towards a different sense 
of self than that founded in alienated labour as imagined by Marx.  
This reading of Marx’s legacy may suggest a postmodern or poststructural approach. 
However, it is, in part, intended as a corrective to the manner in which too many within 
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that school of thought have neglected the centrality of the corporeal. Judith Butler’s 
Gender Trouble exemplifies this difficulty, with her emphasis upon performativity and 
treatment of the body as the passive and completely plastic means for the staging of 
those performances.59 Whilst much attention has been given to embodiment and its 
variations in postmodern literature, too often, as noted in the introduction to this thesis, 
the effect of postmodern thought has been to treat the body as so plastic as to 
effectively erase it. As Fracchia (2005, 57) emphasised in his review of the literature, 
they have “[tended] to dissolve the materiality of the body”. In some senses, Bauman’s 
postmodern nomad (1993, 240) exemplifies this neglect: 
Pulled forward by hope untested, pushed from behind by hope frustrated…The 
vagabond is a pilgrim without destination; a nomad without an itinerary. The 
vagabond journeys through an unstructured space; like a wanderer in the desert, 
who knows only of such trails as are marked with his own footprints, and blown 
off again by the wind the moment he passes, the vagabond structures the site he 
happens to occupy at the moment, only to dismantle the structure again as he 
leaves. 
The nomad only appears to engage with the paths he makes himself without reference 
to the world, despite the power of the metaphor critically being dependent upon the 
radical alterity and resistance of the desert. His image ignores the dramatic influence of 
the desert itself on the nomad’s choices. This is the attraction of a corporeal or 
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 Although, it appears that Butler’s more recent works (Bodies That Matter, 1993) have responded to this 
critique and recognised the influence of the corporeal through the use of Aristotelian concepts (Stone 
2006, 61-4). 
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materialist dialectic, much of which is now being revisited and revived by post-humanist 
writers: it does not forget from whence we come, and the means by which we become. 
It does not neglect the essence of our being.  
As such, an open dialectic—‘a more human language’—depends upon a consideration 
of those various eddies and variations within any society. It demands a consideration of 
how we have come to live and move and be as a woman and a man, as people of 
different ages, races, sexualities, and abilities, and the manner in which those particular 
rhythms interact with those of the principal mode of production. These experiences—all 
too often shaped by oppressive relationships—involve different sensations of, and 
different senses made of, our corporeality. They each involve different prompts towards 
a different sense of self. Many reflect a less than humane experience, and yet suggest 
some aspect of ‘a more human language’, a sense of self that is profoundly involved 
with, and dependent upon, others, often because, like Hegel’s slave, the very terms of 
oppression deny them the ability to evade the essential openness and vulnerability of 
our being. There is potential in, as Foucault has expressed it, an “insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges” of the body (cited in Pease 2002, 135, 141). 
 
A MORE HUMAN LANGUAGE 
The discovery of a more human language, and a more human way of life, demands that 
we engage with the fundamental task described by Epicurus, Lucretius, Feuerbach and 
Marx. It challenges us to explore a human-centred, rather than a religious, view of the 
world. It demands the end of thoughts of escape from finitude and, with that, a much 
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more humble, less certain approach to the world, to ourselves, and to others. In 
Feuerbach’s words, it demands an abandonment of abstract ideas of reason in favour of 
“reason saturated with the blood of man” (1986, 67). It demands, and depends upon, a 
confrontation with our corporeality.  
Our corporeality has the potential to be our great leveller, reminding us of our common 
limitations and anxieties, and yet give expression to the hope Sennett alluded to in 
Flesh and Stone (1994, 370, 375, 376): 
For people…to care about one another…we have to change the understanding 
we have of our own bodies. We will never experience the difference of others 
until we acknowledge the bodily insufficiencies in ourselves. Civic compassion 
issues from that physical awareness of a lack in ourselves, not from sheer 
goodwill or political rectitude…If there is a place for faith in mobilising the powers 
of civilisation against those of domination, it lies exactly in accepting what [the] 
solitude [or separation and passivity of the body] seeks to avoid: pain…lived pain 
witnesses the body moving beyond the power of society to define; the meanings 
of pain are always incomplete in the world. The acceptance of pain lies within a 
realm outside the order human beings make in the world…Such pain has a 
trajectory in human experience. It disorients and makes incomplete the self, 
defeats the desire for coherence; the body accepting pain is ready to become a 
civic body, sensible to the pain of another person, pains present together on the 
street, at last endurable.  
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I have argued that this potential, in the form of repeated ‘prompts’ by the corporeal, is 
an everyday experience and not limited to the extremities imagined by Marx. However, 
absent those extreme conditions, this sensibility or consciousness needs more to 
realise its potential. To contemplate its realisation, the distinction drawn by Margaret 
Archer (2000, 124), as discussed above, remains useful. Archer distinguished the 
common experience, or sensation of corporeality, from the sense or meaning we made 
of it, which can be, and has been, diverse. In a society saturated with the traditional 
language of substance and its application in liberal thought, one is primed to 
pathologise or diminish any experience of dependence or pain that comprises the 
freedom of one’s will. For the potential of the prompts provided by the corporeal to be 
realised, an alternative way to ‘make’ sense of them needs to be available. I have 
argued that Marx’s materialist, ‘ensemble’ conception of our humanity, with its emphasis 
on our interdependence, provides that better sense.  
In the absence of extremity where lived experience would overwhelm our ideas of 
independence and force some recognition of our interdependence, that ‘more human 
language’ needs to be promoted and publicised, whether by a specific party or by a 
combination of actors, such as the Fabian Society of the nineteenth century or the Mont 
Pelerin Society of the twentieth century, as documented by McKenzie (1997) and 
Cockett (1994). The Fabian Society, over a period of thirty years, succeeded in 
promoting the adoption of a more socialist perspective through its strategic commitment 
to “permeate, postulate and perorate” (McKenzie 1997, 162). Similarly, the Mont Pelerin 
Society, by virtue of its and its allies’ efforts over approximately forty years, made a 
substantial contribution to the revival of neo-liberal ideas in the 1970s and 1980s. Both 
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societies sought the adoption of a new language. Both recognised the current 
hegemony of an opposing view and worked to achieve their objective over the longer 
term. Their work saw them engage a wide range of leaders and educators, publish their 
ideas and illustrations of their operation in both popular, affordable media and in formal 
academic and government arenas, and maintain their commitment over decades of 
derision and resistance. Over the longer term, however, their efforts made their 
alternative perspectives widely accepted and, in the face of new policy challenges, 
embraced.  
The experience described by Sennett is the common, everyday experience of pain and 
contradiction that grounds our sense of our selves as separate. That same experience, 
encountered with a different means to make sense of it, has the potential to promote a 
sense of limitation and interdependence: an expansion of that sense we have of our 
selves to include others, to that sense Marx understood as species consciousness, that 
Hegel described as understanding we owe our existence to others, and as Bakhtin 
(1993, 40, 80, 95) imagined, we would assert no “alibi in being”. 
The shared experience of our corporeality might provide the best reminder of our 
humanity, rather than distracting from it, as so many have insisted. Sennett (2008, 292, 
296) drew inspiration from the Greek god Hephaestus, who, like humanity, was the 
builder of great artefacts—a transformer of the natural world—yet one, because of his 
physical limitation, who was not accorded full dignity. The shared embrace of our 
corporeality, with all its pains and joys, has the potential to reveal, like Hephaestus, with 
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his imperfect, painful clubfoot, that accepting our limitations may make us “the most 
dignified person we can become”.  
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